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ABSTRACT 
The British colony of the Gambia was founded in lB16 by a 
military detachment and a community of British merchants with their 
dependents transferred from Senegal.. Their purpose was to check 
illegitimate trade by slavers,and to promote legitimate trade. 
But part1c1pation, in the river:.'trade - in wax, gold and ivory-
was fraught with d1fficulties, among them rivalry from French traders 
operating from Albreda',and constant obstruction along trade routes 'lin 
the interior. Nor was commercial activity facilitated by the 
development of the groundnut. Indeed, dependence on a single cash 
crop created an unstable economy; for which reason the Brit1sh 
colcny 
Government planned to cedethe~ to France. 
Until 1888 the colo~ was governed, intermittently, from Sierra 
Leone; and the resulting delay in the execution of laws and the 
administration of justice caused serious hardship. 
Wesleyan missionaries had arrived im the colo~ soon after its 
foundation and embarked upon evangelisation and educational work there. 
With the influx of Liberated Africans from Freetown, missionaries 
became agenCies for their rehabilitation. To the work of Wesleyans 
was joined that of Roman Catholics and Anglicans in the latter half of 
the nineteenth centur,y. With the consolidation of Islam in the river 
states by reform movements of the mid-nineteenth century, missionar.r 
labour, especially in the field of education, was seriously retarded. 
This investigation into the history of the Gambia has had as 
its subject matter the development of communities in the colony, their 
relations with each other and with the colonial Government which, 
after 1842, consisted of a Governor, an Executive Council and a 
Legislative Council with unofficial representation. The stu~ centres 
on articulate groups and individuals in the colony, in an attempt to 
analyse public opinion in the period. 
1901 1s our closing date, for with it came the declaration of a 
d British protectorate over~the river states. 
PREFACE 
This is a historical stuqy of communities i~ the Gambia i~the 
nineteenth century, with particular reference to their relations with 
British authority in that settlement. 
Apart from the monumental work done by J.M.Gr~ i~~949, studies 
o~ the Gambia have been of a highly specialised nature, spotlighting 
a tribe like the Wolofs,o~ an aspect of diplomatic history, such as 
the recent stu~ of Anglo-French relations in the Gambia imthe mid-
nineteenth century by Prmfessor J.D.Hargreaves. Whatever the stuqy, 
the Gambia has generally featured as only an item within a wider 
field of investigation. While explorers and traders from the 
seventeenth century onwards did give some attention to the area,- their 
writings were limited to descriptive presentations of the river states 
and their peoples. 
It was, therefore, my original intention to investigate i~ 
detail a period of Gambian histor.y from the point of view of the 
inhabitants of the country. The topic selected for such a stu~ 
was the Legislative Council of the Gambia, my aim at that time being 
to consider the growth of nationalism among urbanised Africans through 
the role played by their representatives in the legislature. But once 
I had embarked upon research, I soon discovered that it was 
impossible to pursue this investigation i~ the absence of verbattm 
reports of the Gambia Legislative Council. Further, I did not 
particularly wish to limit myself to a constitutional stu~ modelled 
on the work done by Martin Wight and others on Legislative Councils 
in other British colonies~ Rather, I was concerned to know more 
about the societies which had produced articulate men for the 
legislature. 
It was therefore easy to shift the emphasis from opinion 
expressed by unofficials in Legislative Council to public opinion 
expressed by individuals or groups within a wider context. Inevitably, 
this led me to examine the communities which produced the leaders, 
in particular Liberated African leaders, who expressed opinion on 
major issues which affected the Gambia in the nineteenth century. 
What, then, were these issues? 
It was necessary to be selective here, but it was not pOSSible 
to avoid those issues already treated in GraY's" History of the 
Gambia It, especially as a reinterpretation of the African point of 
view waS required. Although I found this book a very useful standard 
history to which I constantly referred, as my research into original 
sources progressed it became clearer to me that Gr~ had set himself 
to write the histor,y of British traders and administrators in the 
Gambia, to the neglect of the African inhabitants themselves. In his 
work, African opinion, was interesting but usually incidental. 
The problems of administration dealt with by Gr~ could not be 
omitted in this thesis, but this aspect is used chiefly to provide a 
framework in which public opinion can be considered in relatioruto 
British policy. In this investigation, the Government is 
synonymous with the military Commandant, the Governor and Council, 
the Governor and faction inter alia - depending upon the period of 
time under consideration,- with the authoritative presence of the 
Secretary of State or of some Colonial Office official continually 
felt. 
It is my hope that I have succeeded in. my attempt to show that 
Africans were living fully and participating in the making of their 
own historyJ that urbanised Africans, at least, were not unaware of' 
the major issues of their d~. In short, that the Liberated Airicaru 
community of Bathurst became a most articulate, and therefore qynamic, 
element in this nineteenth century society. 
I wish to record my deep appreciatio~of the encouragement and 
assistance I have received from my two supervisors, Professor John 
Fage who supervised my research for two years and showed great 
interest in the subject matter, and Professor Roland Oliver who gave 
me valuable advice during the actual writing of the thesis. 
My thanks are also due to Professor Hargreaves who allowed me t~ 
see in manuscript Chapter IV of his recently published book " Prelude 
to the partition of West Africa "; to Monsieur Maurel of the Archives 
Department, Dakar, Senegal, who kindly microfilmed for my use Frencn 
documents relevant to the history of the Gambia; to the Principal of 
the Sierra Leone Grammar School for sending me early historical 
records of the school; to his EEcelleney, Sir Edward Windley, who put 
at my disposal all historical documents avallable at Government House 
and at the Secretariat, Bathurst, Gambia; to Mr Naylor, Chairman of 
the Methodist Mission in the Gambia, for allowing me to stu~ the 
documents of the Mission; to Mr Henry Jones of Bathurst, who provided 
me with valuable oral material on Gambian merchants; and last, but not 
least, to the Keeper of the Public Record Office and the Librarians of 
the Royal Commonwealth Society, Colindale Library, the Methodist 
Missionary Society and United Africa House for their kindness and 
consideration •. 
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CHAPTER I 
BAClIDROUND TO THE SETTL'EMENT OF THE RIVER GAMBIA 
In 1738, Francis Moore wrote in the preface to his "Travels into the 
Inland parts of Africa" that his aim was to describe the Gambia - "a country, 
much talked ot, and. little known". A succession of European traders and 
travellers had been attracted to the banks ot that river since Alvise da 
Cadamosto, a Portuguese explorer, sailed into the lower river in 1455. 
But the thin red line on the map of West Africa was no better known in 1911 
when l-lary Gaunt was writing for The Horning Post: "A great and. mighty river 
one of the great waterways of the world though the world barely knows of its 
existence; this is the Gambia ••• Think what the possession of a. waterway 
like this should mean to a maritime nation, think what a. Naboth's vineyard 
... 
it must be to the French whose boundary is but six miles away on either bank." 
The noble and. ma.jestic river had captured the imagination of yet another 
tra.veller. 
Rising a short distance from the town of La.be, in what is now the 
Republic ot Guinea, the river Gambia tlows in a north-westerly direction 
through Tenda, and meanders considerably in a. westerly course towards the 
Barracunda. Falls, where ledges of laterite rock form a barrier which impedes 
navigation. From the Falls, the river becomes tidal, and is navigable by 
steam vessels, those of fifteen hundred tons burden rea.ching l-tcCarthy Island 
1\ 
(at a distance of one hundred and seventy-six miles from the estuary) where 
the river is a mile wide. In its lower course, a succession of islands with 
romantic names - Baboon island, Deer island, Elephant island, Dog island -
makes an interesting feature. None of these islands is habitable except qy 
fauna; being formed of silt and sand brought down from the upper river, they 
are mostly water-logged when the river is in flood in the ra~ season. 
Continuing its serpentine course, and intersected by creeks and rivulets, III8.llY of 
which are navigable by local craft, the Gambia river finally enters the 
Atlantic Ocean at latitude 130 30' north of the Equator, on the great bulge 
of West Africa. The estuar,y is twelve miles wide, extending from Jinnack 
creek on the north bank to Cape st. }~ on the opposite shore. Here the 
largest island of all, st. }mry's island, nestles in the curve of the barut, 
end with a number of sandbanks forms a small delta. 
The river valley is low-lying , its lower banks abounding in mangrove 
swamps, behind which lie fertile alluvial lands for rice cultivation. It is 
only in the upper river that the country is undulating with low bush and 
parkland, where the sandy soil is suitable for millet and grotmdnut 
CUltivation. Here, ironstone cliffs receding from the banks, rise from 
twenty to thirty feet above water level in the dry season. In former days 
when the countr,yside was thickly wooded and less cultivated, herds of 
elephant and buffalo roamed the land. Dog-faced baboons still inhabit some 
of the islands and destroy the crops on the mainland; crocodiles fester the 
3 1 
river and creeks; while the abundance of fish in the estuary was a great 
attraction to European travellers in Vest Africa in the nineteenth centur,y, 
such as the Bowdiches. 
Owing to its distance from the Equator, the Gambia territor,y enjoys a 
milder climate than the rest of British West Africa. For six months of the 
year, from November to April, a cool, dry, north-east wind from the Sahara 
desert, called the Harmattan, keeps temperatures down to as low as the fifties 
at night. The annual rainy season, on the other hand, lasting from June to 
September or October, brings heavy floods to this low-lying region; with 
oppressive humidity, dec~ng vegetation, and a sudden growth in the insect 
population, the season was as deadly to human existence as in allY other part 
of the Coast, before the discovery of malaria or of anti-malarial drugs. 
The Gambia region has no geographical boundaries, and is best regarded as 
a distribution of small kingdoms huddled on a river which binds them to each 
other and exposes them to influences from the Atlantic and the Sudan. In 
1806, J.B. Durand, a former Governor of St. Louis, reported that he had found 
eight kingdoms on each bank of the river, all of them small, "nearly alike", 
and. governed by tla multitude of petty princes, who all take the title of 
ki "I ng •••• And as there was no overlord to whom allowed allegiance, most 
1. J.B. Durand, itA Voyage to Senegal l ', (London, 1806, in translation), 
pp. 37 Be 38. 
of the states were constantly engaged in bitter rivalry with each other in 
order to assert their independence. The powerful states in the river were 
not really Barra and. Foigny, as Durand believed, but the interior kingdoms of 
Vuli (the most easterly state on the north bank), Cantora (situated opposite 
on the south bank), and Saloum in the middle river. Richard Jobson, an 
English traveller in the seventeenth century, had observed that all kings in 
the river paid tribute to the kings of these three states. l But by the 
nineteenth century, by virtue of living aW8JT from their overlords, malliY towns 
had become nominal tributaries, "exclusively governed by their own chiefs.,,2 
The pattern of political organization was the same in the majority of the 
states - a hierarchy of kings, chiefs, alcades and elders constituted the 
government in Barra, Yuli, and all other Handinka states. Kings were 
generally revered ~ their subjects from whom th~ received tribute or 
customs, but none could rule without consultation with the elders of the 
people. In fact, stable government did not so much depend on the 
administrative ability of kings, as on the industry and wisdom of the aIcades. 
They were the officials who distributed land, administered justice in minor 
cases, collected the king's customs, and in general, kept the machinery ot 
the state going. 
"If a person wants anything to be done by a good number of people," 
advised Francis Moore of the Royal African Company, "the best wa:y is to apply 
1. 
2. 
Richard Jobson, Extracts from "The Golden Trade" in ttP4r Vest .African 
Explorers", edited by C.Howard 8: J.Plumb, (O.U.P. 1951) p.33. 
Na.jor W. Gray and Surgeon Dochard, "Travels in Western Africa", 
(London, 1825) p.75. 
to the Alcade, who will agree with you about it, and order people to make 
dispatch with it; but if a factor does not take care to keep in with the 
1 Alcade, he will seldom or never get things done as they ought to be." That 
was ~ all factories in the River were put under his immediate protection. 
Indeed, a senior alcade (the office of alcade was hereditar,y), was an officer 
of actual and potential authority, who might one day become king when it was 
the turn of his town to provide a candidate. The danger to all, however, was 
that a system of rotatory succession lent itself to intrigue and keen rivalry 
between collaterals. 
Within contiguous states at~airly uniform political systems, was found 
a state like Barsally, later known as Saloum, with distinctive features from 
the bloc in which it formed a wedge on the north banlt. Saloum was a 'volof 
state and therefore more alan to the coastal kingdoms in the Senegal than to 
those in the Gambia. Unlike l-fandinka. kings, its ruler was "so absolute, that 
he will not allow aqy of his people to advise with him, unless it be his 
Headman (and chief Slave) called Ferbro, viz. (}~ter of the Horse) •••• " 
While Hoore was trading in the Gambia, the king of Barra was "tributary to 
him of Bar s ally • ,,2 
Fogni, too, on the south baOk, was more closely related to the tribes 
further to the south, out of which it projected into the Gambia, than to the 
riverain states which flanked it. All accounts agreed that it was a 
decentralized and fragmentar,y "empire" of isolated villages under village 
1. Francis Moore, "Tra.vels into the inland parts of Africalt , (London, 1738) 
pp. 127 and 128. 
2. Hoore, "Tra.vels", p.87. 
heads, who were independent of e~ch other, but who would always unite against 
a common eneIl'\Y, like the Nandinkas who long attempted to subdue them. 1 And 
though the "emperor" received tribute from his subjects and their neighbours, 
he would seem to have been assigned the role of representative of his people, 
and regarded less as a political force. It was with him European traders 
negotiated. Sheltered behind Vintang creek, the Gambia's main tribut~, 
Fogni was isolated from the rest of the Gambia, and yet accessible to it. 
Though geographically outside our area, politically and economically, 
the confederacy of Fulbe theocracies which was stretched like a bow above the 
upper Gambia, was an integral part of it. Futa Toro on the south bank of the 
lower Senegal, Bondou to the north-east of Wuli, and Puta Jallon to its south-
~ east formed this arc of highly centralised states. Each ruler bore the title 
of Alroamy as a religious and political authority; and under Bondou leadership, 
exerted considerable pressure on all neighbouring states. Nungo Park observed 
that Bondou differed from the riverain governments because its inhabitants 
"are more immediately under the influence of the l-Iohammedan laws; for all 
the chief men ••• and a large majority of the inhabitants of Bondou are 
};!ussulmen •••• "2 Durand said the Alm8ll\Y was revered for his sanctity and 
valour, and "had the absolute confidence of his own subjects, as well as of 
the neighbouring states, in so much that people come from all parts to buy his 
, , d t ki h' f t ,,3 gr1s-gr1s an 0 ss 1S ee. 
1. Noore, "Travels", p.36. 
2. }hmgo Park, Extracts froe "Travels in the Interior ••• " in "Great West 
African Explorers", p.95. 
3. Durand, "Voyage", p.126. 
Futa Toro presented a similar political organization, but there the 
people themselves possessed "considerable influence." The chiefs of the 
country, according to Hollien's account, created an Alm~ whom they selected 
from the ~fuslim community in order to give their decrees greater weight with 
the people; and the AlIll8.h'U could not take any step without consulting his 
council. Besides, he could be deposed ~ those who had set him up.l This 
was substantiated in a despatch of 1812 from Lt.-Governor Charles MacCartqy 
to the Secretary of State in which he reported that Aldondow, Prince of Futa 
Toro, had dismissed Almamy Baboucar; while a later despatch contained the 
information of his reinstatement ~ the same authority. 2 
Nor must the kingdom of Barnbara on the Niger be omitted from this brief 
7 
survey of political systems in the Western Sudan, for it was from that kingdom 
that all trade routes radiated to the Sene-Gambia region. Jenne, for example, 
was a populous and flourishing centre - "a concourse for all Strangers from 
all parts of the Soudan •••• " Segu, the capital of Bambara, consisted of 
four distinct towns which were densely populated. It was a cosmopolitan state, 
which was nevertheless unified under an autocratic ruler. Prom the countries 
to the east of Barnbara carne merchants who "speak a different 1a.ngua.ge from 
that of .Barnbara or aJl'f other kingdom with which they [the Bambaras] are 
acquainted. ,,3 So that here was in fact the frontier for the tribes of the 
Gambia, the furthest state to the east in which they could teel at home, arnong 
1. G.T.Hollien, "Travels in the Interior of Africa.", (London, 1820) p.160. 
2. P.R.O., c.o. 267/36, 1812, 21st November, C.~~cCarthy to Secretary of 
state. 
3. Park, in "West African Explorers", p.l28. 
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tribes the,y could understand and trade with. 
The Gambia was a heterogeneous collection of tribes dominated ~ the 
Mandinkas, who had. entered the river valley from the Sudan kingdoms of the 
medieval age. They had formed settlements all along the river banks till they 
reached the coast, where they established the kingdom of Barra. Durand 
described it as being "almost entirely peopled ~ strangers, as the natives 
of the country are there only few in number." The inhabitants, he said, were 
called "Ha.ndingoes ••• from the name of their native country l-fandin ••• which 
is situated four hundred leagues to the east and is prodigiously peopled, as 
I is evident from the vast number of slaves which it furnishes every year." 
It was the hegemony of the Nali empire over a vast area for more than 
two centuries (1238-1468), which had facilitated the expansion of peoples. 
In the fifteenth century, Cadamosto reported that the Ha.ndinka. of the Gambia 
regarded the emperor of l-mli as their overlord, and Diego Gomez, too, vas told 
by Wolofs there that the bur, or ruler, of Hali controlled all the interiorj 
but J.S. Trimingham holds that this probably meant no more than that the 
hegemony of that empire had reached the lower Gambia. Wi th the expansion of 
its peoples, ~la.nde Jula (nyula) trading colonies were established, and the 
movements of agriculturalists were considerable.2 This resulted in a 
1. Durand, ''Voyage", p. )8. 
2. J.S.Trimingham, HA History of Islam in West Africa", (O.U.P., 1962) p.S3. 
juxtaposition ot villages ot ditterent elements who had learnt to live side 
by side, as in the Gambia where Mandinka, Serahuli and Fula villages are 
tound adjacent to each other - the tirst two being agricultural communities, 
and the third stock-rearing, as well as having agriculture. Handing had 
absorbed diverse elements and moulded them into one culture. And in the 
Gambia, Handinka became the lingua tranca, so that it a trader could speak 
that language, he could travel trom the river's mouth up to "the COlmtry of 
Jonooes '.1 (alias merchants;) ••• which COlmtry ••• cannot by all reports be 
less than six weeks journey trom James Fort. ,,2 
Apart trom Handinkas, the Wo10ts were a dominant tribe on the north bank. 
ot the river, but their origin is uncertain, and their history belongs more 
to the Senegal than the Gambia. This tribe inhabited five states - Kayor, 
Baal, Walo, Sine, Jolof - on the Senegal river, and Saloum on the Gambia 
river. All of them had formerly owed allegiance to the ruler ot Jolot, but 
10 
trom the sixteenth century onwards, one Wolot ruler atter another had rejected 
the suzerainty ot Jolot, whose "prosperity and strength began to decline, while 
the power and wealth ot Kayor and Baol increased.,,3 Thus, Saloum, too, 
secured its independence and spread its influence southwards to the banks ot 
the Gambia. The juxtaposition ot Wolot states in the Senegal to the l-roorish 
states ot the Sahara had iniluenced their culture in IIl8.IlY Wl\Ys. They were 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Country ot Joncoes: Noore explained that the name derived trom the exten-
sive commerce in slaves there (probably Bambara). 
}loore, "Travels", p.39. 
D.P.Gamb1e, "The Vo10f of Senegambia", (London, 1957) pp.17-19. 
H 
excellent horsemen and ve~ brave fighters; and from the fifteenth centur,y, 
Islam had reached them through the MOors. 
Numerically, the Jolas of Fogni were an important tribe in the Gambia, 
but their political system was such that they virtually failed to be influenced 
by other cultures or to spread their own, being content to preserve their 
customs, and avoid cultural contact with other tribes. It was partly for 
this reason that the,y were generally described qy European travellers as a 
people living in a state of sa.vagery, and ready to attack other negroes who 
passed through their count~. Francis Moore called them "wild" pagans who 
worshipped idols. l 
In the Gambia, the Fulas were of no political importance till the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. Living in small communities, generally 
adjacent to the king's town in a l-1andinka state by which they sought protection, 
the,y were content with stock-rearing and farming. Indeed, their Handinka 
neighbours employed them as herdsmen. 2 Serahulis were likewise only 
important for the economic development of the riverain states. The,y swa.yed 
no political power; but their participation in long distance trade was a 
characteristic feature of the Gambia trade. 
1. Noore, "Travels", p.36. 
2. Noore, "Travels", pp.32 8: 33. 
'2. 
Among these distinct tribes there vas a common factor in social 
organization - the institution of domestic slave~. The Wolofs, particularly 
conscious of pedigree, divided their society into freeborn (jrunbur or gor), 
and slaves (jam). So elaborate and rigid was social stratification that 
the freeborn were organised. hierarchically, with royal lineages at the top 
and peasants, sradths, leatherworkers and gewels (griots) on the lowest rungs 
of the ladder. l If society was not so rigidly divided in other communities, 
all of them followed a similar pattern of slavery. 
Generally, domestic slaves were an integral part of the family to which 
they belonged, and could not be sold except as punishment for crimes of 
treason, murder, or adulte~. Slaves of a royal household, for example, 
enjoyed greater power than ~ a freeman, and often amassed wealth b,y 
demanding tribute in the name of their masters. Old men of slave-status 
enjoyed particular privileges, some of them were advisers to chiefs, the,y 
published their orders and saw that their commands were carried out. From 
an economic view-point, slaves were valuable property, but they also had a 
prestige value. Durand estimated that in }~dingo society, only one quarter 
of the people was freeborn, and they were related to the ruling class and 
were generally the organisers of trade; three-quarters of the population, he 
believed were domestic slaves whose prim~ task was to till the earth for 
their masters. 2 
1. Gamble, "The Wolof", p.44. 
2. Durand, "Voyage", p.4l. 
The trade in our region was conducted by specialists, Hande-Julas and. 
Serahulis who were called Slatees (or itinerant merchants) by early European 
traders_ Over maQY centuries, the Julas had formed trading communities along 
a vast network of·trade routes. For the convenience of owning domestic 
slaves, who farmed for them in their absence, enabled them to make long 
expeditions in pursuit of merchandise. ~ the fifteenth and. sixteenth 
centuries, hundreds of settlements in Western Guinea were under their control, 
where ma.ny of them adopted the customs as well as wives from the people 8.'llong 
1 
whom they settled. Long distance trade was virtually their monopoly, and 
it was said that it was "love for commerce" which had first brought Hande-
speaking peoples to the very mouth of the Gambia • 
.As a caravan moved from town to town with its train of asses carrying 
merchandise, the Jula would join it with his own consigrunent of slaves laden 
with bundles of cotton cloth, gold, and carrying elephants' teeth (ivory). 
He had to be a man of astute judgment, who, by diplomacy, could reduce the 
amount of customs he was otherwise compelled to pay to all alcades in whose 
towns he stopped to trade. l-hmgo Park thought the duties imposed on Julas 
were very heavy, especially on the return journey of the caravans from the 
2 
coast, when "in almost every town an ass load pays a.£!!: of European 
merchandise_If) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Trimingham, "History of Islam", p.143. 
A bar is "a denomination given to a certain quantity ot goods ot any kind, 
vhicii quantity vas of equal value among the natives to a Bar[r] of Iron, 
when this River was first traded to. Thus ••• two pounds of gunpowder is 
a Bar[r], an ounce of silver is but a Bar[r] ••• " 
Francis Noore, "Travels", p.45. 
Park in "West African Explorers", p.94. 
Caravans of Serahuli merchants suffered most from rapacious alcades. 
Nollien I S party was delayed in Tenda "on account of the arrival of a caravan 
of Serracollets [Serahuli] who were returning loaded with European commodities." 
The alcade tlobliged them, inspite of their remonstrances, to give him several 
pieces of European stuff [cloth], powder, balls, and glass beads. This, in 
fact," the writer observed, "is always the way in which the Serracollets are 
treated; in consequence of their reputed wealth, heavier duties are imposed 
on them than on other traders."l 
.An equally important community engaged in trade along the Gambia river 
and in the overland trade southwards from Vintang creek was the Portuguese 
Nulattoes. They were the descendants of early Portuguese explorers and 
traders, who had. lived in the riverain states and formed attachments with 
Handinka. women. Though they were now very little different from the 
Mandinkas, they continued to spealt a version of the Portuguese language 
"called Creole, and as they christen and marry ~ the help of a priest sent 
yearly over hither from St. Jago ••• they reckon themselves still as well as 
if they were actually white, and nothing angers them more than to call them 
negroes •••• ,,2 These traders gained such prominence in the European era, 
that their "creole" language was "sooner learnt by Englishmen than any other 
language in lthe] River,,;3 it was only next in importance to the lingua. 
franca, and was spoken by all the Interpreters who served European traders. 
1. G.l-Iollien, "Travels in the Interior", p.308. 
2. Hoore, tlTravels", p.29. 
3. Hoore, "Travels", p.39. 
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Salt was the main commodity produced. by the coastal states for inland 
trade before the arrival of European traders. From Joal, traders from Barra 
collected salt which they exchanged in the interior for millet and cotton 
cloths. And though the Wolofs to the north never had a reputation for long-
distance trade, the salt and fish found on their coast formed a lucrative 
trade with the inland states. They also "dominated the trade in horses which 
were obtained from Mauretanians in exchange for slaves, and sold to the 
Ma.ndinkas. ,,1 
In the well-watered areas of the Casamance, the Jeba and the Nunez, salt, 
fish and grain (in this region it was rice and not millet) formed the main 
conunodi ties of trade among African tribes - the Feloups or Jolas, the Biafars 
2 
and the Pepels. All these peoples spoke related languages and traded with 
each other; and though trade among them was not the monopoly of specialists 
as in the Western Sudan, the Jolas did engage in an overland trade between 
Vintang and Cacheo, a journey which lasted three d~s. The Pepels of the 
Nunez were a sea-faring people, and they engaged in a coastal trade in the 
Bissagos Isles and as far as the Cape Verd Islands. 
Yet trade was controlled, not by coastal peoples, but b,y the political 
rulers of interior kingdoms like Bondou. Strategically situated between the 
Gambia. and Senegal rivers, this state had become "a place of grea.t resort, 
1. Gamble, "The Wolof", p.36. 
2. Dietrich Westermann & M.A. Bryan, u:part II Languages of West Africa.", 
(O.U.P., 1952) pp.16, 17. 
I~ 
both for the Slatees, who generally pass through it, in going from the coast 
to the interior countries, and for occasional traders, who frequently come 
hither from the inland. countries to purchase salt ... Through heavy duties 
collected from traders, the Almamy became "well-supplied with arms and. 
ammunition." And once European fact6:ries were established in the two rivers, 
this ruler also derived an income from factors and their trading vessels. 
To this hive of commercial activity had immigrated Serahulis from Kajaaga 
to the north of Bondou. Nungo Park found them carrying on "a considerable 
trade ••• bartering corn and blue cotton cloths for salt, which they again 
barter in Dentila and other towns for iron, shea-butter and small quantities 
of gold dust. They likewise sell a variety of sweet-smelling gums packed in 
1 
small bags •••• " And not even inter-state wars could reduce the Serahuli 
passion for trade. While Bondou was such a commercial centre for such a 
variety of commodities, it was not surprising that the Alm~ otten brought 
pressure to bear on traders as a political weapon against rivals. 
Trade then had its setbacl~ at ever,y stage in this extensive network of 
trade routes; and politics in the interior states invariably affected 
commercial activity in the Gambia and Senegal. Otten political alliances 
between rulers formed a net into which the long-distance trader was caught. 
His movement might be restricted or accelerated from one kingdom to the next 
in prop9rtion as those kingdoms were enemies or allies. Richard Jobson was 
not altogether accurate in his assertion that Islam was a passport tor Jula 
/1 
1. Park in "West African Explorers", p.94. 
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merchants throughout the Western Sudan. Because they professed that religion, 
Jobson said that they had "free recourse through all places, so that howsoever 
the kings and countries are at warres, and up in armes, ••• yet still the Nary-
bucke [Huslim] is a privileged person, and may follow his trade, or course of 
travelling, without let or interruption of either side."l Long-distance trade 
was not so easily protected by political rulers. 
Discoveries on the Vest Coast ~ Portuguese explorers had been followed 
up b,y the establishment of factories and settlements b,y Portuguese traders. 
Geregia on the Vintang creek was both a trading station and a settlement with 
a church in the sixteenth centur,y. But the Portuguese had ver,y soon abandoned 
their stations in the Gambia for those in the Bissagos Isles and Angola. 
There were, however, other European adventurers to succeed them in the Gambia, 
notably the appearance of the Royal African Company whose main purpose in 
entering the river in the seventeenth centur,y was to participate in the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. ~1aking James Island its headquarters, the company also 
had store houses and factories in ports like Fattatenda and Yarbutenda in 
Wuli, to which slave caravans from the interior resorted. It was therefore 
a river that became familiar to a small body of Englishmen, Francis Hoore being 
prominent among the traders of the eighteenth centur,y. And, equally important, 
Julas and Serahulis learnt to transact business with these strange merchants. 
1. Jobson quoted by Trimingham, "History of Islam", p.143, footnote 1. 
With the appearance of European traders in the Gambia estuary, the 
influence of coastal states was immediately enhanced, and their economic 
position strengthened. The king of Barra, for example, imposed customs on 
all vessels and traders which entered his kingdom with merchandise for trade. l 
Indeed, the king now began to assume the ldnd of power hitherto enjoyed by 
interior rulers; for his state was now a flourishing entrepSt where merchants 
from inland countries transacted business with EUropean clients. Durand called 
him "the most powerful and terrible of all the kings of the Gambia.,,2 
Nor was the emperor of Fogni of less importance to the Europeans, since 
both English and French traders had built factories in his capital of Vintang. 
Unlike Barra, he was renowned for fair-pl~ and for the protection he afforded 
all who traded with his people.:3 And mention is never made of customs exacted 
by him. Apart from slaves, the wax of Fogni was in great demand for European 
markets, being very plentiful and cleaner than wbat was available in other parts 
of the river. Indeed it was the custom of Portuguese Hulattoes to buy large 
quantities of this wax, "melt and purify it, form it into cakes and send it to 
Cachaux [Cacheo J where the magazines are established. ,,4 
European commercial activity in the river was facilitated by the existence 
of trade specialists; and to the factors of James Fort, the Portuguese 
}rulatto gave invaluable service. Though not unwilling to negotiate directly 
1. Moore, "Tra.vels", pp.20 &. 45. 
2. Durand, ''Voyage", p.40. 
3. Durand, "Voyage", p.38. 
4. Durand, "Voyage", p.49. 
with the Slatees, it would seem that where the CompaQY found an experienced 
and honest }fulatto, it vas prepared to employ him as agent. One of them was 
kept at the factory of Yanimaru in the upper Gambia for the sale purpose of 
b~ing corn and rice for the use of the fort. Their importance in the trade 
was such, that when Francis Hoore was instructed to break off conunercial 
relations with them, he replied:- "1 am certain it will be a loss to the 
Company, there being as much trade to be made with them as with the l-fundingoes 
•••• ,,1 These instructions were the result of keen rivalry between the Company 
and the Portuguese }fullatoes. One of the most prosperous middlemen in the 
river at that time was one Signor Antonio Voss, who kept a large number of 
domestic slaves to man his canoes which traded to the main river ports to 
collect slaves and tropical commodities brought down ~ the caravans. 
It was not only as shrewd men of business that some members of this 
community excelled, but also as skilled mechanics. In 1130, some of them 
were brought Over from st. Jago to repair James Fort.2 Even their houses in 
the Gambia were more solid and spacious than those of their neighbours, and in 
their gardens they planted fruit and ornamental trees. In Barra, they had . 
influenced indigenous architecture, so that "the king ••• and the greatest 
people of his kingdom have similar places of residence. ,,3 It was tmfortlUlate 
that by the nineteenth cent~, this contracting community had grown decadent. 
Most of its members became poor and idle with the abandonment of James Island 
by the Compaqy, followed by the Abolition of the Slave Trade; and travellers 
1. Hoore, "Travels", p.165. 
2. }loore, "Travels", p.41. 
3. Durand, "Voyage", p.42. 
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said they passed their time "in the most disgusting state of libertinism ,,1 .... 
This then was to be the environment in which the first British colo~ 
in the West Coast of Africa was located in 1763. A British merchant, 
Thomas Cumming by name, recommended the commercial possibilities of the 
Senegal region to the Elder Pitt. Rich in gum, which was a French monopoly, 
the Seven Years' War with France provided, he thought, a good opportunity for 
2 the English to break that monopoly. Thus in 1758, a British expedition 
captured the French forts on the Isle of st. Louis and Goree, successes 
which were described as taking "from the emeny one of the most valuable 
branches of their commerce." For France, as a chief silk-producing nation 
in Europe, was likely to suffer economically with the loss of the gum trade. 
Peace negotiations in Paris in 1763 confirmed British acquisitions in the 
region during the war, and the Province of Sene-Gambia was created by .Act of 
the British Parliament. Its constitution was modelled on that of the 
American colonies, with "like powers and authority ••• as the differences of 
circumstance and situation will admit •••• ,,3 That an elaborate and eA~ensive 
machinery of Crown Colony Government was set up when the Committee of the 
1. 
2. 
Durand, "Voyage", p.42. 
C.O. 267/12, 1756, 26th January, Thomas Cumming to William Pitt. 
Order in Council quoted by E.C.Hartin, liThe British West African 
Settlements 1750-1821", (London, 1927) p.66. 
1..1 
Compa.I\Y of Nerchants trading to Africa was in existence, indicated the value 
placed on the newly acquired territories ~ the British Government and its 
merchants. Granted that the Committee had its African headquarters at too 
great a distance from Sene-Gambia, and that a recent report on its affairs had 
revealed mismanagement and incapacity to defend trading forts along the Gold 
Coast, yet Dr. E.C. ~~tin's explanation for the creation of this distinctive 
province is of importance. She argues that there were significant 
differences between the two regions - Sene-Gambia and the Gold Coast - the 
former presenting an entirely different problem of government. "That 
problem was made up of a complex native question, an extensive inland commerce, 
unlike the sea board traffic of the Gold Coast, and an acute French rivalry, 
compared with which the Anglo-Dutch friction on the Gold Coast was a ver,y 
minor matter."l 
No attempt was made from Goree to establish a military post on the River 
Gambia, whose distance from the headquarters of the province deprived it, too, 
of the benefits of a civil administration. "Sometimes a Captain was sent 
there, and latterly a Lieutenant-Governor, but no civil officers. The 
consequence was the trade, for want of proper regulations dwindled almost to 
nothing. ,,2 This was the report on the Gambia made ~ the Chief Justice of 
the province, twenty years after its creation. British traders, however, 
for all the lack of protection continued to trade in the river, maintaining 
1. ~1artin, "British West African Settlements", p.64. 
20 c.o. 267/7, 1783, 6th Narch, Chief Justice ~lorse to Lord Sidney. 
lz. 
factories in the old trading ports of Vintang, Yanimaru, and others. 
Excursions up the Gambia were sometimes made by the military from Goree for 
the collection of building materials - oyster shells for making lime, and 
timber from the kingdom of Barra, according to an agreement made between the 
king and Governor Charles O'Hara in 1715. 
The disintegration of the province of Senegambia began with the destruction 
of James Fort in 1779, and the capture of Fort st. Louis by French forces in 
the same year. And the peace treaty which terminated hostilities in 1783, 
ceded to France the key forts for the gum trade - Arguin, Portendic, Goree, 
st. Louis, Fodor, Galam; while Britain kept her rights in the Gambia river 
and James Island, and was given liberty to carry on the gum trade in the 
vicinity of Portendick, without permanent settlements. For this privilege 
to trade on the gum coast, Britain was willing to accommodate French traders 
in the Gambia, where they had alre~ established a factory at Albreda in the 
ltingdom of Barra, opposite James Island. l 
Shorn of what had been regarded as the most important and most profitable 
portion of the province, the Crown decided that its remnants no longer qualified 
for the elaborate system of Crown Colony government. Thus the province ceased 
to exist; and. the Gambia was ruled very much as it had been before 1765, as 
"a subordinate administration to that at Cape Coast. ,,2 But the outbreak of 
the Napoleonic W'ars in Europe provided the motive for the recapture of Goree 
1. Martin, "British lfest African Settlements", p.lCO. 
2. Ibid, p.102. 
in 1800, and st. Louis in 1809, by Britain, both of which were then reorganised 
as militar.y posts under officers of the Royal African Corps, with headquarters 
at Sierra Leone. 
Under the protection of the military, British merchants felt secure, and 
their numbers increased, ~ of them b~ing lots of land on the isle of st. 
Louis and on English island in the mouth of the Senegal. Having allied 
themselves to the local ~fulatto wocen of property, called Senoras, women who 
bore them children and ran their households, these merchants engaged in the 
gum trade with the Moors, and began to accumulate property. It was a 
sufficiently lucrative trade to warrant Government patronage in the form of 
8JUlua.l customs in blue bafts, scarlet cloth, amber, coral, pistols for the 
Noorish tribes who held the monopoly as gum producers. Indeed, it was the 
British Lt.-Governor (who was also head of the militar.y) who negotiated with 
the Moors on the merchants' account. 
It was no simple matter to negotiate with these tribes - the Trarzas, the 
DraclOlas and the Narabouts of Armancour - who were distributed over a vast 
area to the north of the Senegal. The Noors were likely to refuse to do 
business with EUropean traders if they were dissatisfied with the quantity of 
the 8JUlual customs; nor would they part with gum for goods other than those 
of a. specialised nature, notably a variety of Indian bafts. Further, the 
English market for gum, while being lucrative, (in 1810 a ton of gum brought 
between £90 and £95, and was "an object in a national point of view·)l, yet 
1. C.O. 267/32, 1809, 15th January, ~~jor ~~ell to Lord Castlereagh. 
it was a limited market. In 1812, for example, a Hr. 'filson, the principal 
British merchant in Senegal, was reported to have "thousands of potmds of gum 
in England without any demand."l The annual export of that commodity from the 
Senegal was estimated at one thousand tons, and that of 1810 was expected to 
"yield to the country nearly £140,000 out of which Government get nearly 10 
2 per cent." 
The gum trade was seasonal, conducted between April and July, before the 
rainy season, and between September and January, after the rains. The Noors, 
3 
who collected two crops of gum, brought them down to the "escales" on the 
river Senegal, where they held open air markets until the rains gave the signal 
for retreat.4 No middlemen were tolerated on their side, though European 
merchants employed Hulatto agents to transact business in the same way as they 
had used the Portuguese Nulatto in the river Gambia to collect slaves and 
tropical commodities for their vessels. After tIle trade in slaves, the gum 
trade was the most lucrative and valuable to European merchants until the mid 
nineteenth century, when the opening of the China Trade dislocated sill~ 
manufacture in Europe. 
1. c.o. 267/36, 1812, 21st November, Lt.-Colonel NacCa.rthy to :J3"~"J;hur~t~h. 
2. C.O. 267/33, 1810, lOth Harch, Naxwell to L'ivsrpoQl". 
3. escale: "a port or place of call, of supply" (Harrap's Standard French 
Dictionary ) 
4. Durand, "Voyage", p.143. 
After the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1807, the British officer in 
command of the garrison in Senegal made it his responsibility to put the Act 
into effect in the area under his jurisdiction. With no military establishment 
in the Gambia, hovever, illicit trade flourished, and vessels sailing under 
Spanish colours vere sure of a cargo, not only from native but also from 
European merchants in that River. It was a trade prejudicial to legitimate 
trade, vhich exposed individual British traders to attack from pirates and 
slavers. Lt.-Governor Charles NacCarthy, therefore, recommended to the 
Secretary of State, that "the immediate establishment of small garrisons in 
1 the Gambia" vas the best ~ to retain command over Goree and Senegal. And 
when it looked as if Britain might have to surrender Senegal to France at the 
end of the NapOleonic Wars, an argument in favour of securing an alternative 
establishment on the gum coast was presented, for it was feared that legitimate 
trade along the river Gambia would not compensate merchants for the total 
loss of gum. 
These hopes never materialized; and though Dritain retained her right to 
trade at Portendic, the treaty of 1814 permitted France to resume all the 
possessions she had held in 1792, including Albreda in the Gambia, and the 
. . 
forts of Goree and st. Louis. J.lacCarthy immediately began to plan the re-
occupation of Fort James, for he was convinced that if this failed to be done, 
nor "Foreign vessels prevented from trading there, the whole of the trade of 
1. C.O. 267/38, 1814, 17th Nay, l1acCarthy to Lord Bathurst. 
that important River will soon be in the hands of the Americans •••• ,,1 So 
thoroughly convincing were his arguments, that the Secretar,y of State gave 
instructions for reoccupation, and the transfer of the British communi~ trom 
the Senegal to the Gambia. Such then was the birth of the British Settlement 
in the Gambia in 1816. 
1. c.o. 267/40, 1815, 12th July, MacCartqy to Bathurst. 
CHAPTER II 
COMMUNITIES IN THE SErTL1!l-fENT OF ST. MARY'S ISLAND AND ITS DEPENDENCIES 
1816 - 1850 
The primary object ot the reoccupation ot James Island. in the River 
Gambia b,y the British in 1816 was to establish a militar,y post tor the 
suppression ot the slave trade. The.Act ot Abolition ot 1807 had not 
prevented British and American vessels sailing under Spanish colours trom 
entering that River to collect large cargoes ot slaves tor the lucrative 
slave markets ot Cuba, Brazil and. the Southern States ot America. l For 
this reason Lord Bathurst, the Secretary ot State tor the colonies, was 
prevailed upon b,y Lieutenant-colonel Charles MacCarthy to approve his 
recommendation tor a British settlement in that River. Strict instructions 
accompanied this approval, MacCarthy being warned not to incur any expense 
"which mq have tor its object a permanent establishment, or to erect any 
buildings beyond what mq be absolutely necessary tor the protection ot the 
2 
small detachment ot troops employed in that River under Colonel Brereton." 
I 
British merchants, however, were to be tree to undertake such ventures as 
they thought might encourage commercial activity with the natives. Indeed, 
it was also MacCarthy's wish that the settlement might "open a market in the 
1. p.a.o., c.o. 267/29, 1810-11, Commission ot Enquir,y into the British 
Vest African Settlements. p.153 tt. by Thomas Ludlam and William Dawes. 
2. C.O. 268/19, 20th July 1816, Lord Bathurst, Secretar,y ot State, to 
Governor Charles }facCar • 
very interior of Africa for British and Indian goods."l Equally enthusiastic 
for the future prosperity were the two officers of the Royal African Corps, 
Lt.-Co1one1 Brereton and Captain Alexander Grant, who effected the re-
occupation of the River Gambia for the British. 
Grant had sailed from Goree in March 1816 to renew a treaty which 
General Charles 0 'Hara, first Governor of the Province of Senegambia, had 
made with the King of Barra in 1775 by which James Island. (25 miles up the 
River) was ceded to the British and foreign vessels forbidden to proceed 
be,yond that point.2 Having agreed to resume p~ent of a yearly stipend to 
the value of 300 bars or eT5, 3 Grant took possession of the Island on the 19th 
of March 1816. With fifty men of the Royal African Corps, twenty four masons 
and carpenters with a fair number of labourers, he set to work inmediate1y 
to repair the derelict fort on the Island with a view to making it safe as 
4 
"an outpost". Por it had none of the strategic advantages of Banjoul 
Island at the entrance of the River, about three miles from the north batik 
and only a few yards from the south. It was an opinion shared by Lieutenant-
Governor Colonel Brereton of Senegal who had followed Grant to the Gambia 
with reinforcement of thirty men. 5 
1. C.O. 267/42, 5th October 1816, Governor Charles MacCarthy to Lord 
Bathurst. 
2. C.O. 267/47, 3rd January 1818, vol. 1. MacCarthy to Bathurst. 
3. c.o. 267/42, 24th Jtm.e 1816, Captain Alexander Grant to MacCarthy. 
4. P.R.O., C.O. 267/42, 24th June 1816, Grant to MacCarthy. 
5. C.O. 267/42, 18th May 1816, Lt. Governor Thomas Brereton to Lord 
Bathurst. 
Banjoul, however, was devoid of habitation, no signs remaining of the 
"few stragling natives"l reported by Major Houghton to have been the only 
inhabitants there in 1783, although the clearing on Baqyon Point with its 
"well of excellent water" and cotton stubble indicated recent occupation.2 
.zCf 
The rest of the Island was thickly wooded with a considerable number of large 
trees, and intersected by numerous creeks. To its owner, the King of Combo, 
it had no value except as a source of fibre for rope-making, until Grant 
approached him for its cession to the British Crown. On the 23rd of April 
1816, formal possession was taken of Banjoul (now renamed st. Mar,y's Island), 
permission having been granted by the king for the erection of buildings and 
fortifications in return for an annual stipend of 113 bars or £25.6.8d. or 
3 100 dollars. Building operations began on Baqyon Point, that being the 
most commanding situation. Large quantities of stone were made available 
by the king of Barra, oyster shells for lime-burning were abundant on the 
Island itself, as were rhuns and other hardwoods for beams and rafters and 
river craft.4 Before the July rains, a barrack for accommodating eighty 
1. C.O. 267/20, 24th February 1783, Daniel F.Houghton to Thomas Townshend. 
"Bunion Island" (st. Nary's) "is plentifully supplied with every necessary 
of life, cotton and indigo grows there spontaneously, and the few 
strag1ing natives who at present reside there, have great plenty of 
rice, corn, cattle and poultry ••• " 
2. C.O. 267/42, l8th}~ 1816, Brereton to Bathurst; 24th June 1816, 
Grant to MacCarthy. 
3. Ibid. 
4. C.O. 267/42, 22nd August 1816, Brereton to Bathurst. 
men was almost completed; and Grant had reported to Governor MacCart~ the 
facilities for trade with "the Combo country (abo1wding in wax, hides and 
fine ivory, the principal articles of commerce in the River) ••• "1 separated 
from st. Hary's only by a creek of about thirty yards in breadth. 
He was confident that the traders from the interior who hitherto carried 
their goods to the depot at Jillifrey, opposite James Island, would now be 
willing to follow the factors to st. Mary 1 s. 2 Many of these men were 
app~ for grants of land in the newly founded settlement in the belief 
that trade would be less insecure where there was a detachment of troops for 
protection than in defenceless river stations. Governor MacCart~ too was 
all in favour of building up the Island which Brereton had described as "the 
key of the River",3 and had in consequence given instructions for the 
withdrawal of the greatest part of the detachment which had been stationed 
on James Island during the rains.4 Indeed he rejoiced that the settlement 
was already justifying its existence from its record of having intercepted 
five slavers since its occupation by British troops.5 When Brereton 
returned to Goree, he proposed a scheme to British merchants who had settled 
there during the Napoleonic Wars: He would offer them free lots of land on 
1. C.O. 267/42, 24th June 1816, Grant to MacCar~. 
2. P.R.O. , C.O. 267/42, 24th June 1816, Grant to MacCarthy. 
:3. ft " 
ft 18th l-la\r 1816, Brereton to Bathurst. 
4. ft 
" " 
5th October 1816, MacCarthy to Bathurst. 
5. Ibid. 
st. Mary's if they would undertake to erect "good, airy and substantial stone 
or brickhouses wi thin a given time". 1 Thus he hoped to preserve the health 
of European inmdgrants by reducing the number of wooden buildings on the 
Island and indirectly increasing its value. 
British merchants in Goree and st. Louis readily accepted the opportunity 
to move out of those places in 1816, for though the Treaty of Paris signed 
on the 30th Hq 1814 had stipulated that British merchants could carry on 
trade there on the same footing as French subjects, in practice pressure had 
been brought upon them to move out. It was the "vexatious conduct ot the 
French Authorities of Senegal towards them", exhi bi ted in the discriminatory 
duties levied an British imports which compelled them to seek their fortune 
elsewhere.2 Circumstances were thus to save the Gambia settlement from 
remaining a mere outpost of the British ~ as Lord Bathurst had planned. 
It was, however, not southwards ,but northwards to the gum deposits of 
Portendick and Arguin Island on the Atlantic Coast that they first looked.3 
Nor was this because of ignorance ot the conditions of trade along the River 
Gambia, for a few Goree merchants like Thomas Joiner, by origin 8. Mandinka, 
4 had 8.1re~ established trading posts in the upper reaches ot that River, 
1. P.R.O., C.O. 267/42, 12th June 1816, Brereton to Bathurst. 
2. (C.O. 267/56, 21st January 1822, vol. 1. HacCartby to Bathurst. 
(C.O. 267/80, 1815-26, 31st October 1817, William Forster to Mr. 
Goulburn - Under Secretary ot State. 
3. P.R.O., c.o. 267/38, loth June 1814, ~~Carthy to Bathurst; 
c.o. 267/46, 4th Oct. 1817, vol.2. William Forster to 
Henry Goulburn. 
4. "Hissionary Labours in Western Africa", p.176, by Rev.William Hoister, 
published London 1866; Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1833, 
vol. 3. p.73, by Thomas Boteler, Conmander of H.H. Sloop "Heela.". 
( 
: 
and were familiar with the advantages provided b,y a sheltered harbour and a 
navigable wate~ into the interior. Gum was the greatest attraction of 
this part of West Africa in this period, and it was for its pursuit that 
EUropean merchants had found Senegal conveniently situated within easy reach 
of the escal~ of the MOors from the North Bank of that River and from 
,I 
'Portendick. Indeed, when hopes of establishing a British settlement further 
north failed, the merchants were prevailed upon to transfer their businesses 
to the Gambia because of its close proximity to Senegal. They themselves 
admitted maqy years later that it was their "expectation of participating in 
the gum trade ot Senegal" that had been their main object in fOunding the 
settlement of st. }~'s.l 
In short, emigration trom Senegal to the Gambia was undertaken under 
sufferance, trading posts in the former settlement being regarded as "the 
most eligible ••• on the Coast,,,2 where they had purchased land from the 
natives, enjoyed the lucrative gum trade and made lasting or temporary unions 
with the Senoras. As soon as they could wind up their businesses, British 
merchants, maQY ot them with their Mulatto mistresses and wives (the Senoras) 
and children, with household property, domestic slaves, maQY ot whom were 
skilled mechanics and artisans, together with large herds ot livestock, set 
out to build a new trading community on the Island of st. l-lary's. A move 
of this extent involved them in enormous expenditure and loss, but there was 
no desire on their part to lose the capital and experience &lre~ sunk in 
1. C.O. 81/10, 1834, vol. 1. 13th September, Merchants' letter to 
Lt.-Gov. Rendall. 
2. C.O. 267/80, 31st Oct. 1817, William Forster to Henr,y Goulburn. 
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the African trade.' 1 
It is, however, doubtful if a total emigration on this scale would ever 
have been contemplated by the merchants if the Senoras had show. any 
unwillingness to accompaQY them to a new settlement. For the economic and 
social well-being ot all Europeans - militar,y and mercantile - in Goree as in 
st. Louis had tor maqy generations depended upon an energetic Mulatto 
community, ma.ny at them with French, English and Portuguese surnames, which 
had emerged during the eighteenth centur,y.2 Not only did the MUlattoes 
become a binding torce in a heterogeneous society, a channel tor communication 
between the European community and the indigenous population (creating a 
heal~ atmosphere for commercial activity), but this element was above all a 
vital economic torce. All observers ot the eighteenth centur,y scene in 
Goree and st. Louis reported that next to the Europeans, the Senoras were the 
most prosperous, owning substantial houses and wielding considerable power in 
society as heads ot enormous households ot dependents.) Indeed, the entire 
labour force in these settlements was virtually controlled by these women; 
tor they were the owners of a large bo~ ot Wolots who were hired out by them 
as skilled artisans, mechanics, river traders and domestic servants. Besides 
domestic slaves, valuable animal stock and solid gold jewels secured the 
4 
economic independence ot this small sector of the community. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Sir Keith Hancock "Survey of British C9mmonvea1th Affairs", vo1.2. 
"Problems of EconoIhl.c Policy 1918-1939", \London,O.U.P. ,1942) ,Part 2,p.158. 
Andr'Villard, "Histoire du S'negal", published Dakar, Senegal,1943. p.72. 
C.0."267/29, Commission of Enquir,y 1810, page 90, Answer No. 12 by Lt.-
Colonel Maxwell, 1st Januar,y 1811. 
Ibid. 
a 
Nor must their maletolk be lett out ot consideration, tor knowing the 
countr,y admirably well, they were the promoters ot commerce into the interior 
states.l Portuguese mulattoes, particularly, pl~ed a ver,y active role as 
traders in their own right or as middlemen tor slavers.2 Although tor the 
most part the Senoras had hardly received aqy more tormal education than their 
black mothers and grandmothers, their sons were usually recognised by their 
European tathers to the extent ot being taken a~ tor schooling in Europe. 3 
On their return to the West Coast they invariably joined the tamily business 
or the Commisariat department. As early as 1778 there had been a ~or ot 
st. Louis whose main duty was to establish good relations between the 
Governor and the inhabitants; and this responsible task was reserved tor 
~fulattoes.4 It was theretore a tairly capable cross-section ot the society 
which emigrated with British merchants trom Goree and st. Louis to colonize 
st. Mary's Island. The military apart, the colonists consisted ot men with 
civic experience, women ot aftluence with organising ability, and a substantial 
bo~ ot skilled workers. These tormed the ingredients ot the new colo~. 
1. "Histoire" by Villard, p.72. 
2. Ibid. 
3. c.o. 87/6, 1832, vol. 1. 15th December 1832, Lt.-Governor George 
Rendall to Lord Goderich, Secretar,r ot state. 
4. "Histoire", Villard, p.72. 
By 1818, the population of Bathurst (named after the Secretary of state 
for the colonies) on st. Mary's numbered six hundred, including the garrison. l 
The to'WIl, however, did not impress the explorer, Major William Gr~, who 
visited it at this time and described it as "nothing more than a number of 
2 thatched huts". Within three years the picture had changed and the same 
visitor vas astonished at the rapid development that had taken place. Gr~ 
reported that maQY fine substantial government buildings had been erected, 
"and the British merchants resident there, have vied with each other in the 
elegant and convenient arrangement of their dwelling-houses and stores, all 
of which are built of stone or brick, and roofed with slates or shingles."3 
Five years later, in 1827, Major Rowan the Commissioner of Enquiry into the 
settlements on the Gambia and the Gold Coast, reported that he found twenty-
four storied buildings, apart from Government buildings, among a population 
of over 1,800 (excluding the troops) of whom thirty were Europeans and one 
4 hundred and twenty-two MUlattoes. Large sums had been put into these 
buildings (skilled labour being short, and stone having to be transported 
. 5 
from Dog Island, seven miles a~) partly in fulfilment of the agreement 
1. C .. O. 267/47, 29th March 1818, vol. 1. MacCarthy to Bathurst. 
2. "Travels in Western Africa" by Hajor William Gr~ & the late Staff-
Surgeon Dochard. Published London 1825. p.331. 
3. Ibid. pp.365 & )66. 
4. C.O. 267/93, 9th June 1827, vol. 3. Report of Commission of Enquiry into 
the Gambia and Gold Coast by Najor James Rovan & Henry Wellington. 
5. Ibid. 
entered into with Colonel Brereton, but also as a clear indication of their 
decision to make a permanent settlement on st. Mar,y's Island. 
Those early years may have been difficult, but they were worth-while. 
The merchants were purposely recreating that pattern of society to which they 
had been accustomed in the now French-owned Islands. They appreciated the 
security of the barracks, and the confidence placed in them by a COlJBllandant 
like Captain Grant who constantly consul ted them on matters relating to trade. 
In a settlement entirely dependent on import duties as a source of revenue, 
it was inevitable that the element which paid the duties to the officials 
should thus increase its influence ~ the ver,y closeness of its ties with 
them. Officials, soldiers and merchants lived as good neighbours along the 
harbour, dined in each other's houses when they exchanged views on the state 
of the settlement, and awaited patiently the mail from Europe. Bathurst for 
them was an exclusive society, as yet not involved in the politics of the 
surrolmdi ng tribes, dominated by their group. 
The interdependence of communities on st. Mary's Island was not 
immediately obvious to the visitor, for the location of imnigrants according 
to race was striking. The Mulattoes lived in Portuguese Town situated just 
behind the sea front which was the residential and business centre of the 
merchants, and the administrative headquarters of the settlement. l Melville 
Town, later called Jollof Town, for the most part inhabited by artisans of the 
Wolof tribe lay behind this exclusive area of substantial houses and public 
1. "Missionary Labours", Moister, p.1l4o 
buildings. Beyond this the rest of the Island was a sandbank in the dry 
season and a swamp in the raiqf season and here under appalling conditions, 
the poorer inhabitants built their mud huts and thatched roofs; Soldier 
Town was inhabited b.Y disbanded black soldiers of the Royal African Corps 
and the West India Regiments in reduced circumstances, 1 and Hoka Town, later 
called Half Die Town, b.Y paupers, composed largely of immigrants from the 
River states. A Jola community £rom Combo had also taken up residence in 
one corner of the Island, which came to be known as Jola Town. 2 According 
to the Reverend William Uoister, a Wesleyan missionary in the settlement in 
the early l8)Os, st. Mary's as originally laid out consisted of a number of 
separate villages, each intended for a community. The villages were separated 
by strips of land for purposes ot cultivation and pasturage; but as population 
increased, however, vacant spaces were built over and the villages joined up 
to form a single town. 3 Bathurst had trom the start been regularly laid out 
by Captain Grant, with wide open streets bearing the names of British 
Generals at Yaterloo.4 
In a despatch of June 1834 to the Secretar.y of State, Lt.-Governor 
Rendall stated that "the principal merchants are Messrs. Forster, Finden, 
1. Rowan Report 1821. 
2. Ibid. Rowan mistakenly calls them "Jolliffs" who reside in a distant 
hamlet. "The History of the Gambia" by J.M.Gray, p.3l9, published 1940 
Cambridge University Press. 
3. "l-Iissionary Labours", Moister, p.1l4. 
4. Rowan Report 1821; "History" J.M.Graw, p.32l. 
1 Chow and Messervy, Charles Grant, Edward Lloyd, Bocock and Goddard." 
Thomas Joiner, the Mandinka. merchant, should not have been omitted from any 
list of business men of the Gambia, for other sources compared his prosperity 
with those of his English neighbours. William MOister who knew Joiner well 
and taught his children at the local Wesleyan school wrote that starting as a 
small trader with a few dollars, Joiner had gradually amassed considerable 
wealth so that he purchased a good house, furnished it genteejY, "and lived as 
a first rate gentleman". 2 His house was among the twenty four storied 
buildings described in Major Rowan's Repprt; and indeed Joiner had been 
summoned to give evidence before the Commissioner in 1826 on the state of the 
Upper River, with which he was "well-acquainted". 3 He owned several vessels 
which "ca.rried on an extensive trade in the river, as well as with the other 
settlements on the coast, and even with the West Indieso"4 
Joiner's experience in the West Indies as a slave and then as a freedman 
enabled him to make contacts with traders there which proved valuable when he 
returned to West Africa and set up a small business in Goree before 1810. 
His greatest handicap was his very limited education. There was no question 
about his intelligence, but before he was captured and sold as a slave, he 
1. C.O. 81/10, 1834, vol. 1. June, Rendall to Lord stanley. 
2. "Missionary Labours", p.116. 
3. Rowan Report, 1827. 
4. "Missionary Labours", p.116. 
had wandered through the villages ot the Gambia earning a living as a 
minstrel. 1 He was not, however, illiterate for his signature appeared on 
every Merchants' Hemorial ot the 'twenties and 'thirties; nor was he 
incapable as an entrepreneur ot drawing up accounts. One such statement 
showed "articles furnished b,y direction of His Excellency the Lt.-Governor 
on the occasion of the Coronation ot the king of Barra, and as presents to 
kings, chiefs, headmen and messengers ••• on the River Gambia between 1st 
2 January and 31st March 1834" - amounting to a total of £82.6.6d. There 
was no doubt that he was recognised by the Administration as a leading 
merchant from whom valuable advice on 'native affairs' could be sought. He 
ranked as one ot the biggest shipowners in the settlement; his brigantine, 
the "General Turner" was the largest vessel in the trade of the Upper River 
in 1834 - weighing seventy-six tons. 3 The nearest to it was the "Alexander 
4 Grant" owned b,y Chown and Messerv.y - a schooner weighing sixty tons. In 
short, Joiner's business was as broad-based as any in st. Hary' s, and for 
that reason he was a true symbol of successful commercial enterprise in the 
Gambia settlement. 
If Joiner was perhaps the most interesting ot the merchants there, 
William C. Forster was the most influential among them. Born in county 
1. "l-lissionary Labours", }toister, p.116. 
2. C.O. 81/10, 18)4, vol. 1. 12th June, Rendall to R.W.H~; Secretariat 
Archives, Gambia, 31st March 1834, Joiner to Rendall. 
3. . Ibid. 28th June, Merchants' Petition to Lord Stanley. 
4. Ibid. 
Durham, at the age of twenty-four he was a.!ready representing the reputable 
firm of Forster and Smith of Bishopsgate, London, a firm whose trading 
interests extended from Portendick to the Gold Coast.1 Like others, Forster 
had been engaged in trade in Goree before he transferred to St. l-la.ry's in 
1817.2 For IIl8IlY years, his was the leading business house in Bathurst; 
and on that depended William Forster's personal influence among the mercantile 
community there. Able to draw upon fairly substantia.! capita.! (his brother 
Hatthew Forster appears to have started the business in 8, New City Chambers 
which grew into the partnership with Smith),3 he enjoyed that security and 
independence required for leadership. 
Forster's home in No.2 Wellington Street, Bathurst, became the debating 
house of the commercial community, where problems of trade were discussed, 
memorials framed and signed, and a line of action decided upon. It was 
reasonable that the host became the spokesman of this dynamic group in the 
growing settlement. In 1817, the year in which he came to St. Mary's, he 
led the agitation against the French post at Albreda, "formerly only a. 
comptoir", but now, as the merchants complained, used an entrep&t by the 
French to which maqy foreign vessels resorted with cheap goods which glutted 
1. C.O. 267/69, 1825, vol. 5. 18th Januar,y, l-tatthew Forster to Lord 
Bathurst. 
2. Rowan Report 1827, William Forster to Rowan, June 24th 1826. 
3. The Guildhall Library, London, Post Office London Directory 
(Commercial), 1820. 
the River market. l In transmitting the Memorial to Lord Bathurst, Forster 
urged that no time should be lost in demonstrating British claims to the 
exclusive possession of the Gambia River. Alternatively, he proposed that 
the British too might hoist their flag in the vicinity of st. Louis in 
retaliation. 2 
Merchants of st. ~fa.ryt s were practical men of business who valued their 
contact with Matthew Forster in the City ot London, for he could uphold their 
commercial interests in the Metropolis, and, if necessar,y, bring pressure to 
bear on the Colonial Oftice. In 1817, for instance, when J.Iatthew wrote to 
Lord Bathurst to ask tor an interview for his brother, William, he used the 
occasion to make a statement on the newly founded settlement ot st. Mar,yts 
Island, based on information received at first hand. He echoed current 
1,.( 
optimism "that st. Mary's is calculated, with due encouragement, to become the 
first settlement on the Coast," especially as it was suppressing the slave 
trade so effectively. Yet all was not well: illegitimate trade had been 
revived since the French took back Goree and Senegal and there was concern 
that this might interrupt the pursuit ot legitimate trade on the banks of the 
Gambia. Besides, there were further obstacles "to the civilization and trade 
of tha.t cOtmtry." Currency was extremely short within the settlement, and no 
3 Bills or promissory notes could be procured there. Added to these problems, 
1. c.o. 267/80, 31st October 1817, William Forster to Henr,y Goulburn; 
see cha.pter III of Thesis. 
2. Ibid. 
3. c.o. 267/46, 1817, vol. 2. 30th September, ~~tthew Forster to Lord 
Bathurst. 
41.. 
the merchants resented what they considered were prohibitive duties imposed 
on African produce entering England since it reduced their profits considerably 
These then were some of the issues which the young Gambia merchant was 
expected to discuss with the Secretary of State during his 'leave' in London 
in the summer of 1817. 
The Forster and Smith business in West Africa was sufficiently large 
to require the employment of European agents like Richard Lloyd resident 
agent in their factory in the Casamance2 till he was transferred to MacCarthy 
Island in the River Gambia. Thomas Brown, destined to become one of the 
outstanding merchants in st. Hary's, first came to the colony in 1829 as 
mercantile clerk to this firm; but he combined this for a time with another 
clerical job in the service of the Officer administering the Government at a 
salary of five shillings a day. 3 The firm also employed a considerable body 
of Mulatto sub-agents and African traders, to handle its export commodities -
gum from Portendick, rice and wax from the Casamance and Nunez Rivers, and. 
gold, wax, hides and ivory from the Gambia. It was certainly a profitable 
concern which was to keep William Forster in st. ~~'s till his death in 
April 1849 at the age of fifty-six. 4 
1. C.O. 267/46, 1817, vol. 2. 30th Sept., H. Forster to Lord Bathurst. 
2. C.O. 267/173, 26th August 1841, Part 3 of Dr. Hadden's Report on The 
Settlements of Western Africa. Section on "The Slave Trading Factories". 
3. C.O. 87/2, 17th ~~ 1829, V.Hutton, Colonial Secretar,y, to R.V.H~. 
4. Hemorial Tablet in st. Hary's Pro-Cathedral Church, Bathurst, 
Gambia. 
Among the other leading merchants, Charles Grant was a close relative 
of Captain Alexander Grant, the first Commandant of the Gambia settlement. 
He had previously spent four months in Sierra Leone in Government service 
before he left for Bathurst in 1819.1 Until his retirement to Scotland in 
the 'forties, he plSiY'ed a significant role as a strong supporter of the 
Wesleyan mission. He was described by l-loister as "the Missionary's friend", 
a Christian gentleman whose counsel and kindness (he kept open house to all 
2 
missionaries) in times of grave difficulties was a great comfort to them. 
Maqy a pleasant evening was spent with him "in religious and general 
conversation ••• ,,3 It was therefore not surprising that as a contractor, 
Grant was to be employed by the mission to erect a new chapel in Dobson 
Street in 1834.4 
Within the ranks of the mercantile community were also found ex-Naval 
and ~ Officers, who proved a great service to the settlement as officers 
in the Hili tia. Richard Lloyd of the Royal York Rangers had been Commandant 
of Goree from 1804 to 1808, and had risen to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.5 
1. Rowan Report 1827, C.Grant I s letter to Rowan, 30th June 1826. 
2. "Missionary Labours", ~loister, p.125. 
3. Ibid. p.210. 
4. ".A. Brief History of the Wesleyan Missions on the Western Coast of Africa" 
by the Rev. William Fox, p.370, published London 1851. 
5. C.O. 267/32, 8th Januar,y 1810, Richard Lloyd to Cecil Jenkinson. 
His relative (probably a brother) Edward Lloyd had been a Captain in the 
Royal African Corps stationed at Goree since 1805, "till he was obliged to 
quit, in consequence of various Acts of disgraceful conduct."l In 1812, this 
Lloyd was writing to Zachary Macaulay, late Secretary of the African 
Institution against alleged tyrannical and inmoral acts of Najor Chisholm, 
the then Commandant of Goree, where Lloyd had continued to reside till he 
moved to st. Mary's.2 The Lloyd 'influence' was something t.o be reckoned 
with in the Gambia of the 'forties; they had made partnerships with wealthy 
Senoras in Goree and become the heads of large families of children, nephews 
and nieces. Their descendants were important landowners in the Gambia; and 
late in the cent.ury, two female descendants continued to enjoy the eight hundre 
acres of Kotu estate in Combo. 3 Of Richard Lloyd, Lt.-CoDlllander Berwick 
wrote to Lt.-Governor Rendall at the siege of Barra in 1831: "I had in Lt.-
Colonel Lloyd, Bathurst ~1ilit.ia, wo was ma.ny years an officer of the line, 
and who on this occasion took the conmand of the left wing ••• " an able 
soldier., 
Edward Bocock had started a business in Goree; he became a typical st. 
Mar,y's merchant owning trading vessels, supplying materials for making new 
sluice gates to the Colonial Government, signing memorials and petitions with 
his group. Nathaniel Waterman, Charles Johnston, John Wynne had arrived in 
1. c.o. 267/34, 29th July 1812, H. Torrens to Robert Peel. 
2. C.O. 267/34, January 1812, Edward Lloyd to Zachary l-Ja.caul8¥. 
3. Gambia Executive Council l-J!nutes, December 1892. 
Goree between 1806 and 1811 and opened businesses or were employed in 
Government service. The first Thomas Chown too had been a foundation member 
of st. Mary's, ha.ving arrived on the Coast in 1811.1 He had. been a Captain 
in the navy, and. now, in partnership with l-1esservy, owned several vessels for 
the River trade. At Jillifrey they had built a house, "the only stone house 
here; ••• situated between the town and the river ..... and surrounded by 
flowers and fruit trees.2 Indeed, Chown was to be one of the most enterprisin 
merchants in the settlement; he launched capital into the business, and very 
early built factories for his traders in different parts of the River. 3 
When he died in 1845, he left a flourishing concern to his son, by name 
Thomas Chown also. The Chowns became an institution in St. Mary's - three 
generations succe8sful~ maintained the family business till the latter part 
of the nineteenth cent~. 
It was, however, W.H. Goddard who seemed to have 'succeeded' William 
Forster by the mid-nineteenth centur,y. He had married a Senora of Goree, 
and had some influence with successive Administrators. He was the merchant 
they visited and dined with or with whom they enjoyed a picnic into Combo! 
He was an entrepreneur of high standing with trading establishments along the 
River as Thomas Chown, and a fleet of River craft for the pursuit of trade. 
Only a very few merchants were entrepreneurs, the majority began as Agents 
1. c.o. 87/96, 1870, vol. 1. 9th April, Thomas Chown to Earl Granville. 
2. "A Brief History", Fox, p.394. 
3. c.o. 267/61, 1824, vol. 2. 23rd August 1824, Captain G.W.Courte~ io 
Lt.-Colonel Alexander Grant. 
4. "Missionary Lahours", p.209. 
for private merchants of London interested in the African trade. John James 
Staples Finden, "one of our principal merchants connected with Bristol" and 
1 
"the son of the celebrated engraver of the same name in London," was engaged 
in the gum trade at Portendick in the 1830s as agent tor a Mr. Robert 
Harrison of London. 2 His weal thy Senora wife had brought over to the Gambia. 
maqy heads ot livestock; and they had built themselves a. beautiful countr,y 
residence in Jeshwang in Combo.3 Though he owned cutters tor the River 
trade, Finden was not really a shipowner. For the pursuit ot the coastal 
trade he was theretore obliged to employ other vessels; in 1834, tor example, 
he employed Captain James Eunson, J.ia.ster ot a cutter "Industry" for the 
season,
4 
and despatched his clerk, John Hughes, the mulatto son at Thomas 
Hughes a British merchant who had lived in Goree, as supercargo to trade for 
gum in Portendick.5 Similarly, Nathaniel Isaacs did not trade to 
Portendick himself but sent his Hulatto clerk, Mr. Pincent, as supercargo 
6 ot the brigantine "Matchless" ot the port ot London. The gum trade was too 
1. Ibid. 
2. C.O. 87/10, 18)4., vol. 1. 30th June, G.Rendall to Lord Stanleyl- "The 
Mercantile Houses engaged are Messrs.Forster & Smith, Messrs.Harrison 
& Finden, & J.Iessieurs Redman & Co ••••• " 
3. c.o. 87/73, 1862, 24th~, Governor George d'Arcy to the Duke of 
Newcastle. 
4. C.O. 87/10, 18)4., vol. 1. 30th August, G.Rendall to R.Y.H~, -
see Enclosures. 
5. C.O. 87/10, 1834, vol. 1. 30th August, Rendall to R.W.Hay, -
see Enclosures. 
6. Ibid. 
hazardous and highly specialised for the average European merchant in st. 
Mary's, for it demanded a knowledge of French and an acquaintance with the 
tactics of the Goree Authorities and the temperament of the Hoors. 
Most of the trade of the Gambia was in gum, wax, gold, ivory, hides and 
rice. The merchants supplied wax and tallow chandlers, gold refiners, ivory 
turners and. others in London. Rice from the Casamance was exported in husk 
and milled in newly erected mills hard b,y the Thames and owned b,y Forster 
and Smith. Trade was sufficiently encouraging in the early years of the 
settlement of st. ~~'s to induce the merchants to pool capital for bigger 
ventures. The trade in gum had always ranked high with them, and they had 
1 in 1821 opened a trade with the Trarza Hoors at Portendick. In the Gambia 
itself there was expansion, and colonists from st. ~~'s began to move into 
the interior to establish other settlements. 
It was on the initiative of Sir Charles HacCarthy, the Governor of the 
West African settlements that the first dependency of st. }~'s was founded 
on Lemain Island in the Middle River. Always anxious "to cultivate a more 
intimate acquaintance with the natives" ••• in order to promote a "greater 
extension of a free and honourable conmerce", he instructed Capt. Grant, the 
2 Conmandant at st. Nary's, to form a settlement in the Upper River, largely 
1. C.O. 87/10, 18)4, vol. 1. 13th Sept., Merchants' letter to Lt.-Governor 
Rendall. 
2. c.o. 267/66, 1825, vol. 2. 12th ~ 1823, A. Grant to ~~Cartby. 
--
to monopolise the trade of the interior. With a small band of colonists 
composed of one sergeant, twelve privates of the 2nd West India Regiment, a 
number of Government labourers and some of Thomas Joiner's men, twelve 
Liberated African men 1 who had volunteered their services, and, accompanied 
by C. Grant 8: T. Joiner, Grant set out on the 12th of l-Iarch 1823 on board of a 
vessel belonging to Joiner, to found another settlement. Disappointed with 
the terrain around the Barracunda Falls (the highest navigable point in the 
River), and having been made a generous offer of the Island of Gingam-Burr,y, 
otherwise called Lemain, by the proprietor the king of Catabar on his way up 
River, Grant returned to take possession in the name of the king of England 
on the 14th April 1823.2 A mud fort was built and named after King George, 
guns were mounted and the British flag hoisted. Thus the first outpost of 
st. Mary's was founded (James Island. having been abandoned) on another island 
about one hundred and seventy six miles up the River from headquarters. In 
honour of the promoter, it was renamed MacCarthy Island. As the practice 
was, an annual stipend of .£10 was offered to the king of Cata.bar.3 
Merchants who had entered the River trade found MacCarthy Island a. useful 
depot for their goods. Maqy of them began to build storehouses around Fort 
George, and they were joined by discharged soldiers who put up modest huts and 
1. Ibid. 
2. C.O. 267/66, 1825, vol. 2. 12th May 1823, A.Grant to ~~Carthy. 
3. C.O. 87/105, 1873, vol. 2. August 1873, C.H.Kortright to Lord Kimberley; 
See also Chapter III of Thesis. 
began to cultivate the land. About a mile away, a native town began to 
increase its population with persons "wo had fled thither for protection 
from the raging war in the neighbouring country."l The Wesleyan mission 
had been encouraged by the Administration to start work on the Island, and 
towards this end had been granted extensive land. 2 In general then, the 
pattern of society on }facCarthy Island vas not unlike that of st. Mary's; 
and there too final authority lay with the military. In this case, the 
management of its affairs vas left in the hands of an African sergeant of the 
2nd. West India Regiment, one Buchanan by name. 3 On a visit there three years 
after its foundation, Kenneth }facaulay,acting Governor of Sierra Leone,found 
lithe discharged men and others settled there in a very comfortable, decent 
state, both in their houses and persons, complaining of nothing but a want of 
wives ••• "4 He reported that m~ more merchants and inhabitants of Bathurst 
had requested lots of land; and he strongly recommended the new settlement 
ideally suited for the location of a considerable number ot Liberated Africans.5 
1. C.O. 267tr2, 1826, vol.2. 29th June, Kenneth ~iacau1ay to Lord Bathurst. 
2. C.O. '267/66, 1825, vol.2. 12th May 1823, A.Grant to l>fa.cCartby. 
3. c.o. 267/72, 1826, vol.2. 29th June, }facau1~ to Bathurst. 
4. Ibid. 
5. C.O. 267/72, 1826, vo1.2. June 29th, Macaulay to Bathurst. 
It was also in keeping with MacCarthy's instructions to Commandants at 
st. Nary's to attend to the interests of the merchants by signing treaties of 
friendship with chiefs whose states lay adjacent to the British settlements 
that the Ceded Hile on the Barra Coast was acquired for Britain by Kenneth 
Macaul~ in 1826. Relations between the king of Barra and the merchants 
had been strained since the foundation of Bathurst, because Captain Grant's 
agreement of 1816 with the king had recognised the king's right to continue 
to exact custom from all trading vessels 'Which entered the River with cargo. 
MacCartqy had impressed on the merchants the need to fulfil engagements made 
with the natives "as the only means of establishing mutual confidence so 
essential to form the basis of honourable commerce". In answer to the 
merchants' complaints of the constant delay of their vessels at Jillifrey 
by the king's Alcaide who collected the duties, it was proposed by the 
Government that a flat rate of £5 per annum should be levied on the owners 
of craft trading up River. This fee was to be paid to the Custom House 
Officer who would in turn p~ about £130 per annum in quarterly instalments 
to the king. This was only accepted in Barra after some resistance. When, 
however, Governor HacCartby visited st. Mary I S in 1823, the merchants pleaded 
hardship from the duty imposed on their vessels. MacCarthy therefore agreed 
that "the quarterly customs paid to the king of Barra should be charged to 
the Colonial Fund". 1 Following which, Capt. Grant was sent on a mission to 
the king to ask for permission to erect a Martello Tower on Barra Point, a 
1. c.o. 267/66, 1825, vol.2. 25th November, Alexander Grant to R.W.Bay. 
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proposal that was received very kindly, for the king observed that it would 
provide him with protection. l 
Barra, however, remained a thorn in the flesh of st. Mary's from which 
it was separated by only about three miles of waterway. In 1826 Macau18iY' 
SI 
found the inhabitants of Bathurst "in a state of considerable alarm and doubt 
as to the conduct likely to be observed b,y the king ••• in case his differences 
with the Colonial Government were not finally arranged."2 Nor were their 
fears all8iY'ed b,y the activities of the French in Albreda which was situated 
in Barra kingdom. Governor Roger of Senegal had only left the River two,d8iY's 
before Ma.caul8iY"s arrival; it was believed that his mission had been to the 
king of Barra from whom he desired a cession of land.3 Macaul~, therefore, 
acted promptly by signing a treaty with the newly elected king, Burungai 
Sonko, on the 15th ,June 1826 at Jill ifrey. 4 By it, the king ceded to Britain 
"for ever the full, entire and unlimited right, title, sovereignty, and 
possession of the River Gambia with all the branches, creeks, inlets and 
waters of the same •••• " In return for relinquishing all customs and duties, 
the king accepted a yearly stipend of 400 dollars or £86.13.4d. In conclusion, 
a cession of territor.y was made, extending from ~adu Creek on the west to 
1. C.O. 267/58, 1823, vol.l. 7th July, A.Grant to MacCarthy. 
2. C.O. 267/72, 1826, vo1.2. 28th June, K.}.facaul~ to Lord Bathurst. 
3.' C.O. 267/72, 1826, vo1.2. 28th June, Kenneth :Haca.ul~ to Lord Bathurst. 
4. Ibid. - Enclosure. 
sz. 
Jokadu Creek on the east for one geographical mile inland on the north bank of 
the River. l A fort was erected. here, too, mO'lmted with guns and named. fort 
Bullen after COl1lIlodore Bullen who had assisted in its construction. The Mile 
alread3' contained five towns inhabited by the king of Barra's subjects who 
had adopted Islam and withdrawn from the inland. towns in protest against the 
lax morals of society.2 Although this region never attracted settlers from 
st. }f.a.ry's as HacCartby Island or later British Combo, did, it became a place 
for locating Liberated Africans, and refugees from the wars of the mid 
nineteenth centur,y. 
The welfare of military and civilian officers was equally the concern 
of MacCartiJ3r; and since they could not always escape to Europe during the 
annual raiD\Y season when Coast fever made havoc of the European population, 
a cOlIValescent station had to be found along the Coast. In 1821, NacCarthy 
had purchased a piece of land. from the king of Combo and. erected a House for 
officers on a cliff overlooking the Atlantic, in a most salubrious climate.3 
Clifton, as it came to be called, was a quarter of a mile from the native 
town of Baccow, and eight miles from Bathurst which could be reached by water 
in an hour, or by walking in two hours (the narrow creek being crossed by 
ferry). 4 . In 1836 Lieut. Governor Rendall recommended the situation for a 
Liberated African fishing village which would serve the Bathurst market;5 but 
1. Ibid. 
2. C.O. 87/85, 1866, vol.2. 28th September, Administrator George d'Arcy to 
Governor Sam Blackall; see also Chapter VIII of Thesis. 
3. C.O. 87/14, 15th July 1836, vol.l. G.Rendall to Lord Glenelg. 
4. c.o. 87/14, 15th July 1836, vol.l. Rendall to Glenelg. 
5. Ibid. 
it was not till the 'tifties that the Government made a serious ettort to 
colonise Combo. Before this, land had been purchased from private individuals 
there. In 1850, however, a strip ot land along the coast was guaranteed to 
the British ~ the king for building purposes. l It became the fashion for 
senior officials and prominent merchants to build handsome countr,y houses in 
that area; Judge HanteU's Farm was estimated at a cost of no less than 
£2000. 2 The Senoras, however, had long anticipated this expansion into 
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Combo and had leased extensive areas ot land directly from the local chiefs 
and erected their own modest country houses.3 The communities on st. Mary's 
Island had not only settled comfortably in their new environment but had become 
outwardlooking within a relatively short time of building a new settlement. 
st. lIa.ry's was obviously growing into a trading centre with an increasing 
civilian population when the Authorities in England had only made provision for 
a military post under the command ot an Ofticer of the~. Governor 
MacCarthy was ver,y early convinced of the need for a civil establishment, and 
to this end he created a Settlement Court and Court of Requests when he visited 
st. Mary's in 1818, and to the COIlllll8ndant and the Courts he delegated 
1. C.O. 87/52, 4th June 1852, vol.l. Governor R.G.MacDonnell to Earl Grey. 
2. C.O. 87/82, 1865, vol.l. 20th July, d'Arcy to Fdward Cardwell. 
3. C.O. 87/85,1866, vol.2.23rd.June, d'Arcy to Cardwell. 
------~----------------------
legislative, executive and judicial powers which had hitherto been concentrated 
in the hands of the Governor and Council of Sierra Leone. I Merchants in 
Bathurst were given full representation on these bodies in order to reduce 
military control, for even when it was benevolent it tended to be autocratic, 
as no rudimentar,y elements of a municipality as yet existed there. Merchants 
who had lived in Goree and Senegal were familiar with a form of government 
where executive authority was vested in the Commandant, alw~ a soldier under 
instruction from the Governor of Sierra Leone, himself a militar,y man. The 
civilian population in general, however, had provided a Secretar,y, a Harbour 
Master, and above all a ~or, who was appointed for his integrity and 
experience; 2 the only civil officer in Goree was the ~or. Although British 
merchants had seemed fairly well satisfied with the Administration there 
(probably because they were tully absorbed in the gum trade, and their numbers 
were smaller), as Englishmen they could surely not have imagined it to be a 
permanent arrangement. Transfer to St. }fary's provided them with an 
opportunity to oppose arbitrar,y government • 
. In theory, after the disintegration of the province of Sene-Gambia in 
1783, the Crown revested the Gambia in the Com ttee of the CompBDY of 
J.lerchants under whose control it remained on paper till the dissolution of the 
1. C.O. 267/47, 1818, vol.l. 14th April, Governor MacCartqy to Commandant 
William Appleton. 
2. C.O. 267/29, 11th Januar,y 1811, Answer No. 45 to Dawes Commission of 
Enquiry, by Lt.-Col. Maxwell. 
-------- --- - - -- --~ -- -- -
Comp~ in 1821.1 In practice, it was lett to the Governor of Sierra Leone 
to ailm; n; ster the Gambia. MacCarthy was recognised for his "unvearied 
exertions to improve the trade and civilization of that part of Africa under 
his authority",2 but there was growing dissatisfaction among the mercantile 
community with continued dependence upon another Government. The first 
open criticism came not directly from the local merchants themselves, but 
from their contacts in London, who vere better placed to exert influence on 
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the British Government. It vas Ralph Smith, partner of Hatthev Forster, who, 
in a letter to Earl Bathurst pointed to the disadvantages of dependence which 
in the case of st. Nary's hindered "that progress in trade to which it is by 
its situation and natural resources calculated to attain. ,,3 In spite of 
growing demands for a separate government, by Charter of 1821, the Gambia was 
legally constituted a dependency of Sierra Leone (as vas the Gold Coast 
colo~); and in the following year a Court of Common Fleas vas established 
~o 
under a Judge and two Assistants, appeal lying with the Governor and CO\mcil 
ot Sierra Leone.4 Under the new arrangement, legislative authority vas 
withdrawn from the Commandant and merchants of st. l-fary's, the Settlement 
Court being virtually abolished. It vas in the administration of justice, 
1. E.C.Martin, "West Afric8Jl Settlements" (London 1927), p.102. 
2. c.o. 267/50, 1819, vol.2. 8th April, Ralph Smith to Lord Ba.thurst. 
3. C.O. 267/50, 1819, vol.2. 8th April, Ralph Smith to Lord Bathurst. 
4. C.O. 267/93, RoV8Jl Commission of Enquiry 1827. 
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however, that the volunt~ services ot the merchants was most needed. They 
were called upon to do public service as sheritfs, magistrates, coroners, 
jurors and in similar posts. 
The Court of Common Pleas was a practical arrangement and a fairly 
effective instrument of Law, though Chief Justice Rendall ot Sierra Leone 
made some serious criticisms of the legal machinery when he visited the 
Gambia in 1825. He found that the gravest difficulties arose from the 
inexperience of the magistrates with "the most common forms and proceedings" 
1 
ot the law. .According to Rendall, not one person in st. Mary's was 
acquainted with the duties of Sheriff either. The result was inefticiency 
and indeed injustice, so that local prejudice against unqualified judges 
became evident. A situation then arose where "their decisions against each 
other were received with dissatisfaction and led to quarrels and appeals to 
the Courts" in Sierra Leone. 2 The succession of resignations on the part of 
the judges ~ almost brought the legalmachiner.y to a standstill. 
As Governor Charles Turner put it, they "begged to be relieved from situations 
which interfered with their business and for which they were not tit •••• ,,3 
The picture was not entirely a gloolI\Y one, for as Magistrates, l-Ierchants 
were instrumental in the condemnation ot slavers; the "Luba", tor example, 
1. C.O. 267/65, 1825, vol.l. 1st December 1824, George Rendall's Report 
to Governor D.M. Hamilton. 
2. C.O. 267/66, 1825, vol.2. 8th July, Governor Charles Turner to Bathurst. 
3. c.o. 26~/66, 1825, vol.2. 8th July, Charles Turner to Bathurst. 
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carrying slaves within the port of Bathurst was seized by John Bland, the 
Collector of Customs, in 18)0. The case against one John Burdett, a native 
merchant of Senegal, contractor for the hire of the schooner whose }~ter was 
Lorenso Correio, was held "before Edward Lloyd esq. Chief Judge, William 
Forster, Charles Johnstone, and Charles Grant esquires, Assistant Judges of the 
Court of Common Pleas ---." Judgment was given on Sept. 30th 1830, by which 
the schooner,her boats, guns --- wares and slaves were confiscated to the use 
of His Majesty, his heirs and successors.1 The case had been quite 
efficiently executed. }ferchants also gave service as jurymen, sitting for 
, 
trial of minor cases of felony with the Commandant. Among them sat Thomas 
Joiner, the African merchant, and prominent persons from the Mulatto community. 2 
Thus a cross-section of the mercantile community had become an integral part 
of the Colonial Government, especially in its campaign against slave-dealers. 
It was an administrative machinery largely run by amateurs, and thoughit 
sometimes lacked efficiency, it served a purpose in the early years of the 
settlement, and welded a heterogeneous society to its rulers in a healthy 
partnership. 
. . In the organisation of trade, in the general welfare of the settlement, 
even to the planning of its defences, the local government looked for advice 
and indeed for manpower from the mercantile bo~. In 1826, for instance, 
1. C.O. 87/5, 1831, vol.1. 30th June, Lt.-Governor Rendall to Lord Goderich. 
2. Rowan Commission of Enquir,y 1827. 
58 
I 
some of the merchants had been incorporated into two Boards - the Board tor 
Internal commerce dealing with such matters as the drainage of the Island, 
land-tenure, port regulations, and other domestic issues, while the Board for 
External Commerce was prima.ri~ devoted to the affairs of trade. One record 
ot the tormer Board has survived and relates to its third meeting held on the 
29th .August 1827 under the presidency ot John Wynne, with John Pellegrin, a 
Mulatto, acting as secretary, and Goddard, Bocock and Charles Grant as members. 
Discussion was devoted to practical problems - the neglect ot the sluices, the 
hardship caused to poorer inhabitants b,y Governor Neil Campbell's confiscation 
ot their town lots. 2 Through the organ ot the Board for External commerce, 
composed ot other influential business men - Edward Lloyd being President -
the mercantile community fought out the case against French competition in the 
River Trade and submitted tar-reaching resolutions for the consideration ot 
the Governor of Sierra Leone. 3 Though the Boards remained ineffectual, since 
their reports never went beyond the Administrator's office, yet they provided 
tor their members the experience ot serious corporate thinking on matters 
relating to a growing municipality. 
A slightly less ineffective bo~ was perhaps the Agricultural Society 
"established here, tor the encouragement ot the growth of such articles as 
1. c.o. 267/73, 1826, vol.3. 3rd Sept., Governor Neil Campbell to Lord 
Bathurst. 
2. C.O. 87/1, 1828, Correspondence, 6th }~, }mjor Alexander Findl~ to 
R.V. Hq. 
3. C.O. 267/83, 1827, vol.3. Resolutions ot the Board of Commerce held on 
the 1st August 1827. 
II1a3" be valuable to the Mother Country, and. its first act has been to raise a 
sUbscription to support an experimental Plantation of Hemp." In Februar,y 
1831, the subscription list stood at £200, with land and labour guaranteed by 
the Lt.-Governor;l there was no time wasted in starting an experimental farm 
in Baccow with Liberated .Africans provided by the Government. 2 Indeed, Finden, 
one of the most active promoters of the venture, went on leave that r~ 
season with samples of .African hemp with a view to convincing Colonial Office 
ot the discovery· of a new export commodity. 3 The Secretary of State responded 
by cautioning Rendall against entering into rash speculations and engagements.4 
Like other ventures to broaden the Gambia econo~ in those early years, high 
hopes entertained about a hemp trade never materialised. It was not for lack 
of enthusiasm or enterprise on the part of the merchants that business moved 
slowly and sometimes seemed almost to come to a standstill. 
As st. Mary's grew in population and in importance, (in 1825 the once-
uninhabited Island contained about 2,500 persons) and began to widen its 
frontiers, SO did friction with the natives of neighbouring states ensue, 
involving the Colonial Government with their rulers. It was fortunate that 
there was available in the settlement a nucleus of seasoned intermediaries 
1. C.O. 87/5, 1831, vo1.l.loth Februar,y, Rendall to R.V. ~. 
2. c.o. 87/5, 1831, vol.l. 1st November, Rendall to H~. 
3. Ibid. 26th ~ 1831, J.J.S. Finden to R.W. H~. 
4. Ibid. 1st November 18)1, Rendall to Lord Goderich • 
• 
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who had frequently been called to the service of the Governors of Senegal in 
their disputes with native chiefs in that settlement. This nucleus was drawn 
from the MUlatto community for the moat part, although it received the 
assistance of a few Africans like Joiner. 
Access to such rulers either for peaceful or hostile purposes depended 
on the cooperation of those merchants who owned vessels which could be placed 
at the disposal of the Lt.-Governor. The vessels of Chown and Bocock were 
put under government service in 1831, and Charles Grant himself accompanied 
Rendall's party to explore Vintain River, a tributary of the Gambia which 
watered an extensive area on the south bank, and was believed to join the 
River Casamance in the territory to the south of it. 1 It was in fact a 
commercial expedition which it was hoped would secure the unadulterated wax 
of the Jolas of Vintain and Casamance for the Bathurst market. In the same 
year, Bocock's Lighter was engaged by Captain Belcher of His l-lajesty's survey 
ship the "Etna" to carry stones and lime to Bird Island for the erection of 
a beacon there. The vessel was lost at sea during operations and the 
2 Colonial Government was obliged to compensate the owner with £60. Business 
houses in London which participated in the African trade - Messrs. Forster 
and Smith and others - made it a point to inform the Coloni81 Office before 
the departure of their Vessels for West Africa, the reason being that in those 
days of poor communications it was an advantage to sena. despatches by arry 
available vessel.) 
1. C.O. 87/5, 18)1, vol.1. )oth June No. 35, Randall to H~. 
2. c.o. 87/5, 1831, vol.l. 30th June No. 34, Rendall to H~. 
3. c.o. 87/5, 1831, vo1.1. 9th May, Nassrs. Forster 8: Smith to R.V.IUw. 
While only a handful ot established merchants in Bathurst enjoyed the 
tacilities ot overseas communication by their own sailing ships, a growing 
number owned river craft - mostly schooners ot tive to sixty tons. Dr. 
Madden on a Commission ot Enqui~ to the settlement in 1841 tound torty such 
vessels belonging to the merchants, most ot them built b,y their Wolot mechanics 
1 
and lIl81lIled b,y Portuguese l-fulattoes. Not only did they car~ cargo along the 
River, but they vere engaged in the coastal trade, car~ blue and white 
f batts, crimson cloth and tobacco to the Moors at p,tendick, or bringing rice 
trom the Casamance. They vere no less passenger boats, tor there were always 
merchants and missionaries seeking a rest cure in the Cape Verde Islands and 
? Madeira, and others \ on business to Bissao and Sierra Leone. Mr. Finden, 
if 
Mr. Goddard and others with Mulatto wives made regular social visits to Goree 
where relatives and friends had been lett behind in 1816. In fact, there 
vas a ceaseless traftic of passengers between the ports ot Bathurst and Goree 
in the tirst halt ot the nineteenth cent~. Senoras, accompanied by a 
l ~etinue ot Wolot domestics were only rivalled by an equa.lly substantial body 
.............. /'\,.,,-
. 2 
of Liberated Africans travelling southwards to Sierra. Leone. 
There was nothing lethargic about the British merchants on st. Mary's; 
they formed a most versatile group. Through their own ettorts (exemplified. 
in their P83'lDent of taxes for the running of a civil government), and with 
great encouragement from the first Governor of the West African settlements -
1. C.O. 267/173, 26th August 1841, Part 3 ot Conmiasion ot :tnquiry on the 
Settlements on the Western Coast of Africa, by Dr. Hadden. See Sections 
on Imports &; Exports, &; Bathurst. 
2. Gambia Archives, Attorney General's Oftice, Register ot Liberated 
Africans. 1830s &'408. 
Charles MacCarthy - they gradually changed a small militar,y post into a 
thriving commercial settlement, entirely devoted to fostering legitimate 
trade. It was a homogeneous group, a little exclusive, partly because it 
had the ear of the Admjnistration, but nevertheless firmly bound to the other 
communities on the Island for the same reasons that had obtained in Goree 
and Senegal. Dependence on Hulatto sub-agents (not to mention the Senoras) 
and Wolof artisans and mechanics for the better conduct of commerce, tended 
to break down barriers between racial groups in st. Mary's. In SIJY event, 
o there was consanguinity between European and Mulatto, and between Mulatto and 
Negro. 
/ 
Mulattoes were an appendage to the White conmunity, but in spite of that 
they pl~ed a prominent role in the Gambia settlement, as a recognisable 
entit,y. Between 1816 and 1826 when Major Rowan visited the settlement, the 
tight~ knit group of Mulattoes who had accompanied the merchants from Goree 
and st. Louis had been growing because of prospects of higher wages in a 
variety of jobs. The general complaint of the merchants was of the extreme 
shortage of labour in st. Mary's, and of their dependence on Goree for sailors 
and artisans. Better jobs were open to the ~mlatto who was bilingual in 
French and English; the trade to Portendick provided a specialised field 
which he monopolised. Hany a Nulatto youth also earned a living as a 
mercantile clerk in Bathurst. 
Their women continued to enjoy unlimited influence in the settlement; 
the less privileged among them sold local foodstuffs in the public market, 
but a fair number! composed ;the elite of Bathurst throughout the century, 
and were invariably a centre of attraction to visitors to the Island. Mrs. 
Bowdich who visited st. Mary's in 1823 called them "handsome ••• generally 
tall and gracefully formed ••• [and] very elegant ••• " AI though they 
pretended to approach nearer to European manners and customs than those of 
other parts of Africa, !-Irs. Bowdich identified them with the Wolofs in their 
religious and superstitious ceremonies. Nor was their mode of dress unlike 
that of other natives; apart from footwear, a status symbol, the Senoras 
also wore Pagnes and covered their heads with headkerchiefs. Generations of 
intimate contact with Europeans, however, had given them a certain 
sophistication which ~frs. BOwdich disapproved of and called "insolent manners." 
She particularly disliked the way they expected others "to turn out of the path 
for their accommodation" when they were out wa] ki ng, or their constant 
intrusions at her home without invitation. Even the Fantee Mulattoes at 
1 Cape Coast had been found less insolent! It was a brief, but penetrating, 
study of a nucleus of coloured ladies without inferiority complex, an 
indication of the healthy racial attitudes which existed between Whites and 
Mulattoes 0 in St. Mary's as in Goree and st. Louis. 
While it m~ have been true that many of them were very idle, having 
1. T.E. Bowdich: "Excursion in Madeira 8.; Porto Santo ••• 0 while on his 3rd 
voyage to Africa." Added to by Mrs. Bowdich. (London, 1825). 
pp.207-209. 0 
"no manufactures" like the surroundiilg natives, l so that their privileged 
status depended largely on their ability to keep their White Lovers and on 
the acquiescence ot their black dependents in an interior role, nevertheless, 
this group also produced its own entrepreneurs in the River Trade. l-fa.dam 
Eliza. Tigh, a Hulatto lady ot great influence, who had given her name to 
Tighcunda in the River, had much impressed Gr8\Y' and Dochard in 1818 with her 
business acumen. She traded in gold, wax and ivory, which "she purchased in 
exchange tor tirearms, powder, India goods, coral, beads, iron, tobacco, rum, 
2 
cutlery." There were others like her too; some carried on the tamily 
business in the tactories up River when their 'husbands' went home to England 
on leave, or retired trom the settlement. l-~s. Riley, tor instance, kept 
the factory at Doma-sang-sang going when John Riley, a man of colour, was 
aWfI3T (the Rileys also did business in other parts ot the River' including 
Yanemaroo). 3 These business women were among the owners ot river craft, 
without which trade in the Gambia vas impossible. 
' .. , The River had in tact been inhabited by hamlets ot Hulattoes from the 
d~s ot the Portuguese explorers, many of whom moved to st. Nary's after its 
foundation in 1816. The very designation ot one district ot the new town 
pointed to the presence of a substantial bo~ of Portuguese MUlattoes among 
its inha.bi tants. This group filled out its ranks in the course ot the 
centur,y, not only with new arrivals from Goree and Senegal but also from the 
1. Bowdich, "Excursion", p.2 07. 
2. Gr~ &: Dochard, "Travels", p.5l. 
3. Moister, "Missionary Labours", 1'1'.170 &: 184. 
Cape Verde Islands and Bissao, inmigrants who hoped to engage in the carrying 
trade as captains of vessels, or to supply the demand for skilled meChanics, 
especially painters. Robert J\ynsley was a Nulatto, and. a native of the 
River states, for he was descended from the elder Robert Aynsley - an English. 
trader at Pisania (Karantaba) in the Upper River who had assisted Mungo Park 
and other explorers into the interior. l It was the younger Aynsle,y who had 
sold Thomas Joiner as a slave to the captain of an American vessel; but once 
the slave trade was effectively abolished in the River, his business seemed to 
have declined to the extent that Joiner, who had by then secured his freedom, 
was in more comfortable circumstances and owned a better house in st. Mar,y's.2 
It m~ well be that Aynsley had lost much of his property before he moved to 
st. Mar,y's in 1817, for transfer had been dictated by the ravages suffered 
from raiding parties from the interior. He continued to participate in the 
l old trade, and in 1834 his schooner "Reform" - a vessel of thirty tons - was 
--
one of seven vessels trading in the River. 3 
Jean (later known as John) Pellegrin was to the }1ulatto community what 
William Forster was to the British community; "the most respectable of our 
coloured inhabitants," as Lt.-Governor Rendall described him in a despatch in 
1830. By this date, through trade contacts, he had SO far gained the respect 
of the indigenous tribes, that he was delegated official messenger and 
intermediary to the king of Saloum who had committed outrages on the persons 
1. Gray & Dochard, "Travels" p.70; Rev. John Norgan, "Reminiscences of the 
founding of a Christian Mission in the Gambia", (London 1864) p.12. 
2. Moister, "Missionary Labours", p.176. 
3. C.O. 87/10, 1834, volel. 28th June, Merchants' :Petition to Lord stanley. 
and properties belonging to some merchants. "I made choice of Ensign 
Tearnon, then acting Colonial Secretary, and. Hr. Pellegrin - who is 
perfectly acquainted with the native palavers", wrote Rendall. ItI am happy 
to s~ that these Gentlemen were perfectly successful in their endeavours 
This was not the only occasion when Pellegrin was selected ~ the local 
government for public service: He had been secretar,y of the defunct Board 
of Internal Commerce whose reports were intended to provide the Governor at 
Sierra Leone with informed opinion on progress in the settlement. In Februar,y 
1831, with Richard Lloyd, he had been instructed to examine a quantity of 
India bafts returned from the Portendick trade in 18)0 because "the greater 
part of them [is] very much discoloured,2damaged and deteriorated in value by 
being stored at this settlement over the raiqy season." An examination was 
instituted in connection with a claim made ~ the merchants, through William 
Forster, for a remittance of duty already paid on the bafts. It is 
significant that although Pellegrin was a·prominent merchant in the Portendick 
trade, and doubtless a member of the Portendick Company, he was appointed to 
undertake a survey of this nature. 
His particular success in the gum trade was recognised in st. Mar,y's with 
the result that Forster appears to have entered into partnership with him for 
a period in order to exploit gum. In 1834, the two merchants despatched the 
schooner "Rebecca" of forty-eight tons and the brig "Governor Temple" of one 
hundred tons for Portendick; on their return the,y announced their intention 
1. C.O. 87/5, Februar,y 1831, Rendall to Lord Goderich. 
2. C.O. 87/5, 12th February 1831, Report of J.F. Pellegrin & Richard Lloyd 
to Lt.-Gov. Rendall. 
of returning the vessels immediately "as they state there are large 
quantities of gum still lying there."l Pellegrin was no stranger to the 
Portendick trade, and it is not unreasonable to imagine that he had in 
Senegal alre~ made contact with the Moors (tenuous as this might have been), 
and t~erefore 'Knew the ropes'. His knowledge of French was no less an 
advantage in a trade of such complexity. 
The Jury Courts and the Gambia :Hili tia, too, provided a common meeting 
ground for all groups concerned with the welfare and defence of the 
settlement. John Hughes, as Captain in the Militia during the Barra War of 
1831, sustained severe injuries to his foot, resulting in lameness and 
;r eventual loss of life.2 Charles Grant, James Finden and Thomas Brown, 
Thomas Joiner, Jos Degriny and Richard Lloyd are names to be found in the 
militia lists. Degriny, who was a Mulatto trader, also held a government 
post as clerk of the Police Court at a s&1ar.y of £50 per annum and P~ter 
of the militia at another £50 p.a. 3 At the same time, that is in 1848, one 
Thomas Quin, an English Herchant, was appointed Superintendent of Police at a 
s&1&r,y of £50 per annum, Collector of Drain rates, Clerk of Councils and 
Registrar of births, deaths and marriages, appointments which together 
brought him a sal&r,y of £240 p.a. MUlatto and British mercantile clerks 
S:. were also utilized in the public services. Antione Pierre was sheriff in 
1850, and A. Allegre a. sergeant of police at the same time.4 There was 
1. C.O. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 30th August, Rendall to R.W.H~. 
2. C.O. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 23rd June, John Hughes' Petition to Lord Stanley. 
3. Blue Book 1850. - Statistics etc., C.O. 90/24. 
4. Blue ~ok 1850. - Statistics etc., C.O. 90/24. 
naturally contact between Hulatto and White on otticial duty, in commercial 
activity, and at leisure. John Hughes was described as Ita companion ot Hr. 
Brow", with whom he untortunately got up to mischief in st. Nary's. Because 
ot her unorthodox relationship with Brown, young Mrs. Ingram, the mulatto wife 
of a British ofticial - Thomas Ingram - was sent aw~ to her relatives in 
Goree ~ her father and husband. It would seem that "the loIagistrates had 
had. great difficulty in preserving the peace before she lett -," but in a 
short while she had returned to the settlement and gone straight to Nr. Brown's 
house, even betore the Quarantine Ofticer had boarded the ship: It was an 
ugly situation which Rendall disliked. "I accompanied the Harbour Master to 
1 Mr. Brown who immediately - gave up the passengers ••• ft, the tt.-Governor 
reported to the Secretar,y ot state with reliet. There was constant inter-
mingling between those communities which made up the elite in st. Mary's 
Island. 
The purely African comnuni ty on the Island ot st. Mary's was 
heterogeneous, being an assemblage of persons of African stock who had 
arrived there from various parts ot the River, trom Goree and from Sierra 
Leone, at different times and for a variety of reasons. At the foundation 
of the settlement the Wolofs of Senegal formed the largest group, for 
1. C.O. 87/10, 18)4, vo1.l. 14th June, Rendall to R.V. H~. 
without their assistance the merchants would never have found skilled workers 
among the local inhabitants to build their houses or construct public buildings 
at the foundation of the settlement. A number of black troops of the 2nd 
West India Regiment and of the Royal Africa Corps had been equally necessary 
for clearing the land and transporting building materials. Their numbers 
were soon swelled out by labourers from Combo and the River states who had 
heard of the labour shortage on the Island for cutting down trees, burning 
lime, and general porterage. Many of these soldiers, at their discharge 
from their regiments, were offered free lots of land in Soldier Town where 
they lived in thatched huts under distressing conditions which drew comment 
from Major Rowan in 1826.1 On MacCartqy Island, their condition was a little 
improved, though this element was never satisfactorily employed in either of 
the Islands. Since the Barra war of 1831 refugee children had begun to 
filter into Bathurst, and throughout the nineteenth centur,y this flight 
coastwards from the interior was accelerated b,y other wars; and as the 
campaign against kidnapping and the slave trade was strengthened by the 
constant vigilance of trustwort~ traders and merchants at the trading 
stations, so more native children were rescued and despatched to Bathurst 
for the Lt.-Governor's decision. As young registered apprentices, they were 
to form a useful element in society. 
Perhaps the phenomenon of the nineteenth centur,y in West Africa was the 
Liberated African. The story of his liberation b,y ships of the British 
1. Rowan Report 1827. 
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Navy and. of his location in Sierra Leone atter the condemnation of the slaver 
h1 the Vice-Admiralty Court established there has been told by Jean 
Hersltovits. l Once liberated, the procedure followed was "to deliver over -
all the men fit for His ~iajesty's service, apprentice a part of the remainder, 
and then to form villages2 with those who could not be disposed of." It 
was the land. problem which soon created a crisis as more and more Liberated 
Africans arrived for location. The situation on the hills lopes of Freetown 
where erosion was unavoidable became acute, while penetration into inland 
forests was dangerous because of the hostility of neighbouring tribes. In 
spite of numerous difficulties, the village-system instituted for these new 
arrivals h1 Governor Maxwell in 1814 worked well, resulting in the appearance 
of homogeneous communi ties carefully supervised by ~ianagers under the direct 
control of the Governor. 3 
It was, however, the apprenticeship system that attracted merchants and 
traders, not only in Sierra Leone but in the distant settlement of st. Mar,y's. 
The most influential merchants there had on their own initiative applied for 
apprentices from Sierra. Leone; and indeed ~jor Rowan found a handful of such 
children in the colony. William Forster had three boys and one girl between 
the ages of ten and thirteen; the boys had been put on board his vessel in 
the River "to be brought up as sailors, and the girl ••• put out to be taught 
1. Jean Herskovits, "Liberated Africans and the History of Lagos colo~ to 
1886", unpublished Thesis, Oxford University, 1960. 
2. Ibid. Chapters I & II. 
3. Herskovits, "Liberated Africans", Chapters I & II. 
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needlework~" Forster was satisfied with their progress but hesitated to 
express ~ opinion as to the economic benefits they would bring him. Yet 
the presence of Liberated African Apprentices in st. }~'s was for an 
economic purpose; for the merchants saw in the indenture system a possible 
answer to their seasonal labour problem when the natives of the River states 
who had sought employment in Bathurst during the dry season returned to their 
homes to farm crops. Charles Grant emphasised the precarious nature of an 
economy dependent on a spasmodic labour supply like theirs - where labourers 
came from the surrounding neighbourhood, and artificers and sailors from 
Goree. They therefore welcomed Liberated Africans in their midst to form 
"the useful class in Society," the class of artisans and labourers which 
could earn a comfortable livelihood in the settlement where wages were 
relatively high. l Of course they also hoped to keep labour dependent on 
them for as long as possible; and while they complained that their demands 
for apprentices from Sierra Leone had al~s exceeded the number of boys 
sent them, they were all agreed that the term of apprenticeship was too short, 
eighteen years being tar too tender an age to be responsible for oneself. 
Nathaniel Waterman admitted that had he realized that apprentices were not 
to be bound till the age of twenty-one he would never have applied for ~.2 
Officials too had become interested in the suggestion for a liberated 
African settlement in the Gambia. The year before merchants approached Rowan 
on the subject of apprentices, Chief Justice Rendall of Sierra Leone, who had 
1. Rowan Report 1827, Merchants' letters to Rowan, 1826. 
2. Rowan Report 1827, Merchants' letters to Rowan, 1826. 
been sent to report on conditions of that place had recommended that "one or 
two hundred Liberated Africans might be placed under the care of a Superin-
tendent" on some of the islands of the River like MacCarthy where they could 
cultivate land and soon relieve the Colonial Government of the burden of 
making provision for them. Beyond this, Rendall saw the planting of such 
government 'agents' in the midst of native tribes as the building of a bridge 
between that government and those tribes, "proving to the natives the real 
objects we are anxious to attain, and thus strengthen their confidence in 
our good intentions towards them •••• "1 In short, Liberated Africans would 
not only increase commerce with, but would spread civilization into, the 
interior of Africa. It was therefore not surprising that Najor Rowan too 
made recommendations for the location ot Liberated Africans in Gambia on a 
fairly large scale. 
This, unfortunately, provided the Government ot Sierra Leone with an 
ideal opportunity for reducing its criminal population as well as its sickly 
dependents. In the 'thirties, cargoes at 'Acoos', 'Congas', 'Hiboos', 
2 
'Mokos', 'Pappaws', 'Housas', - many in a very poor state ot health, and 
among them a good number ot hardened criminals - were landed at the port of 
Bathurst. Even in 1826 Rowan had observed that all who had been convicted 
of crime in the Assizes that year had come from the recent arrivals from 
Sierra Leone. The plight of maqy of them in the crossing from one port to 
another was vividly told by one John Foster Duffy, Master of the schooner 
1. C.O. 267/65, 1825, vol.l. 1st December 1824, Rendall to Hamilton. 
2. C.O. 87/16, 1835-36, Gambia Returns ot Liberated Africans, 22nd July 
1835, Rendall to Glenelg. 
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"Governor Campbell", commissioned to transport three hundred Liberated Africans 
from Freetown to Bathurst in November 1835. }~ had embarked naked and in 
a poor state of health; and as no blankets or clothing had been issued at 
Freetown for their use, Duff.y was obliged to distribute the mats, "duck frocks 
and kilts" which had been entrusted to him from England for deliver,y at 
Bathurst. Small-pox broke out soon after the ship sailed; twenty-eight died 
of the disease at sea, while the others arrived in Bathurst badly distressed by 
the cold weather at sea and only a short time to live. l 
In st. }~ts itself the picture remained a gloo~ one for ~ years. 
The Return for 1834 showed that on the 1st January that year there were alre~ 
548 Liberated Africans in the settlement; by June 1834 they had been joined by 
299 others, making a total of 847 distressed immigrants. In that period of 
six months 156 had died, and 305 had entered hospital. 2 This was· the greatest 
problem, unforseen to those who had advocated the advantages that would accrue 
to a colo~ dependent on commerce, from unlimited supplies of imported labour. 
That most Liberated Africans were unfit for work on landing in Bathurst became 
a serious liability to the Colonial Government, for the cost of maintaining 
such large numbers was almost prohibitive to a young coloqy in receipt of a 
small Parliamentar,y grant. The situation did not improve with the arrival of 
1. Ibid. 25th November 1835, Report of John Foster Duffy to George Rendall 
(c.o. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 
2. (Secretariat Archives, Gambia, Despatch No. 66, 16th October, 18)4, 
{ (Rendall to R.V.Hay) 
(Return of the number of Liberated Africans under the Government. 
more sick immigrants in the middle of the rainy season in 1832 and. 1833. 
The Hedical Report on these distressed immigrants for 1834 showed tha.t 
the most frequent illnesses were debility (very likely the result of malaria), 
dropsy, chronic diarrhoea, and ulcers. Various factors accounted for the 
low standard of health, such as "long confinement in 'slave-houses' prior to 
embarkation, want of cleanliness and ventila.tion on board 'slave ships', 
consequent alterations in dress, food, habits, and, not the least, change of 
climate. "1 In short, the horrors of the middle passage and the wastage of 
human lives had not been effectively reduced three decades after the Abolition 
Act of 1807. At first it looked as if these bewildered and emaciated souls 
would never do more than await relief from the settlement, not that the colony 
could afford to run a welfare service of the kind recommended by the Colonial 
Surgeons. Far from being provided with "airy, spacious and clean accommo-
dation, abundance of nourishing food, and. sufficient clothing", 2 the daily 
ration was 3d. per patient, and over ninety patients were crowded into the 
portion of the military hospital meant to hold forty: Some of them did 
survive to join the less sickly who had alre~ been located. 
As in Sierra Leone, the Governor was ultimately responsible for their 
welfare, for the Liberated African service in the Gambia was "founded upon 
) 
forms transmitted from Sierra Leone for our guidance." It was the special 
(C.O. 87/10, 18)4, vol.l. 
1. (Secretariat Archives, Gambia, 
( 
Despatch No. 26, 9th April 1834, Rendall to 
(Enclosure Medical Report for 1833 b,y Andrew Foulis 
R.W. Hay. 
and James Donovan. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Secretariat Archives, Despatch No. 66, 16th October 1834, Rendall to 
R.W.Hay. 
task of the Director of the Liberated African Department to locate the 
cargoes of immigrants which poured into st. Nary's in the 'thirties. On 
first arriving, the recaptives were directed to the Liberated African Yard 
for sorting, after which the comparatively healthy were immediately 
apprenticed to the merchants and their mistresses, to some of the Wolofs and 
the discharged soldiers. A quota of fit men was usually kept back in the 
Yard "as prisoners are kept in gaols" under gaolers, 1 specifically for 
employment on public works under the direction of the Clerk of Works. 
From October to December 1833, for example, this group was engaged in raising 
and widening the dyke embankment in Bathurst, at the rate of 6d. per person 
per day, the total amount of £49.19:6. being credited to a fund for their 
subsistence. 2 In 1841, Dr. Madden found some of them employed in making a 
new road towards O,yster Creek. After a period, these men on forced labour 
woUld be set free to find employment of their choosing, their allowance of 
provisions being continu~ for a short time after.3 
It was at Goderich village, at the extremity of st. Mar,y's Island, and 
in }~Cartqy Island that the Government undertook the ditficult task of 
rehabilitation through its own Managers. The purpose was to build up 
communities which would eventually become selt-supporting through their own 
1. C.O. 267/173, Madden Report, 1841. Section under Liberated Africans. 
2. (C.O. 87/10, 18)4, vo1.1. 
(Secretariat Archives, Despatch No.66, 16th October 1834, Rendall to 
R.W.H8\Ye 
3. Madden Report, 1841, Section'under Liberated Africans. 
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labours. For that reason brickworks and farms were started at Goderich 
specially for the "convalescent from hospital and those emaciated from former 
sickness and suffering ••• [who] were enabled to enjoy better food than their 
ordinary rations, with such light labour as was likely to be beneficial to 
1 them." \'hen sufficiently strong, they were sent on to !-facCarthy Island 
where they also made bricks and worked on farms, besides forming the greater 
part of the Militia force there. The Government's policy was al~s to 
apprentice as many as could find masters "owing to their having greater means 
2 
of employing them as sailors, canoemen, farmers and squarers of mahogany." 
Those who had to be located were placed with their countrymen in their first 
year and given plots for farming. Lord Glenelg, the Secreta.ry of state, 
did warn the Lt.-Governor, however, that it was not enough to place these 
newcomers on land, but that the Government was to "provide by all proper 
methods for the moral and religious instruction as well as for the physical 
t • th ••. ,,3 comfor o~ e ~r1cans ••• 
Thus the Government looked to the Wesleyan ~lission established in st. 
Mary's and its dependencies for assistance, but ReT. Thomas Dove, stationed 
at HacCarthy Island did not think conditions on that dependency favourable 
to the health or wellbeing of the recaptives. The diet consisted of boiled 
1. Secretariat Archives, Despatch No.66, 16th October 1834, Rendall to 
R.W.~. 
2. C.O. 87/14, 1836, vol.l. 14th July, Rendall to Glenelg. 
" " " 
" " 3rd Februa.ry, 1835, Glenelg to Rendall. 
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corn with no meat "and. the consequence is, many are going into eternity every 
. week." Those who managed to stay all ve had very little to incite them to 
industry. 1 Dove found them ignorant of the proper methods of cultivation, 
and suggested that the erection ot saw-mills might provide them with better 
employment. Such ventures, however, were to be left to private enterprise 
2 
as Lord Glenelg had suggested. Instead a great responsibility was placed 
on ~fana.gers and Overseers who had to provide work tor persons in a debilitated 
state with a disinclination tor work. It is not surprising that the Governor 
complained of "numerous changes and. inefticiency ot the Managers and Overseers 
at ~IacCartby Island" in his report of 1834.3 
It was probably the Government's aim to employ persons ot African descent 
as Managers in the hope that better understanding would be more easily 
established between them and the motley crowd. Mulattoes or Wolots from the 
Goree and Senegal settlers were the best qualitied. At aqy rate, in 1839, 
one Simon Pignard was appointed successor to Henry Steinbach. He was 
doubtless a native of Sene-Gambia, tor his previous post had been that of 
Government Interpreter ot native languages for which he was admirably suited, 
"being a very active, steady person, and. well practised in the Mandingo, 
Joloff, Syria and Joalla or Feloop languages besides speaking English and 
French fluently."4 The fact that a street in Bathurst was named after him was 
1. C.O. 87/16, 1835-36, Gambia Returns ot Liberated Africans, July 22nd 1835, 
Rendall to Glenelg. Enclosure - Letter from Thomas Dove, June loth 1835. 
2. C.O. 87/14, 1836, vol.1. 3rd Feb. 1835, Glenelg to Rendall. 
3. Secretariat Archives, Despatch No.66,16th October 1834,Rendall to R.W.H~. 
4. C.O. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 15th November 1834, Rendall to R.W.Hay. 
tribute to his public service. Yet it was not on Managers like Pignard 
that the future of the Liberated African depended but on the benevolence of 
merchants and traders in Bathurst. 
Only the mercantile community was equipped to teach skills that would 
enable the recaptives to earn their own living eventually, and perhaps attain 
a modicum of independence. Government contribution to their welfare was 
limited because of lack of funds, but merchants and missionaries carried on 
for maqy more years, especially through the apprenticeship system which worked 
fairly well for both parties. The commercial community was determined to use 
this new element in society for the expansion of business, while the Wesleyan 
}ussion was given fresh stimulus for activity. Within a period of five years, 
Thomas Joiner employed nearly a hundred apprentices, the majority of whom were 
put on his vessels trading up and down the River. Others were attached to 
carpenters , blacksmiths, wax-cleaners and lime-burners, the rest being employed 
as labourers and domestic servants. Over a longer period before 1835, Charles 
Grant had employed forty-two apprentices, and. Edward Lloyd, Edward Bocock, 
William Forster, John Pellegrin and other leading merchants had done likewise, 
some apprenticing a few more and others less. The Lt.-Governor himself 
indentured twelve servants and labourers to work in Government House; a 
discharged soldier who was making a living as a butcher found. himself an 
apprentice, so did the trader, the lime-burner, the wood- cutter. I The influx 
of cheap labour in the settlement was to be a great boon once that labour force 
could be mobilised. 
c.o. 81/16, 1835-36, Gambia Returns of Liberated. Africans, 25th JulY 1835, 
Rendall to R.V.H~. 
Lt.-Governor Rendall, anxious to facilitate this process had made the 
Indenture system fairly straightforward,l by which a person was apprenticed 
for a fixed number of years and promised "honestly, orderly and obediently 
in all things [to] behave ••••• " The J.laster on his part promised to teach the 
apprentice "the English Language, the principles of the Christian religion, 
and useful personal, domestic services, after the best manner •••• " 
Apprenticeships originally extended over a period of five years but the 
protests of merchants against a system which deprived them of the labours of 
apprenticed youths at eighteen had caused Najor Rowan to recommend the 
2 lengthening ot the period to seven years. While it may have been reasonable 
to apprentice children till the age ot twenty-one, it proved most injurious 
for adults to be bound to a ~ter tor seven years, even with board, lodging 
and clothing provided and a small monthly salar,y. In 1~39, all indentures 
were abolished.) This, however, was not to be the end ot apprenticeships 
in the Gambia, tor the system had to be revived to meet the refugee problem 
ot the mid-nineteenth century. On the whole, the system worked well in the 
settlement judging by the small number ot cases of hardship brought betore 
the courts. As Rendall put it: "This town is so small that the Colonial 
1. Ibid. See Enclosure; Secretariat Archives Gambia, Despatch No. 66, 
16th October 1834, Rendall to R.W.H~:-
£1.12s.6d. was charged for each Indenture to meet the expense of the 
apprentice's passage from Sierra Leone, "which sum is carried to the 
credit of the Liberated Africans in their accounts for subsistence." 
2. Madden Report, 1841, under Liberated Africans. 
3. Ibid. 
~o 
Secretary, the Director or myself must be made acquainted with any improper 
treatment should aQY persons be inclined to subject them to it." One 
safeguard against cruelty on the part ot Masters was the periodic inspection 
of all apprentices b.Y the Lt.-Governor. l 
Dr. Madden, having observed the place of Liberated Africans in st. Mary's, 
reported that it was "a most unsuitable home tor their moral development and 
tor tostering habits ot industr,y." With indentures abolished, employment 
had become a problem, especially as the land alloted them in and around 
Bathurst was sandy and swampy, depending on the seasons, so that they could 
not make a living as tarmers. Some earned a. living "as mechanics, sailors 
and la.bourers, but are tar behind the Joloffs and other natives of this part 
of Africa.",2 so wrote the Lt.-Governor. Indeed, Madden concluded that they 
had "been freed trom the horrors on board slave ships only to be faced with 
disease and privation in their freedom.,,3 Their children too were thoroughly 
neglected, he reported; there was not one at the only school in the town, 
even though some of the Wolofs sent their children to school with improved 
results in their behaviour. Liberated African children would appear to 
have been thoroughly neglected - "brought here in barbarism and •••• lett in 
1. C.O. 87/14, 1836, vo1.1. 14th July, Rendall to Glenelg. 
2. ~fadden Report, 1841, Lt.-Gov. Huntley to Dr. Madden. 
3. ~Iadden Report, 1841. 
barbarism •••• in a state of such ignorance and destitution •••• "l Yet this 
was not the whole picture since as apprentices to the merchants m~ of them 
were attached to semi-skilled workers for a number of years. 
It needed to be pointed out to the residents of st. Mary's that they 
were not, however, providing their young apprentices with opportunities for 
education in the sense in which it was understood in Sierra Leone. There, 
"no child who had not been in school at least twelve months could be 
apprenticed. ,,2; the Government could insist on this policy because funds 
were available, and teachers could be provided by the Church Missionary 
Society or other }lissions established in the colopY. Besides, society in 
Sierra Leone was composed of more prosperous elements and a larger bo~ of 
l educated citizens who themselves could influence public opinion, and the 
/ 
Government when necessary, towards philanthropy and particularly the education 
of Liberated African children. In the young settlement of st. ~~'s there 
was little to compare with this. For its mercantile community was still 
preoccupied with establishing its trade in th~ River, in Portendick, in the 
Casamance, for which labour, skilled and unskilled, was probably its most 
urgent need. The result was that the first generation, and sometimes the 
second and third too, of immigrants remained illiterate, forming the class of 
manual workers in st. Mar,y's. Their descendants fortunately were to enjoy 
school education provided not only by Missionary bodies, but b,y the Government 
itself. 
1. l-fadden Report, 1841. 
2. J. Herskovits, "Liberated Africans", Chapter II. 
The role ot Missions in the settlement will torm the subject ot further 
discussion; but it was the Wesleyans who were available at this time for 
moral and spiritual services to the newcomers. They organised catechumen 
classes tor young people between the ages ot sixteen and thirty-tive, as 
the Mission registers indicate, and subsequently ottered them Baptism at 
which their tribal names were replaced ~ the European names ot their sponsors 
1 Rendall, Forster, Grant, Lloyd, Goddard and others. This was part of the 
process ot civilization, and, superticial as the gesture might have seemed 
then, it came to assume deep significance among tuture generations of 
Liberated Africans, who telt a closeness with their European employers more 
than with the indigenous tribes in the River states. In order to obviate 
a social evil, the Missionaries put into force a policy ot "compulsory 
matrimo~" by which young men and women were partnered ott and married as 
soon after arrival as was practicable. In 1832, the }Ianager at MacCarthy 
Island was instructed "to tind good husbands tor the women, taking care to 
2 
marry them alw~s to their own country people •••• " On one occasion in 
1835, Rev. William Fox celebrated thirty weddings, taking the view that that 
3 
vas the lesser ot two evils; though Lt.-Governor Huntley reported that the 
system had proved quite unsatisfactory resulting in a number ot divorce suits.4 
It had been an attempt to produce cohesiveness in an otherwise scattered bo~ 
1. l-lethodist Mission Archives, Gambia, Register ot Baptisms 1831-1872. 
2. J.M.Gray, "History of the Gambia." , (Cambridge 1940) p.364. 
). Pox, "Briet Histor,r', p.373. 
4. Madden Report 1841, Lt .-Governor Huntley to Hadden. 
of distressed and bewildered immigrants to a strange land. With no common 
tribal organization, they were united only in the "fellowship in past 
suffering", lbut in the struggle for survival and for recognition, a community 
spirit emerged which was to be their most powerful weapon against oppression, 
and the greatest stimulus to self-help. 
The settlement founded in 1816, then, had maintained its heterogeneous 
character for the first half of the nineteenth century. Its diverse 
communities were dominated by the merchant oligarchy, which, in the absence 
of homogeneity, was able to establish allegiances and propose goals in the 
society. Having secured the confidence and support of the Colonial 
Government, the merchant group turned to the artisans and mechanics for the 
development of trade with capital which it provided. In short, while social 
barriers in st. ~~ts were fairly rigid, the communities on the Island were 
nevertheless interdependent, especially in the pursuit of commerce, and even 
in the defence of their homes. There was good reason ~ Thomas Joiner 
accompanied the Commandant or Lt.-Governor on ~ important mission undertaken 
to neighbouring chiefs and kings. Without mutual help the settlement would 
never have survived. The revenue alone depended upon the increase of trade 
which presupposed participation and cooperation b,y all communities. When 
Liberated Africans began to pl~ a prominent role in the commercial life of 
the Gambia settlement, they were no longer pitied and regarded as "the scum of 
the earth"; as the most reliable traders of the merchants, they came to 
assume leadership among Africans of Whatever origin in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. 
1. J.H.Gray, "History", p.365. 
CHAPTER III 
TRADE .AND PROTECTION IN THE RIVER GAMBIA 1816-1888 
For centuries the trade of the River Gambia had been organised by 
African long distance traders known in the Mandinka. language a.s Julas; and. 
when British merchants in St. Mary's began to establish business in the River, 
they found there a highly developed caravan trade with the interior. The 
whole of this trade pa.ssed through the hands of the Julas, whose responsibility 
it wa.s to conduct caravans from the remotest area.s to the banks of the Gambia. 
Passing the coffles from one Jula town to another, they protected and fed the 
/ 
;Travellers, and, by the influence they exercised in the Councils of the 
Native Chiefs, were often able to keep the roads open. For all these 
services, tor conducting a caravan to its destination, they expected a 
commission; and tor a long time they had received trom the/Trader to whom 
they conducted the travelling merchant and his goods, a premium ot 10% on the 
va.1ue ot the entire amolmt bartered. I The barter trade wa.s a diverse trade 
in gold, wax, ivory, hides and even slaves (notwithstanding the Abolition 
.Act), exchangeable for gunpowder, tobacco, rum, beads and cottons at the 
termini ot the trade routes - Yarbutenda and Fattatenda. These ports were 
situated in the kingdom ot Vuli at a distance ot about three hundred miles 
trom st. Mary's. Thus it was that a large entrep&t trade conducted in that 
1. c.o. 87/45, 1849, vol.l. 16th September, Blue Book Report, Governor G. 
MacDonnell to Earl Grey. 
kingdom increased the political influence of its king, and in consequence 
aggravated inter-state rivalr,y. 
Wuli then was the gat~ to the interior, and the trade flourished or 
declined as political relations between it and the interior states like 
Bondou improved or deteriorated. For this reason one of the major problems 
of the trade was an inevitable involvement in native politics for Government 
and merchants, necessitating treaties of friendship and protection with kings 
and chiefs of the River. It proved. a difficult task to organize legitimate 
trade through warring states without participation in such wars; but the 
hazards of the African trade were already familiar to merchants like Nathaniel 
1 Waterman who had had twenty years' experience of it. After all, negotiation 
for gum with truculent Moorish tribes on the banks of the Senegal had never 
been easy. Having been displaced. from the lucrative gum trade, however, in 
the process of which much valuable property had been lost,2 the merchants of 
st. ~~'s were not prepared to endure quietly further commercial trauma. 
They tended to react violently to native opposition, and whenever they did 
so, trade was the more injured. The nineteenth century was to be a dreary 
training period in the complicated art ot Native diplomacy. 
Governor Charles MacCarthy had very early understood the situation in 
the River and had pursued a conciliatory policy towards the natives with the 
result that a semi-military base had been established in the king ot Catabar's 
dominions in the middle River in 1823, with a view to extending trade. It 
1. C.O. 267/69, 1825, vol.5. 20th September, Matthew Forster to R.W.H~. 
2. e.o. 267/56, 1822, 21st January, C.MacCartby to Lord Bathurst. 
was interpreted by local potentates, however, as a political move. Indeed, 
Catabar's voluntar,y cession of territor,y to the British vas mainly to 
strengthen his defences against potential enemies, and to enhance his prestige 
by attracting commerce to his kingdom. This did not fail to arouse the 
jealousy of rival kings, especially those in the Upper River who saw their 
influence in the entrep8t trade threatened by the new arrangement. Wuli 
claims could not be ignored, for commercial prosperity either in Maccarthy 
Island or st. Mar,y's vas impossible without its cooperation. It was left 
to Governor Neil Campbell to sign a treaty of friendship with the newly 
elected king of Wuli, in continuation of the policy of tenuous alliances with 
native kings for the protection of traders. 
On the 15th May 1827, an Agreement was signed by Campbell and the king 
in the presence of three witnesses, one of them being John Riley, who did 
business at Fattatenda and "has resided in the Upper Gambia more than any 
other stranger •••• n l It was a treaty which placed a great deal of 
responsibility and trust on a ruler who himself was, in theor,y, a tributary 
to the king of Bondou. Its terms were comprehensive: 
Uhsubjects or property ot either party should be attacked or 
obstructed upon the River, the other party will use every exertion 
to obtain redress and to grant assistance. 
If two other parties are disposed to engage~ in hostilities, the two 
contracting parties before mentioned, will use their utmost exertions 
to prevent these extremities ••• 
The king of Wuli •••. engages not to allow ~ fellow creature to be 
sold or purchased within his territory ••• 
1. C.O. 267/82, 1827, l6th~, Neil Campbell to Lord Bathurst. 
<07 
King Qu.a.i engages to open the paths to Bondou ••• SO that the traders 
mavr come treely to Fattatenda with their gold, ivory, wax •••• n! 
There was no mention ot a stipend in the treaty itselt, but it was the custom 
tor the Colonial Government to otter such kings trom whom it sought protection 
tor traders an annual subsi~, generally paid in merchandise. 
" From Campbell's description ot Fattatenda - "only three thatched huts, 
2 
and very little trade" - it would seem that the object ot the merchants was 
to revive the trade which had been diverted from the Gambia to the Upper 
Senegal in the north, and the Nunez to the south, since the destruction ot 
James tort b,y the French in 1779. Indeed, a general optimism about the trade 
ot the interior was to be the driving torce behind mercantile enterprise in 
the River for ~ more decades. Governors were no less infected b,y this 
optimism; Campbell thought that for the pursuit ot trade the Gambia was "as 
fine a field as nature can offer in 8.QY part ot the world, trom a noble River, 
a productive soil, ••• and a tiner climate than [any] upon the Coast; besides 
the easy export ot valuable productions ••• abounding on the banks ot the 
River, or carried there.") 
The natural advantages ot a navigable river were to appeal to successive 
Governors ot the West African Settlements on their periodic visits to the 
Gambia settlement, and some ot them were inclined to think that ,the conduct 
of trade there was a simple matter, depending largely on the initiative of 
1. C.O. 267/82, 16th ~~, 1827, Neil Campbell to Lord Bathurst. 
2. Ibid. 14th l-fay. 
). Ibid. 16th ~. 
the merchants of st. ~·8. A very realistic report on the settlement had, 
however, been submitted by Mr. George Rendall, when Chief Justice of Sierra 
Leone, in 1824, in which he had empha.sised the hazards of long distance 
trading in the interior ot Africa. The greatest obstacle to the growth of 
the trade wa.s the difficulty of travelling far with safety, for which rea.son 
it was essential to provide "fixed points where [the natives] can alW8¥s 
command. a certain sale for their produc,e ••• otherwise ••• they neglect to 
gather or leave [trade goods] to waste rather than encounter the difficulties 
of the path •••• It Rendall showed how the French, by establishing a factory 
in Galam in the Upper Senegal had not only doubled the volume of trade in gold, 
ostrich feathers, wax and other commodities, but had actually tapped new 
1 
sources of gum. 
Throughout the nineteenth centur,y, French colonial policy in neighbouring 
Senegal and Casamance influenced both official and unofficial opinion in the 
Gambia. The merchants for their part came to regard government protection 
of trade as an obligation due to them. The most attractive side of French 
() 
protection was the maintenance of two stealn-boats on the Senegal in constant 
communication between st. Louis and all factories (often established with 
government assistance in stores and manpower) in the Upper Senegal, from which 
centres government agents were despatched into the interior to induce the 
. 2 Julas to lead their caravans to the b8Jlks of that river. It was such 
1. c.o. 267/65, 1825, vol.l. 1st December 1824, George Rendall to D.Hamilton. 
2. C.O. 267/65, 1825, vol.l. 1st December 1824, Rendall to Hamilton. 
sponsorship that the Gambia merchants expected from their government; and 
indeed the gum trade to Portendick was highly subsidized from imperial fundsl 
in compensation for the loss of the Senegal gum trade, which was found to be 
inaccessible from the Gambia, the gum forests being too far distant.2 
General Campbell suggested too that attitudes in st. Nary's were largely 
determined by a "vant of funds" on the part of its merchants, scarcely one 
of whom was not in debt to the House of Forster and Smith; and the Commandant 
confirmed this.3 Even so, a dozen of them, including Thomas Joiner, had 
promised to send. goods to the value ot £7,600 to open the port ot Fattatenda 
in 1829.4 Financial embarrassment was surely not unexpected in those early 
years of the settlement when,according to the merchants themselves, they had 
alre~ invested £250,ooo?in houses, store-rooms, river craft and merchandise in 
the hope of realizing substantial profits in the near future. Such hopes 
were not easily met even when government protection was afforded; and the 
pursuit of commerce in the River became a fierce struggle for economic 
Survival, not only from native aggression, but, unexpectedly, from French 
competition. 
1. C.O. 267/73, 1826, vol.3. 15th ~, Nerchants' letter to Sir Neil 
Campbell. 
2. C.O. 267/62, 1824, vol.3. 9th February, Hatthew Forster to the Board 
ot Trade. 
3. c.o. 267/82, 1827, vol.l. 16th ~, Campbell to Bathurst. 
4. c.o. 87/2, 1829, vol.l. 18th ~, V.Hutton, Colonial Secreta.ry, to R.V.H~. 
5. C.O. 87/1, 1828, vol.l. 6th ~~, Merchants' Memorial to W. Huskisson. 
'/0 
Disillusionment came to the merchants much sooner than the,y had imagined 
with the French reoccupation of their former factory at Albreda (fifteen miles 
above Bathurst) in 1817, a year after the founding of st. Mary's Island. 
The "comptoir" of Albreda was in extent only 400 yards by 300 yards, situated 
in a native town on the north bank of the River. It had no civil or military 
establishment, only a Resident who was a merchant from Senegal; and by 1822 
there was only one good house belonging to him, and three or four small ones 
occupied by a handful of French traders. l It would appear that it was the 
apparent insignificance of the place that had misled Governor MacCarthy, 
although his official reason for not preventing the French Commandant of 
Senegal from reoccupying Albreda was based on the Treaty of Paris (1814). 
This stipulated that His MOst Christian Majesty should be put in possession 
of all forts and places occupied by the French on the West Coast in the year 
1792. ~~Cart~'s only restriction was to prevent French vessels and traders 
2 from proceeding above Fort James (a short distance from Albreda). 
This re-occupation created serious tensions in the settlement for forty 
years, for not only did French commercial rivalry reduce British trade in the 
Gambia, but in this ~ the very revenues of st. Mary's were impoverished. 
"1 am ••• at a loss to conjecture," wrote .Acting Governor Hamilton in 1824, 
"why the late Sir Charles z.~Carthy suffered them to establish the factory at 
Albreda at the time we were forming the settlement at st. Mary's, and to have 
1. C.O. 267/72, 1826, vol.l. 16th June, K. Macaulay to Lord Bathurst. 
2. C.O. 267/47, 1818, vo1.1. 3rd January, MacCarthy to Bathurst. 
11 
continued there undisturbed Once established in the Gambia, the 
French were determined to st~, so that Albreda developed into a major 
diplomatic issue, necessitating constant, but fruitless, representations to 
the Government in France through the British Ambassador in Paris. While the 
problem remained unsolved, so long did the Gambia trade remain insecure and 
indeed ruinous to British merchants. Yet no hopes of prompt executive 
measures qy the French government were held out by Sir Charles stuart at the 
embassy. He could only see a solution lying in "the determination of H.M.·s 
Government to enforce their claims ••• by the expulsion of the French factories 
from the Gambia ••••• "2 It was not likely that the Foreign Office would 
exert itself in this direction over an insignificant British possession like 
the Gambia; and Albreda remained in French hands for forty years. 
At first the local government took no firm line against Albred.a; French 
vessels had free access to it, and were allowed to land cargoes there without 
p~ duties, provided that such vessels deposited their papers and invoices 
with the Collector of Customs in Bathurst before they proceeded up the River. 
~ goods landed in Bathurst itself were liable to pay the 6% duties paid ~ 
British merchants on foreign articles.) Similarly, ships of the French 
navy were expected to salute the British flag as they passed up the River. 
Thus the authorities attempted to establish their sovereignty to the River 
1. C.O. 267/60, 1824, vol.l. 24th November, D.Ham11ton to Bathurst. 
2. C.O. 267/55, 1821, vol.3. 11th Januar,y, Sir Charles stuart to Foreign 
Office. 
3. C.Oo' 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 8th November, G.Rendall to T. Spring Rice. 
Gambia guaranteed to them by the treaty ot Versailles ot 178) and confirmed 
at Paris in 1814; for the time being no adequate solution was proposed for 
the collection of customs duties from the French. Albreda, therefore, ver.y 
soon became a flourishing entrep8t for French goods, which were thence 
distributed ~ native canoes throughout the riverain states. When the 
Government saw the folly ot its own liberal policy, ~faeCartby urged the 
Secretar.y ot state for the colonies to exclude the French from the Gambia. 
An unceasing flow of petitions and letters emanated from the mercantile 
community which now saw its hopes ot an exclusive trade in the river 
threatened. 
It was, however, the creation ot Goree into a free port which had 
immediate repercussions on ~breda, converting it into a dep8t tor an 
extensive circulation of contraband goods, particularly cheap American 
tobacco and rum. As the merchants ver,y aptly put it, they now found 
themselves "cramped in their operations and their commerce ver,y material~ 
injured - the profits ot the fair and legitimate trader being wrested from 
his hands, ~ the facilities afforded for smuggling, which it is utterly 
impossible to prevent.t~l Vessels bearing French colours continued to enter 
the River loaded with coral, amber, brandy, rum, wine, tobacco and beads, 
of which rum and tobacco were the principal articles of trade and were by 
law forbidden entr,y into British colonies except in British vessels.2 The 
1. C.O. 261/56, 1822, vol.l. August, l-ierchants t Memorial to Lord Bathurst. 
2. C.O. 81/10, 1834, vol.l. 8th November, G.Rendall to T. Spring Rice. 
outcome was that those merchants who had agents in Goree began to import 
cheaper goods through Albreda for distribution to their factors in the River, 
rather than continue to import the same articles from England at higher prices 
with the problem of their disposal at profitable terms. l Whether they 
participated in the smuggling trade or not, the merchants were united in 
their indignation against French activities. Their grievances fell under 
four heads: cheaper goods of American origin glutted the limited Gambian 
market so that the English were undersold; this developed into an extensive 
contraband trade, which inevitably revived the slave trade, for "so long as 
the native merchant can safely carry on this nefarious but lucrative trade, 
it is in vain to point out to him any other source of profit •••• ,,2 The 
Commandant was able to detail the overland route followed from the banks of 
3 . 
the Gambia to the Senegal; but, what was equally disturbing, was the 
disastrous effects of the smuggling trade on the revenue; and not least, 
the discourtesy shown to the British flag b,y French men-of-war visiting 
Albreda.4 Memorials, despatches, letters b,y influential business men like 
Hatthew Forster, even personal representations by selected deputations of 
merchants to the Colonial Office, were not attended with success. 
1. C.O. 267/83, 1827, vol.3. 1st August, Resolution of the Board of Commerce. 
2. C.O. 267/56, 1822, vol.l. August, Merchants' Memorial to Lord Bathurst. 
3. C.O. 267/56, 1822, vol.l. 21st August, Alexander Grant to C.MacCarthy. 
4. C.O. 267/72, 1826, vol.2. 29th March, Alexander Findlay to Acting 
Governor K.Macaulay. 
When, in response to the urgent appeals of the merchants, Captain 
Alexander Findl~ on his own responsibility forbade all French vessels from 
entering the River till the British Government should decide what rights the 
French had there, he was severely reprimanded qy Lord Bathurst for threatening 
repressive measures against the flag of a country with which Britain was at 
1 peace. Nor could the Governors of the West African settlements bring 
permanent relief. In 1825 ~fajor General Turner did open the port of Bathurst 
to American tobacco and lumber for a year, "to enable the merchants to compete 
with that thrown in by [the French] from Goreee"2 To the merchants, however, 
no other solution seemed more reasonable than constituting Bathurst a free 
port like Goree. This alone the,y believed would redress the situation, and 
restore to the settlement the duties which were being enjoyed qy the Goree 
, 
Authorities.) Their proposal, unfortunately, was contrary to Orders in 
Council, which prohibited American Merchant vessels from entering British 
colonial possessions, and excluded French wines from free entr,y into such 
territories for want of reciprocity. Findl~ was reluctant to incur the 
displeasure of Lord Bathurst again for the sake of the mercantile community, 
and anxious though he was for their prosperity and for the collection of the 
revenue, he declared that it was "not in his power to accede to their 
t "4 reques s •••• 
, 
Without African middle men from the River states who became the 
organizers of the illicit trade, carrying the cheap goods from Albreda 
1. C.O. 267/80, 18th January 1825, Lord Bathurst to ~~jor General Turner. 
2. C.O. 267/80, 3rd July 1825, Turner to Bathurst. 
4. 
C.O. 267/83, 1827, vol.3. Resolutions of the Board of Commerce, 
1st A~t 1827. 
C.O. 267/83, 1827, vol.3. 22nd August, W.W.Lewis,Colonial Secretar,y, for Lt.-Gov. to Nerchants. 
directly to the markets in the Upper River,l it is not unlikely that the 
smaller merchant in st. !-Iary's might have acquiesced in a similar role with 
the possibility of making a comfortable living as supplier of contraband 
goods to the factories in the interior. For the interest of the chiefs was 
"to favour the introduction of goods amongst themselves on the cheapest terms _ 
2 
whether offered by the smuggler or the legal trader." In 8IlY event, there 
was a growing minority of French traders in st. Mary's wo had originated in 
Goree and who sometimes had relatives among the traders in Albreda itself, 
so that contraband goods would have been easily available to them. In 1828, 
for instance, a Nonsieur Ducand Valentine, a Mulatto from Goree, was one of 
the traders at Albreda (heavily suspected of slave-dealing), and in the same 
period there were at least two other Valentines trading from st. Mary's.3 
To these lesser business men, the large mercantile houses in Bathurst, 
disposing of merchandise at prohibitive prices, were as much an economic 
threat as the French with cheap goods at Albreda. Nevertheless, most of 
them were so closely attached to the leading merchants (often by consanguinity), 
that the mercantile community al~s spoke with one voice, all petitions 
purporting to represent equally the needs of a unified bo~. 
, 
It was perhaps to their advantage that at that stage, st. !-Iaryts was 
only an operational base for a trading community wose commercial activity 
1. 0.0. 267/65, 1825, vol.l. 1st December 1824. Rendall to D.Ham!lton. 
2. C.O. 87/48, 1850, vol.l. l8th~, Governor G.MacDonnell to Earl Grey. 
3. C.O. 87/1, 15th April 1828, Capt. Findl~ to R.W.H~. 
extended over a wide network of trade routes, not only eastward into the 
interior, but northward to Porlendick and the Saloum River, and southward to 
the Casamance and Bissagos Isles. The variety of the trade provided them 
with opportunity both to do some business on their own account and. to act as 
agents of those who were more prosperous and preferred the sedent~ life of 
, . 
Bathurst. In each area of trade, French competition had to be faced, and it 
was particularly )hllatto and. African agents who bore the brunt of the 
inconveniences of trade. Except for the Portendick trade, ever,y branch of 
trade had its 'fleet' of native canoes and. traders, who were its mainspring. 
They carried food supplies of corn, salt, salted fish, and bullocks from the 
Saloum River, and rice from the Casamance for the Bathurst market and the 
riverain tribes at the time of the year when food was shortest - during the 
rainy season. 1 So important were the branch trades of the Gambia, that when 
British merchants agitated against the French trade at Albreda, the Governor 
of Senegal, Colonel Schmaltz, made an equally strong protest to Sir Charles 
MacCarthy against the corn trade engaged in by the small craft of the Gambia 
"in the coasts and rivers situated between Cape Verde and the Gambia, a 
circumstance the more destructive to the interests of those inhabitants of 
,,2 Goree •••• In the Casamance region, too, the French showed every 
determination to secure a. monopoly of the tra.de with the natives; and by 
18)8 they were building a. tort in Seju situated in that River. Lt.-Governor 
1. C.O. 87/69, 1860, vol.l. 24th April, Governor G.dlArcy to Duke ot 
Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 267/51, 1820, vol.l. 16th June, C.MacCart~ to Lord Bathurst. 
Clogstoun and the merchants of st. ~'s suspected that the object of the 
naval demonstration which accompanied its erection was to "refuse to allow 
English vessels to proceed above Seju ..... 1, as they had barred entry into the 
Senegal. 
From the foundaj;ion of the settlement, Conmandants and Lieutenant-
Governors were in full sympat~ with mercantile aspirations in matters of 
trade, for on their prosperity depended the swelling of the revenue, and the 
stability of the settlement. That was the reason for Captain Findl~'s firm 
line against the French whose evasion of customs duties had reduced the revenue 
of 1824 from £4.000 to £2000. Wi thout adequa.te funds, he complained that he 
could neither p~ off debts owed by Government, nor meet current expenditure, 
or -"recover the settlement in general from the ruinous state it is now in •••• ,,2 .: 
It was, however, not only the French who were blamed for the emptiness of the 
Colonial Chest, but the West African administrative machiner,y itself where 
power was concentrated in a Governor and Council stationed at Sierra Leone, 
who formulated policies for all the settlements on the Coast. In their 
: . 
. ' 
~ 
memorials, the merchants constantly argued that restrictive trade policies, 
vigorously enforced from Sierra Leone were "ill adapted to the local situation", " 
wi th which the Authorities in that place were unfamiliar, resulting inevitably 
in a "deficiency in the amount of duties levied in the settlement, and still 
greater deficiency in the amount of Exports.") And in this view they had 
1. C.O. 87/19, 1838, vol.l. 1st ~, Lt.-Governor Clogstoun to Lord Glenelg. 
2. C.O. 267/60, 1824, vo1.1. 6th November, Findlay to Hamilton. 
3. C.O. 87/1, 1828, 6th ~, Merchants' Memorial to William Huskisson. 
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official support. 
It was official policy, too, to give whole hearted support to whatever 
ventures were undertaken b,y the mercantile community for increasing the 
volume of trade and thereb,y improving the state of colonial funds. The 
l830s saw the revival of commercial activity in the Upper River and even in 
Portendick. In May 1831, Lt.-Governor Rendall reported the incorporation of 
the Tendah Company with a capital ot £5000 with the object ot exploiting the 
1 
resourc'es of the interior, beyond the Barracunda Falls. This was to be 
part ot. a grandiose scheme to form "caravans of the discharged soldiers ••• 
maqy of whom are natives of those countries from whence the most valuable 
trade might be derived •••• " It was hoped that these recruits vauld make 
reliable agents, able to transact business "with the native merchants of 
Africa, the Toocolors, Serawoollies, and ~fa.ndingoes who trade in cotfles 
backwards and forwards from this River to Sego, Bourrie, Timbuctoo, ••••• ,,2 
Rendall was most enthusiastic about the project, and advocated Government 
support and protection in return for an offer ot 1% ot capital proposed b,y 
the merchants. No less willing was he to give his blessing to the Banankon 
comp~ formed a few months later on the representation of a French gentleman 
named Monsieur Duranton who was married to the daughter ot the Moorish Chief 
of Kasson. He arrived in st. Mar,y's to negotiate for the gum ot the tribe 
of Aulad en Barik, which he claimed could reach the Gambia via Ba.n.ankon near 
Barracunda, provided annual customs could be guaranteed to the king of BOndou 
1. C.O. 87/5, 1831, vol.l. 14th ~ 1831, Merchants' letter to G.Rendall. 
2. C.O. 87/5, 1831, 17th Nay, Rendall to n.w.Hay. 
(through whose territories the caravans would travel), and the king of Vuli 
(in whose kingdom the gum factor,y would have to be established).l Government 
gave support to the negotiations and sent presents of bafts and other goods for 
the Moorish chief and the king of Bondou.2 The merchants themselves were not 
slow to follow this up, for it seemed that their dreams of a lucrative gum 
trade on the banks of the Gambia were about to come true. They immediately 
despatched one of their number, John Grant, to ascend the River and pave the 
way for the newly formed companies by opening friendly relations with the 
interior chiefs. 3 This was still not the full extent of commercial enterprise: 
for the same merchants were members of the Portendick Compaqy which had 
prospected for gum in Portendick for nearly ten years. Fairly substantial 
~--
investment in trade was the general policy; and the fact that they never made 
substantial profits was often due to the disturbed state of trade areas. 
A feature of the trade was its fluctuation between good and bad times, 
an irritant to the mercantile community and the Administration. Years of 
optimism and speculation were almost invariably followed by disaster and 
depression when traders were caught in the cross-currents of native politics 
in the River. The Barra War of November 18)1, tought on the doorstep of st~ 
Nary's, was a struggle for survival; and, but for the very timely reinforce-
ments despatched from Senegal under one Captain Louvel, the history of the 
1. C.O. 87/5, 1831, 30th August, Rendall to R.W.H~. 
2. C.O. 87/5, 18)1, vol.l. 30th August, Rendall to Hay. 
3. Ibid. 
too 
settlement might have been ve~ different. The Lt.-Governor himself 
attributed "the salvation of Bathurst from the most disastrous consequences" 
to French assistance. l The mercantile community pl~ed its part in the 
Colonial Militia, both actively in the field and securing the defences at 
home; and some of its agents and supercargoes appeared on the casualty list. 
Success in Barra, however, had seemed to prove the effectiveness of a policy 
of force towards native rulers, so that when Wuli put up trade barriers the 
merchants advocated repressive measures to force them down. But that kingdom 
at a distance of nearly three hundred miles could not be so easily coerced as 
Barra, three miles across the estuary. 
The struggle with Wuli was to develop into a commercial war between 
trade rivals. Drawing on their European experience, the merchants of st. 
Mar,y's called a meeting under the chairmanship of William Forster, and 
unanimously resolved to l~ an embargo on the Upper River, and "abandon the 
Wuli ground altogether ••• and positively to object and refuse to l?8\Y' the 
lodging Bars or Customs imposed by the Julas until such time as they shall 
t ' ,,2 have made repara l.on •••• The reason for the interruption ot trade and 
the interception ot John Grant's mission into the interior, was the 
deterioration ot good relations between Wuli and Bondou. Concerted action 
against Wuli showed a determination at purpose and a great deal ot resilience 
in the mercantile bo~, which, less than a year before was demoralised in 
1. c.O. 87/5, 1831, 15th November, Rendall to Hay; C.O. 87/6, 1832, vol.l. 
21st November, Merchants' Memorial to Capt. Louvell. 
2. C.o. 87/6, 1832, vol.l. 25th June, Herchants' Public Heeting. 
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face of possible defeat from Barra. It demonstrated, too, an unfortunate 
misconception of native mentality - a naivete towards seasoned native men of 
business. A "blockade of the Upper River"l ports was in fact attempted, 
but with damaging results to the trade of the Gambia, for the Julas merely 
diverted their caravans to the French factories on the Senegal. This turn 
of the tables was bemoaned by the merchants three years later, and at a public 
meeting in October 1835, a resolution was adopted for throwing open the trade 
"without delay", and for establishing a factory in an eligible spot in the 
Upper River. Further, they recommended the concluding of a treaty with the 
chiefs of that region through Government mediation.2 Attempts at penetrating 
the upper River had never been successful. As early as 1829, William Hutton 
when acting Lt.-Governor had actually secured a cession of land at Fattatenda 
from the king of Wuli,' but the treaty was never sanctioned. 
Now the merchants tried again for a vigorous Government trade policy 
there; they petitioned for the erection of a small fort to be garrisoned by 
Liberated Africans, under which their traders would find protection.4 In 
other words, the patterns of st. Mary's and HacCarthy Island. were to be 
reproduced in the Upper River; only thus did the merchants hope to shift the 
traders' frontier from the seaboard to the distant hinterland, and the 
1. c.o. 87/12, 1835,vol.l. 2nd November, Herchants' letter to Rendall. 
2. C.O. 81/12, 1835, November 2nd, Herchants' Petition to Rendall. 
3. c.o. 87/2, 1829, 18th~, V.Hutton to R.W.H~. 
4. C.O. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 12th June, Merchants' Petition to Rendall. 
loz 
monopoly of the interior trade se.cured. They required the Government to go 
further and regulate that trade by "reducing ••• Customs from 10% to 5%", 
and b,y limiting those customs to the principal articles of trade such as gold, 
ivory, wax, hides or gum, "but that the spurious traffic in country cloths, 
1 
colas, dates, butter, horses etc. be wholly exempted." 
Such a policy, if pursued, could not have been in the best interests of 
trade, for trade relations could not improve where there was a lack of 
confidence. Caught between the substantial customs of the Julas, and "hea-vy 
duties p~able in England upon African produce, particularly upon beeswax, 
hides, ivory and mahogany, which are the staple articles of trade in this 
River, ,,2 the merchants cried for relief. Typically, they demanded relief 
at the expense of their indigenous counterpart, exemplified in this .instance 
in the proposal for the total abolition of taxes on horses and kolas, 
articles in great demand in the River. Indeed, so important were kolas for 
the trade, that in another generation the Government of st. Mar,y's was 
collecting a substantial revenue from kola nut duty, a tax which fell heavily 
on Liberated .African entrepreneurs. If the merchants of the 1830s had been 
willing to take into consideration "the difficulties of the path" emphasized ......... 
b,y Chief Justice Rendall ten years earlier, they might have been better able 
to understand Jula politics. 
Protection of trade outside British jurisdiction was to be the dilemma 
of the Gambia settlement in the nineteenth century. Trade could naturally 
1. C.O. 87/12, 1835, 24th October, Merchants' Public Heeting - Resolution. 
2. C.O. 267/56, 1822, vol.l. August, Merchants' Hemorial to Lord Bathurst. 
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not flourish until capital was sunk into it, yet the unsettled. state of the 
River and the turbulent character of insecure native chieftains prevented 
commercial elements from that speculation which might have drawn "an extensive 
trade from the interior which now finds an outlet in the River Senegal and 
1 Portuguese Settlement of Geba •••• " Neither local officials nor British 
merchants recognised that African opposition to inland penetration was 
_ legitimate. An alliance at this time between their stumbling block, the 
king of Yuli, and one ot his neighbours, king Kemingtang of Upper Niani (a 
2 bitter rival of Catabar who was alleged to have slain his father), was 
regarded as merely a hostile demonstration b,y predator,y chiefs. The latter 
they described as a "lawless plunderer who waded through blood to the throne, 
and. who is still received with terror and distrust by his neighbours.") 
This at least should have warned them to move cautiously, but Lt.-Governor 
Rendall was bent on subduing another enemy of his merchants. There was 
apprehension that valuable property in vessels and capital should be at the 
mercy ot e:ny ''Warlike Chief" who fancied them; the estimate of capital 
circulating in the River trade in 1835 was placed at £60,000, seven vessels 
4 
with valuable cargo being engaged in the trade. 
l-Iatters came to a head with the seizure of the "Ora" (a schooner belonging 
to Messrs. Goddard and Joiner), her cargo plundered and two of her crew 
1. 
2. 
C.o. 87/11, 1835, 2nd November, }Ierchants' Petition to Rendall. 
J.H.Gray, "History". p.335. 
c.o. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 12th June, Merchants to Rendall. 
c.O. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 12th June, Herchants' letter to Rendall. 
detained by Kemingtang who threatened to seize all vessels passing his port 
of Sarrnee, and indeed to detain the "Ora" until his people seized by a 
Bathurst trader named Saloum Jobati were returned to their home in Niani. l 
Such were some of the complications of the trade. Unfortunately a punitive 
expedition against Kemingtang's impregnable fortress at Dungassen resulted in 
humiliating defeat for the troops under Lt.-Governor Rendall and Captain Fraser ~ 
S who beat a hasty retreat abandoning their canfns2 which the king with much 
ostentation mounted on his fortress. lIe had demonstrated his threat to make 
the Whiteman have some respect for him, even if they had none for aqy other 
chieftain.3 Like rw.y other trade, the Gambia trade required a "pax", but 
that was not to come till the end of the century when a Protectorate was 
established and a tribunal instituted in the riverain states to settle 
disputes of aggression between native subjects and British merchants and 
traders of st. Nary's. Until this step was taken, all parties took the law 
into their ow hands. Usually a native chief avenged an injury done to him 
by seizing trade goods in his domain, while the merchants on their part were 
never slow to petition the Administrator, impressing him with the "necessity 
of immediate~ repelling such gross outrage to prevent the contagion 
spreading ••• and convince the surrounding Chiefs that such acts of 
aggression will not be allowed to pass with impunity •••• ,,4 As they had the 
1. C.O. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 28th }~, W.H.Goddard to Rendall. 
2. C.O. 87/14, 1836, vol.l. 11th January, Rendall to Lord Glenelg. 
. 3. C.O. 87/10, 1834, vo1.l. 21st August, Rendall to R.W.Hq • 
4. c.o. 87/10, 1834, vol.1. 12th June, Herchants' letter to Rendall. 
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Administrator's ear in those early years, abortive attempts were often made 
to redress their grievances, but refracto~ chiefs proved difficult to bend 
or break. Kemingtang therefore remained the Warrior of the River till his 
death in 1842. 
EXperiences of trade were as wearisome in Portendick as in the River 
Gambia, for the French Merchants of Senegal were as anxious to exclude 
British merchants from the gum coast as the British were determined to remove 
French merchants from the River Gambia. Senior merchants of st. Mar,y's with 
their associates in London had formed themselves into the Portendick Compaqy 
in 1821;1 and in spite of accompaQYing frustrations the gum trade was perhaps 
the most satisfying of the trades pursued from st. )mry's. Here at least they 
enjoyed Government support to a remarkable degree - extending from the provision 
of annual customs in bafts, pistols, scarlet cloth, and other merchandise for 
the MOorish chiefs, to the stationing of a man-of-war between st. Mar,y's and 
Portendick during the gum season.2 Precedent had been found in the conduct 
of that branch of commerce in Senegal before 1816. Indeed, before his 
departure from Senegal, }fucCartqy had entered into a treaty with the Trazza 
MOors which proved of a great advantage to British merchants in st. }~'s. 
1. 
2. 
C.O. 267/62, 1824, vol.). 9th February, Matthew Forster to Board of Trade. 
c.o. 267/56, 1822, vol.l. 21st June, ~~Cartby to Lord Bathurst-
C.O. 267/57, 1822, vol.7. 21st December, Simon Samuel to Coloni~l Office. 
10 7 
The gum trade was 'big business' and virtually the monopoly of those who 
could risk substantial capital; competition was therefore limited, and when 
business was good large profits were guaranteed. 
But "a system of fraud and deception •••• carried on by buyers and 
sellers" at Portendick destroyed the confidence necessary to carr.y on trade,l 
as HacCartby saw it. The Moors importuned for larger presents, or an 
advance on account of the next year's customs; and sometimes were rightly 
suspicious that lighters tried to load gum at night without paying customs. 
Generally, it was internal strife among the Noorish tribes themselves, 
purposely instigated ~ the French, it was believed, which interrupted trade 
there. In 1824, Matthew Forster, the accredited agent of the Portendick 
Comp~ commissioned to ship goods required for the purchase of gum and to 
manage the sale of that article in the London market, complained of French 
machinations in the Portendick trade. ~ "briber,y and intrigue," French 
merchants encouraged by their local government "succeeded in exciting the 
jealousy of some of the Moorish chiefs against those tribes that were 
favourable to our undertaking •••• It, so he wrote to the Board of Trade. The 
object of this as Forster supposed.was to ruin the British trade and defeat the 
objects of the comp~;2 and he would seem to have been supported in this 
view by a letter from }.mer Hoctar, king of the Trazzas, who, in a lengthy 
letter of 1826 to the Commandant of st. Mar,y's disclosed how the French had 
1. C.O. 267/58, 1823, vol.l. 30th June, ~~cCartby to Robert Wilmot, M.P. 
for Lord Bathurst. 
2. c.o. 267/62, 1824, vol.). 9th February, Matthew Forster to Board of 
Trade. 
tried to compel him to abandon trade with the British at Portendick.1 An 
attempt had been made under Major (formerly Ca.ptain) Grant to remonstrate 
with the French Authorities in 1823, but the French Governor while giving 
assurance that he would prevent any further interference from his merchants 
denied aqy knowledge of aqy encouragement given to the natives to oppose 
British trade. 2 
The Portendick Compaqy, however, was not to be discouraged. in their 
108 
commercial venture, their efforts to extend the gum trade being rewarded by 
the export of ninety tons of gum in 1823,3 and over one hundred and forty tons 
in 1824.4 In 1826 the estimate was "about one hundred tons annually which 
produces a. revenue to the Mother Country of about .£1,200.,,5 So flourishing 
did the trade become, that the Secretar,y of state proposed that presents for 
the chiefs ought to be made the responsibility of those merchants who traded 
to Portendick. Government presents, however, were still being received. for 
the MOors in the 'forties, as a result of petitions submitted by the merchants. 
They pleaded for the preservation of the gum trade as "a counterpoise to the 
French factory .llbreda", a trade which they could not carry on without the 
1. C.O. 267/73, 1826, vo1.3. [no date]. 
2. c.o. 267/59, 1823, Yol.2. )rd Februar,y, William Forster to Matthew 
3. 
4. 
,. 
Forster. 
C.O. 267/62, 1824, Yol.3. 9th Februar,y, Matthew Forster to Board of Trade. ' 
C.O. 267/61, 1824, vo1.2. 23rd August, Captain Courten~ to Lt.-Co1one1 
Grant. 
C.O. 267/73, 1826, vo1.3. 15th May, V.Forster, Ed.Lloyd & others to 
Sir Neil Campbell. 
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subsidy of four hundred pieces of baft since all trading vessels to Portendick 
were obliged to pay customs double that in amount By 1830, the 
customs demanded by the Moors were found to be so exorbitant that the trade 
was suspended by the merchants. 
When the trade was resumed a few years later, it was the activities of 
the French which created another crisis. In 1834, Messrs. Pellegrin and 
Forster despatched the schooner "Rebecca", a vessel of forty-eight tons, and 
the brig "Governor Temple" of one hundred tons, to trade in gum. The two 
vessels together carried customs to the value of £1,200, and a supercargo to 
strike the deal with the Hoors. 2 The vessels returned to st. Mary's laden 
with three hundred and seventy-nine tons of gum valued at £30,000, and their 
owners prepared to return them to Portendick immediately "as they state there 
are large quantities of gum still lying there." On the second voyage, they 
were accompanied by two other vessels, the "Industry" carrying customs of 
.£1000 and sent by lfr. Finden, and the "Natchless" with customs valued at 
£1,500 sent by Mr. Isaacs. It was while John Pellegrin was ashore at 
Portendick negotiating with the Noors that a French brig of war, the "Dunois" 
arrived and challenged the right of British merchants to trade on the shore 
"at anchor". Pellegrin and John Hughes, supercargo of the cutter "Industry", 
were held prisoners for four d~s and eventually transported in the "Dunois" 
~o r~ort to ~he Governor of Senegal. Their lmowledge of French was at least 
an advantage in their dispute with the Commander of the French brig, 
1. Ibid. 
2. C.O. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 30th August, G.Rendall to R.W.H~. 
1(0 
especially as Captain Eunson, ~Ia.ster of one of British ships, needed an 
interpreter to explain to him wqy his vessel had been seized. 1 The incident 
developed into a diplomatic complication between the Governments at st. Louis 
and st. }~'s; Lt.-Governor Rendall made protest to Senegal for the acts of 
the "Dunois", and forwarded the compensation claims submitted by the merchants. 2 
In both the Senegal and the Gambia trade was almost an activity of government, 
and though its success depended on private enterprise rather than on state 
aid, Governors and Lt.-Governors concerned for the welfare of their settlements 
could not afford to ignore overtures made to them by commercial communities. 
Protection of trade was in fact closely related to defence, and in 
Senegal the steam-boat policy on that River was an aspect of naval defence. 
Merchants of st. }~'s were therefore not only concerned for the protection 
of their property up the River Gambia, but equally disturbed about the 
defenceless state of st. Mar,y's against possible invasion from Senegal in the 
event of a European war. In the 1830s Governors and merchants were 
particularly anxious for "an armed vessel" in the River,3 though it had alw~s 
featured in earlier petitions. It was the Barra War which had pointed so 
clearly to the advantages of a colonial vessel in the settlement. Rendall 
even suggested that a steamer would be even more serviceable and much cheaper 
1. C.O. 87/10, 1834, vol.l. 30th August, Rendall to R.W.H~, Enclosure 
of Affidavits of Super Cargoes. 
2. C.O. 87/10, 18)4, vol.l. 12th August, Rendall to Governor of Senegal. 
3. C.O. 267/82, 1827, vol.2. 10th June, Neil Campbell to Bathurst. 
to run than a sailing ship "from the facilities of obtaining wood and the 
amount of freight which might be obtained from the merchants •••• ,,1 The 
/(( 
Colonial Office, however, continued to turn inattentive ears to ~ 
representations which might tax the slender resources of the Gambia settlement, 
or make a claim on imperial funds. Since a vessel was provided for the 
Governor of the West African settlements, Lt.-Governors were expected to 
hire vessels from merchants when need arose. This unsatisfactor,y state of 
affairs was only put an end to by the recommendations of the Hadden Report 
of 1841 which were adopted by the Select Committee of the House of Commons. 
In 1843 then the "Wilberforce", an old vessel, was sent from England, but she 
was ill-suited to the Gambia, where she was wrecked two years later. The 
"Albert", a condemned vessel and equally ill-suited for the general purposes 
of the River, replaced the "Wilberforce". It was not, however, till the 
"Dover" arrived in November 1848 that it was possible to establish regular 
communications between the different stations on the Gambia; and by allowing 
her to ca.rr,y freight and passengers at fixed rates, the Governor hoped trade 
2 
would be fostered. 
1. C.O. 87/6, 1832, vol.l. 23rd July, Rendall to Lord Goderich. 
2. C.O. 87/48, 1850, 29th July, Governor MacDonnell to Earl Grey. 
U2.. 
By this date, however, the nature of the Gambia trade had undergone 
significant changes. It was shifting from a diverse trade in Interior 
commodities to a staple trade in Groundnutso This was virtually the 
creation of an agricultural econo~ under direct Government sponsorship. 
Governor MacDonnell had been the first official to shake the optimism about 
the trade of the Interior after his first expedition to the Barracunda Falls 
in 1849. He then concluded that he ~ou1d see no near prospect of aQY great 
development of commerce between the Gambia and the hinterland; for one thing, 
the French enjoyed a geographical advantage from their situation in the upper 
Senegal, and for another, the frequent wars between Vuli and Bondou were "a 
drawback to commerce". The main obstacle to the extension of trade in that 
area was the sad fact that "it does not p~." Not only were its inhabitants 
and towns of the poorest quality with "nothing to induce a merchant", 1 but 
this was likely to continue the state of affairs for a long time. It was 
hardly an encouraging prospect to merchants who had a1w~s believed in an 
'Eldorado' in the interior of Western Africa. 
The groundnut had been cultivated in the Gambia since the days of the 
portuguese, but had remained an article for home consumption. It was in 
1835 that it was first regarded as an article of commerce, when over forty-
2 
seven tons were exported and fetched nearly £200, though a small number of 
baskets had actually left the settlement prior to this date. In 1837, the 
1. C.O. 87/45, 1849, vol.l. 16th September, HacDonnell to Earl Grey. 
2. C.O. 87/45, 1849, vol.1. 16th June, }~Donnell to Earl Grey. 
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colony exported over six hundred tons, two-thirds of which went to foreign 
states, especial~ the French ports of Bordeaux and Marseilles, where the nuts 
were refined into edible oil and the waste product sold as cattle fodder. 
A quantity of handpicked nuts was usually reserved for the ~lish market, 
where it was sold as confectionery. In 1841, Dr. }fad.den reported a growing 
trade in nuts, and a significant decrease in the traditional exports of gold, 
ivory, wax, gum ••• 1 Indeed the greater industrialization of Britain was to 
have ,a direct influence on West African oil products, especial~ palm kernel 
and groundnut. The rise in the demand for soap for personal hygiene, the 
substitution of metal for wooden machinery, and the development of railw~s 
caused a steep rise in the use of oil as a lubricant. West African oils 
therefore found reaQy markets in Europe since existing sources of animal fats 
were not only inadequate but sometimes unsuitable. 
Both the local Government and the Wesleyan }lission, engaged in the task 
of civilising the Ldberated Africans, saw this~in opportunity for channelling 
this new labour force to groundnut cultivation. At MacCarthy Island the 
Mission employed them on its model farms, with a view to showing them a means 
of earning a 1ivelihood.2 It was not, however, in the role of producers of 
the crop, but as middlemen, traders and agents of groundnut-b~ng mercantile 
houses that they were to make their unique contribution to the growth of the 
new trade. Like the old trade in gold and ivory, the groundnut drew a 
1. C.O. 267/173, }~en Report, 1841. 
2. William Fox, "A Brief History of the Wesleyan Missions", (London 1851) 
pp.409, 427. 
migrator,y population from the distant Interior to the banks of the Gambia. 
Companies of Serawulis, Tilibonkas and others who had made up the caravans 
of earlier years, became the "strange Farmers" of the River. l Arriving in 
April or May, they attached themselves to the households of chiefs, all~lis 
and headmen of villages and farmed nuts for a few seasons before they returned 
to their original homes. By native law and custom, they were granted 
temporar,y ownership of land in return for certain fees and services; and 
without this regular labour force, the exports of groundnuts from the Gambia 
would have been insignificant. For, contr~ to expectation, the Liberated 
African was reluctant to become a full-time farmer. The new trade then 
reinforced rather than destroyed that bridge between the merchants of st. 
Mar,y's and the Interior which had always been one of the most prominent 
features of the Gambia trade. 
When strange Farmers were arriving on the River banks, so were the agents 
and traders from st. ~'s converging on the trading ports for the opening 
of the "Trade Season". Until the season was over - the nuts shipped end the 
planters dispersed - the riverain states and their rulers were the focus and 
life-blood of the Gambia. For a good Trade Season was its objective; on 
it depended not only its prosperity, but its ver,y existence. The Government 
at st. Mary's lmew it as well as the merchants, and so did native princes -
an awareness which resulted in involved diplomacy between Government and 
peoples, like a game of chess on the riverboard~ In this highly skilled 
1. C.O. 81/45, 1849, vol.l. 16th June, MacDonnell to Gr~. 
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game, the merchants and the native chiefs were the major pieces; the 
Government, the planters, the Mulatto and African traders were in general the 
paws. 
In a sense, it was Government initiative in signing treaties with the 
more important chiefs which commenced operations. Such treaties aimed at 
creating safe zones within which traders could operate. To a limited extent, 
too, the Executive was prepared to make a show of force in fulfilment of 
treaty obligations. For example, a detachment of troops had been stationed 
at ~cart~ Island since its occupation in 1823; and, twenty years later, 
in keeping with treaty cOmmitments,l Lt.-Governor Huntle,y stationed troops in 
the foreign state of Catabar to restore tranquility and check the meditated 
attack of Kemingtang. Customs to chiefs were purely utilitarian, so that 
when a subsidized chief was no longer competent to protect British traders, 
he was at great risk of losing his annual stipend. B,y the 'seventies, this 
same kingdom of Catabar had been overrun" first by one }.Ja.ba of Baddibu, and 
after his death by his brother, l-Ia.hmoud n'Dare Bah, and the king was no longer 
in a position to afford protection.2 Thus·on the 6th of October 1873, the 
Governor of st. Mary's signed a new treaty with the de facto government lIhich 
suspended the original treaty with Catabar, and increased the stipend for 
protection from £33.6.8. to £110 per annum. 
1. ~~en Report, 1841. 
2. C.O. 87/105, 1873, vol.2. August, Treaty between H.H. Cooper and 
- Mahmoud n'Dare Bah. 
Governors generally thought it was wise to follow events as they 
occurred and to formulate policy accordingly. In far awavr Bondou, too, 
treaties were entered into with its ruler, the Alm~, for the protection of 
1 
traders. From 1870 till 1889 (when Bondou fell into the French sphere of 
influence qy the delimitation of the boundar,y) , ~ collected an annual 
stipend of £50 from st. Mar,y's. Indeed, the item "Aborigines" which covered 
all stipends, bore heavily on the annual Expenditure of the settlement. It 
was a policy supported by the Colonial Office as being efficient and 
inexpensive; yet it was fraught with difficulties, as Governor HacDonnell 
had shown in 1849. His view was that "in general, the making of Treaties, 
except under ver,y peculiar circumstances, is not a beneficial mode of 
conducting our relations with the natives ••• [they] entail permanent 
obligations binding on us but easily evaded or rendered nugator,y by the 
natives •••• " Where there were at least forty-five "petty Icings" on every 
one of whom depended the safety of property and the wellbeing of traders, it 
could not be a systematic policy which only recognised half their number and 
bestowed favours exclusively on that half.2 
The privileged chiefs themselves never intended to forego their right 
of declari~ war, or, of engaging in war as allies, when they signed 
treaties with the British and accepted stipends from them. While accepting 
responsibility for British subjects who had been given permission to trade 
1. 
2. 
c.o. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 23rd Februar,y, He~ Fowler to l~jor Bravo; 
C.O. 87/97, 1870, vol.2. 28th October, .Acting Administrator Anton to 
Governor A.E.Kenne~. 
C.O. 87/45, 1849, 16th September, l-la.cDonnell to Earl Grey. 
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in their territories, it was not unusual for chiefs to overlook robber,y 
committed on such traders, if it was in their interest to do so. The 
merchants advocated a show of force in such cases and a demand for reparation 
in cash and kind; but even where the Governor intervened as mediator, he had 
no conclusive evidence to show that the traders had not brought on their own 
misfortune. Governor d'Arcy, a fervent supporter of the mercantile community, 
sized up the situation in 1862. He observed that the Government was "far 
more moderate and considerate in [its dealings] with the natives than the 
mercantile majority of the Council ••• [being] aware how powerless the native 
Authorities are to coerce the evil-disposed and lawless." He complained 
that his merchants unreasonably expected prompt redress for ever,y alleged act 
of pillage or assault committed up the River, in contradiction to 
policy laid down by Colonial Office and transmitted to lthem~l That policy 
-
stated categorically that merchants who traded beyond British jurisdiction, 
that is, be,yond st. Mar.y's, ~Carthy Island, British Combo and the Ceded 
Mile, did so at their own risk. 2 Notwithstanding such a ruling, men led 
by the dominating figure of Thomas Brown in the 'sixties and 'seventies were 
not to defer to Colonial Office niceties. They claimed that British 
jurisdiction had always extended to the upper River, and as proof cited 
ancient treaties of the 'twenties, some of which had never been sanctioned 
3 
by the Secretar,y of state. 
1. C.O. 81/13, 1862, vol.l. 14th Harch, j.d'Arcy to Duke of Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 81/14, 1866, vol.l. 23rd May, C~~",~l:l; to Governor Samuel Blackall. 
3. c.o. 81/81, 1861, vol.l. 2nd April, Nerchants' Memorial. to Lord Cernavon. 
The merchants were sensitive to Colonial Office indifference to their 
financial problems, and needed tactful handling by Governors and Administrators. 
d 'Arcy humoured them until he found control was almost passing out of the hands 
of the Executive into those of a mercantile oligarc~. His successor was to 
be faced with the extremely difficult task of calling a halt to the process. 
One contemporar,y assessment of the st. Mar,y's merchant portr~ed him as 
a. 
something of a snob, belonging to"class "accustomed to be treated by the 
natives with servile respect ••• " by virtue of their wealth and position in the 
town. Quite naturally, many of the African inhabitants of st. Mary's looked up 
to these men who had been their Masters since the,y accompanied them from Goree, 
or since they were apprenticed to them as distressed immigrants. It was 
therefore extremely difficult for this privileged group of Europeans to 
reconcile itselt "to the pillage and assa.ult made by the same people [.Africans] 
simply because they happen to reside a few miles up the banks of a River, 
B iti h h .. di t· ttl where the r s ave no Jur1.8 c l.on. 
John W'bitford, writing in 1877, confirmed this view of men "afflicted 
wi th vanity". He saw them as petty monarchs wa.i ted upon by crowds of 
servants in st. Hary's, but frustrated to discover they were "very small 
potatoes" when they returned to London on their annual summer visits. 
Refusing to associate with shopkeepers, they preferred to live "as princes" 
in the West End of London, where they incurred substantial debts.2 Allowing 
for exaggeration, it is nevertheless a picture which must be looked at 
1. c.o. 87/73, 1862, vol.l. 14th March, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
2. John Whitford, "Trading'life in Western & Central Africa", (London, 1877) 
pp.2l & 22. 
seriously against the background of the River Gambia trade. Their extravagant 
living both at home and abroad ~ well have been a major contribut4r.r factor 
towards insolvency and final bankruptcy, likewise to the struggle betwee~them 
and their African agents and traders. Further, as competition in the field 
grew among the merchants themselves, they were more likely to take bigger risks 
which inevitably involved their traders in debt too. Groundnut harvests 
fluctuated to such an alarming extent in the nineteenth century, causing such 
hardship to the private merchant, that it was not surprising that circumstances 
forced him to liquidate his debts at the expense of his employees. 
Besides the European merchants, Nulatto, Wolof and Handingo factors, and 
a handful of European agents, conducting business from twenty-three factories 
in the River composed the trading community in 1841 when Dr. Madden visited 
1 the settlement. The Wolofs were not only important as traders but as 
shipwrights and sailors of river craft. In such vessels they conveyed rice 
and corn (bartered for British manufactures in Salomn and Casamance) the 
property of their European employers to the factories to launch the Trade 
Season. Factories were in reality merely huts hired from the local alcades 
and used as store houses;2 and ~he apparent simplicity of the barter trade 
which ensued was misleading, for it was a complicated snow-balling process, 
or a net flung far beyond the banks of the Gambia i tselt. With "pagnes",:3 
1. 
2. 
Madden Report, 1841. 
C.O. 87/85, 1866, vol.2. 9th November, d'Arcy to Blackall. 
"pagnes": Narrow l~ngths of cloth, "manufactured from cotton grown in the 
cOWltry, by the natlve weavers, and dyed by the women from indigo ••• " 
G.d'Ar-cy. 
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the traditional currency of the time, the producers paid for the foodstuffs 
on sale from June to September, for this was the rai~ season and food was 
short. In November when the nuts were harvested, the factors in turn bought 
the crop together with some wax and hides with the Sallle "pasnes". This, 
however, was not the full extent of the barter trade, for at the height of the 
Trade Season, the factories were also stocked with British manufactures _ 
guns, gunpowder, Madras headkerchiefs and. rum - and what the farmers could not 
exchange for 9rops was credited to them till the next Season. l 
The credit system, as Dr. Dike has shown, was a West African phenomenon.2 
In the early years of the groundnut trade the system worked well, and debtors 
returned to settle their debts after the next year's harvest. The British 
merchant, having supplied goods for the trade, confidently took his leave for 
Europe by the June Mail boat, entrusting the conduct of trade to his 
employees; 
. J 
he was only to return to st. Nary's in November. In short, the 
credit system depended very largely on mutual confidence for its operation 
and success; and once the native states were ravaged by war, not only were 
debtor-farmers frightened a~ from the banks, but war caused abuses and 
corruption to creep into the system. Exorbitant prices were charged for 
goods in the River, but it became almost impossible to collect debts. 
1. 
2. 
c.o. 87/85, 1866, vol.2. 9th November, d'Arcy to Blacka11. 
K.Onwuka Dike, "Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885", 
(O.U.P., 1956). 
C.O. 87/85, 1866, vo1.2. 9th November, d'Arcy to B1ackall. 
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This was how the French merchant with his much simpler system of b~ng 
nuts for cash avoided the predicament of his rivals in trade, and continued 
to monopolize the Gambia market. l Here then was a factor which complicated 
and aggravated the River problem - a growing competition from French merchants, 
no longer operating from Albreda, but from st. }~'s itself and beyond it to 
the far reaches of the Gambia. The change had come with the signing of a 
Convention by Britain and France in }Jarch 1857 by which Albreda was exchanged 
for trading rights enjoyed by Britain in Portendick since 1815. It also 
conceded to French subjects free access to the Gambia for purposes of commerce, 
and allowed French vessels free navigation of the River subject to the same 
duties, tolls and regulations as British vessels.2 The effects of such 
liberal terms were distinctly harmful to British merchants, who, through 
their Members in the Legislative Council of the colo~, and through memorials 
to the Secretar,y of State, protested against them. 
Thomas Chown, one unofficial member, described the Agreement as "neither 
more nor less than dispossessing us of what I term our birthright ••• " W.H. 
Goddard added that their feelings were not that of "petty jealousy, but ot 
indignation and sorrow to find that the repeated representations of us 
[British subjects] who have passed our lives, expended our best energies and 
hard-earned resources in this unhealthy climate should be disregarded, while 
that of a few Foreign subjects seeking to profit by our dearly bought 
1. 
2. 
c.o. 87/55, 1853, 14th May, }~rchants' Memorial to Governor O'Connor; 
c.o. 87/69, 1860, 24th~, dtArcy to Duke ot Newcastle. 
C.O. 87/106, 1874, vol.l. 7th }Jarch, C.H.Kortright to Sir Samuel Rowe. 
experience are eagerly and promptly attended to and regarded ••• ,,1 Edward 
Bocock, the third member, being prevented from attending Council on grounds 
of ill health, sent his objections to the Governor; and all three tendered 
their resignations in utter despair of the hopelessness of their plight. 
Goddard, who could boast of forty years' service as Sheriff and Magistrate, 
explained his action caustically: "I find it useless to come here," he said, 
"sit and lose my time when Laws are made and come out from England for this 
Council to give force and effect to •••• ,,2 
Unfortunately for the British merchants they were fighting a losing 
battle against formidable opponents to their monopolistic tendencies. Both 
Governor S~h O'Connor and Colonial Office officials were convinced of the 
benefits of free trade. The former believed that "the more the River is 
opened to legitimate competition, will commerce and civilization progress. 
The monopoly of a few large Houses was profitable to them but prejudicial to 
the mass of the population •••• ,,3 The Governor hoped to encourage native 
traders and advance Liberated Africans by widening the commercial hierarchy. 
He was, however, not being realistic when he accused the merchants of ... 
raising the French "to an imaginery elevation which in reality they do not 
possess or deserve ••• [being] ver,y insignificant both with respect to 
enterprise and capital as compared with the British •••• ,,4 Suffice it to 
1. C.O. 87/67, 1859, vol.l. 19th August 1858. Minutes of the Legislative 
council. 
2. C.O. 87/67, 1859, vol.l. 19th Aug. 1858. Leg. Co. }tinutes. 
3. c.O. 87/68, 1859, vol.2. 27th June, Private letter of O'Connor to Sir 
George Barrow. 
4. C.O. 87/67, 1859, vol.l. 19th Aug. 1858. Leg. Co. Minutes. 
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s~ that in another generation a considerable proportion of the trade of the 
River had passed into French hands. 
Sympathy is surely due to the merchants of St. Hary's, for they had been 
shabbily treated b,y the Colonial Office. This was hardly the arrangement 
they had hoped for when as early as 1826 they had delegated one of their 
number, Nathaniel Waterman, to call at Goree on his w~ to England "to 
ascertain the opinion of the French Authorities on the subject of exchanging 
the privileges of Great Britain connected with the Gum trade at Portendick, 
1 for the French Settlement at Albreda •••• " At this time that trading station 
was fruitful ground for disputes between officials and merchants, and was a 
barometer of mercantile relations with the Government; for it was not ever,y 
Governor who supported local commercial prejudices, not even when they were 
directed against French merchants. The 1857 Convention was alre~ a pointer 
to possible British policy in future Anglo-French relations in the settlement. 
O'Connor's policy of free trade for all in the Gambia was logically 
questioned b,y Thomas Chown, one of the most successful merchants in the trade. 
lIe demanded to know - "Where is the field of this boasted operation for Free 
Trade and competition?" Then he proceeded to show the limitations of the 
qambia market, and the advantages enjoyed b,y French merchants in France which 
made commercial competition with them unfair and unprofitable. 2 Chown was 
in effect reiterating what the whole mercantile boqy had incorporated in a ; 
"I 
1. C.o. 267/73, 1826, vol.2. 24th August, Neil Campbell to Lord Bathurst. 
c.o. 87/67, 1859, vol.l. 19th Aug. 1858. Leg. Co. ~linutes. r. I! 
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petition nearly five years before. This had shown that the market for nuts 
in Europe was France, but that differential duties of 20 francs per ton 
/ levied on foreign vessels at French ports in effect gave French vessels the 
1 
carr,ying trade from Gambia. Further, they feared that British manufactures 
might be easily replaced b.Y much cheaper French goods as a result of the 
subsidy on manufactured goods enjoyed in France. Hore perspicacious in 
mercantile affairs than the Head of the administration, they predicted a 
transfer of the whole trade from the Mother-country to France, and that the 
Gambia would simply "become a French colony tmder ~ British flag. ,,2 They 
were very nearly right too. 
Though the Convention struck a deadly blow at British enterprize in the 'I 
River, it was favourable to the planter who benefited particularly from the 
introduction of cash in the River. One merchants' memorial bemoaned the 
"great loss and prejudice" to British trade in goods, when farmers, who 
formerly "never took aQYthing else in exchange for their produce but 
manufactured goods, now, however, - insist upQn getting cash, and we must 
agree to give it to them or lose the trade.") A gloomy pessimism overcame 
the magnates of st. Mary's, at the very time when Albreda infiltration was 
taking on a new and more dangerous form. In 1862 Chow could sta.nd it no 
longer, and he retired to London, leaving behind his young son to act as his 
C.O. 87/55, 1853, 14th Hay, Nerchants to O'Connor. 
c.o. 87/55, 1853, 11th June, Nerchants' Memorial to Newcaat\a. 
c.o. 87/55, 1853, 14th J.Ia.y, Herchants to O'Connor. 
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agent in the Gambia for the time being. 1 Edward Bocock was dead.2 Goddard 
decided to stSiY on. Even Thomas Brown had. attempted withdrawal from the 
trade in the 'fifties, but fiercer competition in London had compelled him to 
return to his business in st. HarY's. 3 
... There was good reason why merchants tried to perpetuate the trade in 
barter. With all the risks involved, all Governors agreed that large profits 
were made, not improbably b,y overcharging and foisting inferior products upon 
the natives. Their concern that the cash trade would oust barter from the 
market catastrophically was exaggerated, for the natives on the banks of the 
River, and those from the Interior, were to continue to maintain their 
preference for British manufactured cottons for a long time to come. So 
aware of this preference were French merchants, that even before the 
Convention was signed they had begun to send their vessels to London to load 
with English manufactures.4 Cash certainly had its attractions, especially 
to, those from long distances in the Interior. Simply put, it was much less 
cumbersome to carry away cash than goods if one had to walk hundreds of miles 
home; so it paid the Strange Farmer to wait till factories nearest his home 
were reached before he exchanged his cash for goods. 
Thus factories in the Upper Senegal like Gdam, and others on the Geba 
and Nunez did a roaring trade from these homeward-bound travellers. st. 
lfa.ry's was not ignorant of what was happening; and describing the influx of 
1. c.o. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 9th A.pril, Thomas Cbown to Earl Ora:nvi11~ 
2. c.o. 87/67, 1859, 31st March, Newcastle to O'Connor. 
3. C.Oo 87/71, 1861, 24th April, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
4. C.O. 87/55, 1853, 14th }~, Merchants to O'Connor. i 
.1 
trade at Ga.lam, one petition observed that the itinerant farmers "dispose 
for their manufactured goods to the French traders at that place, the same 
money they received from French traders in common with US on the backs of 
the Gambia ••• ,,1 There were other attractions of cash, for silver coins 
delighted their womenfolk, who melted them into jewelry or hoarded them. As 
a result "commerce was in fetters", for coins were not always returned into 
the channels of·trade so as to increase the effective volume of trade.2 
Yet it remained a fact that the growth of French influence in the River was 
accompanied b,y an increased circulation of the French five-franc piece. 
This coin had in 1843 been made legal tender at the rate of 3/10! sterling. 3 
The Blue Book of 1868 reported that it had entirely superseded barter in the 
River,4 though this surely must have been inaccurate for that date. 
Nevertheless, b,y 1880 this coin formed 85.10 of the total coinage in circulation 
in the colony. 
1. 
). 
4. 
Ibid. 
Allan :NcPhee, "The Economic Revolution in British West Africa", 
(London, 1926). 
C.O. 87/107, 1874, 4th June, C.ll.Kortright to Governor A.E.Kennedy. 
c.o. 87/93, 1869, vol.3. 4th August. Admiral Patey to Sir A.E. 
Kennedy. 
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After the mid-nineteenth cent~, economic and political forces combined 
even more effectively than hitherto to undermine relations between the 
communities in st. Nary's, and thus to hinder trade. It will be shown later 
how maQY years of tension and frustration were concomitants of wars which 
raged in the River states for the rest of the cent~. In spite of unrest 
end violence, wi. thdrawal of the troops from HacCarthy Island began in 1865 in 
implementation of Recommendations made in Colonel Ord's Reportf and the 
Colonial Office laid down clearly that "Her Najesty's Government cannot 
authorise the Colonial Government to interfere b,y force of arms for the 
purpose of putting an end to the Native Wars which are the main obstacles to 
the improvement of trade •••• It The Governor's role was to be one of mediator 
end "by counsel and persuasion to induce the contending chiefs or tribes to 
2 
make peace." 
The Governor of the 'sixties was Colonel d'Arcy whose desire to interfere 
in native politics on the side of chiefs in treaty relation with the British 
Government was supported b,y a large body of merchants. Any interruption of 
the groundnut trade, especially in such areas as Baddibu and Saloum which 
produced the best and largest quantities of nuts in the River, was naturally 
regarded as a direct threat to their business. The Government was no less 
concerned when threatened with a probable loss of revenue from the groundnut 
export duty. But the employees of the merchants - ex Goree Volofs and 
1. C.O. 87/84, 1866, vol.l. 19th Januar,y, d'Arcy to ~4~~el1, 
2. C.O. 87/117, 1881, Earl Kimberley to Herchants' Memorial of 21st 
July 1881. 
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urbanised Mandingos whose ranks had now been filled out b,y Liberated African 
middlemen felt differently towards the belligerents i~ the River where they 
did business. These subordinates were beginning to present a united front 
in self defence against an unhealthy alliance between the Executive and the 
leading merchants. 
It was unfortunate for Liberated Africans that they made their emergence 
in the River trade at a time when, as they themselves described conditions, 
the River was "in an unsettled and shocking state from plundering and 
kidnapping •••• " The natives they thought "not only ignorant, but naturally 
wicked; they fall upon a.tliY trader they may have ill-feelings against, and. 
without ,,1 cause •••• The Liberated African himself was a disruptive element 
in a situation already highly charged, and was easy prey of any native who 
felt inclined to take revenge for past injuries suffered at the hands of st. 
~ts inhabitants. He was faced with greater problems of adjustment in the 
River environment than either his Wolof or lfundingo associates. Barriers 
of religion and language divided him from those among whom he conducted trade. 
Further, 'he almost demanded preferential treatment from the Colonial 
Government b,y virtue of his past history. In a letter to the African Times 
in 1864, traders from this community asked a pertinent question: "iYhy 
should they after being liberated, settled and called British subjects, be 
left entirely into the hands of heathens, to be ill-treated, beaten, and woun~ 
1. C.o. 87/80, 1864, 6th September, Hemorial of African Traders to 
Newcastle; copy of Hemorial published in the African Times, October 
1864. 
without aqyone to give them redress, for the want of protection ••• "11 
The tho~ problem of protection for traders was not a new feature of 
trade, though it now assumed graver proportions since British subjects were 
in physical danger from persons outside the control of British Courts. 
Opinion expressed in st. Hary's or London must therefore be studied against 
a patchy backcloth of claims and counter claims, threats, violence and 
destruction. The wars proper apart, what hindered the smooth l'1mn; ng of 
trade was the far from satisfactory Alcade-Trader relationship. In 1860, 
one Thomas King, a Liberated African, begged the Governor to enquire into a 
robbery he had suffered that his goods might be returned to him. The value 
of the goods only amounted to £37.10., but often bigger sums were lost under 
similar circumstances. King reported that he had proceeded up a creek to 
exchange goods for produce at a place called Gamboo1. "Previous to Il\1 
paying the custom I first· enquire whether this man is the right person to 
receive the custom •••• Atter I done so they gave me no chance to trade, they 
fell upon me and take all II\Y goods •••• Upon enquiring for what reason I 
am treated in this way they said that a French trader resident there insist 
upon them to drive me away from the place •••• " (sic].2 Numerous letters in 
the same vein harassed a Governor whose hands were virtually tied by 
Instructions from Home and who had no means of compelling natives to make 
reparation except ~ moral influence. In desperation d'Arcy recommended a 
1. Letter of African Traders in African Times, October 1864. 
2. c.O. 87/69, 1860, 9th Z,Iarch, Thomas King to d fArcy. 
demonstration of a man-of-war in the River when in 1863 a case of assault and 
robber,y vas reported b,y another Liberated African entrepreneur, b,y name 
Thomas Johnson. His object, he said, was to show such Africans "that the 
Government makes no distinction of class or colour when there is a wrong to 
dr ,,1 re ess •••• It was, however, not Government policy under d'Arcy to 
advocate protection for these men, who were generally suspected of duplicity 
and dishonesty, of giving support in the wrong camp in the wars, and worse 
still, of indulging in a trans-continental slave trade. 2 
With or without Government support, the African community was b,y the 
'sixties sufficiently articulate to make its voice heard in London. In 
memorials to the Secretary of State and in numerous letters to the African 
Times, African traders pleaded for some understanding of their unappreciated, 
and yet indispensable, services in the River. They argued that merchants 
who barely went beyond the limits of Bathurst were hardly in a position to 
assess conditions in the riverain states. Traders took goods on credit for 
sale; the merchants "only expect their goods or the value for same in produce 
as payment for the amount received, whilst our lives will be in danger, since 
we have no Government protection", 3 they complained. It was to secure their 
own safety in the states that the traders found it politic to temporise; and 
for this Governor d' Arcy accused them of prolonging the war by supplying the 
1. C.O. 87/76, 1863, 12th January, d'Arcy to Commander Wildman, R.N. of 
H.H.S. "Philomel". 
2. c.o. 87/80, 1864, vol.2. 25th September, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
3. c.o. 87/80, 1864, vol.2. 8th September, Traders' letter to d'Arcy. 
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rebels with all the guns and gunpowder they needed. It was obvious, however, 
that the solution of this problem lay in the hands of the merchants who were 
the suppliers of all articles of trade to their traders. While Government 
policy remained negative in the River, so long were traders compelled qy 
circumstances to make their own choices, preference being given to aQY 
autocratic ruler Who could impose law and order and bring some system into 
the exaction of customs. l 
Until the establishment of a Protectorate, they were to continue to 
complain against unjust exactions on one hand, and the equally tmreasonable 
demands of their employers on the other. This multiplicity of taxes which 
proved the ruin of the trader was given full publicity in the African Times: 
On arriving in the River at the beginning of the Trade Season the trader was 
obliged "to p~ customs to the Chief before trading £6, Chief's messenger 
12/-, Alcade at trading port 60/-, besides extras ,,2 •••• Such extras might 
include aqy goods in the trader's store which the local ruler fancied. 
Often, customs were taken in gunpowder and other merchandise; and over and 
be,yond these, 4% was charged on all business transacted.) The trader's 
grievance was that in spite of fulfilling his own part of the agreement with 
native authorities, he was still at risk of having all his goods "burnt, 
robbed, sunk accidentally,,,4 thus saddling himself with an enormous debt of 
1. Letter b.Y a Liberated African Trader to the African Times, published 
l-fay 1864. 
2. C.O. 87/117, 1881, vol.2. 28th June, "Stand-Bye" to African Times, 
forwarded qy C.Fitzgerald to Lord Kimberley. , 
3. c.o. 87/117, 1881, vol.2. 28th July, "Junius" to African Times _ forwarded. ! 
4. "Stand-Bye" to African Times, 28th June 1881. . 
several hundred pounds. Salum Jobarty, formerly a trader of l-Iessrs. ~ 
Forster and Smith, writing to W.H.Goddard, then agent for the firm, was 
"weary of talking and preventing the Chief people of taking and spoiling 
Whiteman's goods ••• the Chief people always to thief and hard begging from 
th t ad ,,1 [ . ] e poor r ers •••• S1C. In a society which accepted begging and 
lavish giving as social forms, the pursuit of business was hazardous, but 
African traders had to take the risks attached. Helpless as pawns in the 
commercial contest, year by year they aroused indignation from the natives 
while the,y sank deeper into debt with their employers at Bathurst. It 
became an intolerable situation when they found they were losing nearly all 
real property in st. }~'s in payment of trade debts, which they believed 
were incurred through no real fault of their own. 
The operation of a system where~ it was alleged that goods were 
"charged at an enormous rate of 200% to 300% above the invoice price", 2 was 
to keep these middlemen perpetually dependent upon their employers. Even 
the French cash trade had repercussions on their transactions, for farmers 
who might otherwise have settled debts ~ offering nuts in p~ent were 
tempted to se1l those nuts to French agents for cash. .As Chown put it in a 
letter in 1870 - the farmers "sold the produce which in honour and reality 
belonged to us, and we were left unpaid our debts •••• " He failed to add, 
what was also true, that such bad debts automatically fell on their traders, 
and contributed ver,y largely to a widening gulf of bitterness and misunder-
1. C.O. 87/69, 1860, 9th March, Salum Jobarty to W.H.Goddard. 
2. "stand-Bye" to African Times, 28th June 1881. 
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standing between merchants and their dependents. The British merchant still 
saw himself as the mainstay of the River trade and regarded the French as 
"parasites". For he alone risked large amoWlts of goods for the trade, thus 
rendering substantial help and support to the farmers during the r~ season. l 
His French rival, on the other hand, pursued a totally different system of 
trade, preferring for maQY years to concentrate commercial enterprise in St. 
Hary's and its vicinity - Combo and. the Lower River. 'fuere one became deeply 
involved, the other m8.d.e profits with a minimum of complication and. 
fruStration. The ~lue Book of 1868 gave official recognition to the changes 
that had occurred in the economic structure of the settlement in its 'statement 
that the "French merchants are now as numerous and influential as the English, 
and the rapid improvements they are making bespeaks the prosperity of their 
2 
undertakings. " 
In world markets, however, groWldnuts never enjoyed the same status as 
3 palmoil, which in 1870 was fetching as much as between £34 and £44 per ton. 
In the same period, the price of nuts fluctuated between £8 for Wldecorticated 
nuts and £18 for decorticated nuts;4 and. competition from Indian beni-seed in 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
c.o. 87/98A, 1870, vol.3. 30th July, Thomas Chown to Lord Kimberley. 
C.O. 87/93, 1869, vo1.3. 4th August • .Admira.l Pa.tey to Sir A.E.Kennedy. 
Dike, "Trade & Politics", p.198. 
"Advocatus" to the Bathurst Observer, 8th Hay 1884; Nessrs. Radcliffe 
& Durant's African Produce Report in Bathurst Observer, June 1883. 
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the 1880s was to subject the price to even greater f1uctuations. 1 Merchants 
everywhere adjusted their bqying price from the producers according to a 
fluctuating world price, which no native producer in the nineteenth centur,y 
was either likely to understand or accept. In 1882, the Gambia exported 
2 25,000 tons of nuts, about the same volume of trade as the Niger Delta of the 
1870s. Yet there was great disparity in the value of the two trades; one 
required elaborate and extensive establishments and. personnel - "sixty large 
trading establishments owned b,y some twenty Scottish and English firms 
[employing] ••• about 2,500 Europeans and Africans (British subjects) •••• ,,3 
The other was controlled b,y a few mercantile houses employing a few hundred 
traders and clerks. In any event, Gambian nuts were overshadowed b,y the much 
better quality Rufisque and ~or nuts of Senegal which brought higher prices 
4 in the European market. While Baddibu, the best producing groundnut area 
in the Gambia, was torn b,y wars, the exports of the settlement were seriously 
affected. In 1887, for example, exports had fallen to 3000 tons. 
Thus world prices directly impinged upon the Gambia economy, aggravating 
group relationships at a time when those groups were becoming less inter-
dependent than they had been in the earlier decades of the settlement. 
1. C.O. 87/126, 1885, vol.3. 13th October, A.l-loloney to S.Rowe. 
2. Statistical Tables 1882-4, p.378, R.A./II) Great Britain (I.C.S.) 
3. Dike, "Trade &; Politics", p.198. 
4. C.O. 87/126, 1885, vol.3. 13th October, Moloney to Rowe; "Trade & 
Revenue" in Bathurst Observer, 23rd January 1883. 
Perhaps strained relations were worsened more ~ continuous disputes over 
the price and the size of the bushel than by any other sip.gle factor in the 
River. It was generally agreed b,y merchants and producers that the groundnut 
price should be 2/- per bushel of l5x15x15;1 but there were numerous 
variations both to price and measure. The size was usually fixed between 
!lcade and trader when the latter paid his custom at the beginning of the 
Trade Season, especially as many producers would not sell nuts except ~ a 
basket of their own making. They, however, al~s demanded a fixed price for 
a fixed measure irrespective of the quality, that is the weight, of the nuts 
or of world prices. 
Disagreement on these issues produced a variety of results. Inevitably 
there were brawls between traders and producers, such as the incident at 
Pac ally in the Jarra country in 1882 when the youngmen of the village 
assaulted a young Mulatto trader, o~e Edward Evans, whose crime was that he 
was trying to carry out the instructions laid down b,y the merchants of 
Bathurst. They had arbitrarily imposed a new measure of their own -
16x16x16 - without previous consultation with the a,1cades.2 Not that 
consultation over price ever bore fruit, for four years later, owing to the 
falling off of the trade in the world market, Administrator carter, at ,the 
request of the merchants, mediated between the parties. The producers on 
that occasion simply told carter that they would rather eat the nuts than 
sell at the price offered - 1/- for a bushel of 14xl4x14; and they proceeded 
1. C.o. 87/118, 1882, vol.l. 10th }furch, V.S.Gouldsbury to C.B.Kortright. 
2. Ibid. 
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to do this. In a despatch to Sir Samuel Rowe, the Governor-in-Cbief, Carter 
expressed the opinion that "the merchants have committed. an error in policy 
in reducing the money value of a nominal 'bushel' - there has always been a 
certain elasticity in the dimensions of the grOl.Uldnut measure ••• ", he 
pointed out, "but its value has for sometime remained at two shillings ,,1 
•••• 
The merchants in retaliation decided to suspend the trade, presumably with 
the result that outstanding debts remained unsettled, and confidence between 
employers'and employees was not improved. 
Hidd1emen also had their own grievance against the local price of 2/-
per bushel of 28 lbs., at which merchants received produce in Bathurst. 
This they argued was Wlderpayment for produce that cost them 2/6 to 3/- a 
bushel to 'bu\Y and transport down the River. Transportation expenses from 
native towns to river ports and on to Bathurst were estimated at 6d. a 
bushe1.2 Eventually, recourse had to be made to the law courts; and thus 
both the administrative and legal machinery came to be closely boWld to the 
commercial activity of the settlement. 
Before 1873, the crude punisbment for debt was imprisonment without 
trial; but in Jl.Ule of that year, as a result of official pressure from 
London responding to the distress of debtors in the Gambia, especially 
expressed in petitions from gaol, an Ordinance for the abolition of 
imprisonment for debt was passed. It was Fitzgerald of the African Times 
who had brought the issue before the Colonial Office. He questioned whether 
1. C.O. 87/126, 1886, vol.1. 22nd Januar,y, G.T.Carter to Samuel Rowe. 
2. c.O. 87/117, 1881, vol.2. 28th July, "Junius" to African Times. 
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the treatment meted out in the Gambia was "consistent with British Institutions 
and Laws, that these men should be so entirely at the mercy ot their creditors, 
as to be without ~ legal means of relief, but be liable to be kept in prison 
until Death brings them release •••• " A change in the system, he emphasized, 
could only be initiated ~ the Secretary of State himself, tor it did not seem 
likely that the Authorities in the Gambia could do it. l 
There had alw~s been solid mercantile opposition to ~ relief for 
debtors. In 1865, d'Arcy had introduced a Bankruptcy bill (modelled on that 
of Hong KOng and Sierra Leone) into the Legislative Council, because he thought 
it "contrary to justice and humanity, that any man should be incarcerated 
without having an opportunity of stating his whole case in a public court.,,2 
So vigorous was the opposition led ~ Goddard that the bill had to be 
withdrawn. It was indication of the strength of mercantile pressure that 
the whole question was shelved for nearly a decade until the desperate voices 
of traders in gaol brought it once again tmder the public eye. Once again 
, 
merchants protested against ~ Ordinance that might relieve the situation, 
and arguing that a fraudulent debtor "keeps what property he has in adjacent 
native countries beyond the jurisdiction ot our Courts, and having his 
personal liberty secured, sets his unfortunate Creditor at defiance_") 
There were indeed maqy evi1-disposed persons engaged in trade, but not even 
1. C.O. 87/106, 187), vol.). 1st March, F.Fitzgerald to Lord Kimber1e,y. 
2. c.o. 87/82, 1865, 18th Hay, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
3. C.O. 87/117, 1881, vol.2. 21st July, Merchants'letter to Lord Kimberley. 
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the honest trader was given a chance to prove his worth ~ the vicious circle 
of higbrate of charges for manufactured goods, exactions and losses in the 
River, low prices for produce brought down to Bathurst, resulting in enormous 
lebts. .A3 the African Times again had put it in 1868: The result of the 
system was that "the unfortunate trader is always in debt to the merchant _ 
is hopelessly his slave •••• "1 Though it took numerous letters and petitions 
from the merchants to move the Colonial Office, in 1882 the Secretar,y of state 
authorised the necessar,y alteration to the law which had merely abolished 
imprisonment for debt,2 without replacing it ~ a Bankruptcy Ordinance to 
punish fraudulent debtors. It proved that when pressure was exerted jointly 
by Governors and merchants it was quite likely to overcome the most united 
African opposition. 
It was shortage of capital that prevented African middlemen from becoming 
entrepreneurs in.the groundnut industry, which required fairly substantial I 
I 
capital either in ready cash or in manufactured goods. A few enterprising j 
Libera.ted Africans did launch out on private business of their own; but it 
was the regular appearance of steamships providing cheap freights atter 1852 
which "had an electric effect on West African trade. ,,3 It immediately 
increased the nucleus of African entrepreneurs. In st. Hary' s, African 
traders continued as agencies in the staple trade but encouraged their 
1. Editorial - "Debtors t Relief Ordinance" - African Times, September 1868. 
2. C.o. 87/118, 1882, vol.1. 1st July, E.W. to Mr. Ashley (C.O. }linute); 
2nd June, Francis Smith to V.S.Gouldsbury. 
3. Dike, "Trade Be Politics", p.1l4. 
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womenfo~ to import kola nuts wholesale from Sierra Leone. The voyage being 
short and deck passages reasonable, maqy women conducted business between 
Ba.thurst and Freetown with great facility, purchasing their own bUesl of 
Kola and returning to retail them in their own small shops in Bathurst. 
Indeed a growing bo~ of clients and petty traders came to depend on these 
women for employment. It was fortuna.te for them that they faced no 
competition from the European merchant who regarded the kola trade as purely 
an internal trade which was best left to Africans. He was satisfied as long 
as -the new class of entrepreneur made its contribution to the revenue in kola 
duty. B,y -the late 'eighties, profits from kola were being made available 
for imports of manufactured goods direct from }anchester and Liverpool; and 
it was by such means that Africans came to participate in the groundnut trade 
as merchants in their own right. 
Only a minority of African entrepreneurs ever attained economic 
independence, but however small the nucleus it was significant because for 
the first time in the history of the settlement, European merchants were 
taced with African competition in the export trade. Hitherto conunercial 
rivalry had been limited to British and French merchants, and while houses 
like Forster and Smith (now bought over by Lintott and Spink, also of London) 
dominated trade by substantial capital and a tleet ot ships, it was not 
possible for Africans to compete. The appearance ot a second steamship 
compaqy in 1869 further lowered freight and encouraged African entrepreneurs 
1. A bly (or "hamper") of Kola weighed 3 cwt. and cost £8 to £11 in 
Sierra Leone. 
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to make visits to the manufacturing centres of England for selecting articles 
for the Gambia trade. l Such opportunities for swelling the trade and revenue 
were welcomed ~ colonial governors, who, besides economic advantages attached 
to increased communication with the outside world, expected this to be an 
educative factor among Africans. Administrator Patey hoped that "the natives 
of Bathurst and the surrounding country may rise from their present state of 
apathy, indifference and subjection, to a life of competition, energy and 
independence. ,,2 In spite of such encouragement, the volume of trade was 
relatively small compared with that of other West African settlements, so 
that it was not profitable for the African Steamship Compaqy to run a monthly 
or bi-monthly service to Bathurst, as it did elsewhere, unless its vessels 
were relieved of port duties) (which provided a large proportion of the 
Gambia's revenue) or a subsi~ was offered. The uncertainty of shipping was 
to be a further obstacle on the road to prosperity, and prolonged the 
dependent status of African traders.4 
Since maqr EUropean merchants of Bathurst were themselves private business 
men with limited capital, and therefore unable to afford their own vessels, 
they were as concerned as African entrepreneurs for improved sea communication. 
In general, they took the lead in petitioning the Colonial Office whenever 
1. C.O. 87/68, 1859, 20th A.ugust, Duncan Campbell, Secretary of African 
S-teamship Co. to Duke of Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 87/93, 1869, vol.3. '4th August, Admiral Patey to Lord G~a:ilv1l1~ 
3. C.O. 87/68, 1859, 20th August, Duncan Campbell to Duke of Newcastle. 
4. c.o. 87/67, 1859, 25th Sept., Commander A.JoM.Croft of the "Athenian" 
to G.d'Arcy; 
C.O. 87/102, 1872, vol.l. 28th ~~, Petition of African entrepreneurs to 
W.B.Simpson, - Administrator. 
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the Mail service was interrupted, always emphasising the hardship it brought to 
African business men. In this connection, proximity to Senegal was to be a 
decided advantage, for it meant that the Gambia settlement was never really 
isolated. In 1873 the merchants of Bathurst hired a boat by subscription "to 
meet the French Nail at Dalmr."l In the 'eighties, there was a fortnightly 
conmrunication with Europe by the }Iessagerie Hari times steamers sailing between 
}furseilles and Dalm.r; besides these the steamers of the Woe~ line called 
monthly at Bathurst, and occasionally those of the Compagnie Fran~aise 
2 (formerly the Senegal Compaqy). 
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• . t ~, t 1/;. ~ ~In" I~if,' The development of shipping became the backbone of the African trade, If;~f 
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almost entirely an external trade, and therefore dependent on overseas transport. ~' ~.i 
II!' The effect of this development was an enormous expansion in trade during which the African entrepreneur emerged. His position in the Gambia was not as 
secure as in other West African colonies partly because he was working with far 
smaller capital and partly because of the recurrent problem of shipping. 
Nevertheless, men and women who had in the 'thirties been entirely dependent 
on society for clothing, food and employment, were in the 'eighties organising 
their own modest commercial ventures, side by side with their former }fusters. 
These were British merchants who had been the pioneers of trade in the River 
Gambia and had survived the vicissitudes of trade through their own resilience, 
and partly through the sympathy and limited protection extended to them through 
successive Administrators. B,y 1888, with the creation of a government 
independent of Sierra Leone, and with the likelihood of a Protectorate being 
established in the River in the future, the growing class of entrepreneurs was 
prepared to step further up the commercial ladder. 
1. C.O. 87/104, 1873, vol.l. 3rd April, Thomas Brown to H.T.lvI.Cooper. ' 
2. C.0.87/l36, 1889, vol.2. 13th December, G.T.Carter to Hon7Ed~~i~~~g~e. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MISSIONARIES AS EDUCATORS 1820-1882. 
Without missionar,y activity in the Gambia settlement, the process of 
education would have been del~ed and with it the growth of articulate 
opinion among the African community on st. Mary's Island. For the 
responsibility of Government was limited to locating and attending to the 
physical needs of Liberated Africans who began to arrive in the settlement 
in the 'thirties, no adequate provision being made for their moral and 
religious welfare. Concern had, however, been shown for this aspect of 
civilization, and Governor Charles ~1acCarthy on his visit home in 1820 had 
applied to missionar,y bodies in Britain and France for men and women to enter 
an uncontested field for evangelism and education in the Gambia. The Anglican 
Church appointed its first chaplain to the troops in the settlement in 1820, 
but otherwise made no significant contribution to the education of the 
inhabitants till the 'sixties. A. Quaker, by name William Singleton, was 
the first missionar,y to arrive in the Gambia and to commence work in Combo 
1 in January 1821. This work continued under Hannah Kilham and a band of 
workers in 1823 but was short-lived. In the same period, Anne Ha.rie 
Javouhey, founder of the Sisters of st. Joseph of Cltmy - a teaching and. 
" 1. Ormerod Greenwood, "Hannah Kilham's Plan - 1., The Sierra Leone 
Bulletin of Religion, vol.4. No.1. (June 1962), p.l4. 
nursing Order - visited the settlement from Senegal and reorganised the 
') 
hospital in Bathurst before proceeding to Sierra Leone. l It was therefore 
left to Wesleyan missionaries to build the Christian church in the Gambia. 
The Wesleyan Missionary Society had sent out the Reverend John Horgan 
who arrived in st. J.fary's a few weelta after Singleton.2 The Island being 
at the time inhabited by a few dozen Europeans with Nulatto and lvolof 
I't-J 
dependents numbering well under a. thousand persons, Horgan had been instructed 
to commenoe his mission among the indigenous communi ties in the riverain 
states, with the objeot of spreading oivilization in the interior. An 
;} 
attempt was made to commence work at Tendaba., a.bout seventy-five miles up 
the River, and then at ~~da.naree in Combo, eight miles from st. l-ary's, and 
though the local chiefs were friendly and willing to grant land to the 
missionary, they could not guarantee protection. In spite of policy laid 
down, Wesleyan missionaries on the spot soon realized that where resources 
were limited in an unhealthy clima.te, it was more expedient to use the small 
nuoleus of Christians alre~ in existence as a foundation of the Church than 
9~"nc:l 
to break fresh~among nominal Mohammedans in order to produce a nucleus of 
Christians. Ironically, the histor,y of missionary enterprize in the 
settlement between 1821 and 18)1 was the growth of the church in an urban 
community almost to the exclusion of rural communities. The need for 
1. 
2. 
Christopher Fyte, "A History of Sierra Leone", (O.U.P. 1962) p.151. 
The Rev. John Horgan, "Reminiscences of the founding of a Christian 
l-fission on the Gambia", (London 1864), p.2. 
Horgan, "Reminiscences", p. 7. Tendaba. (Tentabar) was the place 
recommended by Sir Charles HacCarthy. 
planting the Gospel beyond the coastal fringe was, however, never forgotten. 
On first landing at st. Mary's, John Norgan, by his own testimoD\Y, was 
thoroughly overwhelmed by the task which faced him, the nakedness and apparent 
savagery of the inhabitants causing him considerable disquiet. But far from 
presenting aqy resistance, this section of Bathurst society became the 
missionar,y's most attentive audience, re~ to listen to him for as long as 
he might desire, "but ignorant all the while as much of the Preacher's object 
1 in assembling them, as of the subject of his preaching." Beyond expounding 
the Gospel to an illiterate congregation, one of the first tasks was to sort 
out the heterogeneous character of the society. Through contact with the 
British merchants on the Island, particularly Charles Grant, Morgan had easy 
access to the MUlatto community. 
Grant's mistress was a Senora whose friends and relatives frequented the 
merchant's home even while the missionary was his guest, evoking from him the 
comment that such women being "heathens, they seemed to be unconscious of sin 
from such intercourse with Europeans .,,2 Host of them however must have been 
nominal Christians since they had passed under the influence of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Goree and Senegal. These women were a factor to be 
reckoned with in St. Mary's not only from the economic standpoint as owners 
of an important labour force, but also as a ~ossible link between missionaries 
and their domestic slaves. One Nulatto lady whom Horgan described as "half 
1. J.Iorgan, "Reminiscences", pp.2 & 6. 
2. Ibid. p.9. 
Christian and half white," invited him to her home on the South Ba.nk. of the 
River to preach to her slaves for a few days; and on his departure entrusted 
her nine year old son to him for instruction, and provided him with a passage 
1 
on her vessel. 
In 1825, a t<tission House was erected. in Wolof Town on st. Mary's Island, 
and the whole of the ground floor, an area of 37 ft. by 17 ft., was appropriate( 
2 for a chapel and schoolroom. The nature of missionar,y work was at first 
purely evangelistic, the moral and religious aspects of civilization being its 
concern. While missionaries served the needs of the young - between the ages 
of nine and thirteen - by imparting a rudimentary knowledge in the three Rs 
through Scriptural texts, adolescent and adult domestic slaves who were 
otherwise employed during the day, were provided for in evening classes • 
.Among' them was found an insignificant minority group of Liberated Africans in 
the 1820s.3 So encouraging were the results that after three years the 
school provided the Colonial Chaplain with a bOY-Clerk, since "not a native 
man could be found who was competent to be his clerk. Another boy in less 
4 
time became a merchant's clerk. 
Generally, missionaries coped remarkably well with the problems of their 
juveniles; new pupils totally destitute of raiment were "clothed with the 
1. Jlorgan, 0 "Rellliniscences", p.109. 
2. Rev. William Fox, "A brief history of the 'vesleyan t<tissions", p.369. 
3. c.o. 267/72, 1826, vol.2. 28th June, K.Nacaulay to Lord Bathurst. 
4. :Horgan, "Reminiscences", p.58. 
garments which our friends in England had. given us for the purpose."l Girls 
were given special attention in needlework qy missionar,y wives, and some 
orphans enjoyed the special privilege of living in the Mission House free of 
charge in return for domestic services rendered after school hours. MOre 
difficult of solution was the serious clash of Christian teaching with many 
old founded beliefs and ceremonies, especially those related to the life cycle. 
The Church would allow no compromise on vital issues such as polig~ and 
cohabitation; "for example I s sal~e", persons guilty of indulging in such 
practices could not be accepted as members of the church, nor could the 
children of unmarried parents - black or white - be baptized until old enough 
2 
to answer for themselves. How far this rigidity was imposed on backsliding 
merchants qy whom the Wesleyan mission was in part supported financially , it 
would be difficult to say; though the Rev. William Hoister was to assert that 
he had frequently "to speak in the language of admonition and reproof, from 
the low state of morals which prevailed in the colony •••• " This evidently 
did not in ~ way affect their liberal contributions to the mission. 3 
It was, however, to the moral problems of the African community that 
the missionaries gave their attention, but they soon foun~ that cohabitation 
was an inevitable result of the economic demands of the society. Indeed, it 
was the custom for employers to provide their slaves with women who lived 
with them until they were removed to Senegal for sale. The dilemma of the 
1. Rev. William Moister, "Nissionar,y Labours in Western Africa", p.130. 
2. Morgan, "Reminiscences", p.68. 
3. Moister, "Hissionar,y Labours", p.127. 
'ft.7 
convert, consequent upon this unsatisfactory practice was aptly put by a 
victim of the system thus: "Suppose we marry [a wife] Christian fashion," 
he questioned ~furgan, "next week, perhaps, }~ter will send her to Goree or 
Senegal, and sell her; I shall then see her no more; then lfuiteman's law 
sB\Y' I must not marry another while she is alive. ,,1 Most converts truly 
acknowledged the conflict between what they called "devil fashion" and. "Christ' 
fashion" , 2 and. in large measure acquiesced in the displacement of their earlier 
beliefs and practices. But reaction to the new order of things was yet to 
come • 
.As in the Early Church, some of the most devoted to the Cause were found 
among the class of domestic slaves in st. }Wxy's, whose response to 
Christianity was a sharp contrast to the indifference evinced qy nominal 
Mohammedans of the riverain states. Upon them came to depend the spread of 
Christianity among African groups,and without such intermediaries missionaries 
would have achieved little of lasting effect in those early years. Only a 
handful of their 'congregations' spoke any form of English; and so important 
was the language problem that all missionaries were encouraged to learn a 
vernacular - Handjnka, or Fula - before they reached the field.:3 It was 
therefore expedient to recruit local staff as Catechist-Interpreters at the 
earliest opportunity. 
It was in their efforts to achieve this that the Wesleyans first 
appeared as a threat to the social fabric, into which was so closely woven 
1. 
2. 
J.iorgan, "Reminiscences", p.67. 
Ibid. p.68. 
Hethodist }USSion Archives, Bathurst, Gambia. NacCarthy Island 
Circuit Meeting, 1843. 
''t% 
the institution of domestic slaver,y. While ver.y little could be done for 
such slaves in the riverain states beyond British jurisdiction, missionaries, 
and indeed all Governors, felt that the institution was not to be tolerated in 
a British colony like st. Nary's. In theor.y, therefore, a.n;y slave who applie( 
to the Governor for his freedom was given a certificate of manumission, though 
in practice freedom was not easily secured without mediation. Lt.-Governor 
Rendall attempted to explain the status of such persons on the Island: "They 
are not slaves, strictly speaking while they are on this island;" he wrote, 
"but immediately when they leave, they are and. may be taken. "1 .Anxious though 
he was to secure the freedom of a.n;y who wished it for a moderate price, he 
did not wish to disturb the domestic pattern of the· merchants and the Senoras; 
for this reason the Lt.-Governor preferred slaves to continue with their 
masters even after they had purchased their freedom. 2 
Wesleyan missionaries thought differently partly because they believed 
this policy restricted freedmen, and also because they intended to steer some 
of these men into the service of the church. They therefore became involved 
in the task of securing full social rights for members of their congregations, 
not only by providing financial assistance towards redemption, but by ta.kiDg 
active steps to absorb them as evangelists. Without financial aid, from 
outside, purchasing freedom was a ver.y slow process which often took many 
years to achieve, for the average slave with a family to support was unable 
1. Fox, "Bri ef Histor.y", p. 359. 
2. Ibid. 
to make substantial savings from a weekly wage, of which a half was claimed 
by his owner. }tlssionaries brought pressure to bear on the local Government 
to accelerate and facilitate manumission, and took on the responsibility of 
petitioning missionar,y societies in Britain for funds towards this end. 
In the l830s, two of the four local preachers were "tied in the same way, II 
'--
as the Rev. William Fox described their status; and he called upon the 
Government to "brealt their chains. ,,1 His role as intermediary between slaves 
and Government and masters was difficult and time-consuming. It involved 
drawing up memorials for a predominantly illiterate congregation, such as 
the group who had "long had their freedom promised to them, but it has never 
been granted. They have made several applications to be allowed to purchase 
it, but in this also they ha.ve failed.,,2 Efforts in Britain and with 
benevolent merchants in the settlement brought in funds. Dublin friends 
provided £50 for redeeming one Pierre Sa11ah, a convert, and formerly a Wolof 
... 
mason of Goree. With his master's help (that master was Charles Grant), ,. 
John Cupidon, a carpenter from the same place, was able to purchase his 
freedom. Thus both men became assistant missionaries; the latter impressed 
the Rev. William Moister in the 'thirties for "his consistent deportment, 
fervent zeal and diligence in his work.,,3 Others there were on Fox's list 
for mission employ as soon as redemption could be effected; William Jo6f, 
.Ama.d~ n 'Gum and John n 'Gum were among those commended to the Wesleyan 
1. Fox, "Brief History", p.359. 
2. Ibid. p.375. 
3. Hoister, "J.tlssionary Labours", pp.138-139. 
Committee in London. l 
Even before recaptives began to arrive in large numbers, missionaries 
vere asserting that they had achieved a basic level of civilization among 
their converts, so that the difference "betveen the natives who made a. 
ISo 
profession of Christianity and those who still remained in heathen darkness 
vas so marked, tha.t a stranger visiting the place could at once distinguish 
the character of the people from their personal appearance, and the condition 
of their dwellings.,,2 It was an achievement for which there was cause to 
rejoice for this was the purpose for which men and women had risked their 
lives in a tropical climate. Not only had the harvest been fruitful but 
labourers had been found to share in the trials of the vineyard. It was 
the emergence of a native agency, whatever its limitations, 'Which brought 
- such satisfaction to the missionaries, and gave them impetus to resume work 
among indigenous people in the hinterland. On his return home 'to England, 
Horgan drew up a scheme for a Fula mission and looked for financial support 
from Christians and Philanthropists in his circuit in Southampton. 
This was not an entirely nev venture, for as long ago as 1823 when 
Captain Grant founded the dependency of }!accarthy Island, Horgan had been 
invited b,y ~he Government to assist in the work of civilization in the 
interior. For this reason a grant of land had been made to the Wesleyans 
for missioilary activity.) Under Charles l-IacCarthy°'s influence, the 
1. Fox, "Brief History", pp.360 and 367. 
2. Moister, "Hissionary Labours", p.159. 
3. c.O. 267/66, 1825, vol.2. 12th ~ 1823. Capt. Grant to Governor 
Charles NacCarthy. 
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Government never doubted that through this agency its hopes for the 
introduction of agricultural pursuits and of legitimate commerce would be met; 
and the conditions of the natives generally improved. Equally enthusiastic 
were the merchants of st. Nary's who were attracted by the prospect of a 
possible supply of clerks and traders to extend legitimate commerce and 
improve their businesses in the River. 
}furgan had decided to concentrate his forces in St. }~'s till the 
church had taken root there and produced its first African missionaries, and 
when he left the settlement in 1825, no mission had been established among 
the small community of discharged soldiers in }1accarthy.l Having departed 
from the settlement, }Iorgan was to devote his energy to the founding of a 
Pula mission on that Island. The aim was to locate the nomadic Fula tribe 
\ (an industrious people under Mandingo suzerainty) on the six hundred acres of 
.. 
land alre~ granted for missionary activity, to establish in their midst 
civilizing institutions - chapels, schools and agricultural farms - and 
subsequently to use the station as the spearhead for advance into the 
interior. It was a carefully organized scheme sponsored by a Southampton 
Committee under the distinguished patronage of such persons as Dr. Lindoe, 
"a. pious member of the Established Church" who luid been interested in accounts 
of the Mas of 'vest Africa, the Duchess of Beaufort, and others of "high 
respectability and. well lmown philanthropy •••• 11 Nor was the Colonial Office 
excluded, for the plan vas submitted to Lord Glenelg for approval and 
1. Moister, "}fissionary Labours", p.ll6. 
Government protection. l 
Financial support from the Committee was to the amount of £500 a year, wit 
an extra £1000 to meet the expenses of a missionary-linguist whose task it 
would be to translate the Scriptures into Handinlta. and Fula.2 A large 
number of agricultural tools were purchased and a Hr. Fisher engaged to 
superintend the concern, for "besides his lmowledge of agriculture, he is 
said to possess considerable skill in mechanism. ,,3 
In August 1834, the Rev. and lIrs. Dove and a band of African assistants 
were alre~ on the field, and sending encouraging reports of progress to 
the Wesleyan Chairman, William Fox, at st. Hary's. From the grant allowed 
him, Dove had built "a commodious l-lission House", and a small chapel at 
Fatoto, a Handjngo village on HacCartby. He had also built a school at the 
Fula town of Buruco on the South Bank, opposite the Island, where "the 
children are making progress in their learning." This, he believed was 
making ~ome impression on their parents. So convinced of success was Dove 
that he misguidedly predicted that Hohammedanism was on the decline.4 
Certainly the MacCart~ Island area was a hub of missionar,y activity between 
1. }Iorgan, "Reminiscences", p.1l5. 
2. Fox, "Brief History", p.446. 
3. Fox, "Brief History", p.445. 
4. Ibid. p.363j Hoister, "Nissionary Labours", pp.195-6. 
I 
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1833 and 1836. The missionary-linguist, in the person of the Rev. R.H. 
J.fa.cBriar, was a.ttempting to translate portions of Scripture into Fula and 
}~nka, and had even secured the services of a native of the River with 
a "tolerable knowledge of English."l 
In spite of what seemed like remarkable progress in the hinterland, in 
Hay 1836, violent opposition to the mission was exhibited in the demolition 
of John Cupidon' s house by "a mob led by a European. ,,2 HacBriar himself 
encotmtered difficulties from the European residents on the Island "such as 
had never before been experienced. ,,3 So }loister described this phenomenon. 
What had disturbed mercantile-missionar,y relations in 1836 was never clearly 
I-
stated, but it m~ well have~o~e indication of the generally disturbed state 
of the River which came to a head in that year with the expedition against 
Kemingtang. Appeal was made to Lt.-Governor Rendall for protection of person 
and property of British subjects, and though this was immediately promised 
and the Commandant on the spot reprimanded for failing to give redress to the 
injured party, Fox observed that very little was effected in this direction 
"and we~~lled for sometime to endure a series of opposition and persecution ---
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Fox described his assistant in compiling a }~nka vocabulary as the 
person Hr. MacBriar ha.d employed - "a proper }Iandingo •••• educated in 
England •••• " This may have been Hohammadu Sisei (Ceesay) of Nyani-
l1aru who had been sold as a slave. See article by Captain Washington, 
J.R.G.S. vol. 8. (1838), pp.448-454. 
Fox, "Brief History", p.399. 
Noister, "Nissionary Labours", p.196. 
Fox, "Brief History", p.399. 
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vexatiou~ and unmerited annoyances."l It was generally accepted that evil 
forces militated against the activities of the mission. 
It was a view that was expressed five years later when Dr. Na.dden visited 
the settlement. In his inspection of schools in st. }fucry's he found Cupidon 
in charge of the Wesleyan school there, and described him as a "coloured man 
of respectable appearance --- who had undergone some persecution at the hands 
of violent and arbitrary men a few years back •••• ,,2 Native agency in the 
interior had not been accompanied with lasting success, and the transfer of 
. ~t~~ the Cup~dons to headquarters for a number of yearsJa. the unfortunate inCident, 
together with the continuation of their replacement qy white missionaries 
(Fox and Mr. and }~s. Swallow were posted there after the Doves returned 
home)2 indicated very clearly the limitations of African agency. 
Determined, however, to achieve their objective of civilizing the 
indigenous peoples of the Gambia, the philanthropists of the Southampton 
Committee, now lmown as the London Conuni ttee, embarked on a. programme of 
education of the sons of the chiefs of the River, the Fu1a experiment having 
almost failed. £1000 had been collected ~ the Committee,4 and during Fox's 
ministr,y, building operations began and a goodwill mission "to most of the 
petty chiefs and kings for some hundreds of miles, east, west, north and south 
of HacCarthy Island" undertaken. The distant states of Bondou and Wu1i were 
1. Fox; '!Brief History", p.400. 
2. C.O. 267/173, 1841, }m.dden Report. 
3. Hoister, "Hissionary Labours", p.196. 
4. Moister, "Missionary Labours", pp.197-8. 
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included in Fox's itiner~, and not even Kemingtang's reputation deterred him 
from calling on that Warrior and asking for pupils for his school. l Once 
completed, the bUilding remained a white elephant for want of pupils, and so 
slow was progress generally that the 1846 District Heeting held at St. H~'s 
recommended that }~ccarthy should be reduced to a subordinate station, and 
new efforts concentrated in the immediate environs of st. }fuxy's Is1and. 2 
Plans for the interior had again failed; the 1846 meeting admitted that 
the civilization department for the benefit of the Fulas had failed, likewise 
model farms had been abandoned since the loss of the agricultural agent. 
About the boys' Institution, it concluded that that too had tailed, "for we 
have not now a. single student, nor are we likely to obtain one on our present 
system. Our funds will not allow of our visiting Native Chiefs and giving 
them expensive presents, as formerly was the case; and - although they 
promise to send their children to be instructed, they will in reality do no 
such thing." Their saddest comment concerned old pupils from whom they had. 
expected great things, but who "have quickly resumed the abominations and 
fooleries of their heathen homes" on their return to their villages. 3 
In fairness to Wesleyan enterprise in the interior it ought to be 
emphasised that their aims and objectives in that area aborted not only 
because of the indifference of indigenous peoples both to the Christian 
religion and the facilities for education and planned living offered to 
them, but also because the invasion ot Liberated Africans in that period 
1. Fox, "Brief History", p.424. 
2. Methodist }lission Gambia., 1846, Gambia District }ieeting, Resolution 4. 
3. 1846. Gambia District Neeting: Recommendation II. 
15h 
~ was an unforseen contingency for which all agencies in the settlement were 
required. Circumstances thus shifted interest from an indifferent community 
to destitute immigrants whose needs were urgent. It was not only the 
mission, but all available agencies were called upon to save the situation 
for the sake of suffering humanity. 
Collaboration between Government and mission in the rehabilitation of 
Liberated Africans produced interesting results. The policy of wholesale 
marriages, for example, was carried through in good faith - from a belief 
that marriage would be an integrative factor among a mixed band of immigrants. 
If marriage failed, the church was there as a refuge for the distressed. 
Indeed, chapels and Sunday schools and catechumen classes sprang up wherever 
these recaptives were located ~ Government - in Goderich Town on the 
extremity of st. J.Ia.ry's Island, in Lamin in Combo, in Berwick Town in the 
Ceded Hile, and of course in MacCarthy Island. Fox described this expansion 
as "a gracious outpouring of the Holy Spirit. ,,2 In one year, the congregation 
of the main chapel at Dobson street in Wolof Town had increased from seventy-
five to three hundred, so that the building was no longer adequate for its 
purposes. It was in December 1834 that Lt.-Governor Rendall laid the 
3 Foundation stone for a new building. 
1. Pox, "Brief History", p.373. 
2. Fox, "Brief History", p.369. 
3. Ibid •.• 
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For all its expansion in the spiritual sphere, the church in the Gambia 
remained dependent on the Wesleyan Society at home, for the majori~ of its 
flock was little removed from pauperism. Unlike congregations in Sierra 
Leone which were ~ this period able to undertake the financial responsibility 
involved in building projects of their church, Fox could only promise to 
raise £100 towards the new chapel, while the Society provided £500. 1 In 
actual fact, £153.10.5. was the sum collected in subscriptions and. church 
collections, to which could be added a further £100 subscribed ten years 
later for the addition of a gallery.2 Even with regular contributions from 
officials and merchants, the District Meeting of 1845 admitted to their being 
"so poor that we cannot carry out our financial discipline so fully as we 
would wish." Expenditure for that year was £532.11.11., but Income from 
local sources amounted to £246.13.8. Nor was the financial situation less 
desperate in the MacCarthy Island circuit where EXpenditure was £521.18.104 
while Income was the meagre sum of £71. 19.4!-, 3 most of it probably provided 
b,y the handful of merchants and traders on that station. Deficits therefore 
had to be met by bills drawn on the Treasurer of the Wesleyan Society, and 
without the cooperation of local merchants and African traders, who were 
ready to make loans to the Chairman and awai t p~ent of bills by the Society, 
it would have been very difficult for the mission in the Gambia to function 
4 
efficiently. Continuing dependence of the church was simply a reflection 
1. Fox,. "Brief History", pp~35'l &: 370. 
2. Methodist }lission Gambia, 1835. Circuit Book of st. Mary's • 
. :3. Nethodist }fission Gambia, 1845. Gambia District Neetingo 
4. 1846, 1850, 1855. Circuit Books. 
of the economic dependence of the Liberated Africans who qy now composed 
the majority in all congregations. 
It was the local Government which came to the aid of the missionaries 
in 1848 with the offer of an annual grant-in-aid of £100;1 for it was the 
Wesleyans who had almost taken over the Government task of locating 
recaptives on }facCartby Island. The mission had become the largest 
employment agency in the whole settlement, compelled qy circumstances to 
adjust its objectives, its six hundred acres of land and model farms to 
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present needs. In 1836, a number of recaptives were employed as labourers 
to clear the brushwood, sometimes at the rate of sixty or seventy or even a 
hundred a day at a salary of 7d. a day. A hundred head of cattle was 
purchased and used for ploughing the land for cultivation, by which fm-ther 
employment was provided for the people.2 Corn, millet, indigo, cotton, rice 
and groundnuts were grown. In fostering groundnut cultivation, missionaries 
and Africans in their employ were engaged in a revolutionar,y process which 
was to transform the economy of the settlement. It was a very real attempt 
not only to provide employment but to introduce an aspect of industrial 
education to men who had had no formal education. 
The neglect to' educate the children of these immigrants was to prove a 
most short-sighted and disastrous policy. Dr. }~den laid great emphasis 
on the "mischievous effect of excluding the Liberated African children" from 
the schools;3 the extent of their education being the facilities available 
1. CIO. 87/45, 1849, vol.l. 16th September, }~Donnell to Grey. 
2. Fox, "Brief History", pp.409 and 427. 
3. }~en Report. 
for learning a trade. The Sierra Leone experiment which had made the 
teacher as the ~~ager the responsibility of Government had involved such 
heavy expenditure that philanthropists, missionaries and the British 
Government had reacted very decidedly against the concentration of funds on 
that Group. In 1843, the Colonial Office gave orders to cut down or abolish 
the Liberated African Department in Sierra Leone, which was then costing the 
British taxp~er about £12,000 per annum. l Thus the Gambia's recaptives 
failed to receive that sympatqy and that financial support from Britain which 
others had for many years enjoyed in Sierra Leone. The result was that the 
ver,y process of civilization was de1~ed, and failure to improve the minds of 
large numbers of illiterate youths who had arrived in the settlement meant 
that the very medium of literary language through which opinion was to be 
expressed for bodies outside the settlement waS withheld from them. 
Generally, the school population was on the increase in the 'forties; 
in 1841 ~fa.dden had reported ninety-six children in the school in Maccarthy, 
and one hundred and seventy-two in the schools in st. Mary's and Berwick 
Town. By 1848 numbers in the former school had risen to one hundred and. 
twenty-one, and. st. Nary's to two hundred and ninety-eight, while Berwick 
j 
Town boasted of eighty-four pupils.2 Numerical advance at this pace and 
at th~ primar,y level of education was hardly a great achievement for a 
mission that had been established in st. ~~'s for a whole generation. 
It was true that Wesleyan church government which divided congregations into 
1. Fyfe, "History", p.229. 
2. C.O. 87/48, 1850, 29th July, G.~~cDonnell to Earl Gre,y. 
.. 
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classes, each under a l~ leader was valuable training in responsibility and 
an aspect of adult education. I Yet looking back on Wesleyan labours in the 
settlement, Governor ~Donnell felt little but regret "that as yet so little 
should have been effected." 
The Governor's conclusion was that policy had been misdirected, and 
the benevolence of ma.ny individuals in England channelled through the wrong 
Causes; the consequence of which was that far from making MacCarthy Island 
the gateway to interior tribes, money and energy had been wasted on locating 
Liberated Africans, who "were a class so entirely inferior in appearance and 
civilization to many of the surrounding natives, [that very] little was 
achieved in bettering their appearance and conditiono,,2 Though obviously 
a biassed and ill-informed opinion, the condition of recaptives was still not 
an attractive one. It is significant that the Rev. Henry Badger, the 
General Superintendent of Sierra Leone and Gambia, accepted NacDonnell' s 
premise, himself calling attention to "a marked inferiority in the 
intellectual capacity of the natives especially those who are found amongst 
the Liberated Africans as compared with the other races of the human family.,,3 
I 
Little did either HacDonnell or Badger know that the future of the settlement 
would depend in great measure upon the mental and physical energy of this 
despised community. Efforts of missionaries to improve its status were 
rather an investment for the future. 
Fyfe, "History", p.202. 
C.O. 87/48, 1850, 29th July, ~~cDonnell to Grey. 
C.O. 87/48, 1850, 29th July, Enclosure - Education Report ~ the Rev. 
Henry Badger to Governor MacDonnell. 
/(" 
Tensions in the church in the generally disturbed period of the 'forties 
were signs of the maturity of its congregations and African assistants. The 
latter had, as it were, reached the crossroads in religious experience, when 
they were no longer willing to be led along the road b,y white missionaries 
but asserted their right to choose the direction and determine the pace. It 
was unfortunate that, without exception, three senior assistants chose the 
wrong road. Under the circwnstances, the point had been reached when the 
mission was called upon to evaluate native agency; and at almost every 
District lfeeting between 1841 and 1848 it was preoccupied with the moral 
welfare of its African missionaries. In 1841 the initiative was taken by 
the African Class leaders of the ~Cart~ Island Circuit after their local 
missionary had been fined five dollars by the }Iagistrate' s court for beating 
a Wolof woman on the Island. Taking into account the irregular attendance 
at meetings because "their leader was no good," the class leaders suspended 
1 
n'Gum for three months, and arranged to lead his classes themselves. Their 
decision was then forwarded to st. }fary's as a result of which n'Gum was 
persuaded to resign from the mission. Dissatisfaction with the morals of 
African agents came to a head in 1848 when both John Cupidon and. Pierre SalIsh 
2 
vere-asked to go. Both had been found guilty of intemperance, the latter 
particularly censured for having opened a wine and spirit store opposite the 
mission premises in :HacCarlhy. He had been in the employ of Richard Lloyd 
since his suspension from the mission in 1846;3 and it was the same Lloyd 
1. lfethodist Nission Gambia, 1841, }finutes of Wesleyan District Meeting held at NacCart~ Island. 
31st January 1848. Minutes of Gambia District ~leeting held at Bathurst. 
Ibid. 
who was suspected of being at the root of the disturbance in 1836. Nor 'tras 
this all, evidence of persistently disobeying orders from the }tinisters, and 
of fighting were some of the charges against men who had spent seventeen 
years of their lives as missionary agents. 
These charges did not go unanswered. Cupidon argued that he had left 
his station without official permission because the Rev. Hatthew Godman had 
flogged his wife, but Godman tried to justify his conduct towards Mrs. Cupidon 
~ citing drunkenly and indecent behaviour. l It was a puzzling state of 
affairs, this evidently recent laxity in moral tone in the hitherto faithful, 
though small, band of Volof missionaries, and the rift between it and 
authority. In the same context, consideration should be given to the 
reasons for the striking reluctance of other urbanised Africans in St. Mar,y's 
to follow in the footsteps of that freed slave group which had offered its 
services to the mission; and why the mission for its part had made no attempt 
to give training to its African members of staff. This inadequacy had to 
be stated in the Hadden Report, so were the advantages to be gained from a 
training programme stressed. Dr. Madden knew that a steady stream of 
promising lads from the Church Missionary Society school in Sierra Leone was 
flowing into institutions for higher education in England. He hoped that 
selected. Gambians would also be sent to England to qualify as teachers who 
would return to run the local schools; but he warned that the "insuffiCiency 
of the salary" of teachers in the Gambia would always be an obstacle to 
1. October 1846. J.finutes of Gambia District Neeting held at Bathurst. 
((,3 
securing the right type of teacher. l 
Having decided to dispense with the services of local assistants who 
could not fulfil the requirements of the church of the 'forties, the Wesleyan 
mission began to recruit trained African staff from Sierra Leone. In this 
policy it was greatly encouraged by the outburst of missionar,y zeal from that 
territory which was not only to be concentrated in the Niger but was to embrace 
the Gambia too. Thus in 1849, the Rev. Joseph Hay was transferred to HacCarthy 
Island circuit. H1\Y was "an .Aku brought up in European missionary households 
and in Ajai Crowther' sit, who had later been educated in the Borough Road 
school, London, at the expense of English Quakers. 2 He was recognized as 
an excellent teacher when he returned home; and indeed Governor MacDonnell 
on visiting his school in HacCart~ Island was "much struck by the progress 
ma.d.e by the children as compared with that which they had evinced ••• 
previously." Even adults and elderly persons had shown keen desire for 
instruction so that a class had been formed for them. 3 ~ was succeeded by 
no less 0. person than the Rev. Charles Knight, also a recaptive who had spent 
t~o years at the Borough School, and who was to become the first African 
Superintendent of the Sierra Leone and Gambia Districts.4 Thus HacCarthy 
1. Madden Report; 1840 Circuit Book:- Assistant Nissionaries like 
Cupidon and SalIsh who were also teachers received a quarterly salary 
ot £12.10s.; Assistant teachers received £6. lOs. a quarter (female 
teachers much less). 
2. F,yf'e, ''History'', p.2l4. 
3. C.O. 87/48, 1850, 29th July, MacDonnell to Grey. 
4. Fyfe, "History", p.398. 
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Island continued to be staffed till the turn of the cent~ in accordance 
with a policy to reserve that station for a trained native clergy. 
'By this period, however, Roman Catholic missionaries had re-entered 
the .Gambia. IIi 1849, four priests arrived in st. Nary's and purchased land. 
for the construction of a church and house. l They were followed b,y four 
Sisters of Charity, who, once they had fotmd a base, devoted themselves 
"to education, to the assistance of the poor and sick - receiving orphans 
and abandoned children into their establishment. ,,2 For the first time in 
its history, a boarding school was established on the Island of st. Nary's; 
it was a free school where the children were instructed in religion and 
domestic subjects. This mission also depended primarily on funds collected 
overseas, in particular France, for the maintenance of its social worlt in St. 
Mary's. Its programme for free medical treatment in the colo~ without aqy 
kind of assistance from the local Government became a burden on the resources 
of the mission, causing it to petition for financial aid in 1853. Their 
spokesman, ~on de Schroeter, based his appeal for a substantial grant of 
£2000 on his estimate that nearly two thousand. of the five thousand 
inhabitants of the Island were Roman Catholics.3 This was probably an 
exaggeration from someone who had to justify his reasons for claiming so 
much towards mission buildings, staff salaries, and a. proposed Boys' school. 
It was a claim "beyond the resources of the Colonial Chest", which could not 1'1 il. 
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C.O. 87/48, 1850, 29th July, MacDonnell to Grey. I 
C.O. 87/55, 1853, 29th April, Governor SlI\Y"th O'Connor toNew~closure _I' 
6th February, Baron de Schroeter to Governor O'Connor. " 
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be met if the Government's own programme for civic development - the building 
of a hospital, a market, and Anglican church! was ever to become a reality. 
Education then was not a province of Government but of Volunt~ bodies; 
and while the revenue of the Gambia remained inadequate to meet current 
expenditure, so long was contribution towards missio~ enterprise ungenerous. 
Typically, the thorny problem of a Native Pastorate, which had become a major 
issue both in Sierra Leone and Yoruba land in this period, was never given 
~ discussion in the Gambia; though the idea of a self-governing church 
run by an indigenous clergy was much more the pet theory of the Church 
Mlssionar,y Society than of the Wesleyan mission. In Sierra Leone, for 
instance, the leaders of the Wesle,yan connexion were bitterly opposed to a 
Native Pastorate which received a government grant from which those outside 
. 2.( ~ 
the Established church could not benefit financially. A trained African 
clergy,' nevertheless, was evidence that the church had taken root, and was 
proved to be an invaluable instrument of education. Wesleyans had attempted 
to produce native assistants for evangelism and teaching in the Gambia, but 
their inability to recruit men outside the 'peasant' class resulted in a 
stagnant church, which could not be in the vanguard of public opinion even 
though its place in society was unquestioned. 
It was the .Anglican church particularly which showed "so little zeal -
for the diffusion of lmowledge and religion" in the settlement, in consequence 
1. c.O. 87/55, 1853, 29th April, O'Connor 
F,yfe, "History", p.353. 
((.c.. 
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of which even the chaplaincy was more often than not vacant. l There had 
a1w~s existed a garrison school attached to the barracks, with never more than 
a roll of twenty children and a few adults, "most of them entirely ignorant, 
and taught ~ a schoolmaster who is himself but little more advanced in 
2 lmowledge." Even without adequate funds, Governor d'.A.rcy was to show in 
the 'sixties that reorganization and expansion was possible. With twenty-
two years' experience in Ceylon, the East Indies, and West Indies where he 
had been partly responsible for running the regimental schools, he was able 
to exert influence in the garrison school in st. Ha.ry's which in consequence 
produced "intelligent N.C.Os" for the benefit of the settlement.) If the 
Anglican church would not make a contribution to education, the ~ with 
Government support had become an instrmnent of education. In this w~ it 
began to produce revolutionar,y forces which marshalled African public opinion 
against the Government of the 'sixties. 
Outside the arqy, ancillar,y institutions such as Friendly Societies 
or Companies had a distinct bearing an the educational development of their 
members. There were twenty-two such Societies in existence in st. Hary's 
reported to d'Arcy to exercise such control over members as almost to 
4 
constitute a threat to the Government. Membership was almost exclusively 
drawn from the Ldberated African community which had received its education 
1. C.o. 87/48, 1850, 29th July, }~cDonnell to Grey. 
2. Ibid. 
3~ C.O. 87/71, 1863, 16th September, Governor George d'Arcy to Duke of 
Newcastle. 
4. C.O. 87/82, 1865, vol.l. 21st June, d'Arcy to Cardwell .... 
" 
in the elementar,y schools and adult classes of the Wesleyan mission. 
Significantly, it was not wi thin church groups under the leadership of 
Ministers and Pastors that public opinion was nurtured in those early years 
but at formal and informal gatherings in the homes of the elders of the 
Liberated African community. 
Thomas King, for example, a disbanded soldier of the 2nd West India 
Regiment, and then a small entrepreneur, was the President of what was 
described as "the African West India SOciety.,,1 In association with the 
Vice President and Secretary of the Society, Sergeant Raper and John Daniel, 
a letter was written to Governor d'.Arcy explaining that "the Society is 
not one of a political or commercial nature and as such it cannot and will 
not interfere with the affairs of the Imperial or Local Government... The 
letter continued that the "principal object of our establishing this Society 
originat~s from no source than that we, considering ourselves as Liberated 
African having no Father, Nother, or other relations in this colony, have 
thought it requisite and necessary to combine ourselves together and establish 
a Society for the purpose of assisting each other."2 
Another letter from a Joseph Reffell, a recaptive of Ibo descent, 
indicated that Friendly Societies in the settlement had been formed under 
Wesleyan Nissionary sponsorship during periods of unemployment between 1837 
and 1841 when petty thieving plagued the Island. of st. }fary's. The 
Government, therefore, approached the church for a solution to this social 
1. c.o. 87/83, 1865, vol.2. 
2. C.O. 87/83, 1865, vol.2. 
22nd October, d'Arcy to £ardweI1, Enclosure 
14th October, Letter from the African West 
Indian Society to d'Arcy. 
14th October, African West Indian Society 
to d'Arcy. 
evil; and it was at a church leaders' meeting that the idea of a "lforlmen' s 
Club" for mutual assistance was born. The first to be founded was the Ibo 
Society started in 1842 with a mixed membership, male members paying 1/- and 
female 6d. a month. It became a moral force in society, other ethnic groups 
on the Island following the lead qy pooling resources in similar associations. 
So beneficial were the results that "the Nagistrates and the merchants returned 
their kind. thanks to the Reverend. gentleman •••• ,,1 
It was not long before other uses were found for these Societies, 
\1 especially as Hr. Fyfe has shown, as recaptives were not unfamiliar with 
"religious, political, co-operative, age-group, or vocational" societies in 
their homeland. 2 Indeed, as early as 1849 the black inhabitants of St. 
}~'s had found it a useful medium for expressing grievances against the 
Government. 3 It was here that second and third generation Liberated 
Africans, who had been fortunate to learn the three Rs at missionary schools 
in the settlement, excelled as scribes and even as commentators of the 
political scene. Little wonder that Governor d'Arcy and other officials 
disliked. this younger generation, who, having been "spoilt" by missionary 
education, was accused of disloyalty, ingratitude towards benefactors who had 
4 brought them freedom. The 'sixties provided d'Arcy with ample examples, 
1. Joseph Reffell on "The Gambia Clubs Ordinance", pub. African Times 
December 1865. 
2. 
4. 
Fyfe, "History", pp. 171-172. 
C.O. 87/46, 1849, vo1.2. 19th September Declaration of George Chapman 
before Richard Lloyd, J.P~ 
C.O. 87/71, 1861, 24th July, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
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for it was a period of racial tension in the settlement when Africans were 
making a desperate effort to assert themselves in the society, frequently 
exhibited in opposition to the Government. These were the people Governor 
~Ia.cDonnell regarded as too "inferior" to benefit from the elementary education 
made available to them in the 'forties. They had so made use of those 
opportunities for education as to have begun to question the leaders of 
church and state and to make their own peculiar demands in the 'sixties. 
Expansion in formal education was a feature now of the Gambia; more 
elementary schools were established, b,y missionar,y agency. The Government 
offered a special grant to the Wesleyans to set up schools in the villages 
in Combo where disbanded soldiers had been located, in Baccow Konko renamed 
Newcastle), in Clifton Town •••• 1 In the older schools in st. Nary's and 
the Ceded Nile, expansion was partly encouraged by the influx of refugee 
children, consequent upon the wars which had dislocated communities in the 
River, now made available for education wich their parents had hitherto 
refused them. Because of a lack of funds, the Government made no formal 
provision for their education in the colony, but it encouraged all persons 
to whom they were apprenticed not only to feed and clothe them but to teach 
them. 
~dence soon proved Liberated African masters and mistresses to be 
1. C.O. 87/69, 1860, 24th Hay, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
(70 
defaulters in respect of the welfare of their apprentices. l Though the 
raising up of "alien" children within a household was in the African tradition, 
invariably householders used such children as unpaid servants, thus depriving 
them often of school education. It demonstrated the absolute dependence 
of 'educational programmes upon economic forces. A Liberated African woman 
who was censured for keeping her boy-apprentice from the school at Esau 
(Berwick Town) only to use him as woodcutter, and starving him besides, gave 
the petUlant answer that "when she has not more to get she cannot go and 
steal. It Nor was she prepared to allow him leisure to study when she could 
i - t.D h- - 2 make a 1 nng au 0.1. 1S earn1ngs. It was an attitude which d'Arcy could 
not understand from persons "who of all others in the world ought to be the very i 
last not to do unto others as they have been done unto." So impressed was 
he b.Y the contrast in treatment given b,y European masters that he deprived 
some Liberated Africans of their apprentices and sent them over to the firm 
of Forster and Smith "where they are well fed, and clothed, taught a 
profession, and most kindly treated." other merchants were congratulated 
for so having cared for' their apprentices that "many even now can read and 
write and speak tolerable English. lt ) Long established merchants had been 
training apprentices in the settlement since its foundation, and had shared 
with Wesleyan missionaries the earliest problems of educating its peoples. 
1. C.o. 87/74, 1862, 25th August, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
2. Ibid. Fyfe reported a similar pattern of behaviour among the same 
community in Sierra Leone, see -History", p.270. 
). C.O. 87/74, 1862, 25th August, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
(7( 
The Blue Book Report for 1862 recorded ste~ progress: Wesleyans alone 
were educating 403 children in their schools (223 boys and 180 girls); the 
Roman Catholics had'105 pupils (55 boys and 50 girls); while the Garrison 
school, under a civilian headmaster, now showed 40 children on its register 
(26 boys and 14 girls), apart from a special class of 20 Congo boys newly 
liberated from slavery. With much satisfaction, d'Arcy concluded that "we 
have no less a number than 659 little people under fnstruction in a Settlement 
numbering 6,000 inhabitants, being little more than 9% of the population, 
which I cannot help thinking is very creditable to the Government and to the 
community_"l In actual fact, the Government was doing very little for 
educational development outside the small grant to the Yesleyan mission, and 
2 
a smaller grant of £50 per annum to the Sisters of J.lercy. It was d' Arcy' s 
wish, however, to take a lead in education ~ establishing a Government 
secular schoo! out of the existing Garrison school, but the revenue of the 
'sixties would not bear such burdens. 
For private individuals, however, it was a period of growing prosperity 
and. enlightenment, when certain parents in Bathurst began to plan higher 
education for their sons at the C.M.S. Grammar School in Freetown. It was 
a. school established in 1845 "to provide secondary education for boys from 
middle-class families," with a. curriculum which included Nathematics, Greek, 
Latin, Biblical and English History, Geography and Husic. At first, most 
1. C.O. 87/71, 1863, 25th September, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 87/71, 1861, 24th July, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
3. c.o. 87/67, 1859, 24th September, d'Arcy to Newcastle; 
c.O. 87/71, 1863, 16th September, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
pupils had been subsidized by the C.N.S. but by the 'sixties most of them 
were paid for b.Y their parents or local benefactors, day boys being charged 
4 guineas a year, boarders £15 a year, while Parlour boarders paid extra for 
the privilege of having meals with the Principal. 1 The Grammar school was 
a unique institution on the West Coast because of its cosmopolitan character, 
drawing its pupils from the Gambia, the Gallinas, the Rio Pongas, Liberia, 
2 Cape Coast Lagos, Fernando Po, Bo~, the Cameroons. Such a heterogeneous 
community of picked youths from well-to-do families was bound to produce a 
particular lcind of education based on its distinctive ethos; besides, the 
immediate environment of Freetown could not but impinge upon the school, 
exerting influences which were to modify and direct the education of the 
yotmg. 
1. 
2. 
Fyfe, "History", p.237. 
A.E. Tuboku - }~tzger, "Historical Sketch of the Sierra Leone Grammar 
School, 1845-1935", (Freetown 1935). 
(7) 
It was into this community that the first youths from the Gambia 
entered in the 'sixties. At what age most of them entered is a matter for 
conjecture, since there is evidence to show that as late as 1857 one pupil 
from Freetown was accepted at the age of thirty-two. John Goddard of st. 
Uary's Island enrolled at the Grammar school on the loth of January 1859 
as Number 315. With that surname he could either have been a MUlatto 
descendant of one of the merchants of st. Mar,y's or perhaps a Liberated 
African youth. Alfred Lewis of Freetown, a younger brother of Samuel 
Lewis (the first African to be called to the English Bar), entered the 
1 \Grammar school three months before. 
This pioneer was followed a year 2 later by John Bruce, probably the son 
of George Bruce, Government Pilot in st. Mar,y's and a man of Yourba descent. 3 
.As a low-grade Government servant, Bruce was probably earning less than £50 
per annum, and m~ well have received aid from the Friendly Society of which 
he wAS a member for the education of his son. Collective responsibility of 
Liberated African groups for the higher education of promising youths was to 
be a feature of this eVOlving community and an expression of their solidarity. 
Only a few years later they were to pool resources for the purpose of giving 
Joseph Reffell, (son of Thomas Reffell an lbo), formerly barrack sergeant 
and clerk in the military store, a legal education in London.4 
1. 
2. 
). 
4. 
Entrance Register, C.H.S.' Granmar School 1845-1935 (Freetown 1935). 
Ibid. 
C.O. 87/73, 1862, 7th April, Signator,y to address of Condolence to 
Her l-Jajesty the Queen. 
Joseph Reffel! on "The Gambia Clubs Ordinance", African Times, 
December 1865. 
A3 was to be expected, Bruce returned to the Gambia with ideas for 
higher education in England, for the Grammar School was itself a stepping-
stone to England for a number of Sierra Leone youths. In 1864, he submitted 
a petition "to the President of the Committee of the Council on Education," 
praying to be admitted to the benefits of an English education, for, as he 
put it, he had been "encouraged to make this application because of his 
often hearing that there are ~ good people living in England whose chief 
desires are to do good for poor Africans, and would take care of them as their 
1 
own children." The petition was duly forwarded to the Colonial Office but 
bore no fruit. Consequently, Bruce was still in the colo~ in 1871, then a 
dismissed clerk from the Brigade Office. 
It was a major defect in missionary enterprise in the educational field 
that in the Gambia it provided no outlet for the exceptional youth, and left 
the initiative in this direction to be taken by parents who themselves had 
had a minimum of schooling. When Gambian youths began to participate in 
the activities of the Grammar School, this was as far as they could go. The 
Wesleyans in the Gambia, unlike the C.M.S. in Sierra Leone, seemed to lack 
contacts - philanthropic bodies in England - by which educational facilities 
might be opened to members of their congregations. It was partly this 
ceiling placed, as it were, above the heads of the ambitious which produced 
that degree of frustration among Liberated African youngmen in the settlement 
in th~ period under consideration, and perpetuated a poor quality of education 
1. c.O. 87/81, 1864, vol.3. Enclosure, Newcastle to d'Arcy. 
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in the schools so striking to all visitors to them. 
Nevertheless, the Gambia was now caught in a wave of learning, which, 
like missionar,y zeal of the 'forties, rose from Sierra Leone and washed the 
West Coast. Goddard and Bruce were heralds of a new age of higher education. 
Between 1861 and 1873 the Grammar school enrolled fourteen other youths from 
the Gambia, among them James Goddard, Jobe Beigh, Joseph Shyngle. l It is 
puzzling that this nucleus of fairly educa.ted men seemed to ha.ve made so 
,', 
, , 
little impact on educational life in the colo~ on their return home. Goddard '.:1 
worked for a time as clerk to Thomas Chown before he branched out on his own. 
Beigh became a clerk to W.n.Goddard. 2 Only Sbyngle, whose father was a small 
entrepreneur, proceeded to England for further education in law. Governor 
d'Arcy described them as half-educated, sometimes, as youths who had received 
tolerable education at Sierra Leone, and had returned home to sow dissension 
in the colony and write scurrilous articles in the African Times. 3 Education 
then sparked off criticism of a political nature and produced a hostile 
attitude of officials towards literate Africans. 
llissionaries in the settlement continued with the routine task of 
preaching and teaching and acting as mediators between Government and people 
when occasion arose, as during the crisis of December 1865 when members of 
their congregation were suspected of plotting the massacre of all ~opeans 
Entrance Register. 
C.O. 87/99, 1871, vol.l. 5th ~fuy, Sir A.E.Kenne~ to Lord Kimberley. 
C.O. 87/82, 1865, vol.l. 21st July, d'Arcy to :Cardwell'. 
in st. lfary's.l Otherwise, the Wesleyan mission kept out of current 
controversy and showed a s~lar lack of opinion on major issues. It would 
appear that missionar,y policy so long as it was directed qy EUropeans was 
generally to give support to Government policy, and when necess~ to bring 
their influence to bear on disruptive elements in the society. This was not 
the picture in Sierra Leone. It was not a constructive policy, and hardly 
reflected the spirit of the recommendations of the 1865 Select Committee of 
the House of Commons which stated that "the object of our policy should be to 
encourage in the natives the exercise of those qualities which m~ render it 
possible more and more to transfer to them the administration of all the 
Governments, with a view to our ultimate withdrawal from all, except probably, 
Sierra Leone."2 It was not in the church but in the state, under the 
initiative of Sir A.E. Kenne~, that practical steps were tru~en towards this 
end. 
The new Governor-in-Chief provided a stimulus to education by a policy of 
appointing qualified Africans to all grades of the Civil Service. In April 
1868 he instituted competitive examinations for junior clerkships, and found 
that youths leaving the C.M.S. Grammar school were ready to meet the challenge. 
Not only did they fill junior posts in that colony, but the,y became liable to 
promotion when vacancies occurred in the other West African settlements like 
Gambia.. Among those qualified for Kenneqy's experiment were Zachariah 
Gibson, William Ca.tes, Alfred Lewis, and Robert S,yrett, contemporaries of 
1. Memorial of certain Black inhabitants of Ba.thurst, African Times, 
~liamenta.rY Pa.pers, 1865..1 vol.V..1 Q.85l3-l9; d Re~ox:t, COI},cruS1on8~' .,elect ~ornmittee. e, 'H~stor,y , p.35 • 
Harch 1866. 
2045-6.] C.O.267/286, 1865, 
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those Gambians who had entered the Grammar school in the late 'fifties 
and early 'sixties. The Customs Department provided the largest number of 
jobs for these men who had received further training on leaving school. 
Gibson and Lewis had both gone to sea to learn the art of navigation under 
Commodore Wilmot, who "took great pains in educating both of" them.1 Both 
had subsequently been employed in the Customs at Sherbro. Gibson was 
therefore qualified to fill the post at Bathurst of Tide Surveyor and 
Quarantine Officer at a salar,y of £240 p.a. in 1870.2 Shortly before this 
date, Robert Syrett, a youth of twenty, was appointed as 2nd Landing Waiter 
in the same Department at £40 p.a. William Cates, who had been trained at 
the C.M.S. college in Islington, London, before he returned to teach at his 
old school in Freetown, was appointed schoolmaster to the Anglican school 
which was opened in Bathurst in 1869. 3 Thus almost without exception, posts 
in the Government now available to Africans were filled qy Sierra Leoneans, 
since it was argued that the Gambia had. failed to qualify its citizens for 
them. It was not in vain that missionary bodies had set up seventy six 
schools with an average total attendance of 7,830 pupils in Sierra Leone.4 • 
Kennedy's policy though favourable to educated Africans was bitterly 
resented by the Gambians as every new opening was filled from the neighbouring 
territory. Opposition came out openly in 1871 in a petition to the Secretary 
1. C.O. 87/99, 1871, vol.l. 14th ~~ch, Kenne~ to Kimberley; 
Tuboku - Metzger, "Historical Sketch", p.2l. 
2. C.O. 90/44, 1870, Blue Book of Statistics. 
3. Ibid. Entrance Register. 
4. F,yfe, "History", p.359. 
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ot state against "the open and. 1.mcourteous disregard of Your Petitioners 
and other inhabitants of Bathurst by Sir A.E. Kennedy." They complained 
that having "endeavoured to educate their sons and daughters in the hope 
that not only would they be useful ornaments of society, but that they would 
equally share with others in the distribution of the colonial offices 
adequate to their sphere of intelligence, found that all situations were 
filled by men from Sierra Leone." That colony, they argued, could well 
provide for her own people, and the Gambia need not be "saddled" with them. 
It was only fair that as "men of property ••• even as ratep~ers and licence 
takers, that some of these vacant offices should be filled by some of them."l 
Among the signatories to the petition was a hard core of clerks who had 
been to school in Sierra Leone, also the erstwhile Pierre SalIsh (described 
as foreman of labourers at Forster and. Smith's), and other persons like S.J. 
Forster, a clerk in the Commissariat Department who was later nominated to 
the Legislative Council.Kenne~, however, described them as the "rakings 
of the Gambia", pointing out that many of them had been dismissed from 
clerical jobs because of intemperance, insubordination or improbity; that 
.~. Chase Walcott (A West Indian barrister domiciled in the colony and 
suspected of having drawn up the petition), had been "an inmate of Sierra 
Leone gaol for a considerable time"; and Joseph RetteIl their leader was of 
doubtful character and had been refused admission to the Bar at Sierra Leone. 2 
In short, the Governor-in-Chief waS most unsympathetic to the aspirations of 
1. C.o. 87/99, 1871, vol.l. 4th ~~y, Petition of Africans to Kimberley. 
2. C.O. 87/99, 1871, vol.l. 5th }~y & 7th June, Kenne~ to ICimberley. 
Liberated Africans in st. ~~'s. 
"What Gambia youngman is there at present qualified in point of 
character, and competent in point of education to fill the posts of Clerk of 
Courts, and Harbour J.1a.ster, or Gaoler? ••• What Hercantile House here, 
English or French, will employ any of those whose names figure at the end 
of the Petition? •• _ I beg to assure Y~ur Excellency that rightminded men _ 
men of property and influence ••• are generally satisfied with Your 
Excellency's appointments and are too wise to be drawn aside by designing 
men •••• "1 The writer of this confidential letter to Kenne~ was the 
recently appointed Colonial Chaplain of the Gambia, himself a Sierra Leonean _ 
the Rev. George Nicol, son-in-law of Bishop Crowther. He believed the 
Governor's liberal policy towards his compatriots could only benefit the 
public service and indeed society in the Gambia which was only reaping "the 
fruit of fifty years' careless ease and neglect •••• ,,2 It was a hard 
judgment, but as a contemporar,y assessment of Gambian achievement. in the 
field of education it is valuable. It would suggest that missionaries had 
not made that progress that might have been expected of them because of 
apa.thy evinced by the people even of Bathurst. Certainly the Administrator 
too, Henry Anton, was regretting in 1871 that even with a Government subsidy 
to education amounting to £328.16.0. progress was slow because "it is very 
difficult to secure the attendance of children who are admitted free." The 
Gambia was far from re~ to introduce a system of grants based on attendance 
1. C.o. 87/99, 1871, vol.l. 6th ~, Rev. George Nicol to A.E.Kennedy. 
2. Ibid. 
(So 
I 
and performance, alre~ in operation in Sierra Leone. 
Under the superintendence of the Rev. Benjamin Tregaskis tla vigorous 
missionary inured to tropical service by thirty years in the West Indies", 
energy was concentrated upon building a well organized, disciplined Wesleyan 
church,2 which equalled the progress that was being made in the state under 
Governor Kenne~. The most serious defect of the,church in the eyes of the 
Wesleyan }ussionar,y Society in London was her inability to produce a 
qualified Native Ministry in the Gambia. It was a problem closely tied up 
with education, and so long as no institution for higher education existed 
in the settlement so long was the realization of a qualified indigenous 
ministr,y del~ed. And under the unbending control of Tregaskis the Gambia 
remained largely dependent on Sierra Leone for Uinisters. 
Philip Wilson and James Hero were assistant }unisters from Sierra Leone 
in the 'sixties; and with York Clement, a Gambian, they kept the church in 
the outstations alive. Between them, they taught the people not only in 
English, "which is an imperfect medium of conveying truth to the minds of 
the people here," but also in the Aku and Popo languages, in Wolot and 
Mandinka. 3 In st. Mar,y's itself, a. Wolof Primer and Grammar "which Eng1ish-
1. c.o. 87/99, 1871, vol.l. 6th March, Colonel Henr,r Anton to Kenne~. 
2. Fyfe, "History", pp.328 & 350. 
3. 1871. Minutes - Gambia Annual District }leeting. 
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speaking Joluts (Wolofs) highly appreciate" were in use; also a Wolof 
Liturgy, bictionar,y and Class-Book were in preparation. l To a great extent 
the work was still evangelistic rather than educational; and when Wesleyans 
began to participate in commercial activity in the River, the mission found 
fresh avenues for evangelisation, and resolved in the District Heeting of 
1867 to exhort "our trader members ••• to exert themselves systematically 
during their absence in the trading season for the instruction of the people 
up the rivers in the elements of religious lmowledge ••••• ,,2 So that bibles 
and religious tracts became as much the equipment for the Christian trader 
in the River as the goods with which he traded. Such was the disturbed 
state of the riverain states and the upsurge of Islam, however, that 
Christianity could make no penetration beyond the pockets of settlements under 
British jurisdiction. It was to remain a religion of urbanised Africans, 
among whom the Islamic faith was also growing rapidly. 
Nor did friction between European Hinisters and their African assistants 
produce a healtQy atmosphere for growth; the root of the trouble being the 
unsa.tisfactory manner of training Ninisters locally by private reading and 
study. Ordination depended on passing exams based on such st~ as well as 
upon good conduct, but James Hero, for example, resented his del~ed 
ordination and complained that "the Ninisters in England are ordained." 3 
Trega.skis seriously considered suspending him from his ministerial duties 
1. 1871 ~Iinutes - Gambia. .Annual District Neeting. 
2. 1867 Minutes of Gambia. Annual District Heeting. 
3. 1869 Circuit Book - Enquiry into Mr. Hero's case. 
for intemperance in 1869, but "other considerations" dictated "a modified 
action. til Under the rigid discipline of the Superintendent, this kind of 
inadequately trained missionary could not survive; and both Hero and Wilson 
were dismissed from the mission once they returned home to Freetown.2 York 
Clement, however, having surmounted initial difficulties, gave satisfaction 
at the exams in 1869, and "upon the ground of his conduct and services" was 
recommended to be received into full connexion. 3 He was to pl~ a 
significant role at his station in Maccarthy Island during the native wars 
as a leader of public opinion. 
It was not, however, till 1879 that a local institution for higher 
education was founded in st. Mary's, both for training native agents, and 
for the education of the sons of the growing class of African entrepreneurs. 
The Wesleyan Boys' High School opened with fifteen boys under the Headship of 
the Revo Robert Dixon, with a curriculum little different from that of the 
Grammar school in Sierra Leone. Like that institution, the aim was to make 
the school self-supporting, and "to make the people feel this is their 
institution and upon them its success depends •••• " .Annual Reports of the 
school were encouraging for showing the lively interest which parents were 
beginning to take in the education of their children;4 but a tradition of 
advanced education and all it implied did not come easily. 
1869 Circuit Book - Enquiry into Mr. Hero's case. 
Fyfe, "History", p.350. 
1869 Hinutes of Gambia Annual District Heeting. 
EConomic demands 
1880 Hinutes of .Annual Gambia District Heeting; (Wesleyan Hethodist 
Society Library, London), Wesleyan Hissionary Reports 1883. 
took boys away from school for several months eve~ year to trade up River, 
and. parents were too eager to withdraw their boys from school as soon as they 
could find situations for them as clerl~ or traders. l Very little consider~ 
tion was given to the needs of the church, and ve~ few parents were willing to 
offer their sons as pupil teachers2 or assistant missionaries. 
Growing economic prosperity resulted in preference being given to a 
boarding school education 'abroad' for a larger number of Gambian boys than 
before. In 1881, the Boys High School in Bathurst contained twenty-one 
pupils,3 but in the 'eighties no fewer than eighteen youths entered the 
C.lLS. Grammar school,4 not including those who went to the Wesleyan Boys' 
School in Sierra Leone which had been founded in 1874. 5 Indeed, the daughters 
of the 'middle class' were also being considered for higher education abroad; 
a few were already in the C.M.S. Girls' boarding school, the Annie Walsh 
Hemorial School, in Freetown. Those who could not afford this expensive 
training, sent their daughters to the Sisters of Charity in Bathurst for 
special tuition in Domestic subjects, especially Needlework and Dressmaking6 
1. 1880 }linutes of Annual Gambia District Meeting; (Wesleyan Methodist 
Society Library, London), Wesleyan Hissionary Reports 1883. 
Wesleyan Missionary Reports 1902. 
1881 Minutes of Annual District Meeting. 
Entrances Register. 
Fyfe, "History", p.398. 
1871 1-finutes of .Annual District Meeting a - "The daughters of our members 
have either to go to the Nuns or else away from the Colo~ to get the 
education they need. This weakens our cause." - James Fieldhouse. 
(Dressmaking and Teaching providing the only means of employment for 
, gentlewomen' ) • The Rev. Robert Dixon was made aware of the needs for 
seconda.r.y education for girls in the Gambia, and recommended that ~ 
building constructed for this purpose was to make provision for a few 
boarders, for "it would repay the Society a hundredfold, and confer an 
unspeakable blessing on the colony." A3 he pointed out, it was vain to 
look for great improvement in the horne until the women were "adequately 
educated under Christian influence."l The only surprise was that it took 
Wesleyan missionaries in the Gambia over half a centur,y's labour in the 
educational field to find a congregation that was re~ to provide its 
youngpeople with higher education. 
B,y the 'eighties then missionaries could not simply concentrate on 
teaching church catechism and the three Rs, but had reached the stage of 
educating pupils for the future. There were good reasons for this slow 
revolution in education, not least among them the greater economic 
independence of the Liberated African community, and the cumulative effect 
of educational influences which had permeated society from a sprinkling of 
highly educated Africans from Sierra Leone in its midst since the 'sixties • 
.Among these were Dr. Africanus Horton, 2 Staff A3sistant Surgeon onetime 
stationed with the troops in ~lacCarthy Island, Dr. Thomas Spilsbury,3 
Colonial Surgeon, Rev. George Nicol4 the second African to be appointed to 
1. 
2. 
4. 
1881 l-tlnutes of Annual District Heeting. 
.A.fricanus Horton was of Ibo descent; Studied Hedicine at Edinburgh. 
Fyfe, ''His~ory'', pp.295 &: 347. 
Thomas Spilsbury - a Hulatto of Freetown, studied Hedicine in London. 
Fyfe, "History", p.348. 
George Ni;,oJ-of"HT~nm.te &"Susu descent, studied at Islington College London. ~J~e, 1S ory , p.252o ' 
a West African Chaplaincy, Joseph Renner ~~elll Queen's Advocate. These 
men inevitably affected the climate of opinion on the educational needs of 
West Africans. 
}ussionaries had failed in their original objectives of civilizing and 
educating the indigenous peoples of the Gambia, having been compelled. by 
circumstances to concentrate in urban and coastal areas. MacCarthy Island. 
was never a spearhead into the interior but, like Combo and the Ceded Hile, 
./ was a mere limb of the body at st. Hazy's. Once the troops were withdrawn 
and Liberated. Africans located there began to gain self-confidence and to 
consider the greater security of the capital, a ste~ migration began down 
the River, a movement that was given impetus by the ravages of war.2 Thus 
while the dependencies of st. Mar,y's made ve~ little contribution to its 
educational and spiritual life, in Sierra Leone, the Peninsular villages 
which surrounded Freetown had played a significant role in the life of that 
colony, not least in the field of education. While Islam with its emphasis 
on Arabic schools for boys combated the literacy problem in the hinterland, 
it also del~ed the penetration of liberal and secular education, and. 
generally prolonged a low standard of education in missionar,y schools 
throughout the Gambia. 
As a result of missionary endeavour in st. Nar,y's and its environs, 
notwithstanding the limitations of its educational programme, a ldberated 
African community articulate in its demands and critical of the policies of 
1. Joseph Renner Haxwell, son of the Colonial Chaplain at Cape Coast, 
a Liberated African, studied Law at Oxford & Lincoln's Inn. 
Fyfe, "History", pp.252 & 406. 
C.o. 87/76, 1863, 22nd June, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
its rulers had emerged out of an amorphous mass of distressed and despised I 
immigrants. Herchants of the settlement had made their own contribution 
towards improving the economic conditions of these people, and though the 
Government had given financia.l support to the Wesleyan mission since 1848, 
it was with the passing of the first Education Ordinance of 1882 that it really 
became involved in the educational development of its people. 
(9:;7 
CHAPTER V 
THE QUEST FOR A POLITICAL IDENTITY 1829-1888. 
Problems ot Government were particularly difficult of solution in the 
Gambia settlement because of its meagre population and limited economic 
resources. To one Colonial Office Under-8ecretary it was no more than a 
"knot ot persons less numerous than the inhabi tents of some petty village in 
England [constituting] a separate Government ••• [with] neither the element nor 
the wealth trom which to create the necessary institutions of Government."l 
British colonists,. established on the Island of st. l-fary's, thought differently, 
and unceasingly agitated for recognition of their peculiar needs. In practical 
terms, they demanded the appointment of a Governor and Legislative body with 
a Supreme Court tor the peace, order, and good government of the settlement. 
They were difticult demands to meet, so that no permanent solution was found 
till the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
Prom the point ot view ot men of business, the most urgent need was tor 
"a separate local Government empowered ••• to act at the moment and as 
2 
circumstances ~ require." EXperience had taught them that a government 
at 8. distance ot tour hundred miles could not aflord merchants that protection 
1. C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 15th August, c.o. Minute James Stephen to ~.Hope. 
2. c.o. 267/78, 1826, vol.8. 3rd Mq, Merchants' Hemorial to Lord Bathurst. 
They gave reasons to show "the absolute necessity at establishing proper 
Courts":- In Dec. 1826 one Capt. P~e's cargo ot Gunpowder was seized 
tor breach of the Navigation Laws. He made three successive voyages to 
S'a Leone to get his case heard without success. I~ Feb.1828 Payne was 
given notice that, his" case was to be pros,ecuted in the Court ot Common 
Pleas in st. Mary s. By these means, an lndustrio and. 
in trade has been completely ruined." [C 0 87/1 lUSS a respectable man • • , 28,6th Hemorial • 
and encouragement in commerce which they claimed, for unfamiliarity with the 
Gambia situation and preoccupation with the interests ot its own mercantile 
colllDUl1ity, inevitably resulted in discriminatory or inapplicable policies by 
the Governor and Council ot Sierra Leone. Complaints against subordination 
to Sierra Leone were complicated by dissatistaction with a military Government 
on the spot, for \Dltil 1829, executive power in the Gambia was concentrated in 
the head of the military. Petitions, therefore, deplored encroaChments ot 
the Militar,y upon civil liberties, consequent upon the Commandant's 
unacquaintance with the torms ot civil administration and his ill-detined 
1 
authority. The settlement was as yet a long w~ trom that political identity 
sought b,y its merchants. 
When mercantile opinion was consulted b,y Commissioner Rowan in 1826, 
those leading merchants who gave evidence betore him made categoric statements 
about the lack ot a consistent or relevant policy from a Government "uninformed 
of our Wishes, wants, and what may be necessary tor regulating the Trade here. It 
To Charles Grant, the settlement would continue to decline unless those 
interested in its prosperity were admitted to a share of its Government. 
!-fajor Rowan vas sufficiently convinced by their thesis (for ill-health confined 
him to st. Mary's) to recommend that "the prosperity ot the Settlement would 
be promOted b,y the appointment ot a Lieutenant-Governor and by the establish-
ment of a CO\Dlcil or. Court, empowered to make regulations for the trade and 
the internal a.ttairs ot the possessions in the River, subject to the approval 
1. 0.0. 267/72, 1826, vol.2. 28th June, Kenneth Macaulay to Bathurst. 
1 
of the Governor-in-Chief." While pointing to the necessity of a court for 
the trial of misdemeanours, he warned that the powers of such a court were to 
be limited according to legal knowledge available in the settlement. It was 
a practicable report~ acceptable to the merchants and to the British 
GoverJllIlent. 
It was not till 1829 that a Lieutenant-Governor was appointed, but it 
soon became obvious that until legislative dependence on Sierra Leone was 
completely removed it was not less difficult to exert control over the 
executive authority under a civil administration. Indeed the ma.chiner,y of 
5 Government remained cumbersome under which laws framed by the Lt.-Governor 
were to be submitted for the approval of the Governor and Council of Sierra 
Leone. The del83'S following this tedious procedure in an age of sailing 
ships were as detrimental to the welfare of the colonists in st. Mary's as 
under the former pattern of administration. Neither had the changes to 
improve the adm;nistration of justice been entirely satisfactory. The Court 
ot Requests with its amateur judges continued as the backbone of the legal 
machinery, settling all claims under £10. Twelve Justices of the Peace were 
empowered to inflict fines, imprisonment for not more than three months , with 
2 hard labour, and whipping. And as late as 1841, Dr. Madden found. "many 
Tery unfit persons" among these magistrates, and criticised the practice of 
giving "ever,y White person settled. in the Colony, even to the Clerks in the 
principal Mercantile Houses, the Commission ot the Peace.,,3 As with the 
1. C.O. 267/9), 1827, Rowan Report. 
2. C.O. 267/173, 1841, Madden Report. 
'3. Madden Report. 
('10 
civil administration, so too the administration of justice in the Gambia was 
simply a subsidiary branch of the legal department in Sierra Leone, whose 
Chief JUstice was expected to hold Courts of Qyer and Terminer there. 
Dissatisfaction with a dependent status created strains and stre.ses in 
the intant settlement which was to break out into open antagonism between the 
merchants and the Lt.-Governor. other factors aggravated the situation _ 
the disturbed state of the River of the 'thirties which interrupted trade and 
brought hardship to the mercantile cOmrmmity, was unfortunately accompanied 
b,y a Yellow Pever epidemic in 1837 during which Lt.-Governor Rendall died. 
He was an administrator greatly respected b,y the merchants tor his past 
experience on the Bench, and his consistent policy of protection tor traders 
in the River. l Rendall had shared the aspirations of his merchants and had 
hoped to reduce the dependence of the Gambia on Sierra Leone b,y securing tor 
it a Legislative Council and an independent and qualified judiciar,y. For 
in ~ case, the executive itself needed legal guidance "in the preparation 
of such Legislative Acts as might be necessary to be submitted to the 
Governor and Council of Sierra Leone."2 It was, however, lett to his 
successors to continue the quest. 
Though most people-were agreed that some torm of separateness was 
desirable for the well-being of the Gambia, there were also"ver,y conflicting 
views" enunciated by colonists and ofticials as to the form such a change 
should take. Chiet Justice Rankin after his visit to Bathurst to hold court 
1. See Chapter III of Thesis - "Trade and Protection". 
2. Gambia Archives, -No. 28, 17th lIa.rch 1835, Rendall to Lord Glenelg. 
C.o. 87/12, 1835. 
in March 1835 had stated that ver.y little inconvenience resulted from dependenc. 
on an outside .Legislature, while the merchants gave examples of how the 
distance from Sierra Leone, the infrequency of cODlllJUIlication, and. the ignorance 
of conditions in the Gambia delayed measures essential for the welfare of the 
settlement, making them inapplicable by the time the authorities in Bathurst 
1 
were empowered to act. .As a middle course, Rankin had recounnended the 
appointment of a King's Advocate who would not only advise the executive but 
would give service as chief Judge of the Court of CODmon Pleas. 
The problem in the eyes of officials was basically an economic one, the 
resource8 of the settlement being inadequate for either an elaborate or indeed 
a well-qualified administrative staff. The appointment of the Surgeon to the 
Liberated African Department as the Gambia's first Advocate was a clear 
indication of this. But merchants who had for twenty years manned the 
judiciar,r at no little criticism from all sections of the society and without 
financial compensation, did not look ~ on a paid Judge without legal 
qualification. Mr. Mantell, the Queen's Advocate, a yoWlglll8D of about 
twenty-seven, took the precaution of enrolling as a law.student at the J.liddle 
Temple when on leave in LondOn, 2 but it is not certain that he ever qualified 
at the Bar. In arry event, Mantell's office became an offence to the 
merchants, providing them with a target in their opposition to the local 
Government. 
1. C.O. 87/19, 18~8, 15th September, Memo b,y Major Maekie for Glenelg. 
2. C'.O. 81/79, 1864, vol.l. 21st January, Governor d'Arcy to Duke of 
Newcastle. 
By 1842, the most influential merchants had assumed the role ot an 
opposition bloc to the Mministration in st. Mary's, particularly to Lt.-
Governor T.L.Ingram and Chiet Justice Mantell. Charles Grant, I.J.S.Finden 
and Thomas Brown were alleged to be the instigators ot a "party highly 
inimical to the Authorities at the Gambia. nl That cooperation between all 
colllDWlities which had been a teature ot the early history ot st. Mary's was 
being replaced b.Y bitter rivalry and growing discontent. Such tactics were 
aimed not only at individual otticials who happened to be Wlpopular, but at 
the whole structure of Government which excluded the mercantile element from 
its deliberations, an element that was now so confident ot its own importance 
and ot its usefulness to officials in various capacities, that opposition 
became a real threat to their survival. 
It was James Stephen ot the Colonial Ottice who aptly stated the 
dileJJllla ot Government in small territories. "If you make the attempt [to 
provide efficient government] you are charged with ruining the Colony b.Y 
extravagance and disproportionate establishments. If you do not make it you 
are charged with each individual grievance •••• "2 Stephen's conclusion was 
equallY interesting. He preferred "the occasional and particular grievance 
to the chronic and general grievance of keepiDg up a costly establishment 
with nothing to do for nine-tenths ot the year •••• n3 While most problems 
of the Gambia sprang from the insurmountable one ot finance, the sHuation in 
1. c.o. 81/33, 1844, To1.1. loth Mq, T.L.Ingram to Lord Stanley. 
2. C.O. Fn/'J'J, 1844, vol.l. 15th August, c.o. l-tl.nute James Stephen to 
Mr. Hope. 
81/3'J, 1844, vol.l. 15th August, Stephen to Hope. 
, 
3. c.o. 
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the settlement was more complex than Stephen's appraisal suggested. It was 
not simply the problem ot funds tor rmming an etticient Public Service, but 
also the tar less easily detinable tactor ot social relations in a small 
community which entangled otticials and inhabitants at manitold points ot 
contact. The "sociological aspects" ot the Gambia problem relative to its 
smallness were as worthy ot consideration as its economic deticiency. 
Administrative inetticiency, in part the outcome ot a policy ot 
centralisation in the West African settlements, had created a social problem 
in st. Nary's so that by the 'torties opposing interests and individual and 
personal animosities and recriminations were seriously dictating the public 
behaviour ot otticials and merchants. The immediate reason tor political 
upheaval in this period was tailure on the part ot local otticials to inspire 
confidence and respect in the mercantile community which constituted the most 
influential bo~ ot citizens. For risks were attached to the policy ot 
recruiting staft locally tor the recently established civil establishment in 
Bathurst, whereb,y unsuccessful merchants and junior otticials were invariably 
appointed to senior posts in the Civil Service whenever this was possible 
rather than new men brought out trom England. The "smallness of the total 
social field" in st. Mary's where "maIJY roles (were] plqed by relatively tew 
individuals", the same persons being brought into contact frequently in 
various activities, had important implications tor political, economic and 
social development. One disadvantage was that decisions ot individuals were 
not infrequently influenced b.y their maqy-sided relationships with other 
individuals. l Indeed, a constant complaint from the merchants was against 
Public Officers performing in too ~ roles, thereby being given unlimited 
opportunity for discriminatory practices where they were so inclined. The 
defence of the system was that it aimed at relieving a poor colo~ of 
excessive expenditure. 
The key word of the petitions in the 'forties was 'misrule' or 
'maladministration'. Lt.-Governor Ingram described. it as "the bye word at 
the Gambia since I first came here twenty years ago.,,2 But whereas earlier 
petitions had been concerned with the del~8 involved in & tedious legal 
process, now they deplored "the uncertain and partial administration of law"3 
in the settlement. The very persona.! nature of memorials in 1842 was a new 
fea.ture, and clear indication of the trend of events. In proportion as 
mercantile influence over the executive authority was reduced. in the settlement 
so opposition forces were mustered against those who had displaced them; but 
opposition was not simply 8. sign of resentment. For 8. Chief Judge without 
legal qualification and with far less experience in the courts than merchants 
on 'Whose cases he pronounced judgment was likely to make mistakes, perhaps 
very grave mistakes. In October 1842, Thomas Brown led 8. petition praying 
1. Institute of Commonwealth Studies, November .7th 1962, Seminar Pa.per on 
"Sociological aspects of smallness." b,y Dr. Burton Benedict. 
2. c.o. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 2200 October. T.L.Ingram to Lord Stanley. 
3. 0,0. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 11th March, Merchants' Petition to Lord 
stanley. 
for Mantell's removal on the grounds of "very grave misconduct and want of 
1 probity and integrity." Merchants were not unreasonably disturbed b,y a 
system where Appeal was heard by persons who had given judgment in a lower 
court. Further, they suspected that ofticial pressure was exerted in the 
courts through Alexander Ingram, brother ot the Lt.-Governor and an assistant 
Judge; so that "in all cases when a !1agistrate or Officer of Govermnent is a 
party, the said Chief Judge displl\Ys a fixed and obviously preconcerted 
resolution to defeat the possibility of obtaining constitutional redress.,,2 
These were serious allegations in a settlement where a gaol deliver,y might 
only be held once in eighteen months when the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone 
could be transported to st. !o1ary's; but the petitioners had. not presented 
the complete picture, for their interests were represented in the said Court 
of Common Pleas by' one of their own number, W.H.Goddard an established. 
merchant. 
A period of bitter struggle between Govermnent and people, particularly 
the White inhabitants, had opened. The local Government in its own defence 
accused the mercantile community with a determination to interrupt the 
ooministration of justice by using undue influence over jurors, the majority 
ot whom were their ow. "clerks, friends and connexions." The Lloyd. family, 
for example, were supposed. to wield great influence in comercia! circles, 
not only in st. Mary's but also in Ma.cC~ Island. The Lt.-Governor 
complained that "the influence of the Lloyd family ••• has a1~ ensured 
I. C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 22nd October, Ingram to Lord stanley. 
2. C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 17th October, Merchants' ~lemoria1 to Lord 
staDIey. 
success to aqy of its members without reference to the justice of the case 
-
1 in which they have been engaged. II Such suspicions merely paralysed 
Government so that little benefit was derived from the presence of a Lt.-
Governor on ,the spot; and the legal machinery itself was very nearly brought 
to a standstill. 
Opposition to the local Government for a time became a rallying point 
for all disgruntled elements. Edward Lloyd was b,y now the patriarch, of 
an extended family of Whites and }fulattoes which was an economic and 
political force in the settlement. B,y this period, Charles Grant had formed 
a subsidiary trading comp8.D3" under the authority of Forster and Smith, through 
whose contacts in London disputes with the local Authorities in the Gambia 
could not fail to reach the Colonial Office. Within the opposition were 
found those who had been dismissed the Service for misconduct, including a 
2 fragmentary group of Africans who had found employment with the merchants. 
Consistently they harried the Government of st. Mary's and its dependency ot 
MAcC~ Island with a determination to secure political recognition for' 
themselves. 
In MacCarthy Island where the Commandant, Captain Alexander Findl83", 
as ex officio }fagistrate had prosecuted a large number of the merchants' 
traders for slave-dealing in the Upper River, and tound ma.ny ot them guilty, 
bitter resentment had ensued, and a protracted cowt case in! tiated by the 
merchants against Findl~ for abuse of magisterial power. Pindl~ was 
1. 
2. 
C.O. rn/28, 1842, vol.2. 22nd Oct., Ingram to Stanley. 
C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 21st Oct., List at Petitioners compiled by 
Judges of Common Pleas for Lt.-Gov. Ingram. 
charged under five heads, all constituting "a series of wanton and lUllawful 
cruelties upon H.M.'s liege and unoffending subjects.Hl Such was the 
strength of public opinion, that in JlUle 1842 Pind.l~ had to muster support 
outside the colony for his cause, "lmowing well the dead set upon me by the 
majority of the merchants and mulatto population of the Settlement who in all 
probability will compose the Jury." Damages claimed against him amounted to 
£2000, and the alternative punishment of imprisonment was such a real threat, 
that he begged his father, Colonel Findl~, to bring the circumstances of the 
case before the Secretary of state. In the final analysis, ultimate authority 
l~ there; though merchants could threaten officials, it was well nigh 
impossible to take effective action against them which would lead to dismissal 
or imprisonment. Once the Lt.-Governor came to the support of the accused, 
showing that the root of the trouble was personal animosity against a 
vigilant administrator, Findlay' s acquittal was ensured. 
Where the acts of the Government disrupted trade, there was opposition 
marshalled in all its strength. It would seem that Findlay's administration 
had h8d repercussions on the commerce of the River. His arbitrary treatment 
1. C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 1st December, Charles Grant & Co., William 
Forster to Lord stanle,y. 
(i) Charges were made by Mrs. Riley, Phoebe Thomas and ~1a.ndingo. 
(if) Conniving"at the rapacity of the soldiers under his Conmand ••• It 
(iii) .As J.P. "authorised and inflicted cruel, illegal and tyrannical 
punishments ••• tt 
(iv) ••• inflicted "arbitrary and cruel punisbments both upon unoffending 
inhabitants and natives temporarily visiting the Island. ••• It 
(v) ft •• ,unlawfully pressing and by means ot force and fear compelling, 
as well inhabitants as vis! tors ••• to cs:rry without pay ••• 
provisions to the troops at Cattabar ••• " 
C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 15th June, Alexander Findlay to Colonel Findlay. 
· of long distance traders had so alarmed them that they "now convey their 
produce to the Portuguese settlement at Geba and the French factory at 
Saidgee, passing within a few miles of MacCarthy Island."l The merchants, 
however, knew that diversion of trade from the Gambia was more often the result 
of political struggles in the interior states than the outcome of a restrictive 
policy directed from Sierra Leone or by otticials like Findl~. For all 
this, to a trading community the first task at Government was .the protection 
of trade and traders, and 8.D3'" acts against traders were treated as hostile 
moves which were to be resisted. 
It was not o~ the Government but the Judges too whose task was made 
Tery difficult by the demands of the mercantile community. As a result ot 
the 1842 incidents, all the Judges of the Court ot Common Pleas tendered their 
resignations, with an explanation that the Court was "liable to be made a 
dangerous instrument ot annoyance, persecution and malevolence instead of 
2 being a protection to liberty and justice." Lt.-Governor Ingram would not 
acc~t the resignations for fear ot exposing the administration to the 
intrigues of a local taction, there being & shortage, as he affirmed, of 
3 
"efficient persons for the honorar,y oftices ot Judges and ~~istrates". 
Though without legal qualitication, the present Judges were "highly educated 
Gentlemen_"4 Goddard had eertai~ been a Magistrate since the settlement 
received its Charter in 1822 and was respected for "acknowledged integrity 
1. C.O. 87/28, 1842, Tol.2. 1st Dec_, Grant & Forster to Lord Stanley. 
2. C.O. 87/28, 1842, Tol.2. 4th Oct., Mantell, A.Ingram, Goddard to 
T.L.Ingram. 
3. C.O. 87/28, 1842, Tol.2. 8th Oct., Ingram to Judges. 
4. C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 22nd Oct., Ingram to Lord Stanley. 
and sound sense; like his colleagues, he had accepted office "with the view 
of rendering services to the community and. to accommodate the Local Govermnent.,.J 
Yet a little more than goodwill was required from officials in a growing 
settlement that was over a quarter of a century old, and. within sueh close 
proximity of Senegal where the Governors were usually men of distinction and 
high rank from the Services. The merchants of st. Mar.y's felt it was an 
insult that an insolvent trader like Ingram with bad debts in Senegal and 
Gambia should have risen so rapidly in Govermnent service that he was now 
Acting Lt.~overnor. They therefore openly demanded officials of integrity 
and dignity who would not only command the respect of the local community, 
but also of the neighbouring French Authorities. They complained that 
Captain Bo~t, Gov.rnor-~et of French Vest Africa, and formerlY Commander 
of the French Squadron on the Coast, had declined "to p~ that respect and 
courtesy ••• to H.H. IS Representative at the Gambia, which it is indispensable 
the,y should do in the intercourse which is unavoidable between the respective 
2 Settlements of the two Nations in that neighbourhood •••• " 
It was the casual method of appointing to posts of responsibility in the 
Civil Service that the merchants were beginning to protest against. The.y 
felt they deserved better treatment, especially if the settlement was to 
approach the dignity of other colonies and command their respect. In their 
view, Ingram I s type was an unfortunate choice since he \ did not possess 
firmness, "nor can he ever, in Gambia at all events, acquire that moral 
C.o. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 22nd. Oct., Ingram to stanley. 
C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 24th Sept., John Hughes on behalf of Merchants 
to Lord stanley. 
influence necessar,y to perform [the duties of the Government] effectually.pl 
Thus b,y 1842 public opinion was articulate on all aspects of Government policy 
and behaviour, a mark of self-assurance and consolidation in the mercantile 
community, which was itself a qualification for a greater share in the affairs 
ot state. At least the merchants thought so. The Colonial Office 
perspective had been delineated b,y James Stephen, but circumstances demanded 
that the political aspirations of the merchants should be met.~ 
A new era dawned with the Madden Report of 1841 which recommended thata 
"The growiDg importance of this settlement and great increase in its trade, 
would render it necessary ••• to make it independent of Sierra Leone as to 
the framing of its laws and the execution ot th~." Madden wanted to see a 
Council in the Gambia with a membership of officials, representatives ot the 
2 
mercantile body and ot the coloured residents. His liberal views reflected 
f the spirit ot the Durham Report on Canada, which ~~re had so clearly 
stated the disadvantages ot governing British colonists overseas through 
1. C.o. frT/28, 1842, vo1.2. 24th Sept., John Hughes to Lord Stanley. 
T.L.Ingram had entered Government service as Clerk at the Customs and of 
the police Court in 1835. As a result of the epidemic ot 1837 which 
reduced the administrative staff to ridiculous proportions, he soon 
found himself acting Lt.-Gov. In 1849 charges were made against him 
for falsehoods told to the S/S, and he was found guilty of lraud in his 
public accounts. 
C.O. 87/45, 1849, vol.l. 2nd March, Governor MacDonnell to Earl Grey. 
10th July, Earl Grey to MacDonnell. 
c.o. 267/173. 'Madden Report 1841. 
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Colonial Office representatives to the exclusion of the colonists. Without 
a share in the government, local elements became disaffected and final~ 
revolted against their rulers in self preservation. 
Dr. Madden showed the same breadth of vision in his recommendations for 
the judiciar,y. While he thought that the appointment ot a qualified Chief 
Justice would answer the objections of the merchants, he submitted an 
alternative should expense prohibit such an appointment:- "A stipendiar,y 
Magistrate ot the legal protession associated with one or two ot the senior 
local Justices might preside over the Courts ot Quarter Sessions."l His aim 
was unmistakab~ to separate the Gambia settlement trom dependence on Sierra 
Leone; for the Lt.-Governor himself - Henr,y Huntley - had complained of the 
del~s in the administration ot justice resulting in inconvenience and 
hardship to prisoners, and the anomalous position ot the settlement vi th 
regard to the enactment of laws, which took between one and three years to 
be returned from Sierra Leone for implementation. 
Inability to control taxation and the application of the revenue 
without a Legislative Assembly had frustrated the merchants on whose p~ent 
of duties the colonial funds depended. They had complained tor 80me years 
that "each succeeding Governor, regardless of necessar,y improvements 
contemplated b.Y his predecessors and actually in progress, has expended the 
revenue ••• for personal gratification •••• n Thus, they argued, neither a 
1. c.O. 267/17'3. Hadden Report 1841. 
market nor a whart had been built trom public funds; and only when the 
settlement was in control ot its own aftairs, with a Council that would 
"prevent the injudicious expenditure ot revenue", would there be stability 
1 
and progress. Por commercial development was the purpose ot the settlement, 
and the pursuit ot trade was inseparable from the execution ot laws 'Which 
controlled trade. 
Madden's appreciation of the degree of interdependence between commerce 
and Government vas ot great importance to the tuture development of the coloD\Y. 
It was partly his conciliator,y attitude towards the promoters ot trade in 
the Gambia which gave that body the confidence it needed for its outspoken 
representations to the Secretary of State in the year atter the Report, 
culminating in the dispatch ot John Hughes (a ~ful.atto merchant whose early 
youth had been spent in England and later in Se~egal), to expose betore the 
Metropolitan government the defective attributes of their acting Lt.-Governor. 
The' purpose being to indicate that in the event of iDdependence being granted, 
2 
a change ot Governor would be necessary. 
Separation trom Sierra Leone came in June 1843 with the creation of an 
Executive and Legislative Council on which the mercantile community was 
represented. The first unofficials in Council were Edward Lloyd and W.H. 
Goddard; and it was lett to them to watch conmerci&l interests and to maintain 
the independence that had been gained. It required perspicacity and 
determination, on the part of the mercantile cormmmi ty to produce those 
1. C.O. 87/28, 1842, vo1.2. 11th March, Merchants' Petition to Lord Stanley. 
2. C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 13th September, John Hughes to Lord Stanley. 
changes in the form of Government which the Royal Charter had anticipated. 
It was found necessar,y to submit a petition in 1844 regretting that the 
provisions of the Charter were so far "rendered abortive and nugatoryft, 1 
since officers in the administrative machinery had remained unchanged. 
The appointment ot Commander Charles Fitzgerald, R.N., as the new 
Governor and of Mr. Robert Graves }IacDonnell as Chief Justice, were long-
awaited developments in the settlement; but it was soon made very clear in 
Colonial Office policy that while the Gambia remained financially dependent 
it could not afford all the changes befitting to its new status. For that 
20") 
reason, on }'fa.cDonnell's acceding to the governorship of the settlement in 
2 1847, Nantell was promoted from Queen's Advocate to Chief Justice. Renewed 
mercantile opposition to the appointment ot an unqualified judge at a time 
when the Gambia was considering an "Ordinance to establish a Supreme Court of 
Civil, Criminal and Equity Jurisdiction and also a Court of Appeal", was 
united, being directed b,y their representatives in the Legislative Council.3 
Indeed, in the twenty-three years in which the Gambia enjoyed independence from 
Sierra Leone, the mercantile community did not fail to make its influence felt 
through its representatives in Council. B,y the end ot that period, the 
merchants had not only increased their nwnber in the Legislative CO\Dlcil, but 
1. c.o. 87/33, 1844, vol.l. }'ferchants' Petition to lDrd stanley. 
2. c.O. 90/24, 1850, Blue Book ot Statistics. 
3. c.o. 87/45, 1849, col.l. 26th February, MacDonnell to Earl Grey. 
they had. infiltrated the official stronghold of 1Jle Executive Council. l 
Political maturity, however, was to be found inadequate for efficient 
government without economic independence. That was a major reason ~ 1Jle 
brief period of local 'self-government' was to be succeeded b,y greater 
centralization under Sierra Leone in 1866. The limitations imposed upon 
Government in the Gambia by virtue of peculiar conditions there were 
unreconcilable with mercantile demands, end resulted in antagonism between 
officials and unofficials in Council. Over the dispute precipitated b,y 
Mantell's appointment, MacDonnell observed in a despatch that "the colonists 
have no right to complain of an unprofessional man acting as Chief Justice 
occasionally here, till the Colo~ is willing and able to pq a professional 
substitute, especially as there has not been a record for trial in a civil 
cause in the Supreme Court since I acted Chief Justice tour years ago."2 The 
coloDIY' itself at that time only contributed £70 towards the local courts as 
against £1,200 contributed by the imperial Treasury. It was thus established 
that while such a discrepancy existed, "it would be neither reasonable nor 
expedient to fetter the Home Government with similar restrictions. n3 
, Although policy was noy initiated by a government in st. Mary's, it was 
a government exclusively White, without J.fu1atto or African representation. 
Dr. Madden had. not tailed to notice the claims, tacit though they may have been, 
1. 1ihen Colonel Ord vid ted the Gambia in 1864, he found Thomas Brown in the 
ac. Co. in his capacity aa acting Queen's Advocate. 
c.o. 267/286, 1865, Ord Report, Question & Answer 6743 ft. 
C.O. 87/45, 1849, Tol.l. 26th Pebruary, MacDonnell to Earl Grey. 
C.O. 87/45, 1849, vol.l. 28th ~, Earl Grey to MacDonnell. 
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of these elements in society, in his recommendations for the settlement. As 
yet, neither the Christian Wolof nor the Liberated African in st. Nary's was 
re~ for direct representation on the Council; but they were not unaware of 
their interests, nor of the degree to which those interests were affected by 
the Government's policies. Liberated Africans were alre~ organizing 
themselves in Friendly Societies which were to become councils for discussion 
and. for taking executive measures. Under 'Headmen', primitive justice was 
administered, fines imposed, and decisions taken for concerted action. One 
official report stated that Liberated Africans were thus "kept in terror and 
ruled despotically by some secret power possessed 9Y the Heads •••• ,,1 Th~ 
certainly gave the order to sign petitions, and it would seem that all members 
were bound by such an order. Such Societies were in touch with official 
policy and articulate public opinion, for a nucleus of 'Headmen' was already 
employed in the lower grades of the Civil Service, and others were traders 
and. mercantile clerks. In consequence, not only did Liberated Africans come 
to use the petition procedure as a weapon against arbitrary rule, but their 
very grievances were set out in patterns already laid out. 
Local self-government, then, stimulated the growth of .African public 
opinion and produced a group of men as critical of the policies of an 
independent government, as British merchants had been of a dependent 
government. In 1849, one hundred and thirty-nine of them signed a. petition 
to the Secretary ot state in which they accused Governor HacDonnell of 
1. C.O. 87/46, 1849, vol.2. 12th September, T.F.Quin to ~Donnell. 
"supineness", of misapplication of the public revenue, of excessive taxation 
as compared with what obtained in the neighbouring French territories, and 
of oppression of its Black inhabitants.1 The immediate reason for African 
discontent l~ in the great hardship experienced b.1 the poorer inhabitants 
during the raiD,y season of 1849 when the greater part of the Island. was 
inundated as a result of the crumbling of the sea wall. Against this crisis 
was a background of smouldering disaffection towards the government, in part 
due to the indiscretions of former administrations. An example of this was 
the forfeiture of one hundred town lots to government in 1827 on the grolDlds 
of inadequate title deeds, without aqy legal process having been served against 
2 the owners, all of whom were "simple Blacks". The quest for a political 
identity was not therefore reserved for Vhite pursuers, but urbanised Africans, 
too, joined a 'movement' from which they hoped to derive social and economic 
benefits first, and political rights later. 
7 s.. 
Under the governorship of Colonel L.S.O'Co~or, the Gambia Legislative 
Council developed into an active forum for discussion in which unofficial 
members made significant contribution, justit,ying demands tor the colo~ to 
run its own affairs. In Januar,y 1858, a third mercantile member was added 
1. 
2. 
C.o. 87/46, 
Earl Grey. 
C.O. 87/28, 
" " 
1849, vol.2. 24th August, Petition ot Black inhabitants to 
1842, vol.2. 11th March, Merchants' Petition to Lord Stanley. 
" " 2nd April, T.L.Ingram to Stanley. 
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to the Council - Thomas Chownl whose father had been one of the founders of 
st. Mary's. As the result of the death of Edward Bocock (who had succeeded 
Lloyd in the Council), Thomas Quin,2 formerly Registrar of Courts and Clerk 
of Councils till he turned. merchant, was appointed to fill the vacancy. 
Together they made a formidable and surprisingly capable element in the 
Council. 
Debates fell under two categories:- There were those ordinances which 
were for the general welfare of the colony and which received. the 1manimous 
votes of all elements in CO\Dlcil wi th little or no discussion; and, by 
contrast, other bills which provoked serious debate and split officials-from 
unofficials. These latter, invariably affected mercantile interests and 
prompted unofficials to take the initiative in debate. lihereas the Standing 
Rules and Orders of the Council were willing~ suspended so that an ordinance 
for compelling the people to have their children vaccinated could be immediately 
proclaimed to control a smallpox epidemic in 1858;3 the dabate on the 
Grumetta .Act4 which took place a fw months after it, and that on the Free 
5 Navigation of the Gambia to the French, showed the, unofficials in all their 
aggressiveness. It required a ver,y able and shrewd Governor to encourage 
these promoters of trade on whom the revenue primarily depended, without 
prejudicing the interests of the other communities in the colony. 
1. C.O. -87/67, 1859, 14th Pebruar,y, O'Connor to Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 87/69, 1860, 24th Peb., d'!rcy to Newcastle. 
3. C.O. 87/67, 1859, vol.l. 3rd April 1858, Legislative Council ~Hnutes. 
4. C.O. 87/67, 1859, vol.l. 21st June 1858 
" " 
tt 
5. C.O. 87/67, 1859, vol.l. 19th August 1858. Leg. Co •• ans.; See Chapter 
III of thesis. 
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The Grumetta Act, for the regulation of conditions of service of 
labourers and artisans, had been passed in Sierra Leone in 1825; and was 
applicable to the Gambia settlement, it being then a dependency of Sierra 
Leone. The .Act, however, did not reach the Gambia till 1841; but its 
maladministration had caused Harr,r Finden in 1856 to make representation to 
O'Connor against imprisonment of workmen and labourers by their employers, 
and the invidious system long-established by merchants of paying wages partly 
in goods. It was O'Connor's intervention on behalf of the victims which 
had antagonised the employers, and caused the resignation of two merchant-
Magistrates. Government saw the Grumetta Act as it stood as too dangerous a 
weapon in the hands ot a powerful employer union, which was permitted by law 
1 to claim satisfactory labour for wages agreed upon. 
Debate in the Legislative Council in 1858 was initiated by a despatch 
of the Secretar,y of state instructing the Governor to repeal sections 9 and 
10 of the Act, as being arbitrary. To unofficials in Council this was seen 
as not only an economic threat, but as an infringement of their hard-won 
political rights. This latter fear was to be expressed openly by Goddard in 
another debate. On this occasion, too, he was ready to express the views of 
his colleagues in his usual succinct phraseology. If the mechanics of the 
colony ~had been in the state they are now, thirty years ago," he remarked, 
2 
"this place never would have been built." They tought hard to save 
1. c.o. 81/61, 1859, vol.l. 21st June 1858. Leg. Co. Mins.; 
C.O. 81/8), 1865, vol.2. November, ~~moria1 of Friendly Societies to 
Newcastle~ C'o--rl'{......~ {{ 
21st June 1858. Leg. Co. Mins. 
themselves from the "idling aWB3 time by mechanics wen engaged. in work. It 
Chown and Bocock recommended that a fixed rate of wages for artisans would 
safeguard the interests of the merchants and simplit,y the administration of the 
law by Magistrates; but no official support was given to them. This was a 
situation in which official views were in advance of public opinion, so that 
the ,local Governor was faced with a problem of educating reactionar,y elements 
in Council. Lord Stanley had pointed out that the Act was originally passed 
to meet specific labour problems resulting from slaver,y; O'Connor reminded 
unofficials that "a vast improvement [had] taken place in the native 
population" since that time - a growing independence and respectability by 
I 
means of self-help which deserved recognition. Thus the objectionable 
2 I 
clauses of the obsolescent Act were repealed inspite of violent unofficial 
I 
i 
opposition. It was "arbitrary ••• and contrary to British freedom" that a 
law should exist in a British colo~ which compelled people who were not 
vagrants to work. 3 
It vas often easier for officials to take a less subjective view of 
matters affecting the African community, their responsibility extending to the 
whole society and not limited to a privileged few. There vere maqy instances, 
however, when Governors concentrated on the interests of the commercial 
magnates who expected policy to enhance their superiority in the settlement; 
for they equated their importance and prosperity with that of the Gambia's. 
1. c.o. 87/61, 1859, vol.l. 21st June 1858. Leg. Co. Mins. 
If II "19th July 1858." " .. - "Ordinance for 
the better regulation of artisans, sailors, labourers, & other servants" 
was passed. 
21st June 1858. Leg. Co. Mins. 
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It was therefore not unusual tor merchants to find themselves at variance with 
the Authorities, particularly when the head of the administration was a 
benevolent officer and kindly-disposed towards the African coDlllUIlity in st. 
Mary's. The Secretary at State continued to be the Appeal body tor 
dissatisfied subjects in British colonies; but at this level, too, decisions 
taken depended to a large extent on the personality and imagination ot advisers 
available to that Minister in the Colonial Oftice. 
Overriding powers exercised ~ Colonial Ottice over the local legislature 
were to create a crisis later in 1858, on the issue of the free navigation 
at the River Gambia to the French. While tndependence from Sierra Leone had 
brought with it a tull share in the deliberations of the Government ot St. 
Mar,y's, it had not in ~ ~ transferred power from the Executive to the 
Legislative Council, inspite of the tact that unotficials held three out ot 
seven seats in the latter Council. Their duty was primarily ot an advisory 
nature, ultimate control resting with the Colonial Office. It was significant 
that in protest against what unofficials considered to be infringement of 
their rights, they were prepared to resign their commissions notwithstanding 
1 their prestige value. It was not to be the only instance when the merchants 
refused to compromise the dignity ot their status; or insisted that their 
advice on matters pertainiDg to the internal affairs of the colony, in 
particular its commerce, deserved greater recognition from the Government. 
1. See Chapter III ot Thesis. 
2.u 
In the last few years before the fortunes of the Gambia. were once more 
linked with those of Sierra. Leone under a common Council, the cha.ra.cter of 
the legislature in the former territor.y had undergone marked changes, reflectin 
those developments which had occurred in the society at large. By 1861, many 
of the original merchants of st. Mar,y's (who had founded the settlement from 
Goree and Senegal), had either died off (among the deceased were William 
Forster, Edward Lloyd, Fdward Bocock), or had left the settlement in fa.vour 
of retirement in the British Isles (Charles Grant, Thomas Chown). A new 
type of merchant was repla.cing the old; and with him the French merchant 
emerged. Indeed, the opening of the River to the French vas not only of 
economic significance; its political overtones did not elude the merchants, 
who having removed the yoke of the Sierra. Leone Government were now faced with 
a serious French threat from which they sought to vithdra.v. Both W.H. 
Goddard and Thoma.s Brown offered their premises to the Colonial Government 
1 for sale at £3000 and £4,500 respectively in 1859, with the hope of retiring 
to England. That they did not succeed was a mixed blessing for the Gambia. 
An interesting feature of Government of the 'sixties and 'seventies was 
aD alliance between Thoma.s Brown and long-resident ot:ticials such as John 
Mantell (Chief Justice), and Daniel Robertson (Colonial Secretar.y). While 
the breakdown ot ba.rriers between Government and people was a sign of 
politicalgrovth, it unfortunately caused :tragmentation in a small society, 
the outcome of which was that African traders began to diverge from their 
1. C.o. 87/69, 24th June 1859, Leg. Co. ~linutes, Ca.ptain Anton to 
Newcastle. 
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European employers at a tangent. From now on, they were to resist rule by 
faction from which they were naturally excluded, and which they considered to 
be a retrograde step in constitutional development. Governor d'Arcy too was 
acutely aware of the subtle control gradually concentrated in a merchant-
'oligarchy' and nurtured, as he described it, "for the last fifty years ••• 
converting the nominee of the Crown into a Doge" for the purpose of benefiting 
mercantile interests at the expense of all others, including imperial interests. 
He concluded that this was to be expected where a Clique of men had "lived 
together ·for the last twenty-five years in one place with a collllllDlity of ideas 
I 
I 
and interests that clash with those of a stranger who has served in other parts II; 
ot the world. "I Indeed the circumstances of the time - the very disturbed Ii 
state of the River and the consequent decline of the revenue - provided the 
stimulus tor cliques. 
In Council meetings, d' Arcy was struck by a lack of sympathy for his 
"zealous exertions"; his Councillors being of long experience and residence 
on the Coast had "long given up the Natives as impracticable of improvement." 
2 He interpreted "a very united mercantile opposition" to himself as a tactical 
move on the part of COlDlcillors who preferred a mere official of routine than 
one who planned to effect some good for the majority of the inhabitants. It 
vas a shift in goals; the merchant was bound by a lim! ted horizon of 
commercial prosperity, whereas a Governor who took his Tocation seriously was 
in duty bound to attend to the needs of all. It proTed & difficult task for 
1. C.O. 87/17, 1863, 29th December, G.d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
2. Ibid. 
/' 
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d'Arcy, who, finding himself in pecuniary embarrassment, 1 and.,in disagreement 
with his own otticials, began to court mercantile tavour through the person 
ot Thomas Brown. This merchant was to dominate Gambian life and politics 
tor another two decades, having risen trom the status ot clerk in the 
Colonial Secretary's Ottice in 1829 to that of acting Queen's Advocate and 
ex otticio Member ot the Executive Council in 1861.2 Two years later, he 
was acting Chiet Justice during Mantell's leave, 3 and in general had assumed 
such influence in mercantile and otticial circles, that he was now a threat 
to the liberty ot the African community in st. Mary's. 
By the sixties, there was noticeable antagonism between the two races 
in the co1o~ - Africans and Europeans - to which numerous tactors had 
contributed over a long period, the fundamental reason being the advancing 
maturity ot urbanised Africans whose demands tor equal rights with European 
inhabitants of the colony were to disturb its equilibrium. When Governor 
d • Arcy appeared to sympathise with African aspirations by app,ointing two 
African Magistrates in 1863 - (Thomas Johnson, a Liberated African in the 
Colonial Secretary's Ottice, and Seymour Gay, a Wolot of Goree, and 
Superintendent ot Police),4 a ritt in society resulted because it was not in 
the programme ot merchants who had struggled long tor a share in the 
Government that political pOYer should be shared with their own traders and 
1. c.o. 87/71, 1861, 21st Dec., Colonial Office Minute, Elliott to 
Fortescue; Editor on British West African Governments, Af.Times,Sept.1865. 
2. C.O. 87/76, 25th January 1863, Ex. Co. Minutes for 2200 August, 1861. 
3. c.o. 87/71, 1863, 14th December, Colonial Ottice Minute T.F.Elliott 
to C.Fortescue. 
4. C.O. 87/71, 1863, 21st December, Merchants' Petition to Newcastle. 
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clerks. In a straight letter to the Governor they demanded an explanation 
to justify' "so wanton an insult to the unpaid ~Iagistrates of this coloIliY, as 
to endeavour to force them to associate with the 2nd Writer ••• and ••• a 
Sergeant. Men without education, position or ~ stake in the coloDiY' beyond 
their small salaries, and neither of whom were ever in Europe."l [sic] 
.AlJ evidence that they were "not influenced by colour", they submitted 
that they themselves had coloured connections in the coloIliY, and that no 
objection had been taken to the late A.P.Pierre's appointment to the Magistracy 
in 1850.2 Pierre was in fact a l-fulatto who had been Warehouseman to William 
Forster, and with others of his community formed the peripher,y of the mercantile 
oligarchy. Disapproval of the appointments was in part suspicion of Africans 
in Government Service over whom they could exercise little control; indeed, 
they called Johnson and Gay favourites of the Governor. Basically, however, 
mercantile reaction in 186) was simply an expression of mid-nineteenth centur,y 
attitudes towards the natives of Africa. In their own words, "the natives 
have al~s looked with confidence and respect upon the whites; it has been 
left to Governor d'!rcy to disturb that harmoqy and to set up a feeling of 
race amongst us." 
) 
In the Gambia, reactionar,y elements were more often found in the 
mercantile community than among Governors, who were not a1w~s indifferent to 
articulate African opinion expressed in the Press and in memorial. d' Arcy 
1. C.O. 87/78, 1863, vol.). 17th Dec., Letter of six J.Ps. (Brown,Goddard, 
Quin •••• ) to d'!rcy. 
2. Ibid. 
3. C.O. 87/77, 186), 21st Dec., Magistrates' Petition to Newcastle. 
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admitted to having "lately perceived a feeling amongst the better educated 
, 
that they imagine it is the Gambia policy to keep them back whilst the sister 
Colonial Government bestows upon them a fair portion of appointments •••• " 
He was in favour of pursuing a liberal policy in West Africa, inspite of the 
unfortunate breakdown of the system in the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone where 
African Magistrates had been found guilty of improbity. "Members even of 
the British Parliament have fallen from their high estate", he observed. 1 
But the Colonial Office had no more faith in the Governor's judgment or 
sincerity than did the merchants of st. Mary's, and when Justice l-Ia.ntell 
associated himself with mercantile opinion on this issue affirming that his 
court would be made to look "ridiculous" and to lose the respect of the 
public,2 the Secretary of State was satisfied that the appointments should be 
cancelled. 3 
Thus growth towards a workable self-government was seriously hampered 
by' racial tensions within the settlement whose communities were no longer 
agreed upon EUropean leadership or indeed upon common interests. No less 
united were officials themselves, so that representations to the Colonial 
Ottice were so numerous and often so contradictory that "the Imperial 
, 4 
Government ••• is not in a position to know what the people really feel." 
It petitions and letters were misleading, a number ot incidents in the 'sixties 
removed all doubts on African goals and attitUdes. 
1. C.O. 81/77, 1863, 29th Dec., d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 87/77, 1863, 21st Dec., John .fantell to Newcastle. 
3. c.o. 87/19, 1864, vo1.1. 11th March, Newcastle to d'Arcy. 
4. C.O. 87/80, 1864, vol.2. 22nd Aug., ,d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
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The most explosive situation in St. Mary's W8.8 found in the law courts 
where Africans resisted what they called maladministration of justice b,y l~ 
Magistrates, and took whatever action was open to them outside the courts. 
Where merchants and their clerks could sit as Magistrates on their own suits 
and charges, it was not surprising that judgment sometimes led to uproar in 
court, or that a community without representation on the bench should clamour 
for a paid Magistrate "who is independent of both black and white."l So 
determined were Africans to get justice that the,y subscribed to a fund to 
send Joseph ReffeIl to study law in England. In st. Mary's itself, they 
.,.6-
made men like Thomas Brown, and Dr. Sherwood the Colonial Surgeon, target 
of resistance. 
Sherwood was not only disliked for injustice as a }fagistrate, but for 
negligence towards his patients.2 So that when in September 1864 he broke 
into a coach house and took out a communal hearse to which he was not a 
subscriber because he had to bury a white sailor, the whole African comnnmi ty 
on the Island rallied to their leaders to make this a test case. The 
African proprietors regarded this as another threat to liberty, and with 
subscription fund of £250 the,y planned to employ an attorney from Sierra 
Leone to prosecute Sherwood for burglary. The case was only dropped when n ~ 
attorney could be induced to leave business in Freetown tor that sum. 3 Por 
1. "Civic" on Injustice in the Courts, Afriean Times, Sept., 1865. 
2. J.W.Sawyer on Dr. Sherwood, Atrican Times, June 1866; "Observer" in 
African Times, April 1866. "Is it not true that the educated natives 
have such a dread of the Colonial Hospital now and of the way in which 
the,y might be treated there that they shun going to it even at the risk 
of dying •••• 1" "A Gambian", At. Times, May 1866. 
3. "A. Native Oyster", in African Times, December 1867; "Civic", M. Times, 
Nov. 1865. 
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the moment, however, Sherwood was discriminated against by those he had 
insulted, so that "he could not get a carpenter or mason to work for him" for 
ID8.DY months. The serious racial teeling sparked off by what d' Arcy 
misguidedly called "an accidental circumstance", was unexpected by officials 
and brought forcibly to them the influence exerted b,y Friendly Societies. l 
That it was thought necessary to pass an ordinance "For the Regulation ot 
2 Friendly Societies •••• " was itself an acknowledgement ot the emergence ot 
"a tyrant minorityM3 from within the African community as a political force. 
A new tllPe of African, unlike the skilled mechanics and apprentices ot the 
'thirties and 'forties had appeared in a politically conscious colo~. He 
was not entirely the product of st. J.fa.ry's society, and,refusing to be 
subservient to merchants or officials/he could not hold down a job in his 
restless state. But he was a useful element to the Societies for being 
literate. His ambition was to widen the rift alre~ noticeable in the 
colony and precipitate a crisis out of which political rights might possibly 
be wrung. 
Such a crisis came in December 1865 when a rumour reached the Governor 
of a plot to kill all the European inhabitants of Bathurst on Christmas Eve. 
Harry Finden, a small entrepreneur in the town, was accused betore the Rev. 
'l'yas of being ringleader ot the conspiracy; though Governor d r Arcy declined 
4 to state on what grounds he based his allegations. With the unanimous 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
c.o. f!r{/82, 1865, vol.l. 21st June, d 'Arcy to Card.1J&ln!. 
Ibid. "Civic", Af.Times, November 1865. 
c.o. 87/82, 1865, vol.l. 21st July, d 'Arcy to Carduli.:. 
Harry Pi.nd.en to G.d'Arcy, 22nd Dec., 1865, African Times March 1866-
B.T.Co1e, At.Times, Jan.,1866; W.B.Goddard to d'Arcy, l~th FeQ. 186~ 
.A£.Times,Mii'ch 180'6; c.o. 87/83,1865,vol.2.24th Dec.,d'Arcy toq~~~~11('. 
j 
support of EKeeutive Counei~preeautionar.y measures were taken - the troops 
called in from the Cape, and double sentries stationed at the Gunpowder 
Magazine. 1 Thomas Brown had strong~ supported these measures in the 
Legislative Council, but not so Thomas Quin.2 And on Goddard's return to 
2/&" 
the settlement from leave, he acted as mediator between Governor and people, 
stating that from his long residence among the Ai'ricana, he could not for a 
moment believe "that any such treasonable ideas were ever entertained or 
spoken of, in their Clubs or elsewhere."3 Yet Quin had some time betore been 
taken into the confidence ot Finden who had warned him that if he did not use 
his influence with the Governor and. Council to redress the wrongs ot the 
4 African community, he could no longer restrain the people. The Gambia 
certainly seemed to provide all the conditions tor a revolt in the mid 
'sixties. 5 And colonial Governments ever.ywhere were on the alert tor revolts 
on the pattern ot the Jamaica. Insurrection ot 1865. 
Independence from the Governor and Council ot Sierra Leone had not been 
altogether a success, &1though it had provided experience tor the mercantile 
coDlIlUIlity in 10c&1 se1t-government. Some ot them had enjoyed the privilege 
of participating in the debates of the local 1egisla.ture, and in giving 
judgment in the Magistrate's court. Indeed, to a merchant like Thomas Brown 
C.O. 87/83, 1865, vo1.2. 24th Dec., dtArey to 10arnw~lq. 
c.o. 81/84, 1866, vol.l. 17th Feb., d'Arcy to W.B.Goddard. 
C.O. £>T/84, 1866, vol.l. 16th Peb., Goddard to dtArcy. 
C.O. 81/84, 1866, vol.l. 17th Feb., d'Arcy to Goddard. 
C.O. £>T/82, 1865, vol.l. 21st July, d'Arey to ~~ll. 
~1osive incidentsl- The death ot an apprentice on board the Colonial 
SteamerJ The assault ot Harry Finden in his shop by two European 
Medical Offieers. Editor on "Brutal and eowardly assault on a Native 
Agent ot the African Times,"Dec., 1866. M. Times. 
political identity was in process of being achieved. But in proportion as 
British merchants became satisfied with their status so did less privileged 
groups begin to resist ~ attempt to perpetuate mercantile domination in the 
political field for being an obstacle to their own political evolution. 
Colonel Ord's recommendation for a centralization policy in the West 
African settlements was therefore welcomed b,y urbanised Africans in Bathurst 
as a means to freedom. A return to a dependent status would reduce the 
power of the ruling Clique under Thomas Brown, nicknamed unofficial "Governor" 
of the Gambia. lihile the Secretary of State might not be in a pos! tion to 
estimate the harm done by such a Clique, a Governor-in-Chief, who would visit 
the territor,y periodically could effect changes by acting "with strict justice 
1 both to the rich and poor." It was a recommendation strongly supported in 
the African Times by its ever vigilant Ed! tor Fitzgerald who thought a 
Governor-General would "be removed from these local influences which but too 
otten prejudically bias or ~ontrol the decisions of a resident Governor. n2 
Meanwhile, the merchants mustered their forces (and within it they herded 
their clerks and employees) to defend what they had gained. "Gambian" fa 
letter to the African Times explained that being a dependent mercantile clerk, 
he had been compelled to sign a memorial drawn b,y the leading merchants Itwho 
expect to lose their wicked influence here were this made a sUb-government"; 
1. "Civic" in African Times, November 1865. 
2. Editor, At. Times, Sept., 1865. 
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tor the government in st. Mar,y's was "in their hands."l "Under the cloak 
of Magistrates they would flock to the Court on aqy case affecting a 
European, or an intelligent native who is an object of their hatred or 
displeasure, and. twist the law to suit their prejudice, giving no justice to 
t " "2 na; 1ves •••• Extreme as this indictment against the unofficial government 
in st. Mar,y's appears, it was nevertheless typical of letters that were 
reaching London for publication in the Press. They were at least guides to 
public opinion in the settlement, and indicated the extent to which the 
Governor had become "a puppet" (to use d' Arcy' S Olm phrase) in the hands of 
& powerful oligarchy. 
Colonel Ord's reasons for proposing the centralization of the West 
African settlements were not exactly those put forward b.Y all who found it 
attractive. The Enquir,y into the settlements had been necessitated b,y a 
declining revenue, and the humiliation attending the 1863 Ashantee invasion 
on the Gold coast;3 and the Commissioner found "a want of a regular and well-
defined system of administration", and the absence of a uniform Native policy, 
basic deficiencies. For this he proposed a pattern of Government modelled 
on that of the smaller Vest Indian colonies ot which he had experience. 
~enditure in the settlements would only be effectively reduced to meet 
revenue, and thus lim! t the financial burdens imposed on the Imperial Treasur,y I 
1. itA Gambian", At. Times, Sept., 1865. 
itA Gambian", At. Times, Sept., 1865. 
J.D.Fage, "Introduction to the Histor,y of Vest Africa", (C.U.P., 1959) 
p.135; Dike, "Trade and Politics", p.167. 
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it the settlements were placed under the supervision ot a common authority on 
I the Coast. This would in etfect enable each colo~ to administer its laws 
and revenue, but "subject only to the approval ot the Governor-in-chief. n2 
It was a solution which received the approval of the Select Committee of the 
House of Commons appointed to consider Ord' s Report • 
• To literate Africans in those settlements, Ord's greatest contribution 
was his recommendation for the gradual introduction of self-government into 
the West African colonies - 3 a recommendation that had. been accepted in 
principle b.Y the British Government. Dependence upon Sierra Leone in the 
'sixties was to be ver,y different in complexion trom what it had. been twenty 
years before, when pressure groups in all the settlements were 'almost 
exclusively European and Mulatto. It was going to require much tact and 
wisdom to steer a safe course between the Scylla of oligarchies and the 
Charybdis of the masses in politically conscious territories, where a 
fragmentation process in society had been recently accelerat&d. 
By Royal Commission dated 19th February 1866, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
the Gold Coast and Lagos were merged into one government, under a Governor-
in-chlef resident in Sierra Leone. The Gambia retained its sepa.rate 
Legislature, but the title o~ the Officer in charge of the Administration 
was changed to Administrator. In further implementation ot Ord's 
Recomnendations, orders were given for the tinal abandonment ot .lacCartby 
1. C.O. 267/286, March 1865, "Report on the Western Coast ot Africa", vol.4. 
by Colonel H. st. George Ord, R.E., Governor ot Bermuda. 
2. C.O. 261/286, Ord Report 1865. 
n.An African of Sierra Leone" on "Self-Government at Sierra Leone, It 
African Times, Nov. 1865. 
Island, the troops being withdrawn in 1866, and from St. z.fary's in 1870. 
Merchants and inhabitants saw this predicament as involving the defence of 
the settlement and therefore its commercial prosperity. Following upon 
withdrawal came renewed French interest in the River Gambia. Under such 
unsettling conditions, it was unlikely that dependence on another Government 
would simplify the Gambia's internal problems. In short, the newly establishe 
centralized Government was doomed to failure from its inception. 
Within three years of its establishment, the Editorial of the Freetown 
newspaper - West Atrican Liberator - was discussing the "complete and 
disastrous failure" of centralization in West Africa, which, far from bringing 
benefit to the settlements "has only brought suffering on them all ••• and 
(Sierra Leone] ••• has turned out, as usual, to be the greatest of the 
sufferers."l The Gambia, however, found that it was its interests that were 
invariably subordinated to those of Sierra Leone, particularly under the 
governorship of Sir A.E. Kennedy. 
UDder the new constitution, unofficial representation in the Legislative 
Council had been reduced to one; and the new Administrator, .Admiral Patey, 
was more inclined to make his Private Secretary, Henry Fowler, his confidant, 
. than the influential Thomas Brown, who had retained his seat in Council on 
d' Arcy' s recollJllendation. Brown now found his sphere of influence circumscribe 
by officialdom; indeed he was often ignored by Patey, whose despatches were 
given more serious consideration by Colonial Office Officials than had 
1. Editor, West African Liberator (Sierra Leone) 5th Sept. 1869, quoted by 
a Gambia Creole on "Administration from Sierra Leone", African Times, 
January 1871. 
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d'!rcy's. He vas, atter all, Mr. Cardwell's brother-in-law; and. Brown by 
this time vas known as an agitator. 
Brown did not so easily accept his personal loss ot political pover. 
In 1869, the year ot the terrible Cholera scourge, he used the contused state 
into which the settlement vas thrown to expose the Administrator's shortcomings 
producing evidence to denounce Patey's utter failure to check the spread of 
the disease, thus causing great injury to the poorer inhabitants who fell 
Victims to it. In this attack he received support from business associates 
1 inside and outside the colony. T.P. Quin who had just retired to London 
wrote to the Colonial Office in the same vein; 2 and even officials, Hastings 
Kneller the Collector of Customs, Dr. Jeans, the Colonial Surgeon, and Mr. 
Chalmers the Chief Magistrate, failed to give support to Patey's administration 
Still without representation in the Legislature, Africans were alert to 
views expressed in and outside the colony and now had other means of disputing 
or supporting such views. By 1869, they were not entirely dependent On 
Fitzgerald to fight their battles, for Reffell in London could make direct 
contact with the Colonial Office whenever circumstances required it. For 
this reason he was kept posted with current news of the colony, just as Quin 
was in touch with mercantile opinion there for the purpose ot making 
representation too. 
C.o. 87/92, 1869, vol.2. 8th June, Merchants' Memorial to Earl Granville. 
c.o. 81/95, 1869, vol.5. 19th July, T.P.Quin to Earl Granville. 
C.O. 81/91, 1869, vol.l. 12th Feb., A.E.Kennedy to Earl Granville:-
"On a review· ot these proceedings ••• I cannot but regard them as an 
attempt on the part of Mr. Kneller, Dr. Jeans, and Mr. Chalmers to 
embarrass and bring discredit upon the ,Admj nistrator .... It 
From the point of view of the Africans it was worthwhile to accommodate 
a Government that was impartial even if it did not encourage political 
aspirations. Reffell's letter to Lord Granville in September 1869 in part 
expressed African tactics. While accepting Patey's faults, he pointed to 
his "love for justice" which vas of greater importance to "down-trodden African 
_ inhabitants of Bathurst", and for which reason no pet! tions against the 
administration had emanated from that sector. He described Brown and Kneller 
as "pertect tyrants to the African inhabitants ••• when they were in power." 
Now, divested of privileges they formerly enjoyed, they naturally harboured a. 
grievance against the new Administrator "who would not allow himself to be 
dictated by their prejudice feeling in the management ot the Government •••• "1 
Rettell himself bore a. personal grievance against Kneller, who, when acting 
Administra.tor in 1867 had introduced laws into the settlement which denied 
him admission into the courts as legal practitioner with inadequa.te 
qualitications. 
The new arrangements under Sierra. Leone likewise reduced the powers ot 
the local courts, the offices of Chief Justice and Queen's Advoca.te having 
been a.bo1ished, the Chief Justice ot Sierra. Leone va.s required to make an 
annua.l circuit to the settlement. But a. petition of 1876 complained tha.t no 
circuit had been made to the Gambia "since the recommendations of the 1865 I) 
committee, notwithstanding the Judicial E$ta.blishment vas reduced to one 
officer on that understanding •••• "2 The problems ot a. legal officer acting 
in numerous capacities had not changed; but added to them was disaffection 
1. Jos. Ref tell to Earl Granville, 4th Sept. 1869, published African Times 
October 1869. ' 
2. C.O. 87/100, 1876, 29th April, Herchants' Petition to Earl Carnavon. 
which arose from the abolition of voluntar,y Magistrates. l Governor Kenne~, 
however, thought this was beneficial to the colony since it did away with the 
inconvenience of merchants adjudicating on their own cases. 
These men had welcomed the abolition of Trial b,y Jur,y in civil cases in 
2 
all West African settlements by ordinance of 1866. For EUropean merchants 
had. long bemoaned the injustice ailmjnjstered. by prejudiced jurors, Ill8.IIY of 
whom were their own traders and dealers. Indeed, it was due to constant 
complaints of slave-dealing among civilized Africans in the Rivers of West 
Africa that convinced G~al Sam Blackall, the then Governor-in-chief, "of 
the necessity of the proposed alterations ••• the abolition of the Grand 
Juries .... [to] teach these slave dealers that they can no longer reckon upon : 
.! 
Ord had. ~I exemption tram punishment through the connivance ot corrupt Juries.") 
also reported a strong suspicion against African traders and. agents dealing in 
slaves at a distance from the settlements. 
It was in the Sierra Leone legislature that the Bill to effect abolition 
had been hastily passed in one si tUng , without first having been published 
4 before the First Reading, as unofficials in that settlement complained. 
Protest was concentrated. there since no opportunit,y oftered in the Gambia tor 
debate. As before, it vas obliged to accept whatever acts were passed for it 
1. 
4. 
1869 Ordinance - "providing tor the duties hitherto pertormed b,y two 
J.Ps to be undertaken b,y the Chief Magistrate". c.o. 87/93, 1869, vo1.3. 
12th August, Brown, Goddard, Quill to Earl Granville. 
C.O. 81/119, 1882, vo1.2. 21th Nov., A.E.Havelock to Earl Kimber1e,ya-
A deputation of .African inhabi tents ot Bathurst submitted. a Nemorial 
against the enactment of an Ordinance, 8ubsti tuting tor Trial by Jury in 
certain criminal cases, a tribunal composed ot the Chiel Magistrate and 
two Assessors or two J.Ps. 
c.O. 81/81, 1861, vol.l. 15th January, Governor Sam B1ackall to Lord 
Carnavon. 
l-Iemorial of Sierra Leone Chamber ot Comerce, pub. At.Times, January 1867. 
j 
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:1 
b.1 the superior legislature outside the settlement. In London, Fitzgerald 
remonstrated against an .Act which robbed "the African on his own soil of every 
vestige of citizenship ••• a strange beginning of preparation of the people 
1 for self-government." 
Africans panicked when a year later an ordinance was introduced in the 
Legislative Council at St. Mar.r's for further amendments to the laws relevant 
to Jurors and Juries.2 The object of it being, as the Chiet Magistrate 
explained, "to develop and carry out the spirit ot the legislation begun b,y 
the Ordinance ot 26th November 1866", J that which abolished Trial by Jury. 
FollowiDg the precedent of the Sierra Leone legislature, the Gambia planned 
to raise the standard ot qualification of Jurors by the new legislation, on 
the argument that the material wealth ot the colony had very much increased 
4 
since the Jury Ordinance of 1845 was drawn up. It was also the object of 
the 1867 bill to raise the status of the Bar by encouraging qualified legal 
practitioners to enrol themselves, especially as the Court could exercise 
more efficient control over the professional conduct ot regular practitioners 
than of temporar,r agents. A qualification test tor enrolment would be some 
guarantee against improbit,y.5 Liberated Africans interpreted this as a 
deliberate attempt to keep out thoir kins8aettell who had returned to the 
1. 
2. 
J. 
4. 
F.F1tzgerald. Af. Times, December 1866. 
C.O. 87/89, 1868, vol.l. 14th Dec., Hastings Kneller to A.E.Kenne~. 
C.O. ffT/89, 1868, vol.l. 11th April, Kennedy to Duk~ ct._BUckingham -
enclosure, Notes on Ordinance by D.H.Cha~ers, 27th March 1868. 
c.o. 87/89, 1868, vol.l. Colonial Ottice Minute, 7th Feb., T.F.Elliott 
to Sir F.Rogers:- Qualifications ot Jurors. 
c.o. 87/89, 1868, vol.l. 27th l-Iarch, Chalmers to Kennedy. 
Gambia from his studies in London. 1 Even Governor Kennedy was suspicious at 
the Kneller-Brown Bill, and deprecated "the practice adopted by .Acting 
Admjnistrators at the Gambia at altering the Law and passing Ordinances, 
except in cases ot urgent necessity •••• "2 
The situation in the Gambia had become untenable by the 'seventies, 
relations between Government and people having deteriorated. Thomas Brown 
and his associates saw no advantage to be derived trom a subordinate status 
fraught with problems. While the 1865 Coumittee had anticipated and in 
principle provided for some of them, in practice, the implementation of 
Recommendations had not al~s followed the lines laid out. For instance, 
inspite of improved sea communication between the settlements, the Governor's 
visits to the Gambia were spasmodic; and naturally this was taken tor 
3 indifterence to the interests at that settlement. 
Opposition theretore hardened against the local Administrator who was 
seen as a tool ot a disinterested Governor. To ease growing tension in St. 
}~'s, the Secretar,y ot State was obliged to remove Brown's henchmen trom 
the colony - Hr. Chalmers the Chiet Magistrate, lIastings Kneller the Collector 
4 
ot Customs, and Dr. Jeans, Colonial Surgeon. Brown nevertheless persisted 
1. Joseph Rettell to Earl Granville, 4th Sept. 1869, pub. African Times, 
October 1869. 
n ••• of altering the Lay'!' and passing Ordinances ••• " 
C.O. frl/89, 1868, vol.l. 11th April, Kennedy to B1.tckinglram. 
C.O. 81/102, 1812, vol.l. 2nd !-farch, T.Brown to Lord Kimberley. 
c.o. 87/91, 1869, vol.l. 10th June, A.E.Kennedy to Earl Granville" 
C.O. 87/92, 1862, vol.2. 13th July and 9th August, Kennedy to Pa.t~y. 
in opposition, provoking the acting Administrator in 1813 to expostulate that 
he had no experience of unofficial members of Council in other colonies 
repeat~ addressing the Secretar,y of state "in the tone assumed b,y Mr. 
Brown, ••• but it appears," he ,added, "to have become a recognised thing in 
this settlement and it leads persons in the settlement to believe that ~tt. 
Brown's functions are of an executive rather than a l~gislative character •••• nl 
By the late 'seventies, all communities in st. ~fa.ry's were united against 
a system of government tha.t had quite obviously proved a failure; and in his 
shrewdness, Brown utilized unifying forces created by the French bogey of the 
mid-seventies for motivating a heterogeneous society to common action. The 
separation of the Gold Coast and Lagos from Sierra Leone was a further 
incentive for Gambian demands. .Among the petitioners of a memorial of 1816 
were British and French merchants, Liberated African entrepreneurs, a 
scattering of European and African civil servants, and other representatives. 
They exposed the anomalous pos! tion in which their colony was placed, by which 
they were compelled to make annual financial contributions to certain services 
in Sierra Leone without deriving ~ benefits.2 Among them an annual 
/ contribution of £500 towards the salary of a Governor-in-Chief3 wo rarely 
\~ 1L? 
visited -the Gambia (KeDIledy had not paid a visit since 18691); nearly £300 f -p.a. contributed towards his yacht "Sherbro" which was to facilita.te inter-
colonial communication but which only visited the Gambia once between 1869 
1. C.O. 87/104, 1873, vol.l. 24th March, H.T.M.Cooper to A.E.Kenne~. 
2. C.O. 81/109, 1816, 29th April, Petition to Lord Carnavon. 
3. C.O. 81/J.~O,..l881 t" vql!l.U.tl. 2nd JW1e, C.O. Hinute, S.Wingfield to 
Sir H. Holland. 
), 
and 1876.1 It was an inventory of unfulfilled promises and bad debts, in 
which the inefficiency and inconvenience of the legal machinery, increased 
expenditure without a corresponding increase in the number of representatives 
of the ta.xpqing cOIli1l1;U1ity in Council, figured prominently. 
A.V. Hemming of the Colonial Office thought there was good ground for 
complaint. "The argument for centralization, n he wrote in a minute, "drawn 
from the experience of the Vest Indies ••• appears ••• to be founded on false 
premises. The circumstances of the two cases are so very different. ,,2 He 
suggested that it would be an advantage for the Gambia to be placed in direct 
correspondence with the Home Government. For though it was within thirteen 
days of steam communication with Liverpool, despatches took about six weeks 
to reach it via Sierra Leone, and another six weeks before the Administrator's 
reply by the same route could reach the Colonial Office. The earnest desire 
! 
I 
t 
of the colonists was for "a separate and a permanent Government, one that shall ; 
inspire the confidence of the coumunityand the respect of the surrounding 
natives It •••• It was pathetic that they should have been asking for 
protection and for assistance to open up the River and the interior to 
"Christianity, Civilization, and COllUDercelt3 , sixty years after the foundation 
of st. Mary's Island. 
With the 1876 memorial submitted, Thomas Brown continued to agitate 
against the state of affairs in the Gambia through the British press, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
C.O. 
C.O. 
C.O. 
c.O. 
87/102, 1872, vol.l. 2nd March, Thomas Brown to Lord Kimberley; 
87/109, 1876, 6th July, Colonial Office Minute, A.W.L.Hemming. 
87/109, 1876, 6th July, A.Y.Hemming. 
87/109, 1876, 29th A.pril, Petition to Lord Carnavon. 
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particularly the Liverpool Mercu;r.l He had resigned from the Council in 
1874.2 But nothing was immediately done to alleviate conditions in the 
colo~. The appointment of an unqualified person as Chief Magistrate3 had 
been a major cause for the storm ot protest in 1877; Mr. Adolphus had to be 
removed. The colo~ continued to meet heavy financial commitments to Sierra 
Leone inspite ot a diminishing revenue. In 1884 it contributed £1900 towards 
the purchase of another yacht to facilitate the visits of the Governor, but 
no visit was made between that date and 1886.4 Brown did not live to see some 
of the new changes towards political identity for the Gambia to which he had 
devoted the greater part of his public life. He died and was buried in 
Bathurst in 1882. 
A significant change however came with the reconstruction of the 
Legislative Council under Administrator V.S. Gouldsbur,y. Between 1882 and 
1888, three unofficials were appointed to the Council, two of them being 
Liberated African entrepreneurs - J.D. Richards5 and S.J. Forster.6 The 
colony was created a separate colony by Letters Patent transmitted on the 30th 
November 1888; and thus ended a protracted struggle for political identity. 
Changing policies towards the problem of Government in a small and insolvent 
, , 
1. c.o. 87/110, 1877, Cuttings from Liverpool Hercury, 21st Hq, 13th August, ,i ,: 
6th Sept., etc.; 28th sept. 1877. Letter from Thomas Brown to Lord ,1 
Carnavon. 
C.o. 87/110, 1877, 19th April, Colonial Office J.Iinute, HelJllling to Hr. 
Meade. 
3. C.O. 87/109, 1876, 22nd December, Petition, for a qualified Judge, 
to Carnavon. 
4. J.}f. Gray, "History", p.460. 
5. c.o. 87/133, 1888, vol.2. lOth Sept. G.T.Carter to Lord Knutsford. 
6. C.O. 87/126, 1886, vol.2. 5th August, I.J.H~ to Hon. Edward Stanhope. 
~3{ 1/ 
colony had del~ed its emergency as a working political entity, under the 
immediate control of local officials and unofficials. Internal tensions of 
a diversified society were a consequence of smallness, aggravated b,y the 
disparity in the development of racial groups there; and this had not promoted 
political growth. By 1888, as the result of educational and economic forces, 
the African community in st. ~~'s was adequately equipped for participation 
in government with European officials and merchants. But the settlement ~ 
ver,y veIl have drifted on as before~f the Berlin Conference of 1885 had not 
heralded a new era in the history of West Africa. French colonial expansion 
on the borders of the Gambia made it necessar,y to define spheres of influence; 
and only an 'independent' Gambia under its OVll Governor and Council could 
deal with the urgent problems of the late nineteenth century. 
i 1 
I" 
CHAPTER ,VI 
THE PROBI»IS OF AN UNSTABLE lroNOMI 1816-1888. 
A limited revenue was the most constant factor in the Gambia settlement 
throughout the nineteenth century, and the root of its problems. In the early 
years ot the settlement all elements had been optimistic about potential trade 
and good prospects for an expanding revenue. When expectations failed to be 
realized while the growing financial responsibilities of Government imposed 
heavy burdens on the taxpaying minority in Bathurst, frustrations and tensions 
~ecame the characteristic features of relationship between government and 
people. Indeed the struggle for political emancipation had been intimate~ 
bound up with the economic problems ot the settlement. For an econo~ 
"7 
dependent upon a non-economic crop like the groundnut could not enjoy the 
stability required for ste~ growth. 
Generally, its smallness had deprived it of the same extent of imperial 
aid enjoyed by the other settlements on the Coast; so that no Parliamentary 
Grant was provided for some years after its foundation. l Even the erection 
ot public buildings - the Government House, the Military Barracks, the 
Hospital and the Gaol - had been provided out ot public funds collected from 
2 the mercantile community. Nor were British merchants unwilling to meet 
such responsibilities at first, for they knew it had not been the intention 
1. C.O. 267/66, 1825, v01.2. 8th July, Charles Turner to Bathurst. 
2. c.o. 267/58, 1823, vol.l. 18th June, C.}1a.cCartby to Lord Bathurst. 
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of Lord Bathurst or the British Government to establish anything more elaborate 
than a military post on st. Mary's Island. That was why they expended large 
smns in building themselves the kind of settlement they required for the 
pursuit of trade, out of which they contributed towards the running of a civil 
establishment. 1 
Until the 'sixties, import duties collected from the mercantile community 
comprised the greater part of the amlual revenue. Policy in! tiated by the 
Governor and. Council of Sierra Leone was based on high import duties, an 
important reason why merchants of st. Mary's agitated for a local government 
empowered to formulate its own fiscal policy that would encourage British 
trade. For with French Albreda conducting an extensive contraband trade in 
the River, large deficits were created in the revenue. 2 If British merchants 
were not themselves engaged in evading customs duties, they defrauded the 
Colonial Chest by systematically refusing to P83" duties in silver coins (which 
were in short supply), and using instead 'Promissory Notes' received by the 
Government at the rate of £1 sterling each, but only accepted again by the 
merchants in p~ent of debts at l7/4d. each. Such was the loss involved 
that Government was obliged to buy all Notes with a loan from Sierra Leone in 
1826.3 
When Dr. }'fadden visited. the GaJIlbia in 1841, he tound that the 2% ad 
valorem duty on general imports had been raised to 3,%, that tobacco still 
carried an extra tax of~. per lb., and spirits a duty of 1/- instead of 6d. 
C.o. 87/1, 6th l183" 1828, Merchants' l>lemorial to Lord Bathurst. 
See Chapter III ot Thesis. 
C.O. 267/72, 1826, v01.2. 28th June, K.Hacaul83" to Bathurst. 
PromissorY Notes were first issued by Lt.-Col. Alexander Grant with the 
approval ot Governor NacCartby for th~urpose of carrying out a 
programme for public works:- C.O. 261 66, 1825, vol.2. 1st July, Turner 
to Bathurst; 25th Nov. A.Grant to Ba urst. 
1 per gallon as betore. These, together with Tonnage and Harbour dues, and 
minor items of Quit Rents and spirit Licences, made up the total revenue. 
With such limitations, it was not ditticult tor expenditure to disturb the 
finances ot the settlement, whereupon public protest against waste and 
misappropriation of funds was aroused. Since public works were dependent on 
funds and on the skills ot experts, it was not surprising that ten years after 
the fOWldation of st. Nary's no Court House or Secretary's Office had been 
built, nor a ~fa.rket or Wharf as late as 1842. l-Iadden totmd the lack of 
engineering skill in the colony a cause tor the striking absence ot public 
buildings there, and pointed to the wastage of public funds occasioned by the 
current policy of employing "any merchant's clerk who might be considered an 
Arch! tectural Amateur as the Colonial Architect and Civil Engineer." In 
1839, a. newly built market costing £602 had. tallen down. The same tate had 
befallen the barracks at J.facCarthy Island; and the Govermnent House at 
Bathurst which had cost between £8000 and £10,000 to erect had been blown down 
by a !OrnJUlO, repairs subsequently amoWlting to an extra £3000.2 
This short-sighted policy in the Gambia of embarking on projects Wlder 
the supervision of unqualified persons persisted as long as the revenue 
remained static or declined, and was a major factor in its halting development. 
The perennial problem ot j>rainage vas certainly one tha.t demanded high technical 
lmovledge and skill, if it was to be efficiently ta.ckled; but here, too, it 
was left to successive Administrators to use their ingenuity, rather than to 
1. C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 30th November, Charles Grant, Thomas Brown &; 
others to Lord Stanley. 
2. C.O. 267/173, 1841, Madden Report. 
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experts, simply because the Colonial Chest could not bear the burderi. 
Governor d' Arcy, with experience of the swamps of Bombay and. Demerara, showed 
a great interest in the drainage of st. l-fa.ry's, himself undertaking the 
supervision ot the construction ot an embankment by convict labour ,and. of 
sluice gates. He a.lw~s hoped to tackle the Pontine lfarsh which practically 
divided the Island into two halves in the rains, and made existence on the 
island precarious, but funds were not available.1 
This was a serious state of affairs, for upon the efficient working of 
a drainage scheme depended the health of all communities on the Island. 
British merchants with profits to spend at the end of a trade season took 
their leave of the Island during the rainy months. This in itself was an 
uneconomic procedure where profits were cons\DDed by annual holidays to Europe. 
Indeed, Governor Kennedy was to emphasize that if the occupation ot the Gambia 
was to be continued, "no effort should be spared to render it babi table for 
EUropeans; for upon their energy and capital its progress and prosperity must 
depend. "2 .Africans who were in no position to withdraw from sodden huts and 
flooded streets in the rains died off, or grew debilitated by fevers (in tact, 
malaria, which was not yet discovered), thus reducing the economic output of 
the settlement for three to tour months every year. 
1. G. d • Arcy - Report to the Leg. Co. on Dykes and Drains, 30th July 1864, 
pub. African Times, Feb. 1865, and June 1865. 
2. C.O. 87/89, 1868, vol.I. 1st Sept. Kennedy ioIalke' og:~B~pk1ngham. 
These were some of the features of the economic background to the 
chronic financial situation of the 'sixties and ·seventies. Though the 
sources of revenue had increased by then, and a more complex fiscal system 
had emerged embracing French merchants and Liberated African entrepreneurs, 
the demands on public ftmds had also multiplied. In particular, the Civil 
List had grown out of all proportion to the size ot the settlement, thereby 
providing further cause tor mercantile disaftection. While BritiSh merchants 
held the initiative in the organization of trade, on which the revenue still 
depended, and while the,y alone were directly represented in the Legislature, 
they were in a favourable position to put pressure on those who controlled 
taxation. Final controlling power really lay with the Imperial Treasury, 
whose distant hand on the purse strings was always alert to halt public 
expenditure. For this reason, the views on the Treasur,y Officers and those 
of the mercantile bo~ in st. Mar,y's did not often agree; nor did this 
fa.cili tate the Herculean task of the Governor on the spot who was blamed by 
the merchants for overtaxing citizens without embarking upon adequate 
development programmes. The extent of imperial control was implied in a 
Colonial Office minute ot 1868 in answer to mercantile opposition to certain 
items ot expenditure: "I do not see that we need let Hr. Brown determine how 
money is to be spent in a Colony receiving Imperial aid •••• n l 
The change in the econoD\Y of the Gambia from a trade in interior 
commodities (which were taxed upon entering :&gland), to a staple crop in 
groundnuts, directly affected the revenue of the settlement; and altered 
1. c.o. 87/89, 1868, vol.l. 3rd November, C.O. ~Unute - no signature. 
the pattern of duties from an import to an export basis. The immediate 
reason for the change in the pattern ot taxation was the growing prosperity 
of French merchants whom the free navigation of the Gambia River had provided 
with opporttmities for extensive trade. .As the Queen's Advocate explained to 
the Legislative Council during the debate ot 1857, the French gained 
advantages in trade because as the law stood, they could "take money up in 
their vessels upon which they p~ no duty, but goods upon which duties are 
p~able they cannot take up, hence they are torced to take money.. .... .An 
export duty would fall tairly upon all merchants, and. increase the revenue; 
but this was objectionable to the Colonial Ottice an the principle that such 
a duty would tall heavily on the industrious producer, while relieving the 
other portion of the community trom contributing to the maintenance ot the 
Government. Ofticials and. unotticials in Council were, however, unanimous 
in support of the tax on nuts. Dr. Robertson, the Colonial Secretary, showed. 
that in the Gambia, the consumer was generally the same as the producer, in 
consequence ot which the Government had been mainly supported, not by an 
import or export tariff but "b.1 what we should strictly speaking call a 
transit duty •••• " The native producer he said was taxed equally for the 
support of the Government "whether you tax the goods passing "W the River or 
the produce passing downwards." But an export duty had the advantage ot 
1 being eas,y and cheap to collect. 
. 
Edward Bocock and Y.H.Goddard, merehants in Council, were tar more 
concerned with opposing the threat ot higher import duties that would only 
1. C.o. 87/67, 1859, vo1.1. Legislative Council lfinutes for 30th 
December, 1857. 
"induce the merchants to cease the importa.tion of goods and. to purchase produce 
with money," than with showing enthusiasm for an a.l terna.tive means of taxation. 
In f~t, Governor 0 'Connor complained of the lukewarmness of the response to 
his invitation for comments on his tariff proposals from the commercial 
community. He had proposed an export tax of 1l/8d. per ton of nuts; Goddard 
thought about 10/- per ton would be a. fur figure. It was to take five years, 
however, to establish a new fiscal system for the Gambia. l 
Those five years were to show the deficiency in the revenue that was the 
direct result of the importation of French cash (the French dollar being 
"highly appreciated in all regions of Africa •••• "). Governor d' Arcy 
estimated that in 1860 nearly £40,000 value in goods had been shut out b,y 
cash, injuring import duties to a considerable degree, which for that year only 
amounted to £2,000. Two years before, revenue collected from this source had 
2 been £3,500. The colony had reached another of its economic hurdles, and 
d ' Arcy, taking a long term view of the situation, saw no reason for the 
optimism of his predecessor. He found in the colony "no less than seven 
firms have closed during the last two years with liabilities amounting to 
something like £50,000 or £60,000 to the Home C~pitalists ••• [who] are 
consequently char,y of making further advances.") 
It was therefore the worst moment to embark on a war against Baddibu 
to secure indemnity for British merchants who had suffered severe losses in 
1. C.o. 87/67, 1859, vol.l. ~g. Co. ltinutes for 30th Dec. 1851. 
2. C.O. 81/61, 1859, vol.l. 19th Januar.y, Governor O'Connor to Newcastle. 
). c.O.< 81/61, 1859, vol.1. 18th October, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
that state. The result was to be a war debt of £2,500 (an enormous figure 
in comparison with the annual revenue), merchants who had furnished vessels for 
the war pressing for payment, and the Colonial Chest groaning under the added 
burden of locating a party of Liberated Africans newly arrived from Sierra 
1 Leone. But merchants caught up in the cross-currents of economic change of 
the mid nineteenth century did not lose the resilience which was characteristic 
of their community. It was their faith in the River trade and its possibility 
of sometime expanding the revenue that kept them in the commercial field for 
the greater part of the century. 
It would be 'Wrong to suppose tha.t import duties were no longer a feature 
of the Gambia econo~, for apart from tobacco and spirits which were al~s 
dutiable imports, a comparable article of luxury had now appeared on the 
market. This was the kola nut which was to the Liberated A:trican entrepreneur 
what grOtmdnut was to the European merchant, his main source of income in the 
River trade. .As Islam swept over the country in the nineteenth century, so 
it opened up new markets for kola, a cheap and inocuous stimulant, drastically 
reducing the consumption of spiritous liquors. By 1861, African entrepreneurs 
had shown a preference for the trade in local foodstuffs in which they could 
participate with fairly small capital. When, therefore, the ill-consequences 
of the Baddibu War compelled the Government to look for new sources of revenue, 
British merchants being reluctant to make further contribution to Public 
Funds, it was to the African sector that it turned, "acting upon the principle 
1. C.O. 87/71, 1861, 9th April, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
that as the Liberated Africans have hitherto enjoyed the advantages of British 
subj ects, they must now in all fairness share the burthen. "I 
In 1861 the tax was 10/- a bly. of 3 cwt. of nuts, and it was to bring a 
revenue of about £300 p.a., 2 but by 1863 it was making a substantial contribution 
of £500 to £600 p.a. to the revenue. 3 Even this was regarded by European 
merchants as minima.! compared with the burden of taxation which fell upon them. 
It was in this mood that Thomas Brown as Acting Queen's Advocate framed the 
1865 tariff, which bore his name, and carried extra import duties on kola and 
sugar (5/- per bly. and ld •. per lb. extra respectively), and an extra duty ot 
4 3d. per gallon on palm wine. It was a Bill "so framed as to fall on the 
French merchants, the Aka traders ot Sierra Leone, and the Aka women of this 
town, who b~ the pa.!mwine from the wild Jola and. retail it •••• It d'Arcy, 
impressed by Brown's arguments, forwarded the Ordinance which Council had 
passed unanimously and which he himself fomd acceptable. 5 The Colonial 
Office, however, was not favourably impressed, being "suspicious of Mr~- Brow's II 
Tariff", knowing that the Governor was "so much in the hands of his Council, Ii 
/1 
6 
where the mercantile element rules supreme." 
The Liberated African econo~ had emerged as a recognisable pattern woven 
into the economic fabric of the settlement; and as facilities of steam 
1. C.O.--87/71, 1861, 22nd. April, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
2. Ibid. 
3. c.o. 87/79, 1864, 1st Januar,y, d'Arcy to Newcastle.-
4. Blue Book for 1858: Pa1mwine Revenue amounted to £733.l0.9d. 
5. c.o. 87/82, 1865, vol.l. 17th Hay, d'Arcy to De,mweTl:. 
6. c.o. 87/82, 1865, vol.1. 22nd. Jme, C.O. ~tinute - no signature. 
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communication with Sierra Leone improved in the second half of the centur,y, 
so their prosperity was assured, though it did not go beyond that of small 
2e,.1 
business men. In terms of capital, their diversified trade was only modest. 
As has been shown, they were not excluded from the groundnut trade, but it 
was as sole organizers of the kola trade and its ancillaries in palmoil, rice, 
yams and. corn, that they found recognition in the cotmnmity in st. Mary's. 
In a real sense, this was their emancipation from tutelage, and a moment of 
great achievement when their former European employers recognised them as 
equals in the commercial field capable of making substantial contributions to 
the Revenue. Kola certainly penetrated the far interior, increasing in value 
at. every station"until at J.lacCartby Island the bly. is worth from £18 to £20," 
the cost price at Sierra Leone var,ying from £8 to £11, with freight charges 
1 
of 8/- to 12/- a bly. It was a comnodity which threatened some of the 
interests of the est.ablished merchant, kola nut being "more necessar,y to the 
natives than tobacco,"2 which, with rum, used to be consumer goods in greatest 
demand in the River. As retailers of foodstuffs then, Liberated Africans 
reaped fair profits. 
These Africans met the challenge of the 'sixties in good faith, so that 
the Collector of Customs was able to report that once the Ordinance on the 
kola tax had been passed in 1861, its implementation had been easy, and the 
tax collected without difficulty. It. is worth noticing, too, that in 1865 
the Council passed an Ordinance for rais~ the Licence on Spirit or 'Grog' 
1. C.o. 87/11, 1861, 19th July, Hastings Kneller to G. d'Arcy. 
2. C.O. f57/82, 1865, vol.l. 17th ~fa3r, d'Arcy to PardweI.l;. 
shops from £30 to £50 p.a. with the same object of swelling the revenue, and 
of reducing drunkenness in st. Mary·s.l It was a. ta.x almost exclusively 
collected from the Liberated African community, a substantial number of whom, 
like Harr,y Finden, were making a living from retailing imported spirits. 
Through this, and by other trades, a few Afric8Jls had acquired a small degree 
of economic independence, which enabled them further to increase the volume 
of trade in the Settlement. In their effect, the tariff laws of the 'sixties 
were a test to the economic strength of the African community; that taxation 
did not cause the collapse of their system of trade was indication tha.t 
taxation va.s not unfair, and evidence of buoyancy 8Jld a large degree of 
stability in this emerging commercial group. 
Typical of the Gambia. revenue, tariff laws were incapable of maki.ng 8l\Y 
dramatic change in its character; and revenue could not meet the growing 
demands of increasing expenditure. Inspite of all resistance, it was found 
necessary to revise, the fiscal system further so as to provide taxation both 
. 2 
from imports and exports. In 1866 ad valorem duties at ~ were reimposed 
on all imported goods, wile the duty on the staple crop was not abolished. 3 
.Among the new duties was an item aimed at French merchants - the duty of 4/-
per 1000 bricks, such building materials being only imported in French 
vessels trom France into the colo~. 
1. C.O. 87/82, 1865, 18th June, dl,Arcy to Cardwell,0. 
2. This was among Colonel Ord's Recommendations for the Settlement. 
3. C.O. 87/84, 1866, vol.l. T.F. Quin's Hemorial to C'.ardw.ellr-. 
~ 
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While unofficials were willing to support the new tariff for three years, 
they resisted Admiral Patey's attempt to secure its re-enactment in 1869 "for 
1 
another period of three years." European merchants and African traders 
made representation to Thomas Brown, b.Y now their only member in Council, 
against the continuance of "so excessive a tax upon the Imports", which they 
could only regardftas a. grea.t breach of fa.ith on the part of the Administra.tor 
and Council." They argued that the purpose for which the Ordinance had been 
passed in 1866 had been so far carried out as to ha.ve provided a. surplus of 
over £9000 in 1868, the greater portion at which 1~ "idle in the hands of 
the Colonial Treasurer." 
In their opinion there was no point in taxa.tion for the sake of shewing 
Ha large and useless surplus ••• whilst our roads which cost so much to 
construct, and were one at the causes of our getting into debt in past years, 
are neglected and a.llowed to go to ruin."2 One merchant, Thomas Chown Jnr., 
in a. persona.l protest to the Administrator a.lleged that for the years 1867-68 
his firm "being the largest contributor to the Colonial Revenue ••• [had pa.idJ 
3 
upward of £6000 for duties." Opposition was not simply the result of 
:Patey's unpopularity with the mercantile community, but the obvious dilemma 
which faced Government and taxp~ng citizens wa.s to decide wha.t margin to 
allOY for a. surplus revenue fund. While the interests of the two parties 
differed, agreement on this vita.1 issue could not be reached. 
1. C.O. 87/92, 1869, vol.2. 3rd June, Pa.tey to Kenne~. 
2. C.O. 87/92, 1869, vol.2. 30th March, Letter of Principal inhabitants to 
T.Brown. 
3. C.O. 87/92, 1869, vol.2. 23rd March, Thomas Chown Jnr. to Pa.tey. 
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Such divergence ot opinion otten meant that taxes imposed Qy the 
Government were not collected trom the more influential merchants. An 
otficial report on the CustODl.! Department in Bathurst in 1869 disclosed "a 
great l~ty ot practice in the collection ot the Revenue ••• [which] is 
defrauded to a very considerable extent •••• " The Collector, Kneller, in 
close alliance with a mercantile clique dominated Qy Thomas Brown, showed 
gross errors in his Account Books; not only were they out of date, but there 
was evidence that only goods liable to specitic duties were ever examined, 
and that certain duties on goods received b,y Goddard and Quin and other 
1 
merchants had not been collected. Brown and Quin were later implicated in 
two cases ot smuggling in 1873, when Kneller's successor seized two schooners _ 
the "Arabiston" and the "Atlanta", tor evading Customs duties.2 The 
f 
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merchants, determined to protect their interests, tailed to understand that lihUe:: 
a precarious revenue was exposed to so many hazards its enlargement was likely 
to remain uncertain. 
These duties did not exhaust the sources ot revenue in the settlement 
Harbour and Tonnage dues, Town Rates, and a Land Tax in British Combo made 
their own contribution, and provided ~ occasions tor disagreement between 
Government and people. The tirst Rates Ordinance had been passed in 1850, 
by which property valued at £5 or upwards paid 4% p.a., and 3% it valued at 
less.' It proved one of the most irksome items of revenue to collect, 
1. C.O. 87/91, 1869, vol.l. 12th March, A.Richmond's Report to A.E.Kenn~. 
2. C.O. 87/105, 1873, vo1.2. 21st July, H.T.M.Cooper to Lord Kimberle,y; 
C.O. 87/104, 1873, vol.l. 10th April, T.F.Quin to Kimber1e.y; 
C.O. 87/106, 1873, vol.3. loth April, Quin to Kimberle.y. 
,. C.O. 87/74, 1862, 27th Sept., G.d'!rcy to Newcastle. 
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entailing the issue of hundreds of summonses against defaulters annual~. 
In 1862, Harry Finden and 374 other African inhabitants of Bathurst made an 
appeal for the repeal of the unpopular Ordinance, for they complained that it 
fell heavily upon them, and had not produced aqy benefits to them since its 
implementation. Their districts remained low-lying and swampy, and they 
were compelled "to cleanse the streets as they were before the passing of the 
said Ordinance."l Such objections demonstrated the climate of opinion among 
this community; a general feeling of oppression was abroad - a feeling that 
those who lived in the front streets with amenities of street lamps and 
policemen on patrol at night had reason enough to p~ rates. Maqy Africans 
had, therefore, refused to p~ rates, and, according to their own account, 
others of them had migrated to the mainland to escape p~ent, for the high 
prices ot provisions had exhausted their earnings. 
Governor d'Arcy and successive Governors appeared to have accepted the 
validity of these complaints, and made representation to the Secretar,y of 
state on their behalf; but repeal was thought to be a retrospective step, 
since the tax. was "very unobjectionable ••• both in its amount and object."2 
Even when the finances of the Gambia improved and Administrator KOrtright 
proposed an Ordinance to alter the Rates from 4~ to 3%, and to exempt from 
tax. all properties valued at less than £5,3 the Colonial Ottice was of opinion 
1. C.O. 87/74, 1862, Petition ot Liberated Africans to d'Arcy. 
2. C.O. 87/74, 1862, 15th November, C.O. ~tlnute, G.B. 
). C.O. 87/107, 1874, 27th August, C.H.KOrtright to Kenne~. 
that "the revenue derived from these rates should not be sacrificed unless an 
urgent necessity for such a course can be shown."l Nor did the local 
legislature support aqy attempt to exempt the African community from p~ 
rates, although Goddard was reported to be fully sympathetic to the hardships of 
the poorer citizens. 
Rates had been originally imposed to provide a margin for urban 
development, and to provide the beginnings of a municipality. Indeed, section 
21 of the 1850 law stipulated that an ~ual general meeting of the ratep~ers 
should determine how the rates were to be expended. 2 The Government, however, 
seemed to have concentrated solely on collecting revenue to the exclusion of 
any training in civie life. It must have caused not a little embarrassment 
to the Governors who tried to relieve poor Blacks from taxes they could not 
p~, in face of opposition trom their Councils and the Colonial Office, but 
their efforts in this direction derived from a conviction that prosperous 
Blacks were making adequate contribution to the revenue in other ~s. 
Harbour and Tonnage dues provided another source of revenue; and with 
the growth of the groundnut trade maqy more ships than before entered the 
harbour. At first the dues were imposed on an annual basis, but French 
merchants were suspecte~ of attempting to evade the taxes by employing fine 
Clipper vessels which could make several voyages in one year. For that 
reason a new' system based on tonnage was introduced, and. in 1873 tonnage dues 
vere raised from 2/- a ton p.a., to 1/6d. a ton,ever,y time a vessel entered 
1. C.O. 87/107,1874, 4th April, Carnavon to Kennedy. 
2. C.O. 87/14, 1862, 15th November, C.O. Minute, G.B. 
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Bathurst. Its object was partly to dislocate the French carrying trade from 
the River; but Henry Helm, Agent for T .C. Chown, stood alone in the mercantile 
community in support of the Government's proposal to effect such a change. 
This, Helm believed, "would protect the English Firms and English vessels 
against the French, who just now have, if not all, but the most profits and 
1 benefits of this countr,y." Yet the issue of harbour and tonnage dues was 
far more complicated because the African Steamship Comp~'s vessels (on which 
most of the merchants and all the African entrepreneurs depended for 
transporting their goods to EUrope,) could afford to by-pass Bathurst whenever 
they felt these dues were in excess of the shipping business available in the 
Gambia. And interruptions to the sea mail were regarded b,y the merchants 
2 
as disastrous to them, for isolation from markets was its consequence. 
For all these attempts at imposing and raising taxes in the Gambia, the 
economic picture remained the same, and expenditure continued to outstrip 
revenue. In the words of the Colonial Office: "The Revenue appears to have 
been of a capricious character, yet the Expenditure seems to have been kept 
at a ste~ figure."3 
1. 
2. 
C.O. 87/107, 1874, 8th Januar.y, Henr,y Helm to C.H.Kortright. 
See Chapter III of Thesis. 
C.O. 87/93, 1869, vol.). 4th August, Major Bravo to A.E.Kennedy. Y,. ~') 
The mercantile community had not been unaware of the hazards of an 
economy based an a single cash crop. Even before the groundnut trade had 
developed, they had made attempts to broaden the economy, with their schemes 
for the cultivation of hemp and cotton. Nor had the local Government been 
lacking in initiative in the same direction. Governor d' Arcy, who was faced 
with some of the coloqy's most serious financial problems, gave thought and 
energy to agricultural schemes. In 1862, he obtained a ton of Egyptian cotton 
seed from the Manchester Association, for distribution among French and 
British merchants in the coloqy. Liberated Africans working on a Government 
1 farm in British Combo planted the seed too. In 1864, 200 cwt. of cotton 
was exported from the coloqy, with further requests for Government sponsorship. 
Both Quin and Brown showed great enterprise in cotton growing, the former 
exporting a "considerable quantity" to GeI'1ll8.lV, while the latter loaded the 
first -cotton ship" to leave the River with a cargo ot 27,843 lbs. of cotton 
2 for the Liverpool market. A few other attempts at exportation, however, 
soon proved the uneconomic nature of the new commodity. Merchants complained 
they could not make -the smallest profit on this article, after incurring all 
the expenses of freight to Europe." In aqy case European markets preferred 
3 ginned cotton. 
Experiments in cotton cultivation were a feature of the West African 
scene in the 'sixties and 'seventies, the Governments in Senegal and Sierra 
Leone attempting to stimulate cultivation4 with little more success than the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
C.O. 
C.O. 
C.O. 
C.O. 
87/71, 1863, 25th Sept., d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
87/80, 1864, 18th Oct., d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
87/85, 1866, vol.2. 10th Dec., d'Arcy to Blackall; 
87/17, 1863, 25th Sept., d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
Correspondent in the .At.Times, August 1864 - Sierra Leone CottonExhihitio 
November 1863 - At. TlilleS. 
Gambia had had. Interest in the crop was sustained into the later nineteenth 
century, when more substantial sums were invested in agriculture by 
Governments and commercial interests. For a period, rubber exports from the 
Gambia raised the hopes of all concerned to diversify the economy; but this 
too proved a mere outburst of prosperity which did not 1ast.1 A Government 
Experimental Farm was started on Kotu Estate (formerly the property of the 
Lloyd-Evans senoras), under the supervision of a Curator from Kew Gardens. 
After some years at tr,ying to improve rubber cUltivation and agriculture in 
2 general, the EXperimental Farm closed down for want of results. It was not 
strange that so m~ projects in agriculture bore so little fruit, since there 
was no Agriculture Department in the colony before 1924.3 But when all 
experiments failed the groundnut remained dominant. 
So much so that the land on which the nut was grown in British terri tory _ 
Bri tish Combo and HacCartby Island - came to be taxed as a result of 
representations made by mercantile members in Council. When discussion on 
expenditure tor these dependencies had come up in 1858, Thomas Chow. Snr. had 
then proposed that landowners and merchants in those areas should be liable 
to p~ rates to meet current expenditure on roads and bridges.4 The then 
Colonial Secretary, Dr. Robertson, objected to such a view, since he argued 
the dependencies contributed to the general revenue by p~ customs duties, 
1. 
2. 
4. 
Correspondent, on "India-Rubber", Ba.thurst Observer, April 1883. 
Gambia Secretariat Archives, Official Diary ot the Manager of British 
Combo - Sergeant G.J.Thomas; 
C.O. 87/162, 1901, vo1.1. 25th March, Governor G.Denton to Joseph 
Chamberlain • 
.An Jgricul tura.1 Board composed of Officials and Herchants was set up by 
Governor Llewelyn to supervise Kotu. 
C.O. 87/71, 1861, Legislative Council Minutes for 1st July 1860. 
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and therefore had a right "to be attended to as well as Bathurst."l It was 
in 1860 that d'Arcy was allowed to tax British Combo;2 and experience at 
first showed that the farmers did not object to being taxed. d'Arcy reported 
"that it prevented Palavers about grotmd, and that it showed them we [the 
British GovernmentJ were not going to give up the territory to the king of 
Combo •••• ,,3 With the appointment of a resident Na,na.ger 6f that area in 18614 
it became practicable and desirable "to tax the remtmerative groundnut farms 
in order that the territory might be selt-supporting for the most part.,,5 
Population had increased since the Combo wars of the 'fifties, and a growing 
prosperity was not yet disturbed by the wars of the River, so that the tax 
of one dollar per acre was not really a great hardship. This did not mean 
that the collection of tax was less difficult in British Combo than among the 
poorer Africans of st. Mary's. On the contrary, not only were there 
disruptive elements who refused to P83' tax for land which had belonged to 
their ancestors, (especially as the senoras were not taxed),6 but generally, 
the land tax was an annoyance to many farmers. And when the price of nuts 
was unattractive in the settlement, large numbers of these farmers were 
1. c.o. 87/61, 1859, vol.l. Leg. Co. ~anutes tor 14th June 1858. 
2. C.O. 87/69, 1860, 30th May, Newcastle to d'Arcy. 
3. c.o. 87/11, 1861, 24th July, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
4. Ibid. 
5. ( C.O. 81/11, 1861, 5th Dec. 1860, d'Arcy to Colonial Surveyor, Lt.-Garsia; { c.o. 81/84, 1866, vol.l. 23rd June, d ' Arcy to C"ard,nl"J:t!. 
6. c.o. 87/84, 1866, vol.1. 23rd Jtme, d'!rcy to eal'dwel.~. 
••• 
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r~orted to migrate into French territor,y where the price ot nuts was higher, 
and there was no comparable tax on Farms. l Governors therefore found they 
had to continue to remind the inhabitants of British terri tory of "the 
advantages ot roads and bridges, and ••• resident Constablesn2 stationed in 
their vil18€es. 
Thus a dreary story with few highlights was the economic picture of the 
Gambia in our period; sometimes it almost looked sinister, but al~s it was 
? 
relevant and disturbing. Economic problems invaded all other areas of 
activity in the settlement, and lo'erethe basis for m~ political decisions. 
That no satisfactor,y solution could ever be found to these perennial problems, 
drove Governor Kennedy to extreme pessimism - he predicted that under the 
circumstances, "the resources of the Gambia will y~arly become less and less.,,3 
In preference to such a decline, he was determined to conduct the colo~ into 
French hands; for they were more likely to produce the tunds required for 
4 development of a settlement on the borders of Senegal than were the British. 
It was a realistic attitude to an insoluble problem, notwithstanding Kennedy's 
own prejudices against the Gambia and his desire to safeguard Sierra Leone 
interests. 
1. "Civic" on "British Combo" in Ba.thurst Observer, 29th April 1884. 
2. 0.0. 81/84, 1866, vol.l. 23rd June, d 'Arcy to Cal'chreir'. 
3. c.o. 81/96, 1810, vol.l. Kennedy's Comment to Earl Granville on Major 
Bravo's despa.tch, 15th January 1810. 
4. See Chapter VII of Thesis. 
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Dependence on Sierra Leone between 1866 and 1888, and the real threat 
of French rule between 1866 and 1876, produced a programme of political 
development from the merchants of Bathurst. They had for long believed that 
nextravagance and bad management are the sole causes of our monetary 
troubles." ~faDy of them were convinced that the revenue "in the hands of a 
competent Administrator ••• is amply sufficient to meet all our wants and 
gradually extinguish our liabilities. nl As merchants, they affirmed that 
their interest in the Gambia was trade; it was hardly to their advantage, 
therefore, to maintain a Government with "a large official staff at a cost of 
over £10,000 p.a •••• lfor] SO long as retrenchment is lett to Governors and 
high officials on the Coast, 80 long will salaries, emoluments, and offices 
be increased tmder one plea or another, as our Colonial expenditure has been 
2 
more than doubled within the last twelve years." Thus the issue ot Transter 
became a turning-point, not only in their attitudes to Governors and Colonial 
Office officials, but in their expectations for the future. Those who were 
prepared to continue business in the River under the cloud of tmcerta1nty 
stumbled on the idea of a type of Consular Government. 
The practicability of local self-government was for the first time a 
matter of ver,y great appeal and wor~ of serious consideration. No longer 
was it enough to demand separation trom another government, but it was now 
desirable to replace the system of Crown Colo~ Government b,y a less elaborate 
machiner,y to be operated by a Chief Justice; for men with legal education 
1. c.O. 87/84, 1866, vol.l. 23rd March, T.F.Quin toCM.'dwell '. 
2. Merchants I Memorial to Earl Granville, 13th August 1869, published in 
African Times, Sept. 1869. 
"respect the constitutional rights and liberties of the Colonists."l They 
demanded to be allowed to manage their own local affairS~_whi,~~ they could 
make such reductions in the Civil Establishment as would effectively decrease 
the annual expenditure; "we do not see that we are more unfitted for it than 
our cOl.Ultrymen in the Rivers Bonny and Benin where they have a larger trade ••• "2 
Under Thomas Brown's leadership, they agitated for internal autono~ in press 
and petition, in preference to French rule. 
Consular Government had operated successfully in the Bights of Benin and 
Biafra since 1849; and :trom the point of view of British merchants engaged 
in the trade of the Niger Delta it proved a most e:tfective means of 
protecting their interests in native states. Under John Beecroft, the first 
Consul, influence was exerted with local potentates for :turthering British 
political and economic interests. As a former merchant in the area, 
Beecro:tt "had. unrivalled experience of local affairs" which was to be o:t 
great service to him in his capacity as official representative of Great 
Britain. And while Lord Palmers ton remained Foreign Secretary with his 
"intelligent grasp of the meaning of events in the bights of Benin and Biai'ra", 
Beecroft could rely on support for his energetic 'measures and even interference 
in the affairs of Jfrican states. His significant contribution to the growth 
ot British power in Nigeria during his consulship 1849-54 has. already been 
:3 told by Dr. Dike. 
1. Merchants' llemorial to Earl Granville, 13th August 1869, published in 
African Times, Sept. l869~ 
2. Ibid. 
3. Dike, "Trade and Politics", p.93. 
l.Slf-
The attraction of this kind of Government to the merchants of the Gambia 
in the 'sixties was its ver,y simplicity which required no taxation for its 
maintenance, and its effectiveness among African states. They had long 
petitioned for protection of trade in the River Gambia ~ interference in 
native politics b.r methods which Beecroft had showed could be employed with 
success. But on the whole, Colonial Secretaries did not share Palmerston's 
thinking, and, until the late nineteenth century, were opposed to increasing 
British commitments on the West Coast. In any case, the Gambia hardly 
provided the ideal conditions for a Consul. Even in the eighteenth century, 
the expensive machiner,y of Crown colony government had been found more 
appropriate to it than rule ~ a Committee ot merchants, because of acute 
French rivalry in the region. By the mid-nineteenth century the French had 
"-.-/ 
~ made Dakar their headquarters in Vest Africa, trom which point the,y pursued an 
expansionist policy into the interior. With French rivalr,y on one hand and 
native wars on the other, a Consul could not have achieved the results of 
Beecroft. His influence in the River Gambia would certainly have been far 
less extensive. 
l-Ierchants ot st. Mary's were nearer the white planters or colonists ot 
the West Indian colonies than British traders in the Niger Delta. They had 
emigrated from Goree to st. Mar,y's with their households and deFendents, with 
commercial ambitions, and with a desire to build permanent homes as well as 
factories. That was partly WQy the,y agitated for a civil government under a 
Governor,l and later for a representative Council ~ which the growing needs 
1. See Chapter II at Thesis. 
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of the newly fotmded town of Bathurst could be met. With the loss of two-
thirds of their representation on the Legislative Cotmcil in 1866, and the 
return to a dependent status, the mercantile body looked to the experiment in 
the Delta as a possible solution to their discontent. 
In the matter of defence, for example, they planned to subsidize native 
chiefs who would protect trade in the River, "and with one Compaqy of soldiers, 
or the frequent visit in the hea1t~ season ot one of H.M.·s gunboats, we 
1 
could protect ourselves here." The dread of a warship ~ Atrican chiefs 
had given Beecroft the whip-handle in the Delta states, and he had made it a 
practice of visiting them in such a vessel, and of holding palavers with them 
on the spacious deck. 2 With the regular visit of a man-of-war in the River 
Gambia merchants there, and indeed Governors too, believed that depredations 
by riverain tribes would cease. But the imperial Government could never be 
moved to activity for the defence of the settlement unless it felt the lives 
of British subjects threatened. ·And it did nothing now, even with the troops) 
withdrawn and the settlement stripped "of all arms and ammunition," the defence 
was lett to a modest militia force and a small ill-disciplined Police Force.4 
To this was added a Police boat which would give some protection to traders 
in the River. Meanwhile frustration motmted, and so did demands for internal 
autonoIl\Y. 
1. 
4. 
Merchants' Memorial to Earl Granville, 13th Augu3t, pub. At.Times, 
sept. 1869. 
Dike, "Trade & Politics", p.129. 
The Troops stationed in the Gambia had been maintained at a cost of 
£20,000 p.o.. by the Imperial Treasury. 
C.O. 81/99, 1871, vol.l. 14th April, Herchants to Acting Administrator 
Colonel Anton. 
Attack was concentrated on the Civil Establishment, which Colonel Ord 
had not found excessive in scale even though it absorbed a large proportion 
of the revenue. Civil servants in the Gambia did not enjoy extravagant 
salaries but "the year's revenue is rarely able to meet" all the demands of 
the Civil Establishment. B.y 1864 the Colony had incurred liabilities to the 
amount of £5,6)0.11.0., the revenue being then £17,204.15.10. inclusive of a 
1 Par1iamentar,y Grant of about £4,000. Between 1860 and '70 revenue climbed 
from £14,153.14.0. to £22,088.7.0. (the latter being the figure for 1868), 
while expenditure kept a close position behind, reaching £21,937.0.4. in 
1870.2 Aqy table of accounts demonstrated forcibly that no margin was 
available for contingencies like an epidemic or indeed for public works. 
Ord 's recommendation was for a regulation of expend! ture according to the 
ability to raise revenue. Indeed officials and merchants seemed to have 
been agreed on this objective, but they differed as to the means of its 
7 achievement. Whenever revenue was slightly productive, merchants ~itated 
~ '- -- ----
for relief from taxation (which was mainly absorbed in salaries and pensions), 
and the Secretar,y of state raised the issue of a reduction in the amount of 
the Parliamentary Grant. For _the British Government was now committed to a 
policy of retrenchment in the West .African Settlements. Nerchants, too, 
accepted. that it was an unnecessary waste ot imperial and colonial funds to 
? spend "Forty-thousand a year for the support ot a Colony ot five English and 
-
( 
1. C.O. 87/82, 1865, 21st April, d'Arcy to Pard~ell. 
2. C.O. 87/84, 1866, vol.l. 23rd March, T.F.Quin to Vardw.e111. 
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four French merchants and some tour thousand native inhabitants 
Consular Government would certainly have reduced 'overheads', and largely 
removed the problem ot salaries and pensions for civil servants; and Thomas 
Brown was perhaps as qualified as Beecrott to operate Consular government in 
West Africa. There was no denying his abUi ties, his grasp of the needs of 
the settlement or of his almost hypnotic influence over a considerable cross-
section of the inhabitants of st. J.fary's. Perhaps the experiment might have 
been worth attempting, though the complete absence ot such an alternative 
solution in the Ord Report would suggest that condi tiona in the Gambia, as in 
Sierra Leone, were not comparable to those of the Bights. Beyond this, if 
Ord could envisage self-governing communi ties in Yest .Africa under African 
leadership, then Consular Government could hardly have provided the training 
ground required for political development of that kind. It was no more than 
a primitive and skeleton machine~ - an expedient device to meet peculiar 
conditions. 
Government by Governor and Council, on the other hand, was an old 
institution in the Sene-Gambia region, and had almost produced a kind of 
mentality and maturity in its mercantile communities not yet found in the 
Delta. That Thomas Brown had thought it necess~ to remind Admiral Patey 
"that a mercantile community is not to be governed in the same arbitrary 
manner as the crew ot one ot H.M. 's Frigates", was indicateof attitudes in 
a 'provincial' town like Bathurst. 2 Put in a different ws:y, one "Nobody" 
1. 
2. 
Merchants' Memorial to Earl Granville, 13th August, African Times, 
Sept. 1869; The Hemorialists argued that an annual revenue of over 
£20,000 ("supplemented by a Parliamentary Grant of £1,500 p.o..") was 
collected from their small community of five English and four French 
mercantile establishments,with seven or eight European and African 
c.o. 81/88 , 1861, vol.2. 4th June, Brown to Patey. entrepreneurs. 
wri ting on Brown t s favourite subj ect "Taxation and Representation" in 1868, 
demanded for tax-paying citizens the right to the disposal of the proceeds ot 
taxation "as we think proper ••• subject to constitutional restrictions."l 
The people, he complained had no voice in the Government, being tmfairly 
represented in Council, in consequence of which "our revenues are frittered 
away, and our Government administered by incompetent and incapable men. ,,2 
Another writer to the same paper - the African Times - illustrated the effects 
of this want of adequate representation in terms of everyday living: "If we 
had aqy voice in the spending of public money raised here," he wrote scornfully, 
"we should have got a fire-engine and fire buckets for the public long ago •••• ") 
Obviously, such demands could have been answered by a Ma3ror and 
Corporation elected from the mercantile bo~, a proposal that the merchants 
themselves did submit.4 Brown would have been a popular candidate among 
EUropeans and MUlattoes for the otfice of }~or, being the oldest resident 
among the Europeans in the colony, and "interested in most of the affairs of 
':-'--b't t· ,,5 the ~ 1 an s •••• It was during the Cholera Epidemic of 1869 that the 
want of some kind of municipality was most felt. For the Administrator and 
a small official staff could not by themselves cope with a whole town ot sick 
6 
and qying inhabitants, even had the Colonial Surgeon been cooperative. It 
1. "Nobody't, in African Times, February 1868. 
2. Ibid. 
3. "Eye-witness", in African Times, Feb. 1868. 
4. Memorial to Granville, At. Times, Sept. 1869. 
5. c.o. 87/92, 1869, vol.2. 5th July, Patey to Kenne~. 
6. C.O. 87/92, 1869, vol.2. 22nd & 25th June, Patey to Kenn~. 
2.St:( 
was tragic that no machinery existed in the town for such emergencies, and 
nothing could be done "except by moving the Administrator." llroof persons 
died within a month, and a general paralysis afflicted those who were left 
behind, but there being "no municipality, no authority, and no money at our 
disposal, we are powerless and cannot assist our fellow creatures nor alleviate 
their troubles •••• "1 In short, the epidemic brought out the deficiencies of 
the system of Government in the Gambia in the late sixties, and increased 
tensions there, compelling merchants to demand "something like constitutional 
liberty." They would no longer tolerate a policy by which the,y contributed 
"thousands. a year to the Colonial Chest with not even a voice in the 
2 
appointment of a policeman." 
In contrast to the easy control exercised ~ the Foreign Office over a 
Consul like Beecroft, Governor and Council were bound to Colonial Office b,y 
stringent regulations which often proved far too restricting for sm~l-scale 
societies such as was found in the Gambia. Among other powers, the Secretar,y 
of state could lay down instructions to be observed in the annual Estimates of 
the colo~, and it was incumbent on all officials in Council to "do their duty 
and not shirk responsibility.") In other words, the British Government held 
1. tiT", in African Times, June 1869. 
2. "Gambia", in.At. Times, June 1869. 
3. c.o. 81/89, 1868, vol.l. 14th November, Colonial Office Minute, B.C. 
ultimate control, and exercised the right to retire officers on pensions 
calculated by the Treasury, but paid out of colonial funds without the approval 
of unofficials in the Legislative Council. l Thomas Brown's remonstrances 
against imperial patronage even at a time when the Parliamentary Grant was 
being reduced went unheeded. For an unofficial mercantile member in an 
insolvent colo~ did not qualif,y to express views on the spending of public 
funds, whereas Colonial Office might pay deference to "the two or three 
principal planters or merchants in Ceylon or Trinidad." Though retrenchment 
was the policy of the Government it was not expected to disturb the Civil List. 
It was no mean feat that under the governorship of Dr. V.S. Gouldsbury _ 
<-----
1817 to 1884 - the settlement began to accumulate "a considerable surplus" 
from the revenue, and, after paying otf its debt to the Imperial Exchequer, 
it assumed charge tor the Mail subsi~ formerly paid by the Home Gover.oment. 2 
Gouldsbury had followed instructions to the letter, for arriving at the colony 
when its financial condition was serious, he was strictly warned to economize. 
It was in 1883 that "the best revenue ever lmown was collected" in the colony, 
amounting to £28,952.0.10. while expenditure was only £23,865.14.3 •• thus 
providing a surplus of over £5000. 3 But this boom did not last; and the 
Administrator simply avoided financial crises by undertaking a minimum of 
1. C.O. 87/89, 1868, vol.l. 14th }~ch, Kennedy to Newcastle, enclosure, 
6th }1arch Legislative Council Minutes; 
c.o. 87/97. 1870, vo1.2. Leg. Co. Minutes 12th November. 
2. C.O. 87/118, 1882, vol.l. 27th }Iarch, c.o. Ninute, A.V.L.H. to Meade. 
3. C.O. 87/125, 1885, vol.2. 3rd August, C.O. Hinute, A.V.L.H. to R.Mea.de. 
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public works, and employing cheap labour whenever practicable. Thus, deprived 
of jobs as skilled mechanics and artisans, the Bathurst Native Association 
deplored a policy which sacrificed efficiency to econo~ (meaning particularly 
the employment of convict labour in public works of all kinds). I Not only 
the African community, but merchants in the settlement agitated for sanitary 
improvements. But Gouldsbury had his instructions, and he would not incur 
debts. 
After Gouldsbur,y's departure, the revenue followed a sharp decline till 
in 1887 it only yielded £12,497 while expenditure remained at over £20,000.2 
This was due to the falling off in customs revenue consequent upon the failure 
of the groundnut crop. Once again voices rose in support of retrenchment 
and a simplification of the machinery of Government - "Thirty-five officers to 
a little black village - is rather too much," was S. lfhitfield's comment to 
Meade.) Yet Gouldsbury's economies had displeased; even his employment of 
an African as Commandant of MacCarthy Island, partly with a view to making some 
saving, had been condemned by a writer "0" in the African Times. Prestige 
and influence among the riverain tribes were thus lost to econo~, "0" had 
complained.4 There seemed to be no answer to the crippling eeonomic problems 
of the settlement. Indeed the colony was again foreed to raise additional 
funds b.1 imposing higher duties on certain articles like kola, inspite ot 
strong opposition from African entrepreneurs. That was how kolas brought the 
1. 
2. 
Bathurst Native Association - 1879 - Nemoria1 to Sir Samuel Rowe, pub. 
African Times, March 1883. 
C.o. 87/134, 1888, vol.3. 19th Dec., G.T.Carter to Lord Knutsfordj 
C.O. 87/130, 1887, vol.l. 25th May, s.v. to R.l-Ieade. 
C.O. 87/130, 1887, vol.l. 25th Hay, C.O. l-1!nute, S.W. to Heade. 
"0" on the "River Gambia", African Times, Oct. 1880. 
highest revenue in 1889 - £1,829.9.10 compared with £1,359.2.6. collected from 
1 
the Groundnut export duty. It was evident that there was "little or no chance 
of the Colony being able to do more than just pay its way •••• "2 
While separation from Sierra Leone relieved the colony of certain salaries 
which had strained its resources,and increased unofficial representation in 
the Council enabled the people to bring pressure to bear upon the local 
Government, political advantages qy themselves provided no instant solutions 
to the problems of an unstable econo~. Until the revenue expanded 
considerab~, there was little to choose between the complete neglect of a 
programme for public works and spasmodic attempts at providing indifferent 
works b.Y unqualified officers. This was a recurrent problem in the Colonial 
Engineer's Department; numerous letters to the African Times deplored wasteful 
expendi ture incurred in that department. A classic example was the 
construction of the Oyster Creek Bridge which was to join st. ~fur,y's Island to 
Combo, which was under construction from 1879 to 1885, because of the 
inefficiency of Mr. Bauer, the Colonial Engineer. 3 Indeed, the bridge was 
only finally completed qy a qualified civil engineer.4 
An efficient government presupposed a healthy econo~, for Colonial policy 
in the mid-nineteenth century was not based on philanthropy but on the hard 
facts of economics. British merchants in the Gambia !mew this; they joined 
issue with their rulers because of a lack of understanding of their real needs, 
1. C.O. 87/137, 1890, vol.l. 11th March, R.B.Llewelyn to Lord Knutsford. 
2. c.O. 87/105, 1873, vol.2. 4th Sept., A.V.L.H. to R.Herbert. 
3. C.O. 87/117, 1881, 21st July, Merchants to Lord Kimberley. 
4. C.O. 87/124, 1885, 23rd May, C.14..Moloney to Sir Samuel Rowe. 
and for a refusal to plan efficiently for the colony. Rather, that Colonial 
Office officials waited hopefully for a renewal of negotiations for an 
exchange of the Gambia with the French. 1 
1. C.o. 87/130, 1887, vol.l. 28th ~~, C.O. }nnute, O.P. to W.I.Holland. 
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CHAPTER VII 
AFRICAN OPINION .AND THE PROPOSED 'CESSION' TO FRANCE 1866-76. 
Britain's desire to cede or transfer the Gambia was based on fiscal j 
grounds. As has been seen, the colony's revenue fluctuated to such an 
extent that long-term development programmes were not possible without the 
colony falling into debt. The drainage of the Island of st. Mary's for the 
improvement of public health, the maintenance of imperial troops and a 
colonial steamer for the defence of the settlement, the p~ent of a mail 
subsi~ to Lacilitate external communications - all these required substantial 
capital which the colo~ could not al~s afford either in the 'sixties or 
the 'seventies. And as the Treasury was never generous towards the colo~, 
the result was a "defective" government, which James Stephens had. described 
as "the essential condition of all such Societies •••• ,,1 
The smallness of the territor.Y, was general~ equated with insignificance 
and unimportance in the Colonial Office; SO that when 'Cession' became a 
political issue and a subject of debate in Parliament in the late 'sixties, 
w. MOnsell, the Under-5ecretar,y of State, supported b.Y Charles Adderley, 
stated categorically that the Gambia could not be regarded as a colony, nor 
could it be compared with those colonies established b,y the British nation 
and destined to develop into nations. To many officials it was "merely a. 
1. C.O. 87/28, 1842, vol.2. 20th June, James Stephen to Mr. Hope. 
station for carrying out a policy" (an anti-Slave Trade policy), with only a 
handful of colonists - "39 males and 8 females", and being of no importance to 
the trade of Britain. l In fact0 served no useful purpose to the Mother 
Countr,y whatever, neither increasing her political influence or mi1itar,y 
power, nor promoting her trade. And trom the state ot her tribal communities, 
e-had become "a constant source ot danger and anxiety," so that it was 
expedient that~e should be disposed ot.2 
/ 
The issues which such a cataclysmic solution raised provoked public 
discussion both inside the Gambia and in Britain. An outburst of indignation 
accompanied the rumour spread abroad ot the 'plot' to deprive British 
citizens of their nationality without their consent; for negotiation between 
the French and Bd tish Governments had passed the introductory stage, with 
I no otticial statement on the Proposal having been made in the coloDiY. It 
was this tactical blunder on the part ot the Foreign and Colonial Ottices 
which made 'Cession' a sinister proposition tor Africans and their supporters. 
Without official support, African and British merchants took the initiative 
into their own hands, organising pressure groups wherever they found 
opportunity to oppose Transfer. 
For the French Government alre~ suffered from a reputation for 
discriminator,y practices against British merchants in commercial enterprise,) 
and for a harsh military policy against African chiefs, so frequently 
demonstrated in the Sene-Gambia region. Indeed the coloDiY had tor Ill8.DY 
1. "QUestions in Parliament - 15th July 1870", pub. African Times, July 1870. 
2. C.O. 87/108, 1875, 14th October 1875, A.V.Hemming to R.Meade. 
). See Chapters II & III of Thesis. 
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decades lived under a French threat of invasion and possible defeat in the 
event of a EUropean war between Britain and France, one reason why the problem 
of the defence of the settlement was of such major importance to the 
colonists. But even with the withdrawal of the troops in 1866 and 1870, the 
alternative of a peace-time Transfer to a Foreign Power had never seriously 
presented itself to them as a solution to the Gambia problem. 
Frofessor J.D. Hargreaves has made an interesting and detailed stu~ of 
'Cession', particularly of its diplomatic aspect, and of the Parliamentar,y 
debates which were the outcome of negotiation. I There remains to be told 
in greater detail the effects of the Proposal on Africans in the Gambia, not 
onlY urbanised persons who had for nearly halt a centur,y been nurtured as 
British Bubjects, but also indigenous tribes who had lived on the banks of 
the River for generations, and whose chiefs had ceded land to the British in 
the first half of the nineteenth centur,y. Indeed, the British still paid 
them annual stipends in recognition of their status as the owners of the land; 
but it was not thought necessary to consult them about the proposed transfer 
of their states to the French Government. 
It was therefore appropriate, even if the initiative might have come 
:trom Thomas Brown (as was implied by officials), that Tomaney Bojang, the 
1. J.D. Hargreaves, " /PrelUde to Partition in West Africa", (London, 
z.Ia.cmillan &. Co. 1963), Chapter IV' - "Towards a Territorial exchange 
1869-76". 
king of Combo, whose father had sold Banjul (st. Nary's Island) to Captain 
Grant in 1816 should now ask for his lands to be returned to him as an act of 
friendship, rather than that he should be "transferred to another person." 
It was war, he explained, that had compelled him to give up part of his 
territory (that is, Combo), to the British, but his father had given Banjul 
in friendship.l Attitudes of urbanised Liberated Africans contrasted 
markedly both with those of the chiefs, and of British merchants in the 
settlement whose primary concern was with the possible loss of property and 
profits that might be the outcome of transfer. While such men came to be 
absorbed with compensation claims, their African traders, equally desirous 
to protect their modest houses and small businesses, and the nucleus of 
Africans in the civil service and the church, were moved much more by 
sentiment than by economic reasoning. Their immediate reaction was to 
submit a petition of dismay couched in terms of deep loyalty and patriotism. 
This was not surprising for immigrants with their histor,y of lost homes 
and temporary slavery, and of rehabilitation in strange ports. Harr,y Finden, 
John Bocock, John Campbell, leaders in the community, had all been rescued 
from slave ships as adults. By dint of self-help and the benevolence of 
governments and merchants, and the devoted service of missionaries, maqy of 
their kind had risen in life and a few were beginning to aspire to a degree 
of economic independence~ One Thomas King had property valued by the local 
barrister, Chase Walcott, at £2,500, and capital at £4,000. Harry Finden's 
1. C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 2nd June, A.E.Kennedy to Earl Granville -
enclosure - Translation of letter by Tomaney Bojang, 23rd ~~ 1870. 
2. See Chapter III of Thesis. 
property was valued at £350 and his capital at £500, while Joseph Richards 
owned land and house to the value of £500, and capital of £800. Such were 
the hazards of trade in the Gambia, however, that like British merchants, the 
debts owed b,y maQY of the Liberated Africans "overbalance all what they are 
worth, and should demand be made for payment, it would leave them nothing but 
1 poverty." 
For this reason, Governor Kennedy, a protagonist in the drama, discounted 
protest from this element, on the pretext that they were grog shopkeepers or 
persons from a low grade in society, "and, wholly without stake or property in 
2 the Settlement." Notwithstanding such a derogation, some of these men were 
planning higher education for their sons at the C.H.S. Grammar school in 
Sierra Leone. And if Transfer was not immediately seen as a threat to their 
livelihood, it filled them with apprehension for their w~ of life - their 
habits, customs, language and religion. Such losses could not be measured 
in stocks and shares as if they were commercial houses. For Africans, then, 
the issues involved were as much psychological and emotional as economic or 
political. 
Peace and retrenchment, however, were the guiding principles of mid-
Victorian colonial policy, in consequence of which a hostile attitude was 
adopted towards colonies tha.t involved Britain in expense without increasing 
her trade or political power, or exposed her to the risk ot participation in 
tribal wars. Colonel Ord's report of 1865 had been a deciding factor in the 
1. C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 10th ~, Report ot T.G.Lawson to A.E.Kenne~o 
2. C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 30th April, Kennedy to Major Bra.vo. 
new colonial policy tor West Africe, which had as its objective eventual 
withdrawal trom that region. I The Gambia was the most vulnerable ot the 
West African settlements, but though the British Government would have 
preterred to cede rather than exchange it tor posts that might only increase 
financial responsibilities, the Colonial Ottice thought it necessar,y for the 
appeasement ot public opinion to exclude a pure cession to the French.2 
The French posts under consideration were Grand Bassam, Dab~ and Assinee 
on the Ivory Coast, each of them rejected by Kennedy as an "encumbrance".? 
.And even when hopes were raised by the substitution ot the Gabon in Equatorial 
Africa (with its harbour facilities and trade in palm oil) tor the three 
"inferior posts", 4 calculating minds reckoned that heavy expense would still 
be involved it this neglected French colo~ were to be governed satisfactorily. 
A letter trom a British merchant in Gabon confirmed this view, and anticipated 
an improved state ot aftairs under British rule. It complained that the 
"laissez faire style ot rules adopted by the French completely ruined a very 
flourishing River", having allowed the tribes in that area to set them at 
defiance with impunity. In conclusion, the writer looked for "more 
efficacious protection for property and person" under the British, even at a 
cost of increased taxation. 5 Such an adverse report ot French administration 
1. 
4. 
5. 
C.O. 267/86, 1865. Ord Report. 
c.o. 87/86, 1866, vol.). 21st August, T.F.Elliott to Lord Clarendon. 
c.o. 87/9), 1869, vol.). 23rd Sept., A.E.Kenne~ to Earl Granville. 
C.O. 87/86, 1866, vol.). 21st August, T.F.Elliott to Lord Clarendon.~ 
l ....... '" __ '" "" ~_ 
Letter trom Gabon to the African Times, pub. 18th Feb. 1870. 
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in the Leeward Coast of West Africa was not typical of French policy in the 
Windward Coast, and would indicate that they were not showing the same 
enthusiasm for their posts at a great distance from Senegal. 
In contrast, British interests in the Niger basin were growing with the 
annexation of Lagos in 1861; and the activities of Captain John Glover, its 
Administrator, represented to British merchants in Gabon what the British 
1 Government could also do for them. Indeed, it was upon the assumption of 
a shift of trading interests on the Coast that the French proposal for exchange 
was made in 1866. Thus the Prince de la Tour d'.Auvergne,. French Ambassador 
to the Court ot st. James, represented to the British Foreign Secretar,y "that 
whilst French trade on the West Coast of Africa has of late years increased 
especial~ on that portion of the Coast comprised between the mouths of the 
Senegal and Gambia Rivers, British trade on the other hand, has been increasing 
to the south of Sierra Leone; and that for the above reason, it would be for 
the mutual advantage of the two countries to make an exchange of terri tory 
and factories, by which France should acquire additional advantages for 
trading purposes to the North, and Great Britain to the South of Sierra 
Leone, which it is suggested, might form the point of demarcation between 
the territorial interests of the two countries.,,2 It was an attractive 
proposition, not only to the British Government, which had accepted Ord's 
Report in which the trade ot the Gambia was stated to be "chiefly French and 
1. Dike, "Trade and Politics", p.195; Letter from Gabon, Af.Times, Feb.1810. 
2. C.O. 81/86, 1866, vol.). 2nd March, The Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne 
to the Earl of Clarendon. 
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in French hands"l, but it was warmly approved by successive Governors of 
Sierra Leone who saw in the proposal advantageous concessions for their own 
mercantile community. 
Beyond the limitations of British trade with the Gambia, was the very 
real danger of involvement in tribal wars on the banks of that River from the 
'sirlies. Ord had pointed to this factor in the decline of trade; and the 
Select Committee of 1865 had concluded that capital was not likely to be 
attracted to a neighbourhood that was constantly disturbed. 2 It was therefore 
with much confidence that Charles Adderley, during the debate on Cession 
affirmed that no place on the Coast was more likely to become the scene of 
tribal warfare than the Gambia; and if Britain could avoid such wars and 
strengthen her position in the Leeward Coast, leaving the French "who seemed 
to be in love with tribal wars" to fight the battles, he did not think aqyone 
wo~d regret the loss ot the Gambia.) 
The Gambia settlement was not destined to be used as a pawn in the game 
ot diplomacy, and strong opposition was soon organised against the threatened 
return ot the pernicious system ot transferring whole peoples from one power 
to another without their consent.4 It was F. Fitzgerald ot the African 
Times who was among the tirst to challenge anti-Gambia sentiments exhibited 
in the British Parliament, pointing out that Monsell had "so completely 
ignored ••• the existence of aqy other British subjects at the Gambia than a 
portion ot the tew Europeans ••• to whom he alluded as if these were the only 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
1865 Ord Report. 
Ord Reportl Questions of Select Committee - Chairman to Ord. 
S1'r Charles Adderley in Debate on Cession in the House ot Commons 1 t ' 
, s lH '" July 1870, reported in African Times, July 1870. / 
Ibid. - Lord Sandon. 
2.72. 
human beings whose destinies were to be affected or involved in the projected 
1 Cession. II In contrast to official opinion, the African Times had. long 
regarded all the West African colonies as future kingdoms which deserved 
better treatment from the British Government, &nd protection from the "selfish 
policy" pursued b.Y France. To Fitzgerald, it was a proposal far from 
attractive or ethical that Britain, "having been the means of raising up an 
educated native class attached to English Rule", should now abandon that same 
people to a foreign power because of imperial econo~. Besides, he reminded 
the Government that the Gambia had not been built up simply b.Y its efforts, for 
the Church, too, Wesleyan missionaries in partiCUlar, had. pl8¥ed its part.2 
In July 1870, Lord Sandon put a direct question to the Government -
whether or not the people of the Gambia had been or would be consulted on the 
subject of their transfer to Prance. The situation was summed up by Mr. 
Heygate who described British colonial policy as guided purely by self-
interest to the extent that the strong and powerful had. a better chance of 
being better cared for than small and insignificant dependencies which were 
not likely to be remunerative to Britain.:3 To these poig~ant words, Mr. 
Monsell gave very summary answers, dismissing the idea of any likely discontent 
in the Gambia settlement. Governor Kennedy, he assured the House, had 
ascertained the feelings of the inhabitants on the matter, and his opinion was 
that they would not offer any serious opposition to transfer.4 
1. F.Fitzgerald, African Times, June ,1870. 
2. Editorial, At. Times, Sept. 1869. 
3. Mr. Heygate - Debate in House of Couunons, 15th July 1870, pub. At. Times, 
July 1870. 
4. V.Mansell, House of Comnons, 15th July 1870, pub. At. Times, July 1870. 
Since Kennedy's main interest was to secure favourable terms for Sierra 
Leone out of the Anglo-French negotiations, it was politic for him to 
underestimate the strength of opposition within the Gambia itself. Although 
he was right to point to the cosmopolitan nature of the African population in 
st. Mary's, which now numbered between 4000 and 5000 persons, he was very much 
mistaken to suppose there would be "no strong, united end national feeling" 
over a threat like transfer. til do not believe," he wrote in March 1870 to 
the Secretar,y of state, "that any serious reluctance or opposition would be 
offered by them on learning the equitable end sate terms which would of course 
1 be agreed upon as regards their rights and property." Wi thin a month of 
writing this, he received the first petition against transfer from the 
Liberated African community, and others were to follow. Officials had not 
learnt a lesson from the discontent which had accompanied the exchange of 
territories on the Gold Coast between the British end the Dutch; they still 
saw no good reason for consulting local African opinion on matters affecting 
their interests. Indeed, Frederi!'ROgerS reckoned in a minute that the 
consent of the families affected in the Gambia "might be procured by no very 
great expenditure of dash.,,2 If officials envisaged aqy form of opposition, 
it was from the British merchants that they expected it. 
Certainly, once British merchants in the Gambia became aware that 
negotiations were afoot between the two Governments, they began to organise 
their defences. It was Thomas QUin who first made enquiry about the 
1. C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 29th March, A.E.Kennedy to Earl Granville. 
J.D.Hargreaves, ~Prelude to Partition in West Africa", (London, 
l1a.cmillan & Co. 1963), Chapter IV - "Towards a Territorial exchange 
1869-76." 
negotiations from his London office in Januar,y 1870, to which he received a 
reply that "his Lordship is not able at present to give 8JlY definite answer 
to your question, but that in no case could such an arrangement take place 
without the intervention of Parliament ... l The story of the partnership of 
Quin and Brown in the struggle against transfer has alre~ been told,2 though 
this writer is not convinced ~ the interpretation of mercantile motives as 
presented ~ a highly prejudiced Governor, like Kenne~. In any event, Brown, 
Quin and Thomas Chown were regarded ~ all Africans opposed to cession as 
champions of their cause. Certainly African chiefs made them their agents, 
intermediaries between themselves and the Governor, and the Sovereign too. 
Leaders of the Liberated African community consulted them before they 
submitted their petitions, for they were rightly recognised as men with some 
influence in London. The transfer question had for the moment bridged the 
gap created by racial antipat~ in st. Mar,y's society of the 'sixties. 
Brown, who had been the most tyrannical of British merchants towards literate 
Africans in the 'sixties, had become their adviser in the 'seventies. This 
was significant, for it did indicate the determination of these men to stave 
off French rule in the Gambia. Their leaders were sufficiently shrewd to 
work for a united front in face of Colonial Office diplomacy, for only from 
such a position of strength, did they stand a chance of defeating the 
proposal. 
1. 
2. 
FrederiCI ROgers~to Thomas Quin, 3rd Feb. 1870, pub. At.Times, Feb. 1870. 
J.D.Hargreaves, " Prelude to Partition in West Africa", (London, 
Nacmillan Be Co. 963), Chapter tv - "Towards a Territorial exchange 
1869-76." 
In 1866 when the French proposal was first made through the Foreign 
Office, it was kept strictly confidential between~~ and the Colonial 
Office, except that the Governor of the West African settlements - Samuel 
B1acka11 - was invited to comment on the Ambassador's proposal. In detailing 
the disadvantages of the French posts offered for exchange, Blackall corrected 
the general error that the Gambia trade was almost exclusively French, pointing 
to the considerably less tonnage entering the ~iver from France than Britain. 
The Governor, however, found no arguments against transfer, which might not be 
overcome by treaty; matters relating to fugitive slaves, landed property for 
Africans, and the rights of the Protestant church could, he believed, form 
subjects for negotiation. As to public opinion on transfer in the Gambia 
itself, Blackall expected to find a "considerable diversity of opinion amongst 
them (the merchants) as to the effect a transfer may have upon their interests 
•••• "; for which reason he suggested that there should be compensations for 
those who did not wish to continue business under a French Government. From 
the unsatisfactor,y state of the River trade in 1866, in consequence of which 
merchants had made losses and complained of the want of protection, it was 
assumed that those who did not retire from the trade, "may prefer the French 
policy which no doubt would be to assume the Sovereignty ot both banks of the 
River, and secure order by a strong militar,y and naval force as on the Senegal 
River. "1 African reactions to the proposal were not generally considered, 
and, like his successors who were faced with the issue of transfer, Blackall 
never thought the proposal was preposterous or unethical. 
1. C.O. 87/86, 1866, vol.3. 4th June, Governor Blackall to Ed.1trard" Cal'd,,iellr', 
Preoccupation with internal problems and racial divisions isolated the 
inhabitants ot st. Mar.y's trom external events, so that the dialogue between 
the Colonial Ottice and the Governor of the West African settlements in 1866 
completely b.y-passed the Gambia. When the discussion of terms was resumed 
between the British and French Governments in 1869, it was (the British press) 
that exposed the rumour circulating in London, for the benefit of the Gambia, 
Fitzgerald's object being to arouse public opinion against transfer both in 
Britain and in that settlement. It was unfortunately an unpropitious time 
for rallying a people recently ravaged by cholera, producing from the new 
1 Governor - Kennedy, the bland. comment that though the rumour ot cession had 
reached the colony, he had as yet received no protests trom the people. l 
With a certain amount of external stimulus this was to come. But it was 
from the British mercantile community that the initiative came: as a group, 
the merchants had been far less distressed b,y the epidemic, and the,y were in 
closer contact with London than were African traders. 
Once cession had become an issue within the settlement, Liberated 
Africans entrenched themselves in the vanguard of protest, organising 
r meetings which were to produce petitions, albeit under the direction of 
2 Thomas Brown, as was believed. While .Africans might have been prompted 7to 
activity, they did not depend on Brown or aqy EUropean merchant tor motivity. 
For this reason their petitions differed from those ot the merchants; and 
even where common ground was shared, each group recognised and emphasised its 
1. C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 2)rd April, A.E.Kenne~ to Earl Granville. 
2. c.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. lOth }~, T.G.Lawson to A.E.Kenne~. 
own peculiar interests. Liberated Africans had among them persons with 
legal training who were able to put their feelings and desires into words. 
277 
Official prejudice against petitioners on this issue tended to deflect 
attention from their petitions, which were invariably accompanied by 
derogator,y remarks from Governors and Administrators. ~mjor Bravo, during 
whose administration the first protest petitions were prepared, suggested that 
in weighing "the value of the Petitioners' opinion, ••• it ought to be 
estimated in accordance with the abUi ty to understand the real nature of the 
change •••• " .And. indeed "the opinions of only a few are entitled to any 
consideration •••• ", the majority of the population of Bathurst being of a 
1 
migrator,y character. These official agents of the British Government were 
disappointed that they could not educate Africans under them to appreciate 
the advantages of transfer. Opposition to the proposal was therefore 
interpreted b,y them as primarily inability to understand what it was all 
about, added to an inherent aversion to change of any kind in the nature of 
a~' 2 the A.Lr1can. 
The African Protest Petition to the Secretary of State of April 1870 
carried over five hundred signatures of the African inhabitants of the 
settlement. That Kenne~ dismissed their opinion as mere sentimentality 
gave cause for concern, but it did not deflect them from their objective. 
Hargreaves is inclined to support Kennedy's judgment, for he has written that 
1. C.o. 87/96, 1870, vol.I. 13th ~, Major Bravo to Earl Granville. 
2. Ibid. 
2. 7'0 
the "very real dangers" which faced the African community then "were not 
particularly clearly described", except in the use of "general rhetorical 
~~'" 
arguments" against transfer. He would seem to mean by this the absence of 
economic arguments, such as the threat to their livelihood which largely 
"depended on their education in the English tongue, their acquaintance with 
British law or commercial practice •••• " For the majority of those employed in 
the civil service and mercantile houses, "French Rule was liable to mean 
1 deterioration in personal status and loss of legal rights." 
Later petitions from the same group showed that Africans were not 
unaware of their interests, but for the moment they were more deeply moved by 
other considerations. Even when Kenne~ received a deputation of Liberated 
Africans led by Harry Finden in Government House Bathurst to which he had 
resorted upon receiving the April petition, he still maintained that no 
weighty arguments were put forward. That the only questions of any importance 
asked were: "Would religion be respected and would there be a Consul or other 
British Resident." Nor did he discover "any sound or sufficient reason 
against the proposed transfer" on receiving a deputation of British merchants.2 
In the final analysis, Governors, Administrators and Colonial Office 
officials had to realize that a question which involved the African's mode 
of life and institutions he was used to was as much a psychological problem 
with strong emotional overtones' as a matter of politics and economics. 
Arguments, however weighty, could not convince men against their innate desire 
1. 
2. 
J.D.Hargreaves, itA Prelude to Partition in West Africa", (London, 
Macmillan &; Co. 1963), Chapter IV. - "Towards a Territorial exchange 
C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. lOth May, Kennedy to Granville. 1869-76". 
to remain under a political power they were used to, even where that 
government was defective. In aqy case, it was alw~s a risk to accept the 
unknown. J.fajor Bravo was not far wrong Jthat African conservatism was a 
L--
factor in their opposition to transfer. It was equally true, too, that such 
consistent opposition to French rule was not a decision of the moment, but 
was based on some experience or on observed facts in the neighbouring 
territor,y of Goree and Senegal. "I fear the representations I have made of 
the advisability of the measure," bemoaned Bravo, "has met with little 
response, and &QY efforts made to convince them to approve of the transfer can 
only, I feel sure, result in failure_"l Kenne~ despised such an admission, 
and warned the Colonial Office that Bravo had the wrong attitude to transfer 
himself and was not the right Administrator to get it through. 2 
African opposition was more vigorous for coming from a wide cross-section 
of the African inhabitants of the settlement. Indeed, maqy illiterates 
allowed their names to be appended to aqy protest petition drawn up because 
it was believed that they were fully aware of the implications of French 
rule.) Nor must it be forgotten that Harr,y Finden himself was illiterate, 
and that as leader in his comnnmity he would have had a directing hand in the 
actual framing of &QY petition. Chase Walcott, the West Indian barrister, 
was reported to have "worded and written" it, being apprehensive that transfer 
"would be materially detrimental to his profession as a lawyer •••• " Nuch 
1. C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 13th }~y, Bravo to Granville. 
2. C.O. 87/96, 1870, Tol.l. 2nd June, Kenne~ to Granville. 
). C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 13th ~fay, Bravo to Granville. 
inside information about the petitioners had in fact been discovered for 
Governor Kennedy by his official interpreter, Thomas G. Lawson. l Walcott 
seems to have been commissioned to stress the general effect of transfer on a 
'small' people; and in interpreting Liberated African feeling, he rightly 
made an appeal to the heart rather than the mind, expressing a pathetic 
situation in a sequence of thought 8lld phrase that was African. 
Beneath a facade of generalisations lay deep-rooted objections to French 
rule, suspicion of unfamiliar customs, manners and institutions, and, above 
all, of impending loss of language and laws long established. To urbanised 
Africans, particularly, the administration of justice was the key to good 
government 8lld the happiness of the subject. They had made themselves 
watchdogs of the local courts in order to protect their rights against 
oppression from l~ magistrates;2 and the thought of living under a 
complete~ foreign legal system must have filled them with trepidation. 
The timely return of Joseph Reffell from London in late 1870 brought them 
relief, and further legal aid for opposing transfer. Inspite of outbursts 
of anti-government petitions) which had preceded the transfer issue, neither 
British merchants nor Liberated Africans welcomed French military rule as 
the answer to their griev811ces. 
There was no enthusiasm displayed in the settlement for benefits to be 
derived from French administration. Liberated Africans argued that they had 
been rescued from slavery and located in the Gambia by the British, and that 
1. C.o. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 10th }my, T.G.Lawson to A.E.Kenn~. 
2. See Chapter V of Thesis. 
3. See Chapters V &: VI of Thesis. 
others among them were the descendants of African soldiers who had moved to 
st. Nary's when Goree was ceded to France. That the settlement had been 
built "by their arduous labours in cutting down trees and bushes •••• " l>lore 
than locating them, the British had educated them and converted them to 
Christianity, so that maQY were now employed as "Ministers of the Gospel and 
schoolmasters, clerks, tradesmen, carpenters, joiners, shipwrights, etc."l 
In a post-script to their April petition they submitted an ultimatum to the 
Secretary of state, they declared that they "will not consent to live under 
French Government, and desire to know what is to become of their lands, houses 
and properties when they remove from the place •••• ,,2 Even so, it was as 
"deeply grieving" British subjects, rather than indignant traders or civil 
servants that such Africans saw themselves. 
In short, they had no grievance against the British nor aqy objection 
to their administration. On the contrary, there was a feeling of sincere 
gratitude to British philanthropists by whose exertions maqy benefits had 
reached the African race. Fitzgerald, for example, never failed to expose 
their grievances to the British public, and not without results. That the 
British Parliament, too, had accepted in principle Colonel Ord's recommendation 
for the eventual establishment of self-government in the West African 
settlements made the future seem promising, and transfer unnecessary. Alre~ 
their counterpart in Sierra Leone were beginning to work for that self-
government. 
1. Petition to Earl Granville, 31st ~~ 1870, pub. African Times, July 1870. 
2. Ibid. 
Indeed, the role of Sierra Leoneans in the protest drama demands 
attention. While evidence here is sparse, it is known that the mid-
nineteenth century saw a steady inflow to st. Nary's of "competent youths who 
have received tolerable education at Sierra Leone ... l Local officials 
regarded them with suspicion for their radicalism which was penetrating the 
Liberated African community in Bathurst. They formed a ~ic element in 
this community, exerting some influence b,y virtue of their ability to read 
and write English. From the point of view of self-interest alone, it was 
reasonable that these youngmen to whom the civil service and other clerical 
employment was open, would oppose transfer. At least, an interesting conunent 
on the petitioners of April 1870 appeared in Lawson's report to Kenne~. It 
related to a name appended to the petition and belonging to one Thomas F. 
Cuthbert "whose son, James Cuthbert, went to the Gambia about a month ago, and 
I am told," Lawson stated, "thought it a matter of course to place his 
Father's name, who at the time was in Sierra Leone, on it •••• ,,2 
.As relevant to African protest was the support of the natives of the 
River Gambia and the adjoining French territories, including a handful of 
Mulattoes. There were one hundred and thirty-five signatures on the April 
Petition reported to belong to "Foreigners",) an apt reminder of the French 
presence within the settlement ever before transfer was conceived. Freneh 
1. C.O. 87/82, 1865, vol.l. 21st July, d'Arcy to ~rd.w&11. 
2. C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 10th Na.y, Lawson to Kennedy. 
3. C.O. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 13th ~, Bravo to Granville. 
influence had permeated the society through commerce, religion and social 
habits and customs. French merchants had pursued trade from Albreda long 
before the foundation of st. Nary's; and at the time of negotiation for 
transfer there must have been as maQY French as British merchants and 
mercantile clerks domiciled in Bathurst. Representatives of this community 
did not only identit,y themselves with Brown, Quin and Chown in opposing 
transfer, but had often taken the initiative in matters ot common interest 
in st. Mary's. For instance, it was the then French Consul in Bathurst who 
had immediately reported to Governor d'Arcy the rumour of a December plot in 
1865, a re~ort that had been acted upon because it came tram a responsible 
1 
citizen. In the colonial service too, French doctors had been employed as 
Assistant Colonial Surgeons. 2 
It was, however, the l-'Iulatto community that had bridged the gap between 
British and French, being familiar with the habits, manners, customs and 
language of both nations. Their female tolk, practised in French cuisine, 
had made admirably suitable mistresses for lonely British merchants engaged 
in the Sene-Gambian trade. By the influence ot the Mulattoes, a considerable 
floating population oscillated between st. Mary's and Goree and st. Louis, 
some on social visits to relatives but others in search of seasonal employment. 
1. 
2. 
C.O. 87/83, 1865, vol.2. 24th December, d'Arcy to Cardwell~ on interview 
with Honsieur Pechard. 
C.O. 87/71, 1861, 12th Feb., d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
In 1860 Dr. Arrault after six years' service as Assistant Colonial 
Surgeon in st. Hary's retired to France. In 1861, Dr. M.N. Chazaraint 
ot st. Louis appointed. 
It was inevitable that cultural, social and economic ties should have been 
maintained between the two peoples under such favourable conditions, where 
locally-built craft could make the voyage with little difficulty within a 
day. The French Roman Catholic church, too, was making a significant 
contribution to the spiritual and educational life of st. ~~'s through the 
agency of two religious orders. The nuns of the Order of st. Joseph of Cluqy 
had been indispensable as nurses during the Yellow Fever and Cholera epidemics, 
and were regarded with affection and trust b.Y the growing number of destitute 
1 persons in the colo~. In short, only French political and militar,y 
influence was absent, and no citizen of st. Nary's, including the French 
subjects themselves, showed aqy desire for the proposed change of government 
that was being advocated from outside. 
Nor did the indigenous tribes in Combo and the River support transfer, 
f~r they had good reason to fear French power which so consistently organised 
ptmitive expeditions against recalcitrant tribes. ~larabout warriors in 
these states knew that the British policy of non-intervention in native wars 
would never be tolerated under a French government. Further more, a Roman 
Catholic power was less likely to regard the jihad as a matter of tribal 
politics in which neutrality was desirable. With this in mind, ~~oud 
n'Dare Bah, brother and successor of the great Ama Bah of Baddibu, submitted 
1. c.o. 87/69, 24th J.fay 1860, d' Ar'cy to Newcastle:- The Sisters of Hercy 
"were indeed visiting angels to the sick during the last [Yellow Fever] 
°d mi " ep1 e c ••• 
C.O. 87/100, 1871, v01.2. 23rd Hay, lIenry Anton to A.E.Kennedy:-
"The ladies of charity exercise a very beneficial influence in the 
community in taking care of and teaching female children, and are always 
ready to attend a sick bed ••• " 
a memorial to the Queen in 1871 deprecating "the sale" of the River Gambia to 
the French. Such an act, he protested, would be equal to "placing them 
under shot and shell," the aim of the French being "to spoil properties and 
destroy lives."l Native chiefs were sufficiently astute to weigh up the 
advantages ot British rule against obvious disadvantages of French rule. 
Not that French native policy was unenlightened, tor it was determination to 
improve the conditions of natives in their territories that provided a 
school for the sons of chiefs in the Senegal.2 There was nothing comparable 
in the Gambia. Indeed when Wesleyan missionaries had attempted to build up 
such a school in MacCarthy Island, they met with little success because 
there was no compulsion imposed on parents by the local government, rather, 
Gambian chiets wanted inducement betore they would provide pupils for 
education:) For all this, French methods ot civilising the people of Africa 
were far too often ruthless, even tor tribes accustomed to violence and 
bloody warfare. 
1. C.O. 81/100, 1870, vol.2. 20th June, Hahmoud. n'Dare Bah to H.M. 
the Queen. 
2. Andre Villard, "Histoire du Senegal", p.127. 
). See Chapter IV ot Thesis. 
An important aspect of the struggle against transfer was the collaboration 
between merchants and Africans which was reminiscent of racial harmony in the 
early years of st. ~~IS. It was the quest for local self-government that 
provided opportunities for cooperation; for it was widely known that Britain 
was contemplating transfer largely on fiscal grounds. Governor Kenn~ 
himself had pointed out to Harry Finden I s deputation of 1870 "the 
unreasonableness of Her Majesty's Government continuing a large military 
expenditure for the protection of a Settlement where the trade was so 
insignificant and the resident EUropeans so few." He had warned them that 
the approaching withdrawal of the troops would only result in increased 
taxation for the provision of a large addition to the police; though even 
with such a force, he said, they would be "wholly defenceless against native 
I 
aggression." But Africans were not convinced that it was in their interest 
to accept alternative protection from France. If such were the arguments 
for transfer, then British merchants and African entrepreneurs were willing 
to p~ extra taxes to increase revenue and thereb,y provide a larger militia 
and police force for the protection of the territory against aggressors. 2 
Demands for self-government were therefore resumed as a practical alternative~ 
to transfer. 
When Reffell returned to the colony in late 1870, he found opinion a1re~ 
formed among his people, this simplifying his role as intermediary between 
them and philanthropists in London. By October of the same year, he had 
1. c.o. 87/96, 1870, vol.I. 10th May, Kenneqy to Granville. 
2. Letter from African inhabitants to Kenneqy, 6th Hay 1870, pub. 
African Times, June 1870. 
organised another petition from one hundred and twenty of the principal 
African inhabitants for the Sovereign, the same being adapted for the Houses 
of Parliament. Apart from sentiments of loyalty and horror of impending 
French government, emphasis was given to the need for a local government. 
Thus the African community, too, had its contribution to make to the Scheme 
of Government previously submitted to the Colonial Office by Brown and Quin. 
While supporting the basis for reductions in the salaries of the civil staff, 
they scrutinized and revised the judicial proposals. l 
Urbanised Africans, for example, would not accept that justice should be 
sacrificed to economy, which is how they saw a judiciary that was to be 
dependent, for the most part, on unpaid magistrates. To them this would 
perpetuate a pernicious system of which they had bitter experience. It is 
interesting that their SUbstitution of a legal system based on qualified 
legal officers did receive the support of Brown, an indispensable oracle to 
the society on the transfer issue. It had been his tactical and deliberate 
move that shifted emphasis from mere protest to concrete proposals for the 
establishment of local self-government, the achievement of which would make 
transfer needless. ".Allow the people to have a voice in the management of 
their affairs," they urged, "and things will be set right; more so when they 
2 
are fully capable ot self-government." On their patron, Fitzgerald, they 
urged the necessity of bringing the Scheme before "some of the influential 
friends of the African", and "to press the adoption ot the proposed scheme 
1. Remarks of Liberated Africans on the proposed scheme, Dec. 15th 1870, 
pub. African Times, January 1871. 
2. Ibid. "An African of Sierra Leone" on "Self-Government at Sierra Leonell, 
pub. African Times, November 1865:- Africans of Sierra Leone explained 
exactly what they meant ~ self-government. 
with [the] improvement in the Houses of Parliament, should the Colonial 
Office show slackness •••• "l 
There was indeed little time for prevarication, for alre~ a French 
man-of-war had arrived in the harbour on the 1st of Nay 1870 with Monsieur 
Joubert, Director of the Interior, whose purpose was to collect information 
on the spot for the Colonial Minister in Paris.2 The report ot the visit 
which had been sent to Fitzgerald stated that the exchange was planned for 
August, the programme of the French visitor having included inspection of 
"GoverDIllent House, the BarraCks and all the Government buildings, measuring 
the depth and shallow part ot the River arotmd Half-Die, the Cape and Fort 
Bullen etc."3 Kennedy was as excited with a "long and sa.tisfactory 
conference with Mr. Joubert who. wa.s undoubtedly much pleased with all he saw 
4 
and heard," as the inhabitants were "crying bitterly" against the 
preliminaries to cession. Only a few weeks later, the Governor of Senegal 
himself, Monsieur V. Valnre, arrived in the man-of-war "Bellone" accompanied 
by H.M.S. "Etoile", to obtain personal knowledge of the settlement and. to 
make the views of his Government lmown to the inhabitants. 
It was at this stage that mercantile forces fought particularly hard 
to save the settlement; it was a struggle they kept up to the end of 1871. 
The firm of Forster and Smith which claimed "experience ••• older and larger 
1. Letter by Joseph Retfel1 to F.Fitzgerald, 15th Dec. 1870, pub. At.Times, 
January 1871. 
2. C.o. 87/96, 1870, vo1.l. 25th April, Governor V.Vali~re of Senegal to 
Major Bravo. 
3. Inhabitants of Bathurst, 13th }fay 1870, pub. African Times, June 1870. 
4. C.O. 87/96, 1870, vo1.l. 10th }fay, A.E.Kennedy to Granville. 
5. c.o. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 6th June, Bravo to Kennedy. 
than that of any other House in the African trade, "made the basis of its 
opposition the disadvantages of French protectionist policy. These merchants 
claimed that in no instance had British merchants found it possible to carr,y 
on business of any importance in a French settlement, even though French 
merchants in Gambia were engaged in extensive trade. They further drew 
attention to commercial experience on the Gold Coast where the exchange of 
territories between British and Dutch "has been attended ~ ruin, in the 
literal sense of the word, to nearly all the merchants established there, 
and has been followed by the calamities of incessant wars and anarchy among 
the natives ever since •••• ,,1 To support these arguments, Quin and Brown 
had given examples from the trade of the Senegal, the Casamance, the Rio Nunez, 
and of the Rivers Sa10um and Sine which contradicted any theor,y that British 
2 commerce could flourish under the French flag. 
That long-established merchants in the Gambia simply put up opposition 
to transfer in order to secure compensation from the French for their 
businesses is not altogether supported ~ the facts. Hargreaves admits 
that if Thomas Brown was the chief sponsor of .African petitioners, it "rather 
weakens the hypothesis that [his] only real aim was to secure compensation. ,,3 
Brown, for example, had built up his influence in the settlement over a long 
period, and he now played a role with prestige value, as adviser on tactics 
to be adopted in face of Anglo-French operations, which he wa.s not anxious to 
1. C.o. 87/98A, 1870, vol.3. 18th June, Forster and Smith to Granville. 
2. Quin &. Brown to Lord Kimberley, 21st July 1870, pub. Af.Times, Oct. 1870. 
3. Hargreaves, If A Prelude to Partition", Chapter IV •• 
lose. Like Quin, he had. close family ties with the Hulatto community, 
which may have involved him in the scandal of 1873, 1 but made life in the 
tropics pleasant generally. David Brown, his }fulatto son, was now an 
established merchant, and so was Thomas Quin's son, (the Quin daughters _ 
~fulattoes - were among the belles of st. }~'s who dined at Government 
2 House). Jnd though Thomas Brown was not regarded as a prosperous merchant, 
even by Gambian standards, he was certainly a big property owner. From this 
picture of rather comfortable living, one wonders whether the leisurely pace 
of commerce in the Gambia might not have been more attractive for a merchant 
like Brown in his late sixties than the prospect of sudden retirement to 
London, albeit on some form of 'pension'? 
It was certainly under mercantile influence that African chiefs rallied 
to oppose transfer, using Brown and Quin as representatives to act in their 
interest "both at Bathurst and in England in the matter now in question.,,3 
As C.H. Kortright, Administrator of the settlement, was to observe, and as 
the chiefs themselves knew well: tilt would be the policy of the French to 
conciliate the River Natives Lthat is, the Soninkes] who are the principal 
growers of the groundnut, but no such incentive would rule their conduct in 
dealing with the }fa.rabouts4 of Lower Combo who now possess the whole of that 
country up to the British boundary. They cultivate but little, their trade 
5 is war, and a. strong enmity exists between them and the French •••• " This 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
c.o. 87/104, 1873, vo1.1. 21st June, D.~Cha1merst Report; 
C.O. 87/105, 1873, vol.2. 28th Dec. C.O. }an., E.F. 
C.O. 87/106, 1873, vo1.3. 17th }~ch, Thos. Quin, Jnr. to his Father. 
C.O. 87/100, 1871, vo1.2. 20th June, .Hahmoud n'Dare Bah to H.}!. the Queen. 
See Chapter VIII of Thesis. 
C.o. 87/107, 1874, 19th June, C.H.Kortright to Earl Carnavon. 
comment was equally applicable to the situation in the River states. 
Protest from these rulers did not carry much weight. For Mahmoud 
n'Dare Bah was very much a de facto potentate who yet had enemies to vanquish 
before he could establish authority wi thin Baddibu and. its environs; while 
• 
Tomaney Bojang, de jure ruler of Combo had become a nominal king.l The 
latter appealed for treaties between himself and. the British Government to 
be a.brogated and his former lands returned to him rather than be handed over 
2 to "strangers". This was hardly realistic when he knew that whatever part 
of his partitioned domain he now recovered would only fall to l-farabout 
aggressors. Little wonder that a few months after this petition, in a 
private interview with the Manager of British Combo, Bojang disclosed that he 
would consider a. powerful government in st. Hary's which was able to give him 
some protection against his enemies an advantage. Indeed, he was reported. 
8.8 having said that he was prepared. to respect any ruling power that 
administered the government if that power was just and friendly. Atter all, 
the British had never yet assisted him with arms or men; and. now that all 
troops had been withdrawn from the settlement, African chiefs believed this 
was indication that transfer was being effected. 
The essential difference between British and French systems of 
administration had been partially explained by the Rev. W.B. Boyce, General 
Secretary of the Wesleyan Nissionary Society in 1869. He thought tha.t "the 
French are on the whole better Administrators ••• for colonies like ours in 
1. See Chapter VIII of Thesis. 
2. C.o. 87/91, 1870, vol.l. 2nd June, Kennedy to Granville, enclosure _ 
Letter from Tomane,y Bojang to H.M. the Queen. 
West Africa •••• .As an instrument of civilization and national progress," 
Boyce continued, "I do not undervalue }Iissionary labour or Education, but 
good rational Government in which the rulers bear not the sword in vain but 
are a terror to evil-doers, (Romans XIII) is equally an Ordinance of God •••• ". 
French military discipline among hostile tribes appealed to this missionar.y, 
but Africans preferred British rule which they described as "just and ample 
protection, care and liberty.,,2 
It would, however, be wrong to infer from this that Liberated Africans 
believed that British native policy in the hinterland was satisfactor,y. As 
traders who were often exposed to the consequences of war in the River states, 
they had frequently urged the local government to adopt French methods with 
tiresome native chiefs who obstructed trade. Nevertheless, the prospect of 
a French government in the settlement itself filled them with misgiving, 
because they feared they too might fall victims to a rigorous policy. Under 
French administrative efficiency, it was unlikely that aqy Africans would be 
given special privileges, such as Liberated Africans enjoyed under British 
rule. After all, this community was a social phenomenon, in large measure, 
a creation of British policy in West Africa, and consequently of particular 
concern to a certain section of the British public.) 
1. c.o. 87/9sB, 1869, 17th Sept., Rev. W.B.Boyce to Dr. Rigg. 
c.o. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 10th ~~, T.G.Lawson to A.E.Kenn~. 
Ibid. Africans felt that to keep quiet about transfer, "might appear as 
if they were wanting in gratitude and loyal sentiment ••• to the British 
Government who have done so much good to them." 
~e annexation of the Ashanti Protectorate in 1874 was the turning-point 
in British non-expansion policy of the mid nineteenth centur,y. It gave the 
British for the first time some interest in taking over from France on the 
Ivor,y Coast in order to control the import of firearms into recently conquered 
Ashanti through Agni kinsmen. l Colonial policy was now to acquire territories 
which stood in the way of its new scheme for Vest Africa. According to a 
comment Qy A.V.Hemming at the time, the British Government was now committed 
to "a policy of real and earnest efforts to raise the natives of our 
Settlements from the slough of ignorance and barbarism in which they are 
unk ,,2 s • To finance roads and schools in the newly acquired territories in 
the Gold Coast, an expanding revenue based on customs duties was required; and 
to secure duties, smuggling was to be prevented Qy the control of a long 
extent of sea coast. For this worthy cause, Hemming declared that the 
interest of the few British merchants in the Gambia "are hardly to be weighed 
against the possibility of providing the means of carrying the blessings of 
civilization and imparting advantages of education to thousands of British 
subjects.") Thus officials argued the expediency of sacrificing one part ot 
the Empire for the good of another. 
l>feanwhile in the Gambia, the situation had. worsened with the resumption 
ot tribal wars, to the extent that in 1874 and '75 the Government in Bathurst 
prepared against possible invasion of its borders b,y the Marabouts of 
1. Hargreaves, "A Prelude to Partition", Chapter IV~. 
2. c.O. 87/108, 1875, 14th October, A.V.Hemming to R.Nead.e. 
). Ibid. 
1 Combo. Lord Carnavon, the Secretar,y of state was naturally disturbed ~ 
the prospect of the Government becoming involved in the wars, and therefore 
welcomed the opportunity to resume negotiation with the French for the transfer 
of that settlement. But if the British Government was interested in 
}funsieur Gavard's restatement of the French proposal, the British public 
showed no enthusiasm for it. In the Gambia, opposition was renewed by the 
Liberated .African community, now under the leadership of Joseph Richards, an 
entrepreneur in groundnuts and kolas who was to become the first African member 
of the Legislative Council of the settlement. Among the one hundred and 
fifty-one petitioners of the Gambia Native Association were ~ of whose who 
had signed earlier protests, including Harry Finden. 
Their reasons for opposing transfer had not changed in five years, 
though perhaps their language was more insistent, and the,r claimed to speak 
for the whole population. They could not accept transfer to an "obnoxious" 
government, because they loved political and religious liberty, and disliked 
a scheme "fraught with such evil consequences to - [themselves] and their 
children." In detailing advantages offered by the Gambia, they made a new 
and relevant assertion, that via the River the "geographical or scientific 
explorer [is accorded] easy access to the vast interior of Africa, which 
notwithstanding recent explorations remains a terra incognita to the 
2 European world." These were some of the arguments presented ~ the Native 
1. C.O. 87/107, 1874, 6th }~, C.H.Kortright to Pope Hennessy; 
C.O. 87/108, 1875, 20th June, H.Cooper to Carnavon. 
2. C.O. 87/108, 1875, 7th October & 18th October, Petitions, pub. The Hour, 
5th November 1875. 
Association for the consideration of the senior British merchants in the 
colony with a view to "enlisting interest ••• and engaging interference to 
arrest the sanction of Parliament to the proposed Transfer. ,,1 
Not only was their petition given publicity in The Hour, a British 
/ newspaper, but a deputation of merchants sought an interview with Carnavon 
to expound on these views. But no encouragement was found at the Colonial 
Office. Far from being solvent as the Gambia claimed, the Minister showed 
that it had been in debt to the Crown Agents for a long time, and that war 
on its borders might involve the settlement in further difficulties. The 
Government's plan then was "not Cession but a mere Exchange ••• for the 
purpose ot rounding off a rather inconvenient property.n2 
This was not a satisfactory answer to men of business, so that most of 
them began to press for compensation in lieu of "compulsory withdrawal". 
Lintott, Spink and CompllllY (the successors of Forster and Smith), had already 
requested that in negotiating transfer the "purchase by [the French] of our 
fixed and floating property in the River Gambia m~ be taken into consideration, 
and that we m~ be fully indemnified for the loss we shall sustain in being 
compelled to retire from the trade. ,,3 This was not unreasonable while the 
threat of transfer seemed so near to becoming a reality. What is surprising 
is that British merchants, and indeed African entrepreneurs, had restrained 
themselves from making an issue of compensation for the greater part of the 
1. C.O. 87/108, 1875, 18th October, Petition to Hessrs. Thos. Brown, Thos. 
Quin, Thos. Chown, Lintott & Spink. 
2. C.O. 87/109, 1876, February, Lord Carnavon to the Deputation of Nerchants. 
3. c.O. 87/108, 1875, 8th Sept., Lintott, Spink & Co. to Carnavon. 
decade in which they lived under the French threat. 
Nov, according to the Administrator, most merchants were preoccupied with 
securing compensation for businesses disorganized by the uncertainties of the 
River trade. Quin and Brown were not doing good business; the prestige of 
Brown had been severely damaged by the .Anna. Evans Affair of 1873. "Hr. Brown 
comes ver,y badly out of the affair," Fortescue had commented. "It is a 
question whether his conduct would not warrant his expulsion from Council. ,,1 
.And he was then the only Wlofficial in the Council. In 1874, Brown did 
resign his commission. Sensibly, he was negotiating to sell his property 
and business to a French firm.2 Alternatively, retirement from the coloQY 
on a lump sum (it was hoped that France would pay a substantial sum for 
Government property out of which compensation claims would be settled) must 
now have seemed both attractive and inevitable to a man "so advanced in 
years,,,3 as Brown was pathetically described b,y Henr,y Cooper, Acting 
Administrator. 
When all efforts seemed to have been of no avail, one final summing-
up petition emanated from a cross-section of the inhabitants of Bathurst 
which dwelt on the geographical and economic advantages of the Gambia, but 
made no mention of compensation! The British Government, it warned, was 
about to give to France five hundred miles of Wlinterrupted coastline from 
which British commerce and British shipping would be excluded; indeed the 
French would also possess the main rivers of West Africa. The petitioners 
1. C.O. 87/104, 1873, yol.l. 28th Dec., C.O. ~anute, E.F. 
2. C.O. 87/107, 1874, 6th November, C.n.KOrtright to Lord Carnavon. 
3. C.O. 87/105, 1873, Yol.2. 16th August, H.T.M.Cooper to Kimberley. 
rightly deprecated the fact that they were about to lose "their birthright 
and. property" for the sake of providing additional funds for the Gold Coast 
and. Lagos. "It is a principle of elementary justice and human dignity," 
they concluded, "that man's rights and properties cannot be disposed of 
without his consent, even if it were for his enjoyment •••• ,,1 Six years 
before, Liberated Africans had reminded Earl Granville of a similar rule of 
the ancients - "that the King cannot confer a favour on one subject which 
occasions loss and injury to another. ,,2 Somewhat dramatically, and. 
unexpectedly, on the 7th of April 1876, a letter from Lord Ca.rna.von informed 
the public that "the negotiations for exchange of terri tory with France have 
been broken off •••• ,,3 
Once again transfer had been dropped for political reasons, and because 
of moral pressure which had been brought to bear on the Secretary of State. 
There was however no guarantee given that the question would not be resumed, 
as it was to be in the 'eighties. Transfer was in fact one of the most 
controversial issues of the centur,y on which public opinion was expressed 
with vehemence. The British Government held the same position throughout a 
decade of negotiation: As the Gambia settlement did not 'pay', it was 
expedient to exchange it for colonies that would fit into their scheme for 
the West African settlements. That objections would be made to such a 
proposal officials well knew, but it was hoped that mid-Victorian anti-
imperialism would carry policy through, as it nearly did. Though events in 
1. C.O. 87/109, 1876, 29th Feb., Merchants & traders to Carnavon. 
2. Petition of Liberated Africans to Granville, 20th April 1870, pub. 
Af. Times, June 1870. 
3. C.O. 87/109, 1876, 7th April, Carnavon to merchants & traders. 
EUrope put up barriers through which negotiation was impossible, it was 
really articulate British and African opinion, organized and directed ~ 
men like Fitzgerald, Brown, Finden and Richards, which brought pressure to 
bear on successive administrations that finally defeated the French proposal. 
In protesting against transfer, all sections of Gambia society had rallied 
,under the same banner, a truly significant achievement. But throughout it 
~ all, it was articulate African opinion that was the deciding factor. 
CHAPTER VIII 
POWER STlUXiGLE IN THE HINTERLAND AND THE PROBLEM OF INVOLV»fENT - 1862-1894. 
In 1862, Britilh jurisdiction in the Gambia was limited to four isolated 
pockets bordering on that River, a total area ot about sixty-nine square 
miles; but in the riverain states extending along three hundred miles ot ita 
coarse, the British Government had entered into treaties with African chiets. 
While such treaties did not guarantee the British trader against the natural 
hazards ot river societies, they did protect his life unless he took up arms 
against such rulers during a punitive expedition organised from Bathurst. " 
I 
fi 
11 
!I 
Unrest in the River with resultant skirmishes, pillage., and indeed violence, ;! 
But it wa.s the decline ot traditional r was not unfamiliar to British traders. 
authority in the Mandinka states ot the region, caused by the unsatisfactory 
condition ot Islam in them, which not only protracted the state of violence, 
but altered its intensity considerably. For the jihad which was proclaimed 
in the Gambia in the mid-nineteenth century meant organized warfare in nearly 
all states for almost fifty years. 
states like Barra had been established by Mandinkas who had come down 
to the banks ot the Gambia atter the disintegration of the medieval empires 
ot the Sudan. Amari Sonko, a Mandinka warrior, was by tradition regarded 
as ODe of these invaders from the interior. Having fought several battles 
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with the Wolot king ot Salum (Burba SalWD or Barsally), he subjugated Barra, 
Koular and Baddibu which he then tormed into one kingdom; but after his death 
the kingdom was divided between his sons, Barra becoming a separate kingdom. I 
.And according to Francis Moore's evidence, in the eighteenth century the king 
ot Barra, though virtually independent, paid tribute to the ruler ot Salm. 
There was, in tact, no overlord with sOTereign power over 81rf extensive area 
on the River; rather, political authority among indigenous peoples in the 
Gambia was 1Dleasily shared by numerous chiettains, each ot whom assumed the 
title ot 'Mansa' (translated 'king' by early explorers and traders). Each 
jealously guarded his domain from the encroachment ot rivals. 
Islamic religion and culture had penetrated all the Mandinka states in 
the River, STen though the degree of penetration did not al~s extend beyond 
the adoption ot the elements ot material culture - personal hahi ts, clothing, 
Arabic terminology. Indeed the process of religious change in such societies 
had been 10Dg and unhurried, an intil tration rather than a radical revolution; 
so that in assimilating Islamic culture, Africans had rejected no more ot 
their own indigenous culture than was absolutely necessary. In short, 'lDltil 
the retorm JDOTements ot the mid-nineteenth century in the Gambia, religious 
lite rested on a double toundation - indigenous beliets and ceremonies as 
2 "UDderl~er and the Islamic superstructure." It wa. this reciproeal 
influence ot Islam and African cultures which the reformer. of the nineteenth 
1. c.o. 87/100, 1871, vol. 2. 27th Sept. Thomas Brown to T.P.Callaghan, 
,Admi nistrator. 
2. J.S. TrimiDgham, "Islam in Vest Africa." (O.U.P. 1959) pp. 36-43. 
centur,y sought to destroy. Such tolerance towards traditional usages and 
habits only produced a debased taith, and stimulated violent attempts at 
retorm. 
That Mandinka rulers ot states showed. no sympathy for the jihadis was 
not only due to their fear ot losing political control, but was possib~ a 
retlection ot their own ignorance of, and unfamiliarity with the doctrines 
J 
and principles of their faith. That maqy ot them protessed that religion, 
1 
even where they were incorrigible drunkards, vas borne out by Francia Moore 
who lived and traded among them for five years. In general, he found that 
" -
Ii 
;r 
'I ;f the small nucleus,' ot "Mahometans or Busherines" in the River abstained trom 
drink and kept strictly to their devotiona, being able to read. and write 'I' 
o t ir i ,1
1
.
1
,. Arabic "which they take care to each the ch ldren, there being Schoolmasters ~. 
2 
among them tor that purpose •••• " The influence of MahoDlDedan clerics in 
village societies, where they were often traders, was important; tor as 
members of the chiet's entourage (Portuguese explorers had. described Wolof 
chiettains with Mauretanian teachers in their entourage), 3 they were given 
otficial recognition by political authority. And from the common people, 
eapecial~ the Mandinkas, they received such "great veneration," according 
to Francia Moore, "that it ~ ot them are ill, they apply to a Mahometan for 
cure •••• [desiring] them only to write a sort ot a note on a small piece ot 
4 paper tor them to wear about them •••• tt Thus Moore concluded that from the 
1. Francis Moore, "Travell into the Inland Parts of Atrica,- (London, 1738), 
p. 39. 
Moore, "Travels", p.145. 
D.P.Gamble, "The Volot ot Senegambia", (London International African 
Institute, 1957) p.70. 
4. Moore, "Travels-, p.39. 
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business of local physicia.n the ~fahoDlDedan cleric made a substa.ntial living 
and was "generally richer ... than the generality ot the Mtmdingoes." 
Outside the religious sphere, too, Muslims wielded considerable influence, 
for the adoption by indigenous societies ot elements ot Islamic law inevitably 
transtormed. their social institutions."l J.B. Durand, a French traveller in 
Sen~ambia in the early nineteenth century, found an Alcaide in every large 
town, in whom executive and. judicial powers were combined, and whose ottice 
vas hereditar,y. His duty was "to preserve order, to receive the tribute 
imposed upon travellers, and to preside at the sittings of the tribunal of 
justice." Though customary law was the toundation at legal institutions in 
the River, and was usually the basis on which decisions vere made by judges, 
it was moditied by the addition ot Islamic regulations, appeal being sometimes 
made to the Koran. For this reason, protessional interpreters ot the Koran 
2 
were allowed to plead in courtJ and theS8 men were ~fuslims. It the 
penetration at Islam in the riverain stat8s at the Gambia betore the re~orm 
movement was largely superficial, it had neveriheless aftected most areas ot 
life, thereby weakening the structure at traditional cultures and indeed ot 
traditional political authority. The ~ had been prepared tor the success 
at the j ibad. 
There were, however, stories ot the persecution ot Muslims by certain 
Mandinka chiets. British settlers on Maccarthy Island in 1823 had tound a 
small hamlet ot MUalims at one corner ot the Island called MOrocunda.3 
1. Trimingham, "Islam in West Africa", p.43. 
2. J.B~Durand,".1 voyage to Senegal", (London 1806) p.39. 
3. l-loister, "Missionary Labours", p.15l; Moroctmda in the Gambia means 
"holy town". 
At that distance from the centre of the kingdom ot Catabar they probably felt 
safe from persecution. It was not fear ot persecution alone that caused 
the isolation of Muslim villages in the region, for devout converts to the 
faith seemed to have preferred to separate themselves from Mandinka society, 
and, with permission of the traditional rulers to form units of their own, 
in which they could more diligently follow the precepts of the Prophet and 
instruct the young with little distraction and. annoyance. In the kingdom of 
Barra, for example, the Muslims had built five tOYIlS along the banks of the 
River away trom the interior towns which formed the centre of the kingdom. l 
Yet slowly, Muslim towns increased in size and importance, and by the mid-
nineteenth century a large number of them had grown up alongside the 
tradi tiona! towns. Prom the ldng ot Brekama.· s complaint to the Governor in 
Bathurst once the religious wars were advancing, it would seem that Muslims 
had succeeded in entrenching themselves before the tradition8l rulers, to 
whom they owed allegiance, ever began to understand its significance. The 
king explained that his great grandfather, Ma.rmoodoo, "allowed them [the 
MUslims] to settle at Cojooroo (Gunjur] as a then poor and helpless people, 
[but] they have nov advanced so far as to make war on Marmoodoo's great 
.. 2 grandson •••• 
By the 'sixtial it vas obvious even to the Governor in st. Mary'. that 
traditional authority waa being seriously undermined in m~ states; and 
1. C.o. 87/85, 1866, vol.2. 28th Sept., d'Arcy to Sam Blackall. 
2. C.O. 87/1UT, 1874, 5th Mq, King ot Brekama (Ceesea Angelah) to 
C.U.Kortright. 
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Governor d'Arcy had observed that the chiets had not "the ability to 
1 
reconstruct their government." The death of Demba Sonko, king of Barra, 
in 1862 precipitated the decay ot that Mandinka state; and in another decade 
the new ruler was described as "a ver,y weak chiet".2 Indeed, b,y the 'eighties, 
nearly all chiets were reported to have lost their authority to their Muslim 
subjects, and "shorn ot all or nearly all power tor the furtherance ot good 
and the repression ot evil •••• "3 The collapse of authority in Barra was 
repeated in turn in other states. Jarra countr,y, on the south bank ot the 
River, became a battle ground when Muslim subjects refused to pay customs to 
their rulers b,y whose permission they had built themselves towns there. 
Such a 'revolution' was due as much to internal conditions as to external 
stimulus. While rum, for instance, remained one ot the principal articles 
-....-
? of trade in the River, so 2~~_ must devout Mualim clerics have telt the need 
tor retorm, b,y compulsion. Latent discontent within River societies was not 
improved b,y a political s,ystem which excluded Muslims trom the role ot chiets 
or alcaldes, except in their own towns. In the setting ot the Yestern Sudan 
through which swept religious trends in the nineteenth century, it was 
inevitable that the bond that vas growing among the scholars ot a great 
teacher, and indeed among the teachers thelll8e1ves, would be directed everywhere t: 
! 
against tradi tiona! authority which still clung tenaciously to non-Islamic 1 
i 
beliets. 
1. c.O. 87/14, 1862, 24th Oct., d'Jrcy to Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 87/100, 1871, vo1.2. 2nd October, T.F.Ca1laghan to .A.E.Kennedy. 
3. C.O. 87/118,-1882, vol.1. l3th~, V.S. Gouldsbur,y to Samuel Rowe. 
The stor,y of the nature of the struggle which was the result of religious 
tensions in the Gambia and outside it, and ot the extent to which it involved 
the British government and British subjects in that coloqy is the subject ot 
this chapter. J.M. Grq states that it was the Pan Islamic movement which 
had caused the French much trouble in Algeria in 1847 and 1848 which was the 
immediate cause of the religious wars in the Gambia. For emissaries from 
the Mediterranean coast had ani ved in the Senegal and the Gambia to preach 
a jihad against all non-Islamic coumunities. According to the same source, 
a MOor named Haji Ismail was travelling through the Western Sudan at this 
time preaching a jihad, and though there is no evidence that he visited the 
Gambia, nevertheless he had agents there. Among them, another Moor named 
Omar, who had been concerned. in Abid al Qadir's rising qainst the French in 
1 Algeria in 1847. 
While events in North Africa must have had repercussions across the 
Sahara, emitting sparks into an explosive situation in the Western Sudan, the 
jihad which was proclaimed in that region waa less dependent upon the 
Algerian rebellions of the 18408 (which had unique c8UIes in the French 
invasion of Algeria), than upon reforming movements indigenous to the Western 
Sudan itself. For such movements can be traced back into the eighteenth 
centur,y with the foundation of the Qadiriya and Tijaniy'y& brotherhoods which 
2 
exercised important missionar,y and political roles in West Africa. Each 
religiOUS order waa UDder the authority of a shaikh (a religious leader), 
1. 
2. 
J.M.Gr~, "History", pp.388 &: 391. 
Trimingham, "Islam in Yest .A:trica", pp.91-93; H.A.R.Gibb, "Modem Trends 
in Islam", (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947, &: C.U.P.), chapter II. 
whose otticial subordinates enrolled, trained and initiated new members. It 
vas an .Arab named al-Mukhtar who had tounded a 'monastery' in Azawad, north 
of Timbuctu in 'the eighteenth century, which became the centre ot the 
Qa.diriyya order and produced jihad leaders like Uthman dan Podio who led the 
movement into Hausaland. It was, however, the Tijani Way which va.s preached 
with great vigour among the Tuculors and Wolots at the Senegal by the Trarza 
Moors in the nineteenth century which played an important part in the 
islamization ot the Gambia. 
Trimingham rightly asserts that the "most important event ~n the history 
of the Tijaniyya in West Africa was the initiation at Umar Tal (1194/7-1864) 
•••• "1 He vas a Tuculor born at 010ar near Podor in Puta Toro in the Senegal; 
and while he was on pilgrimage in Mecca, he was appointed khalifa2 for the 
Sudan, with title at al-h&jj. On his return trom Mecca, where he had spent 
a number of years, he first initiated Muslim clerics at Puta Jalon, from where 
3 his movement spread throughout the western Sudan. As a means of binding 
devotees to the cause of the jihad, Umar imposed Tijani allegiance &8 the 
official cult of the peoples he conquered. His pOlicy was to overthrow 
traditional governments and then to force conversion on the people; and 
between Puta Jalon and Timbuctu he met with great success. But it vas in 
the lover Senegal, in his own homeland of Puta Toro and its environs, that 
he met humiliating defeat. General Louis Faidherbe, the then Governor of 
1. 
2. 
Trimingham, "Islam in West Africa", pp.94-91. 
Kha1ita,"the initiating leader at a tariqa", i.e. a Sufi brotherhood 
( Trimingham) • 
General Loui. Faidherbe, "I.e ScSn'gal", (Paris, 1889) p.159 ff. 
Senegal, saw the jihad as a political torce directed towards territorial 
expansion; and he organized military campaigns to resist Umar' s incursions. 
French involvement with Uma.r and his disciples, whose objective was to 
secure an alliance ot all Muslims tor the extermination ot unbelievers, was to 
aftect Government and opinion in the Gambia, where the preaching ot the jihad 
was an integral part ot the movement which had swept through the whole ot the 
Western Sudan by the 'sixties. But whereas in the Gambia, British policy was 
extremely cautious in its dealings with African chiets in order to avoid 
involvement in the hinterland, French policy under the Governorship ot Louis 
Faidherbe was the reverse, tor the French themselves had embarked on a policy 
ot political domination in the Senegal. They were as determined to subjugate 
the native states in that territory, primarily to secure trade, &8 the leaders 
ot the jihad were relentless about their objective. French and MUslims then ~ 
were rivals in a Y83 that was not comparable in the Gambia situation. In 
Faidherbe's own words, the French cause was lost it resi.tance were not put 
up against Umar'. progreu in the upper Senegal, and it he were allowed to 
1 
enter the lower River. In other words, France was to take the ottensive even 
to the extent ot organising elaborate and expensive campaigns against all who 
.tood in the ~ ot French objective •• 
From the beginning, Unar had declared that he did not vant a war with 
the Europeans, and had gone so tar &8 to approach Governor Protet, Faidherbe's 
predecessor, tor &lllDUDition and 'an otticer to usist him in his war against 
1 
the 'idolaters'. Cinar was prepared to live in peace with the Europeans if 
they would limit their activities to the pursuit of commerce and would not 
fo~ settlements in the countr,y or send vessels of war on the River Senegal. 
These were unacceptable conditions, so Paidherbe stated, for it had long been 
proved impossible to pursue trade without protection among "des barbares". 
Indeed, far from being prepared to abandon or demolish their settlements and 
forts, the ~ench were proposing to extend their frontiers further into the 
interior. 2 Theirs W&8 perhaps a more realistic policy than that adopted b,y 
the British in the Gambia, who, while desiring to develop the coumerce of 
that territor,y,refu.ed adequate protection to traders in factories outside 
British jurisdiction, on the ground8 of expense. In Sene-Gambia, it was 
found to be an impracticable policy; it only meant that British policy would 
in the future have to follow in the direction consistently pursued by the 
French since the mid nineteenth centur,y. 
Interference in wars of religion, however, was found to be more than 
expensive. Paidherbe described such wars as "impi toyables et Ie fenatisme 
inspire un courage qui ne recule devant rien, puisque, pour ceux qui en sont 
animes, la mort elle-mhle est regardee cOUlDe un bien." It was the bond 
created among the adherents of a universal religion like Islam which 
transcended tribal barriers and became a powerful integrative factor. 
Thus Touculors, Fulas, Serahulis, and even Bambaras, fought with singleness 
1. Paidherbe,"Le Senegal", p.160. 
2. Ibid. p.170• 
ot purpose under the direction of umar and his talaba,lirrespective of their 
allegiance to the political rulers ot their own states. This fanatical 
element ot 'disciples' tormed the vanguard ot Umar's torces, carrying guns 
on their shoulders, with veiled taces, they led the massacre ot the inhabitantt 
of all villages which showed any resistance, "psalmodiant les versets du Koran 
d'une TOU sinistre." It was all in keeping with the mystery that surrounded 
their khalifa, who was believed to be endowed with supernatural power and was 
2 
recognised as "prophhe envoye de Dieu •••• " Indeed the leaders ot jihad 
vere politically astute, employing such tactics as would both undermine the 
established. regime in the states they attacked, and that would bind subjected 
i peoples to their cause. umar imposed the oath of allegiance to the Tijaniya 
-
? 
order on all. 
starting from the vantage point of Futa Jallon, where the formation ot a 
Mbe theocratic state vas to be "the primary factor leading to the ditfusion 
) 
ot Islam throughout western Guinea", Umar, with considerable 8lld fairly well-
organised. torces, carried the war through the states ot Kaarta and Segou 
4 (against the pagan Bambara), into those ot the upper Senegal, where he 
established his influence inapi te ot French resistance. Nor was he deterred 
trom extending his mission into the lower Senegal knowing the strength ot the 
French detence. in that region; tor he overestimated the advantages ottered 
1. Paidherb" "Le Seneg~l", pp.164 & 165; talaba, talib (sing.) = student, 
disciple LTrimingham]. 
Faidherb., "Le S'n6gal", pp. 160 & 161. 
Trimingham, "Islam in West .Africa", p.IS. 
Ibid., p.14. 
by another theocratic state (his native country ot Futa Toro) as a base ot 
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operations into nominally Mualim Wolot kingdoms beyond. 1 Indeed, in the very 
centre ot the colony, in st. Louis (Ndar) itselt, Umar had his agents and 
m~ ardent supporters. 
AccordiDg to a letter quoted by Paidherbe, Umar urged these adherents 
to the taith to make war on all who did not believe in God (animists), or 
tollow the true religion and the cOlIIDands ot the Prophet (the Jews and the 
Christians). Any reconciliation with such persons, he declared, would make 
them infidels too.2 That he was alleged to have called the Governor a 
tyrant who was to be made to submit to his cause, showed that inspite ot his 
earlier declarations, Umar had t~ed against European colonists. .And 
Paidherbe who had had six years' experience in the Muslim world ot North 
Africa, in particular, Algeria,3 was not likely to overlook the threats ot 
a leader ot jihad. He believed that it was a policy of the Muslims to raise 
disaffection between the citizens ot the colony and the French administration, 
with a view to toiling French expansion in the Senegal. 
In 1864, Umar having succeeded in estabUshiDg himself as ruler ot an 
extensive empire trom !Uta Jallon to Timbuctu, on both banks ot the Niger, 
for a distance ot over 1,500 miles, met a violent death at the hands ot PUla 
- 4 
rebels ot Massina. He had, however, Dominated his son, .Amadu, as his 
successor. 5 Governor Paidherbe, too, lett the colony the following year, 
1. Wolot kingdoms had been penetrated b,y Islam since the fifteenth centur,y. 
Trimingham, p.l3. 
2. Faidherbe, "Le S'ntfgal", p.I64. 
3. Ibid., p.121. 
4. Ibid., p.299. 
5. Trimiogham, "Islam in West Africa", p.143, Note 1. 
!II ( 
recommending to his successor not to lose sight ot his project to link the 
Senegal to the Niger b,y establishing settlements at strategic pOints. l The 
departure of these protagonists did not resolve the war, tor Umarls 
supporters were as determined to continue the subjugation ot the Wolot and 
Serer states in the loyer Senegal as the new GOTemor, Pinet-Laprade (who 
had tirst arrived in the colo~ as a young captain in 1849), was resolved to 
extend and consolidate French influence in that region and elsewhere.2 Poyer 
struggle along the Senegal River had as its goal the extension ot political 
influence, tor eTen to Muslims engaged in a holy war, it yas recognised that 
"the government ot a country tollows that ot its chief. If the chief is a 
Muslim then the country is dar-aI-Islam, it a pagan then it is a pagan 
country.n) The ambition ot jihad leaders vaa, theretore, to create theocratic 
states J in pursuing war they were as much interested in pol! tical power as 
in religious reform. 
The struggle which vas extended to the banks ot the Gambia in the latter 
halt ot the nineteenth century was simply an ott shoot ot the movement which 
had been organised b,y al hajj Umar trom 1848. Maha Bah, Fodey Si11a, and 
Podey Cabba, the chiet clerical reformers in the Gambia, were lesser Muslim 
1. Faidherbe, "Le Senegal", p. 300. 
2. Pinet-Laprade waS to subdue the Jolas ot Cuamance. 
3. M. Bello, "Intaq-al-Maisur", quoted b,y Trimingham, "Islam", p.33. 
scholars inspired to action by the career of Ulnar, and, like him, determined 
to carve kingdoms for themselves from the indigenous riverain states of the 
Gambia. Indeed, it is significant that none ot these jihad leaders was a 
native of the COlmtry; they were all toreigners who had. received their Islamic 
education 'abroad'. Maba, tor example, had already taken part in the 
subjugation ot some of the Wolot states ot the Senegal ever before he showed 
~ interest in the Gambia • 
.Amady or Mahaba, commonly known as Maba, was, like Umar, a native ot 
Futa Toro and a Touculor by birth. In:tormation about his early life is 
scanty, except that by 1861, by his deToutness, he had been recognised as a 
Muslim cleric with a small band. ot ardent disciples. He may very well haTe 
been initiated at some earlier date &8 a khalifa in the Tijaniya order, but 
there is nO reterence to this in the documents. Nevertheless, he had grown 
sufticiently powertul by 1861 to subjugate Rip, a province ot Saloum. Indeed, 
he was deeply illTobed in the politics of the Volot states to the northward, 
having entered into alliances with some of their chiets, such as Macodou, damel 
of Cqor, l who had. been expelled trom hi. kingdom by the French. Under their 
joint alliance, SaIoum had been attacked and subjugated, so that by 1864, 
2 Maba had reached the height ot his power, with the title ot ruler or Alm!lJlY 
ot Saloum in French, and ot Baddibu in British, territory.:3 It was not only 
the French government that accorded him this recognition, but the chiefs ot 
C~r, :saol, Jollot and Sine had. agreed to his title it he would respect their 
1. 
2. 
damel was the otticial title of the ruler of C~or. 
Al.ma!st = al-imams West Sudan = pOlitico-religious head ot a Muslim 
community [Trimingham, "Islam"]. 
Paidherbe, "La S'n'gal", p.271. 
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territories. 
His ascendancy to power in British territor" had been achieved in the 
usual way of Muslims of his d83", by quiet penetration dramatically followed. 
by effective torce. Maba had entered Baddibu 88 a trader and settled. with 
his companions in a separate village, by permission at the J.Jand.inka king. 
It vas the British attack upon the kingdom at Baddibu in 1861 to exact 
compensation tor robberies previoualy committed on British merchants which 
provided the Muslims with the internal breakdown of authority that was their 
signal for proclaiming a jihad. Maba had. sued. tor peace aDd signed a treaty 
with Governor d'Arcy in the absence at the legitimate ruler of the state, an 
action that vas interpreted by the king as treachery. For this reason he 
sought to kill Maba, thua creating an open breach between the factions in his 
kingdom. 
Town after town vas burnt down and m~ of the natives of Baddibu were 
obliged to seek retuge across the River Gambia in Tendaba, where they attempted. 
to organise resistance. Meanwhile, circumstances favoured the C&uae at the 
rebel reformers; for the death of Demba Sanko king at Barra in 1862 opened. 
the way to the subjugation at that kingdom too. MUslim forces were marshalled 
under one .Amar Paal, a 'lieutenant' at Maba's, the king's capital at 
Beringding vas destroyed, &8 vere other towns, to the ver" frontier at British 
territory in the Ceded Mile. l The war was then carried acro.s the River to 
Kiang in the south bank; 2 but Maba was defeated at Kvinella. 
1. C.O. 87/73, 1862, 22nd Mq, d'ArC)" to Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 87/76, 1863, 5th June, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
By the 
intervention ot Governor d' Arcy, peace was signed between the British and 
1 Maba's representative in March 1863. 
In th&t year the radius ot war brought Saloum vi thin the Muslim compass, 
an event that directly atlected the economy ot both the British, and French, 
coloqy. To the British in st. Mar,y's the destruction ot towna in Saloum 
"the granary ot Bathurst" was a great hardship. Governor d' Arcy bemoaned 
the fact that the live thousand inhabitants ot the Island were fed on corn 
from that tertile region, which explained why numerous petitions "from our 
traders who have lost their goods and cattle, and in one instance a loss ot 
life •••• " were pouring into Government House. A further problem which 
faced the Government was the growing number ot retugees which was entering 
British territor.Y' Sereres and Wolots, accompanied by their llocks and herds 
2 
sought British protection at Berwick town in the Ceded Mlle. Some ot them 
crossed over into Bathurst and British Combo, thus straining the public tunds 
at a time when the colo~ was in debt. 
Governor d'Arcy would have liked the means to "check this Fanatica the 
customs ot the king ot Dahomey are not SO dreadtul as the blood-thirsty career 
3 
of this MahoDlDedan •••• ", he wrote. It was only the restraining power ot 
the Colonial Office and the limitations of the forc.s under his command which 
maintained Bri Ush neutrality at this period. The Duke ot Newcastle agreed 
tha.t the Governor was to be instructed "to abstain to the utmost of his poyer 
from either commencing or joining in aqy measures ot hostility arising out ot 
1. C.o. 81/76, 1863, 23rd ~ch, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 87/76, 1863, 24th March, d 'Arcy to Newcastle. 
3. Ibid. 
!>IS 
1 
these native wars." d'Arcy's views on the progress ot Islam in the region 
vere sometimes extreme and highly prejudiced, because his experience of the 
Indian Mutiny ot 1857 had made him bitterly opposed to the adherents ot that 
religion. But, like his contemporary, Paidherbe, he did show insight into 
the religious movement that had swept through west African states in the mid-
nineteenth century. He affirmed that the Muslims wanted "the Government ot 
the countr,y, knowing full well that the universality ot the religion will 
2 
surely follow the temporal power." In short, that the civil war in the 
Gambia was not so much caused by religion as by "policy". This partial 
misunderstanding ot the motives ot the leaders ot jihad resulted in open 
preterence tor the traditional rulers, who, as the Governor believed, stood 
tor "the cause ot order", and enabled him to apply to a chiet tor redress 
when a trader vas robbed. 
Certainly, the French in Senegal shared this opinion about their Muslim 
~ 
neighbours. In April 1863, J.B. Jaureguiberr,y, captain in the French nayY, 
while on a mission in the Senegal varned Governor d'Arcy in a letter that 
~/' 
sooner or later Maba was bound to attack the European "whose influence tend 80 
IDUCh to cOlDlteract his project •••• but it we allow him the tirst opportunity 
ot attacking us openly," the letter read, "his power would only become more 
consolidated, and we would become more isolated. and all commerce would be 
ruined." He pointed out that this had been the tactics ot Muslims in the 
Senegal, resulting in a series ot interminable wars, which only French military 
1. c.o. 87/76, 1863, 16th April, T.F.Elliott to Newcastle. 
2. C.O. 87/82, 1865, vol.l. 21st Januar,y, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
operations repulsed ettectively, the enemies in Puta Toro having "received a 
1 
rough lesson." For d'Arey, then, the dilemma. ot involvement was the major 
issue ot the 'sixties, with French administrators across the frontier, and 
r British merchants in his Council, urging him to resist aggression with force, 
I against Colonial Ottice instructions to maintain a strict neutrality. 
Maba, having started his career u jihad. leader in the Wolot states ot 
the Senegal, maintained his interest in that territor,y almost to the extent 
of neglecting to extend the retorm movement into Mandirika states ot the Gambia 
i outside Baddibu and Barra. This was p~ecause a progranee tor enforcing 
conversion upon the Volots ot Senegal had long been outlined, in pursuit ot 
which alliances were already tormed with the Moors and Touculors, while Maba 
seemed less villing to break faith with a non-aggressiTe Government like that 
of the British in the Gambia, than with the French. For where.. he took 
pains to observe the terms ot the treaty signed with d' Arcy in 1863, Governor 
Pinet-Laprade ot Senegal complained that "in detiance of a treaty made in 
1864,. (Ma.ba] has ravaged the Jollofs our allies and pillaged several villages 
under the protection ot this coloqy." Such acts of spoliation, he announced, 
2 had obliged him to undertake an expedition against Maba. But the French 
expedition ot December 1865 was not deci.iTe , tor though Mabawas reported 
to have lost two-thirds ot his army, the French Governor had been severely 
wounded and his troops depleted b.r tever.) It was French involvement in 
1. C.O. 87/76, 1863, 5th April, J.B. Jaur'guiberr,y to d'Arcy. 
2. C.O. 87/83,1865, TOI.2. 22nd Nov., d'Arcy to Newcastle, enclosure-
letter from Pinet-Laprade, 11th Nov. 
3. c.o. 87/83, 1865, vol.2. 23rd Dec., dtArcy to Newcastle. 
native politics, by which they undertook to de tend their numerous allies, 
which created a third dimension in the religious wars, and del~ed their 
outcome. 
MUslim attempt at domination shitted between the lower Senegal and the 
lover Gambia, so that resistance met in one area was answered by aggression 
in the other. This happened in 1866, to 11 owing upon the campaign ot 1865, 
when the Muslims in the Ceded Mile broke the peace by burning one ot the tovns 
ot the king ot Barra, having tirst lifted several heads ot cattle. This was 
British territory even though British courts had not been set up, and d'Arcy 
repudiated & policy ot neutrality to protect British subjects. It was his 
good fortune that H.M.S. "Mullet" entered the harbour then, thereby providing 
the means of taking prompt action without awaiting instructions trom the 
Secretary of State. Tubababcolong, the chiet Muslim stronghold in the Ceded 
Mile, was blockaded, and tiv. other ot their tovns were burnt and the 
stockades pulled down; for the Governor did not see how he could have acted 
otherwise, "consistent with justice, humanity and the honour of the flag."l 
Maba's end came violently and suddenly in 1867 when he again invaded a 
Wolot state in allianee ' with the French. This was Sine, whose ruler he had 
long tried to subdue, but who was well detended by the French. It was indeed 
the superior reinforcements provided by Pinet-Laprade tor the king of Sine 
which won the dq. At a tierce battle on the 18th ot July 1867, at a village 
called. Somb, Maha'. torces vere routed, Lat Dor a rebel ot Cayor and other 
1. C.O. ffT/85, 1866, vol.2. 3rd July, d'Arcy to Blackall. 
allies escaped; but Maba, his son and nephew, and his principa.l lieutenants 
I 
were killed. Thus ended a period ot bitter struggle which had raged in 
Sine Saloum tor six years. Maha's career had been cut short, betore he had 
sufticient time to consolidate his power in any ot the states he had overrun, 
so that his successor, who was his brother Mahmoud n'Dare Bah, was to struggle 
to establish his authority. 
The vars ot the 'sixties vere signiticant in the development ot the 
Gambia settlement tor they compelled the Government and communities in st. 
Mary's to engage in serious thinking about the tribes on the mainland. Maba 
had demonstrated that he vas more than a petty warring chiet who could be 
controlled b.Y policy tormulated b,y either the government ot Bathurst or st. 
Louis. He was indeed a dynamic torce in the River, and, like Unar vis-a-vis 
st. Louis, had within the capital ot the British colo~ 8. body ot ardent 
supporters, 80 that he became the cause ot bitter disagreement between people 
and government there. Even Governor d'Arcy vas impressed b,y his commanding 
2 presence, standing "head and shoulders above the people;" and Faidherbe, too, 
had written that he wielded considerable influence and enjoyed almost 
superstitious veneration trom the Volots and their neighbours. 3 
1. Faidherbe, "Le S6negal", pp.286-288. 
2. C.o. 81/SlJ, l864~ 24th October, dtArcy to Newcastle. 
3. Faidherbe, ttLe S6negal", p.278. 
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British Africans trading in the River supported Maba's regime, not 
because they were interested in his religious preaching, but because he was 
Ha great protector of trade." Under his disCipline, robbers, rogues aDd 
refugees had been driven a~ from trading stations; and instead of robberies 
and floggings which they had formerly experienced UDder Mandinka rule (the 
chiefs not being capable of restraining avaricious subordinates), they 
enjoyed a modicum ot protection. This element had, therefore, opposed aqy 
suggestion of an Anglo-French expedition against such a "great publio 
benetactor", such action, they said, would be tantamount to "ingratitude and 
stupidity". I 
But sympathy tor the Muslim retormers was not shared by the Government 
nor by the merchants ot Bathurst. The Governor, for example, was convinced 
that Maba. only got the support of those who were his accomplices in the 
2 
continental slave trade which the outbreak ot war had revived. Since 
MUslims bought ver,y little trom the merchants and produced hardly aqy articles 
tor the export market, it was concluded that their desire was "to be 
:3 independent of the white trader." Such then were the conflicting views on 
the power struggle in the hinterland, that though the policy laid down by 
Colonial Office was neutrality, the local Government on one hand, and urbanised. 
Africans OD the other, firmly supported opposite sides in the contest. 
1. Extracts from twenty letters to P.Pitzgerald from Gambian traders, pub. 
African Times, Sept. 1864. 
2. c.O. 87/80, 1864, vol.2. 25th Sept., d'!rcy to Newcastle. The Governor had 
received 8DO~OUS letters reporting on the handsome profits made by 
British African traders who transported slaves across the River Gambia. 
3. c.o. 87/13, 1862, 16th June, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
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It was not easy to assess the extent to which the wars improved or reduced 
security of traders in the River, but from the experience of those who traded 
in Baddibu, it would seem that in that state, at least, Maba had forced up an 
umbrella of protection under which traders operated. effective~, short-lasting 
though this proved to be by subsequent events. It is not unlikely that he 
did attempt to tame the pests of trading stations by pressing them into his 
armies or scaring them oft the land. Among Muslim leaders, Maba was remarkable 
tor hi. interest in/trade ondlagriculture.l Once Baddibu was unquestionably 
under his control, he turned 0 its internal organization, publicly inviting 
traders to enter free~ into the country. "I will giTe them authority to 
s811 their goods &8 they like," he wrote in Arabic, "coumencing from the part 
of Ngaryane right down to Cower. None of my' men will trouble them," he 
declared, "and it any ot my' people oves any trader and retuud to pq, let 
2 
the trader come and make report to me •••• " To the Prench CollllWldant at 
Kaolack he wrote in the same strain, pleading to be giTen a tair trial to 
show that his great object was to promote trade by providing peace and 
protection for traders. " •••• I have now ordered the whole of my'men to 
cultiTate the ground and to sow seeds. And I do believe that you will have 
no occasion of complaint ••• when comparing the former d~s with the present ••• J 
If the development ot the economy ot Baddibu and Saloum wu one of Maba IS 
objectives, it 11&11 not easily attainable in the midst ot a jihad. Even it 
1. Trimingham, "Islam in Vest Africa", p.1871 "Islam has taken little 
interest in agriculture, which has no essential place in legal texts ••• " 
2. Translation ot Maba's letter to d'Arcy, pub. African Times, ~ 1861. 
3. Copy ot Maba's letter trom Macca, Salem, 1st June 1864, pub. M. Times, 
Sept. 1864. 
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he had wished it otherwise, his primary objective was to vanquish all enemies 
within reach in order to extend his influence, and a bellicose polic.y 
defeated his development programme. Though Governor d I Arcy was prepared to 
admit that "he has protected our traders and invariably treated the Governor IS 
Agent from time to time with respect and hospitality ••• "1, Maba's armies 
continued to live on the land. by seizing large herds of cattle belonging to 
,.--, 
British merchants. It is, however, possible that had Maba lived, he PI83" 
L.,.: 
have produced stability in the states under his control. But the anarchic 
situation which the jihad produced in all the Gambian states atter his death 
confirmed the view that the leaders ot jihad "were rarely capable of affecting 
the transition from militar,y rule to a stable civil administration", and that 
their wars merely led to political disintegration and instability.2 
This was partly the reason for French resistance to Muslim incursions, 
and for a pro-French policy advocated by European merchants in st. Mar,y's. 
To men of business, the loss of the old foundations of authority could not 
but disrupt trade and. bring financial loss to them. Governor Faidherbe I s 
purposeful campaigns against al hajj umar vere therefore advocated as the 
only effective means of reducing MUalim control in the River Gambia too. 
Continual native vars caused incalculable misery, so that "it is really a 
merc,y when some strong arm ot a civilised pover interferes in Africa to 
keep the peace among them, although it mq be attended with bloodshed at the 
CODlDencement"; this was mercantile opinion. 3 
1. C.O. 81/80, 1864, 24th October, d'Arcy to Newcastle. 
2. Trimingham, "Islam in West Africa", p.142. 
3. From our Correspondent [Gambia], pub. African Times, June 1863. 
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They therefore welcomed the French in their neighbourhood, while 
detesting them as commercial rivals. Like merchants ever,ywhere, their main 
concern was tor a 'pax' under which cOlIIDercial activity could be profitably 
pursued, so that the disruption of River econo~ ~ the interruption of 
agriculture, resulting sometimes in famine among the farmers, apart from 
bringing financial loss, gave the mercantile commtmi ty in Bathurst genuine 
cause for concern. In their view, a colonial policy which wilfully 
disregarded tribal politics in the hinterland was mere "playing at Government", 
and unlikely to produce effective results. "If the British Government mean to 
do anything for these countries," one of them complained in a letter to the 
African Times, "they must compel the kings and chiefs to keep the peace with 
one another •••• "1 This was in fact advocating a policy of involvement in 
order to achieve peace ~ methods adopted by the French in Senegal: "When 
they are arrogant and ver.y offensive," they wrote, "give them a jolly good 
thrashing, and then afterwards shake hands with them •••• "2 If the lSi tuation 
did not improve in the riverain states, they even suggested in their anxiety 
that it might be "far better to let the French have the river ••• provided some 
3 
arrangement could be made with them for freedom ot trade •••• " 
Opinion on the struggle for power among the interior peoples, and on 
policy pursued by the two EUropean governments in such states varied according 
1. From our Correspondent, African Times, July 1863. 
2. Unsigned article on "Policy ot non-intervention in Western Africa", 
African Times, May 1867. 
3. From our Correspondent, African Times, June 1863. 
to the interests ot particular groups. Within st. Mar,y's itselt, opinion 
conflicted to such an extent that Governors retlected this inconsistency in 
their policy. The Muslim element domiciled there, which openly gave support 
to Maba and. vas suspected ot spying on the colonial Government, vas rivalled 
I 
b.Y a groving number ot retugees, depressed and bitter against all MUslims. 
Liberated African traders tell somewhere between the two groups, while it 
suited their interests, allying themselves to Maba because under his rule they 
enjoyed wider scope tor trade, including illegitimate trade. It was largely 
through them that the belligerents in the River were provided with all the 
powder, shot and provisions they required "to carr,y on their civil wartare 
with tacility." 
In 1864, the Commandant at MacCarthy Island despaired at his efforts at 
mediation between the contending parties, "for as long as they are provided with 
the munitions ot war from the merchants of this Island," he complained, "so 
1 long will they continue the same." European merchants who were the 
suppliers ot all articles ot trade, vere the most critical ot the attitudes 
of their traders and ot the policy of Government. But, like Governor d'Arcy, 
they preterred the traditional rulers, over whom they exerted some influence, 
providing the funds out ot which annual stipends vere paid to them. It vas 
in their interest too to ensure that their credits in the Riverain states 
were honoured; & show of force to prop up tottering Mandinka governments 
might, they hoped, preserve the status quo. 
1. C.O. 87/19, 1864, 31st ~, J.Plumridge to Governor d'Arcy. 
In the final analysis, involvement entailed the use ot torce, so that 
Government and people were not unreasonably perturbed by the withdrawal ot 
the troops trom the Gambia at the height ot the disturbances. Merchants 
with goods in the River claimed protection tor their trade and property to 
which they telt entitled in return tor the contribution they made to the 
revenue in customs duties. In petitioning tor a small torce to be stationed 
at MacCarthy Island, they explained that they urged for "no aggressive policy, 
but simp~ one ot self preservation."l Mercantile interests, they felt, were 
too often subordinated to those ot the Government. lihat they had al~s 
2 
wanted was a constant patrol ot the River b,y a gunboat; and even a moderate 
Governor like Admiral Patey, d' Arcy' s successor, was inclined to agree with 
them. After his visit up river in H.M.S. "Lee", a warship which entered the 
harbour early in 1869, he reported that it had made a moat tavourab1e 
impression in the riverain states, and recommended that a regular visit ot 
that kind, as tar up as MacCarthy Island, was "the only ~ in which any 
3 influence can be brought to bear on the natives •••• " It was, however, 
never easy tor Governors ot the Gambia to move the Colonial Oftice in a 
direction that might involve the use ot torce or extra expenditure. 
Further, the Colonial Ottice suspected the extreme views expressed b.Y 
d'Arcy and the merchants on the consequences ot Muslim domination in the 
Gambia. At a distance tram the field ot struggle, the Secretary at State was 
1. C.o. 87/87, 1867, vol.l. 1st June, Merchants' Petition to Newcastle. 
2. Extract from Letters to African Times, Sept. 1864. 
3. C.O. 87/91, 1869, vol.l. 5th March, Admiral Patey to Governor Kenne~. 
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able to see the situation in perspective, and to conclude that "we cannot be 
expected to undertake the protection of a weak tribe against a stronger one, 
especially where a religious element is involved. •••• "1 His guess was that 
the MUslim leaders would ultimately completely take over all the,states, and 
it was useless to delay the process. Officials outside the Gambia had begun to 
regard Islam as an effective agency for civilization among tribes with whom 
Wesleyan missionaries had had little success. Its advantages were not 
inconsiderable: it was Afriean-directed., it encouraged literacy and cOndeamed 
drink, albeit b,y fire and sword. Early Wesleyan missionaries themselves had 
been impressed b,y the improvement in mode of behaviour among those who had 
embraced that religion, and concluded that it was "profitable" to them.2 In 
short, political supremacy b,y the religious reformers seemed to be a possible 
answer to political instability in the River up to the 'seventies, for which 
reason Governors were consistently instructed to maintain a strict neutrality, 
to await the outcome of the struggle, and finally to sign treaties with the 
victors. 
The departure of Governor d' }.;roy and the death of Maba in 1867 marked the 
end of the first phase of the MUslim reform movement in the Gambia. In the 
north bank states the nature of the struggle altered significantly, degenerating 
1. C.O. 87/85, 1866, vol.2. 5th November, ~arnavon to Blackall. 
2. Morgan" "Reminiscences", pp.7l & 72. 
into a lust for power among rival reformers, all of them the descendants or 
lieutenants of Maba. lihile l-fahmoud n'Dare Bah, the otticial successor, was 
preoccupied with establishing his authority over Baddibu and Saloum, there 
was little opportunity tor establishing stable government in that area ot the 
River. While l-fa.ba was motivated by ideals, and showed powers of organization, 
his successors had not comparable ability and completely tailed to guide the 
reform movement beyond their own limited horizons of personal aggrandisement. 
This was partly the reason for J.M. Gr~'s conclusion that the destruction of 
the old hereditary chieftainships in the Gambia "put back the clock for close 
on half a century". Muslim leaders, he argued, erected nothing of aD\Y' 
permanent value in the place ot what had been overthrown, rather that they 
brought anarchy to the more settled areas of the lower River. 1 
The second phase of the war affected all the states on both banks of the 
River which comprised the lower Gambia, and was pursued with much violence 
into the twentieth century. In the 'sixties when Maba was overrunning 
}~djnka states in the North Bank, the Combo area in the immediate environs 
of the coloDiY' ot st. Mary's in the South Bank, had remained fairly peaceful and 
had attracted large numbers of refugees whose homes had been devastated in 
Saloum and Baddibu. Following the death of Maba, however, the scene of warfare 
had shifted southwards, where the jihad against 'pagans' was preached in all 
its violence b,y two MUslim clerics - Fodey2Silla and Fodey Cabba. Combo had 
1. J.M. Gr~, "History", pp.428 &: 429. 
2. Fodey: Tukulor call aqy Muslim cleric 'modibbo', and the highest 'foayot. 
In Futa Jallon, the most important clergy are the 'fodie', legal 
experts. Trimingham, "Islam", pp.69 & 70. 
in fact been a training field for devout MUslims since the 'fifties, having 
first come under the influence of Moorish emissaries. Within it too were 
situated two Muslim strongholds - Gunjur, a 'holy' place in local tradition, I 
and Sucuta (Sabijee) "one of the oldest marabout2 towns in Combo with the 
largest mosque in this portion of Africa and celebrated for its A1m~s •••• "3 
These natural~ became the centres of the reform movement, and therefore, from 
the point of view of the king of Combo and the colonial Government, centres of 
rebellion. 
Disagreement between the reformers and their traditional political rulers 
in this area had caused little concern in Bathurst at first, Governor O'Connor 
having then regarded it as a purely domestic affair restricted to two groups 
wi thin the same kingdom. Bri Ush merchants, however, had attached greater 
significance to the breakdown in political authority with its consequent 
effect upon trade and agriculture, and had persuaded the Governor to mediate 
between the contending parties. It was the arrival of a British man-of-war 
in the harbour which moved O'Connor to immediate action. With additional 
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it troops at his disposal, he took the field in ~ 1853 with a view to destroying 't 
Sabijee,4 the centre ot Muslim rebellion, and restoring complete authority to 
the king with whom the Government had been in treaty-relation since 1816. 
With the success of the expedition, and the expulsion of the rebels from 
Sabijee, British influence was further extended into Combo ~ the acquisition 
1. A local legend tells of the visit made to Gunjur ~ the Prophet Muhammed; 
C.O. 87/80, 1864, 21st Novt, d'Arcy to Newcastle, enclosure, Ex.Co.Minutes, 
26th Oct. 1864, The Queen's Advocate described Gunjur as Ita hornet's nest •• 
,ost necessar.y to the present and future well-being of our settlement ••• 
L to J be wiped out of the map of Combo." 
In Gambian terminology, Marabout simply means a devout Muslim. 
j I 
c.o. 87/55, 1853, 8th June, L.S.O'Connor to Sir John Palkington. rNewcastl~ 
Ibid. t' -:1, 
ot territor,y on the trontier ot Foreign and British Combo. O'Connor's 
una.cceptable explantion to the Secretary ot State was that extra land was 
needed tor "the growing and increasing wants of the British settlers in the 
River G~bia."l It was on this land that d'Arcy was to locate Liberated 
Africans and discharged soldiers in the 'sixties. 
By the 'seventies, the situation in Combo and adjoining states like 
Poni had altered with the emergence ot the two 'fodeys' whose mission was to 
pursue organised war against all unbelievers till all accepted conversion. 
Fodey Silla was supposed to have been born in Gunjur where his mother, a slave 
woman from the interior, lived. It was not known who his father was as none 
of his father's relatives lived in that town. However, he had continued his 
Islamic education at Batenti in Niumi Bato, on the northern frontier ot the 
kingdom ot Barra; and when the legitimate chief of Gunjur died, the Muslims 
there assumed power and invited Silla to be Alm~ - their political and 
religious head.2 
An equally sketchy description of Fodey Cabba in contemporar,y documents 
gives a pla.ce called Jacha in the interior as his native town. In a letter 
to Governor Rowe in 1887, Cabba called himself the son of Shieku .Abu Bakr;3 
while a supporter addressed him as "son ot Bakarie Domboyah, born ot noble 
4 blood, both father and mother." Cabba had evidently entered the Gambia with 
his father, who was eventually killed in an engagement in the Niani countr,y 
1. c.o. 87/55, 1853, 11th July, O'Connor to Palkington.~NewcaBtl~ 
2. Gambia Archives, Ex.Co. Minutes, 24th Feb. 1894, Mr. Topp. 
l. Gambia Archives, Enclosure No. 189, Letters 1888, Fodey Cabba to Sir S. 
Rowe, Translated 22nd September 1887. 
4. Gambia Archives, Arabic letter ot Sasoom Cham to Fodey Cabba., translated 
by M.A. Sa.vage, Government Interpreter, 9th January 1892. 
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by ~a Molloh. With the remainder of his father's ar~ he subjugated a 
district between Kiang and Jarra on the South Bank ot the River, tortif,ying 
several of the towns there with stockades, but making Datore and Medina inland 
I 
towns under French jurisdiction, his headquarters. Under the leadership ot the .. 
two fodeys, a loose confederacy of l-fuslima was formed in the lower River; and 
Cabba, in particular, was to give a direction to the war which only Maba had 
equalled. Like that chief, he was described by officials as a man of 
remarkably fine appearance, a powerful pqysique, intelligent with some 
knowledge ot French, and considerable powers ot leadership and organisation.2 
While these men dominated native politics so long was the jihad pursued 
unmitigatedly to the end ot exterminating the Jolas, who were 'pagans', and. 
reconverting back-sliding Muslims among the Mandinkas. It was a war, they 
believed, ordained by God. Cabba's outlook was typical ot that ot other jihad 
leaders. In a message to the Administrator in Bathurst, he wrotel "I beg to 
say I have nothing to do with groundnuts, as, where I am, I am only a stranger. 
Ever since I knew ~self to be a man, ~ occupation has been a warrior; and 
3 I make it lI\Y duty to tight the Soninkes, who profess no religion whatever. 
If the Soninkes on the north bank of the river had accepted the MahoDlJledan 
religion, we could have lived in unity •••• "4 His attitude towards the ) 
Colonial Power was equally forthright and uncompromisingl "I have nothing to 
1. Gambia Archives, Lt.-Col. Y.G.Patchett to the Adjutant-General, Horse 
Guards, 11th November 1890. 
2. J.M.Gr~, "Hlstor,y", p.452. 
3. Soninkesl In Gambian terminology, Soninke did not refer to a tribe, but 
to nominal Muslims and pagans. 
4. J.M. Grq, "History", p.452. 
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do with whitemen", he wrote in 1887. 1 Cabba and Silla acted with a singleness 
of purpose which knew no compromise; the extent of their power was such b.1 
the end of the nineteenth cent~ that only joint Anglo-French expeditions 
eventually crushed them. 
The narrative of the 'Soninke-Marabout' wars has been told in great 
detail by Gr~ in his -History of the Gambia", and all that will be attempted 
here is to consider the British role as intermediary, and the extent to which 
mediation between belligerent parties developed into intervention and a 
growth of militar,y and territorial involvement. It has earlier been suggested 
that official opinion outside the settlement was not at first opposed to 
MUslim domination in the Gambia. The Colonial Otfice had declined to prop 
up disintegrating states and was prepared to reach a compromise with the 
de facto governments established by the Muslims when it was expedient to do 
80. otherwise, the Governors were instructed to pursue a policy of 
neutrality. In 1872, Pope Hennessy, the Governor-in-chiet, endorsed. 
Colonial Office thinking by a comparison with the situation in his own colony 
of Sierra Leone, where contests between MUalims and their opponents had ended 
in victory for the tormer and. their nearer approach to the colony area. "But 
so far from being dangerous neighbours or people who despise labour," Hennessy 
wrote, "the,y have turned out to be well-disposed to the British Government 
and most useful to the extension ot trade." It wu Sir A.E. Kennedy's 
conciliatory policy towards Muslims in Sierra Leone which, he thought, had 
.. 
produced advantageous results to that coloqy. "I am theretore disposed to 
1. Gambia Archives, Letters 1888, Enclosure No. 189, Fodey Cabba to 
Governor S. Rowe. 
instruct him [the Administrator of the Gambia] to maintain a strict 
neutrality ••• to cultivate friendly relations with the l-fohanrnedans as with 
1 the pagans." But attempts at mediation in the Gambia were to lead to 
involvement, and to the extension of British territo~ and influence • 
. 
The role of the British Administrator ot the Gambia as inte~ediar,y 
between the belligerents was a position into which he was raised, both ~ 
warring parties themselves, and b,y third parties which entered the Gambia 
from outside the territo~ in order to bring peace between their allies and 
those with wom they were at war. Thus the Administrator became the recipient 
of numerous letters in Arabic from a large number ot rulers from the interior, 
maki.Dg the African Arabic translator one of the most important junior officers 
in the Civil Service. As early as 1865, a deputation of pagan Jolas and 
their opponents, Nuslim Mandinka.s of Vintang Creek area on the South Bank, 
had requested acting-Governor Primet to arrange peace and draw up a treaty 
2 between them. 
Twenty years later, the war of extermination in the South Bank and the 
struggle for domination among the ~luslim rulers ot the North Bank were still 
1. C.O. 87/102, 1872, vol.l. 2nd Sept., Pope Hennessy to Lord Kimberley. 
C.O. 87/82, 1865, vol.l. 14th Sept. Jolas and others to C.Beresford Primet; 
C.O. 87/55, 1853, 12th Aug., 3rd Sept. O'Connor to Palkington. [NewCastlej 
In 1853, Governor O'Connor had meditated between the king ot Barra and 
one of his chiefs; and the people of Gunjur and Brufut had appealed. to 
him to bring peace to Combo. 
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being pursued. To intervene among the rival reformers the Muslim ruler of 
the theocratic state of Puta Toro, Abdoul Boobacare, entered Baddibu in 1886 
"to bring Beram Cees~ [one of Mahmoud n'Dare Bah's lieutenants] and Said 
~~ttee [Maba's son] into a peaceful pursuit." While he was on this mission, 
Abdoul Boobacare appealed to the Administrator in Bathurst, I.J.S. H~, to 
participate in the negotiations. "If the Governor does not come Baddibu 
will spoil •••• [that place being] the chief seat of Bathurst traders •••• n l 
The invitation was accepted; and, through British intervention, a temporar,y 
peace was established in Pebruar,y 1887. Beram Ceesay's lordship over the 
towns he held was recognized, while Said Hattee, as overlord, was provided with 
2 
a subsidy of £100 per annum by the Colonial Government. 
In the MacCarthy Island area, over which the l-fus1im reformers of Baddibu 
had extended their authority by the 'seventies, the Commandant of that Island 
found that Liberated Africans there had assumed the role of intermediary 
between the king of Cattabar and his Muslim opponents. But far from 
supporting official policy, they had, on their own initiative, adopted an 
independent line (as indeed they had done in Maba's Baddibu of the 'sixties) 
under the leadership of their local Wesleyan MInister, the Rev. York Clement. 
For the difficulty of all Africans as long as the wars lasted was emotional 
involvement in all the issues raised by the changes that were taking place 
in all the states. Neutrality towards the belligerents was therefore not 
only difficult for them, but meaningless. In order to obviate involvement 
1. C.O. 87/127, 1886, vol.l. Arabic letter translated 6th Feb., 
Abdoul Boobaeare to the Administrator in Bathurst. 
2. J. Grq, "History", pp.462, 463. 
in the wars, (~Carthy Island being defenceless after 1866 except for an 
untrained militia force of "old men"),l Mr. Tanner, the Manager, had forbidden 
MUslims and ISoniDkes
' 
from the mainland from entering the Island. This waa 
&Ccepted by the inhabitants as a wise and cautious policy until it was applied 
to the fugitive king of Cattabar in 1872. 
That Tanner refused political asylum to the king, his wives and retinue, 
and deported them to an uninhabited island a mile aW'~ - Papyong island - gave 
cause for great concern. Representations were made by Clement and his 
I committee I against an act which waa "equal to ••• murder ••• ", the king of 
Catabar being the rightful owner of MacCarthy. 2 And in defiance of 
instructions laid down by the Manager, they visited the king at Papyong with 
a view to bringing him back to MacCarthy Island. The outcome of this 
incident was the arrest of the Wesleyan Minister, York Clement, and of the 
leader of the African trading community there, -H.G. Dodgin. 3 The king of 
Catabar continued his flight beyond the upper Gambia into Bundoo to seek new 
allie8.4 But a treaty between Mahmoud n'Dare Bah and the colonial Government 
in 1873, gave official recognition to the Muslim chieftain as effective ruler 
of Catabar and surrounding territories; and for the security of British 
5 traders in Bah's domains, he was offered a stipend of £110 per aDDWD. When, 
1. 
2. 
C.o. 87/96, 1870, vol.l. 23rd Feb., Capt. Niven, Superintendent ot Police, 
to Major Bravo, Administrator. 
C.O. 87/102, 1872, vol.2. 19th April, Petition ot Y.F.Clement & other 
inhabitants to Mr. B. Tanner, Manager MacCarthy laland. 
C.O. 87/102, 1872, vol.l. 21st April, B.Tanner to H.Fowler, &Cting 
Administrator. 
C.O. 87/102, 1872, vol.l. 26th April, Tanner to Fowler. 
c.o. 87/105, 1873, vol.2. August Treaty between H.M.Cooper and Mahmoud 
n'Dare Bah; see also chapter III of the.i •• 
however, political control in Baddibu was lost to Said Mattee, the treaty of 
1887 deprived Mahmoud n'Dare Bah of £100 ot his stipend. 
Por attitudes towards the Huslims were now less rigid than they had been, 
to a large extent being dictated by expediency. Indeed the 1873 treaty must 
be regarded as a decisive approach towards Muslim warriors trom whom the War 
Ottice now looked tor recruits to tight the Ashantee war. But Bah himself 
was at war with the king ot Sine, and had not the authority to recommend the 
depletion ot his torces for this purpose to his lieutenants. Liberated 
Africans, however, had demonstrated their own preference for the traditional 
ruler in their area who had alw~s been tai thful to treaty corom! tments with 
the British; and while they had given support to Maba in the 'sixties, they 
had shitted their ground under his successor, becauae of relationships long 
established with the native authority and peoples of Catabar state. 
The Clement case demonstrated the vigour of urbanised Africans in the 
Settlement; whether in the colony or in out-stations, they involved themselves :/ 
in local politics. Indeed, while this element remained in the River states 
and continued to pursue the role ot intermediar,y between the belligerents and 
the Government in st. ~~'s, it was not possible for that Government to 
maintain its neutrality. Clement and his congregation did not only involve 
the local Government in the incident of 1872, but also the church, and ver,y 
nearly the British Government itself. It was rumoured that some ot the 
Minister's triends had laid the case betore a member ot the House ot Commons 
J. 
I 
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with a view to some public action being taken in the matter, and that legal 
proceedings against }~. Tanner were also contemplated. l 
But it was not like Benj amin Tregaskis to allow the damage done to the 
prestige of the church to pass unnoticed.2 As a result of his representation 
to the colonial Government, the Governor-in-chief reprimanded Tanner and 
instructed him to make an official apology to Clement. At the same time, 
he requested the Administrator in Bathurst to "draw the attention of the 
missionaries of fiery denomination, in a friendly wa:y, ••• to the inconvenience 
of their becoming leaders of opposition to government authorities, especially 
in remote stations where a public servant has sometimes little assistance in 
dealing with the difficulties that arise." But urbanised .A.:trican traders in 
native states were not yet prepared to support Government policy if it was not 
in their interest to do so; neither could they avoid involvement in the 
politics of those states. 
As hostilities approached nearer the colony area, the colonial Government 
had to provide for the detence and protection of British territory and British 
subjects; it could not afford to remain neutral. Por Pode.y Billa and Podey 
Cabba'were determined to subdue or destroy the Jolas ot Foni, a province which 
la:y adjacent to Foreign Combo and produced excellent wax tor the export 
market. The Nuslims were not unaware ot their economic importance to the 
settlement, but their trade in intoxicating liquors, of which the.y were the 
producers, was as offensive as their animism. And while the Jolas remained 
C.o. 87/102, 1872, vo1.1. 14th Oct., P.Hennessy to Lord Kimberley. 
C.O. 87/102, 1872, vol.l. 17th August, i-M.Tregaskis to the Administrator. 
invincible, they provided the justification for the jihad in the Gambia. 
But constant raids into Foni were to have repercussions in Combo; and 
gradually Government policy changed from mediation to intervention, since the 
annihilation of an industrious tribe on the frontier ot British territor,y was 
itselt a threat to British subjects there. Besides, slave-raiding was a 
concomitant ot the jihad for it served the purpose ot breaking up village 
religion and dispersing tribal groups to the end that Islam became an 
integrative factor when slaves settled under their new masters. l British 
policy atter Abolition knew no compromise with any form ot slave-raiding; 
military involvement with Sill a and Cabba was to be sanctioned by Colonial 
Office on this score. 
Until the 'seventies, the situation even in this region looked hopeful, 
for by its mediation, the colonial Government had encouraged the king of 
Combo to sign treaties with the Muslims. Though such treaties reduced 
bloodshed, they gradually handed over all lands in Foreign Combo to the Huslims; .1 
and 8illa as overlord was offered an annual stipend from the Government for 
the protection of British subjects in his domains. This was in 1873 when 
Captain Cooper, the acting Administrator, made an expedition to Gunjur in 
H.M.G. "Merlin" and signed a treaty with Muslim clerics there by which the 
colonial Government agreed "to respect in ever,y wa:y the terri tory held by the t 
Marabouts, and ••• not in a:n:y wa:y [to] intertere with their laws, customs, or 
proceedings amongst themselves, but only as regards British subjects •••• " 
1. Trimingham, "Islam in West Africa", pp.29 8; 142. This was very much the 
picture among the Fulani of Northern Nigeria. 
,! 
A stipend of £50 per annum was offered to the chief of Gunjur in compensation 
for protection of British subjects entering Foreign Combo Itfor the purpose of 
legitimate trade •••• It Thus the Government hoped to end the threats of 
invasion of BritiSh Combo; but }fuslims insisted their objective was to get 
"all the ground" from tmbelievers, that if God "made war come, they must go 
1 to war, if he made peace come, they would have peace •••• It 
That no provision had been made for the protection of the Jolas (for 
they were not British subjects) by Cooper's treaty was soon evident, as was 
the Administrator's indiscretion in having been signator,y to a treaty to which 
8illa himself was not a party. His warriors ignored the agreement of 1873 and 
continued to harrass and seize the Jolas, while they subjected the Mandinkas 
of Combo to greater humiliation. In 1874, Sucuta was destroyed, the 
inhabitants being dispersed into British ComboJ2 and in the following year, 
Busumballa, the last stronghold of the Mandinka king, fell to the Muslims, 3 
and the fugitive king took refuge in Bathurst. It was a situation which 
required immediate action for it looked as if war in British Combo was 
inevitable in the event of the war lords pursuing the refugees into British 
territor,y. The Administrator, therefore, despatched all available police in 
the colony to the frontier, having taken precaution to issue a proclamation 
1. c.o. 87/104, 1873, vo1.1. 26th March, H.M.Cooper to the Governor in Chief, 
enclosure - Treaty of 24th l-farch 1873. 
2. C.O. 87/107, 1874, 26th June, C.H.Kortright to Governor George Berkeley. 
3. C.O. 87/108, 1875, 20th Jtme, Cooper to Lord Carnavon. 
restricting the movement of armed persons across that frontier, and appealed 
to the Home Government tor assistance. l The Muslim threat that no peace 
would be permanent till unbelievers had been driven out ot Combo was thus 
effectively demonstrated. 
In a matter of such importance to the security of British subjects, the 
Colonial Office did act with promptitude, a warship being "sent for the 
purpose of affording the Colonial Government moral countenance and support •••• 
[but] not to be brought into action except to secure the safety of the lives 
2 
and property of British subjects." There was in tact no need for hostile 
action; tor in the Gambia, unlike the Senegal, the jihad was never brought 
into British territory, Which was generally regarded as neutral ground. Even 
in the midst of hostilities, the mediation of the British Administrator was 
acceptable 'to both parties. Muslim supremacy in Foreign Combo was now 
recognised b,y a new treaty between Fodey 8illa and Tomaney Bojang, the nominal 
king. It was a humiliating peace for the king; he agreed to have his head 
shaved and to become a loh1slim, and to l~ down. his arms provided that land was 
3 
allotted to his people "to cultivate and sit down quiet." 8illa accepted 
the terms, and. declared the war against backsliders in Combo at an end. 
1. c.o. 87/108, 1875, 20th June, Cooper to Lord Carnavon. 
C.O. 87/108, 1875, 9th July, Lord Carnavon 'to H.t.M.Cooper. 
C.O. 87/108, 1875, 29th Sept., Treaty Agreement between Tomaney Bojang 
and Fodey Silla. 
In Foni, in Kiang and Jarra, the jihad was pursued with renewed religious 
fervour under Sil1a himself, Fodey Cabba, and lesser warriors, such as one 
Ibraimah n'Jie, a French subject from Senegal, who established himself in 
Vintang in the 'eighties and attempted the destruction of Foni. l Once the 
colonial government was convinced that raids into Foni were for the purpose 
of "catching slaves", Sir Samuel Rowe recommended that some action should be 
taken "to interfere with the passage of slave caravans through districts 
neighbouring to, or, in treaty with our possessions.,,2 The obvious alliance 
between the Muslims of the Gambia and those of the Senegal in the 'eighties 
gave the colonial Government further cause for concern; and policy approached 
nearer that adopted ~ the French, across the border, since the mid nineteenth 
century. In short, the British Government began to understand the objectives 
of the leaders of the jihad, their devotion to the cause of reform (notwith-
standing the evidence of bitter riva1r,y among the Mllalims of Baddibu), and 
their determination not to l~ down arms till their goal had been reached. 
In 1886, H.M.S. "Rifleman" was despatched to Bathurst in consequence of 
an appeal made for reinforcement against "the threatening attitude of the 
natives on the Senegal bank", 3 which informed opinion believed might lead to 
a general uprising in both territories. Alre~ there was interchange of 
MUslim leaders and troops between Senegal and Gambia. From Baddibu, Mamadou 
Seydou, a disciple of Fodey Silla, had entered Futa Toro and collected an ~ 
1. C.O. 81/125, 1885, vol.2. 20th ~, W.H.Savage to the Administrator. 
2. c.O. 81/125, 1885, vol.2. 13th August, Governor Rowe to Sir Fred Stanley. 
3. C.O. 81/127, 1886, vol.l. 27th April, ~we to Earl Granville. 
of 12,000 men with which he marched against the fortified French post of Bakel 
in the upper Senegal. 1 What disturbed the Government of st. Mary's was that 
Seydou was reported to be carrying on active correspondence with the two Fodeys 
in their territor,y, and recruiting Serahulis and Touculors for their armies • 
.As E. Allegre, a local ~1ulatto merchant, put it:- "If the element which is now 
forming this party [the Muslim alliance], were purely local and be composed ot 
our Mandingo tribes there would not be ••• much to apprehend ••• but the fact 
that strikes me the most and which I believe is quite new is that Foreigners 
coming from the interior and from agitated countries are being joined to that 
element •••• "2 Such information, submitted b,y a local personage in close 
touch with public opinion on both sides of the border, was immediately accepted 
by Governor and Council as coming from a reliable source; and on the strength 
of it the Government appealed for protection. 
The French, on their part, acted decisively; wi thin a few months of the 
jihad being preached again in their settlement Mamadou Seydou was arrested by 
3 their forces and ordered to be deported to the Gaboon. Their presence in 
the vicinity of the Gambia was always an important factor in counteracting the 
growth of the influence of the Muslim 'confederacy'. By a policy of political 
alliances with .African chiefs - the king of Sine, Mahmoud n'Dare Bah, Husa 
Malloh - they succeeded in reducing Muslim supremacy as a poU tical power in 
their territor,y. Thus the struggle at the end of the nineteenth century had 
1. C.O. 87/127, 1886, vol.l. 14th April, E.Pellegrin,Consul tor France, to 
I.S.Hay. 
2. C.O. 87/127, 1886, vol.l. 16th April, E.Allegre to I.S.H~. 
3. C.o. 87/128, 1886, vo1.2. 20th ~, I.S.H~ to S.Rowe. 
assumed international proportions when French troops, in providing aid to 
allies, entered states like Baddibu in violation of the treaties ot Versailles 
and Faris which had guaranteed the Gambia waterw8iY to Bri tain. l In the 
upper River, too, the French had watched events with growing anxiety, and 
had made an "a.lliance with Nusa Holloh, by which they assisted him to establish 
his authority as head of a confederacy ot Fula chiefs. Land-hlmgry, with 
numerous herds and people, the Fulas, under Musa's father, had entered the 
Gambia in the mid nineteenth century, and had acquired extensive tracts ot 
land by dri'ring out the natives of Carboo. Now Musa Molloh was prepared to 
make alliances with aqy ruler who would recognise his authority over Fehrdou 
or Fulladu, which bordered on Kiang and Jarra, countries under the control ot 
Fodey Cabba and of his father before him. Malloh had also decided to 
champion the lost cause of the traditional rulers in the upper River, and thua 
to engage in battle with Fodey Cabba, not only for political supremacy in the 
2 South Bank, but also for economic advantages. Nor was the struggle which 
ensued of less interest to the French than that of Baddibu, since the extension 
ot French jurisdiction in the Casamance involved the subjugation of interior 
tribes there; and Musa Molloh's kingdom lay on both sides ot the Anglo-French 
boundary. 
~ernal pressures and the deterioration ot good relations with rulers 
with whom peace treaties had been signed necessitated some adjustment to the 
1. C.O. 87/1)0, 1881, vol.l. 6th May, Colonial Ottice Minute, A.W.L.H. to 
R.Meade. 
2. C.O. 87/129, 1886, vol.3. 23rd October, E.A..N.Smith to Administrator, 
G.r.Carter. The Manager of ~fa.cCartlv Island. reported that the "capacity 
of the countr,y (Fehrdoo] for trading,purposes is only second to Baddiboo, 
when Baddiboo was in a tranquil condl.tion •••• n 
British policy of mediation and neutrality. When Said ~attee broke the peace 
of 1881 by attacking the king ot Sine, he very nearly suttered the fate of his 
father. His army was routed by the French at a place called Koomboof , and 
he was pursued into Baddibu and beyond it to the borders ot Barra. From there 
Mattee crossed the River into Bathurst and sought protection from Sir Samuel 
Rowe who was in the colony at the time. With him swarmed a large bo~ of 
MUslims, all of whom now sought British protection, for fortunes had been 
reversed. 1 That this chief had long been ill at ease with his French 
neighbours had been evident in his appeal to the British and French in 1884 
to delimit the boundary, and show him "what part they had in Saloum grotmd", 
as he did not wish "to have anything to. do with the French government". His 
tather had been "a good friend of the British government", he said, and it was 
hi's wish not to violate British territory or offend that government. 2 
For the moment, however, the British remained indecisive about their role 
in the war beyond the protection of British subjects, and the refusal to 
surrender Said Mattee to the French Commandant, who was reminded that he was 
making war on chiets in friendly alliance with the British Government.) 
Governor Rowe, having accepted the chiet's unconditional surrender, kept him 
in Bathurst as a political prisoner till provision was made tor his location 
in British Combo. This was a tar-reaching step, when Muslim warriors were 
1. C.O. 81/130, 1887, vol.l. 6th ~, Bathurst - Reuter's Telegrams. 
2. C.O. 81/122, 1884, vol.l. 15th July, Said Hattee Bah to the Administrator 
Holoney. 
). C.O. 81/1)0, 1887, vol.l. 6th June, R.L.A. to R.I-feade. 
recognised as British protected persons; thus the British had been forced to a 
policy involvement which was to provide the solution to the menace of the 
Podeys in the South Bank. 
Fodey Silla, like other jihad leaders, h&d shown no desire to fall under 
French rule. til beg that you do not put me into the hands of the French ••• 
tor I have no love tor them •••• ", he wrote to the British Administrator in 
1890.1 And the following year, he complained that his towns were rebelling 
against his rule and deserting him. The people ot Sucuta and Bretet, tor 
example, had refused to pay him custom and had oftered their towns to the 
British.2 The jihad was wearing itself out; it was not only the Jolas who 
were tormented by it but ordinary Muslims longed to get back to normality. 
But their leaders "had. no experience of a Muslim state, ••• [only] an 
idealistic model gained trom reading law books", 3 which they were unable to 
reproduce. Inspite ot their short-comings as administrators, Silla and Cabba 
were not prepared to cede territories over which they had established their 
influence. The former was altered a pension ot £100 per annum it he would 
reside in Bathurst and cede the whole ot Foreign Combo to the British, but he 
replied tersely that nO. bird in the bush is happier than a bird in a golden 
cage.,,4 But the new Governor, R.B. Llewelyn, under the impetus ot disgruntled 
merchants,5 and influenced b,y the international agreements signed at Berlin and 
1. Gambia Archives, Enclosure No.5, Aborigines No. 33, Fodey Silla to G.T. 
Carter, translated 19th Dee., 1890. 
C.O. 87/141, 1892, vol.l. 3rd June, R.B.Llewelyn to Lord Knutstord. 
Trimingham, "Islam in Vest Africa", p.143. 
c.o. 81/144, 1893, vol.2. 18th Dec., R.B.Llewelyn to Lord Ripon. 
Merchants in Bathurst were enraged "at the a~atby ot the English Government 
in allowing such acts to be done by a Chiet lFodey Sills.] who gets a. 
subsidy trom the Government,." C.O. 87/144 1893 vol 2 18th Dec 
R.B.Llewelyn to Lord Ripon. ". • ., 
Brussels in 1885 and l890l respectively, was determined to extend British 
influence in the Gambia by effective occupation. 
He agitated for the removal of slave dealers and marauders from British 
territo~, in conformity "with the advance movement now taking place in 
West Africp;."2 It was therefore in this context that the destruction of 
Fode,y Billa and Fodey Cabba was planned ~ the British Government. With 
French cooperation, Silla was captured in the Casamance in 1894 and deported 
to st. Louis, where he died; while Cabba was shot in his stronghold of 
Medina in 1901. Thus the jihad in the Gambia came dramatically to a close. 
1. The Colonial Powers at these Conferences agreed that they had a 'dual 
mandate' in Africa: to stop the slave trade and replace it by the 
benefits of EUropean civilisation, and to make the trade and resources 
of Africa available to the rest of the world. Such objectives could 
only be achieved by effective occupation of Africa. 
2. C.O. 87/144, 1893, vol.2. 18th Dec., Llewelyn to Ripon. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE RESOLUTION OF A DII...»fMA. - A PROTECTORATE CREATED. 1887-1901. 
By the intervention of British forces against the Muslim confederacy on 
the South Bank of the River Gambia in the late nineteenth centur,y, the policy 
. 
of neutrality in native politics vas considered to have failed. For, b,y the 
late nineteenth centur,y, the compelling factor in West African policy vas 
fierce rivalr,y among European Powers for colonies in that region. So that 
punitive expeditions against J.1uslims became the preliminaries to the extension 
ot British jurisdiction over the banks ot the Gambia to "checkmate" the French • 
In the newly appointed Governor of the settlement, Mr. R.B. Llewelyn, the 
Colonial Office had one ot its most devoted advoeates of Proteetorate government. 
To him, the creation of a British proteetorate in the Gambia was the only 
solution to the dilemma whieh'had taced all administrators since the foundation 
ot the settlement. It was therefore during the nine years ot his 
administration that the British Government established a working politieal 
unit in the River states controlled b,y the central Government in Bathurst. 
Though this was only achieved through the advice and support of the Exeeutive 
and Legislative Councils of the territor,y, and b,y the co-operation ot mediating 
groups in the River states, sueh as influential merehants and African traders, 
the Governor was ahead ot public opinion on this issue. He it was who had a 
clear vision ot a working protectorate, to~dB which he ste.red Government 
and opinion. 
Thirty years earlier, however, Governor d'Arcy had been the first to 
advocate the destruction of Muslim power in the Gambia, and the creation of a 
British protectorate u an alternative to continuous warfare in the vicinity 
of British territory. In d'Mcy's view, it was expedient that the British 
should safe-guard their cODlllercial interests in the River by accepting the 
"numerous applications requesting permission to allow the union Jack to be 
hoisted in several towns in Baddibu", and elsewhere in the River. Such a 
government as he proposed, could be established "without a shot being fired", 
and within two months, he believed, a protectorate system could be euily set 
I 
up as far up as MacCarthy Island. 
In the 'sixties, the overriding interest in British settlements was the 
increase of trade; and in the Gambia, apart from fostering groundnut 
cultivation in the fertile districts ot Baddibu and Saloum, d'Arcy and 
British merchants there hoped tor an abundant supply ot cotton (a commodity 
in great demand during the American Civil War) "it the lives ot the farmers 
2 
and the results of their industry were secured to them." The Duke ot 
Newcastle, however, was not prepared to consider mere commercial interests 
as indication for declaring protectorates, especially when British merchants 
in the Niger Delta region were conducting profitable businesses without sO 
much as a formal government, apart from that exercised ~ a British consul. 
The Secretary of state therefore replied tirmly that "the Governor' s scheme 
of :protectorate cannot be sanctioned. "3 
1. c.o. 87/74, 24th October, 1862, Governor d'Arcy to the Duke ot Newcastle. 
2. Ibid. 
3. C.o. 87/74, 1862, 17th November, Colonial Oftice Minute Qy Newcastle. 
Apart trom the confused. state ot affairs in Baddibu in the 'sixties, 
events in the Ceded Mile during the wars would seem to have called for the 
extension of Bri Ush jurisdiction over this area, at least, with a view to 
isolating it from Muslim invasion. This might have been achieved but tor 
the ancient institution of domestic slaver" which existed in all native states 
and presented one of the major obstacles to the declaration of a protectorate. l 
As anxious for a protectorate were British African traders with factories in 
Baddibu. Inspite of their apparent satisfaction with Maba's regime, the 
possibility of the continuation of hostilities, caused them to petition the 
Governor in 1864 for the creation of a British protectorate over hamlets b.y 
"the waterside" (meaning on the ver" banks of the River) which they would build 
a~ from the interior towns of the natives.2 But it was not Governor d'Arcy's 
plan to create segregated zones in the River for such traders, fearing this 
would only provide them with better opportunities for participating in the 
trans-continental slave trade. 
While there was no agreement between Governor and people on the need for, 
or, the nature of, a protectorate in the Gambia, it was not likely that a. 
strong ca.se could be put up to the Colonial Office. Even members of the 
Legisla.tive Council were not enthusiastic about the Governor's own 
recommendations, criticising projects which involved an impoverished coloqy in 
3 
unnecessar.Y expenditure. Territorial expansion was genera.1ly unpopular with 
1. C.O. 87/85, 1866, vol.2. 28th Sept., d'Arcy to CarnaY~. 
2. C.O. 87/80, 1864, vol.2. 20th December, Traders' Petition to d'Arcy. 
3. C.o. 81/85, 1866, vol.2. 27th May, Legislative Council ~tlnutes. 
British merchants in the 'sixties; and even humanitarian attempts at locating 
Liberated .Africans and refugees in BarrOW' Town in British Combo, and in 
Fitzgerald Town in the Ceded Mile were resented b.Y them. The,y were firmly of 
the opinion that the revenues of the colony did not warrant the expenditure 
that would be incurred in taking actual possession ot the Ceded Mile with a 
Manager and twenty policemen as d' Arcy had proposed. Thomas Brown, as always, 
was suspected ot being at the bottom ot opposition,l but it waa to be 
expected that merchants who had resisted taxation tor years would be unwilling 
to provide additional funds for the maintenance or protection ot native tribes. 
All the,y wanted was to secure commercial interests b.Y stationing a gun-boat and 
a detachment ot troops in the River to coerce and punish native rulers who 
dared to oppose those interests. Though a Manager tor the Ceded Mile was 
appointed during .Admiral Patey's administration, when the revenues ot the 
settlement improved,2 his authority was limited to the British towns in the 
area, native towns continuing to be governed under native law or Islamic law. 3 
It was not till the 'eighties then that serious discuasion on the 
declaration of a protectorate in the Gambia was entertained b.Y the Colonial 
1. C.o. 87/79, 1864, 26th January, d'Arcy to lDUka·.'otO!Ns.wcsfJUe. 
c.O. 87/79, 1864, 22nd January, Merchants' Memorial tOlfEWC~fSTtE. 
c.o. 87/80, 1864, 2200 August, d'!rcy to Newcas:tle. ' 
c.O. 87/91, 1869, 5th April, Admiral Patey to Sir A.E.Kennedy. 
C.O. 87/85, 1866, vol.2. 19th September, Governor Sam Blackall to ... 
na:rnavon •. <..:.~ UP.. 
Office, as a direct result of the complete collapse of traditional government 
in the Handinka states, and of the threat of French occupation of Baddibu and. 
Foreign Combo. B,y this period, the situation in the states had drifted into 
general chaos; for, in practice, British neutrality meant that the Government 
was neither willing to undertake the responsibility of establishing peace and 
order, nor 'WOuld it permit the new rulers to do this in their own wa;y. Indeed, 
the traditional rulers hoped that the longer they resisted MUslim incursions, 
the greater the possibility of receiving aid from the colonial Government with 
whom they were in treaty relation. The result was, that while the struggle 
remained indecisive, so long was the question of a protectorate shelved. 
Meanwhile, British African traders were engaged in propaganda in those i· 
native states which were likely to take their counsel, their objective being 
to persuade the rulers of such states to take the initiative b,y offering their 
territories to the British and thus to conclude the wars. It was no doubt 
one such trader who wrote a ver,y rudimentar,y letter to the Queen on behalf ot 
Chief Beram Ceesay in 1880:- "lotY great opinion," he began, "is to have consolt 
with your Governor of Bathurst to have agreement between I and people to be 
under English subject." It concluded ver,y simply: "I shall thank your Royal 
Highness to receive an answer."l It seemed almost a ludicrous letter in 1880, 
but b,y 1887, when \ the Baddibu civil war had developed into an international 
border dispute between Britain and France, it was beginning to be important 
to take offers ot territor,y seriously. 
1. C.O. 87/116, 1880, vol.2. 12th Sept., Beram Ceesa;y to II.H. the Queen. 
351 
It was in ihis period of ihe l880s when the British Government was 
contemplating decisive action against French encroachment in the Gambia that a 
nucleus of Bathurst traders with roots in native states like Jarra on the South 
Bank were working their hardest as self-appointed mediators (though it is not 
impossible that the,y might have been working under explicit directions of a 
Liberated African committee in Bathurst). In November 1885, one Benjamin Bah, 
a trader and cutter-owner of Jarra origin, but domiciled in Bathurst, approached. 
the Administrato~, C.A. Moloney, on behalf of the king, chiefs and people of 
Jarra, pr¢ng him to take the whole kingdom of Jarra under British proiection, l 
although it was a state Wich had been dismembered by Podey Cabba and Musa 
Molloh. In December, a further effort was made to cede that state without 
success, the Secretary of state instructing the Governor-in-Chief trto cause 
the king and chiefs of Jarra to be informed that Her Majesty is not prepared 
to accept their offer. n2 But the Administrator saw advantages to be 'derived 
from the possession of an area fourteen miles deep by twenty miles long in the 
middle River.:3 
So did African members of the Legislative Council, men like J.D.Richards 
and S.J.Forster whose role in the commercial community and in the Government 
of the colony enabled them to bring pressure to bear on those who formulated 
policy. For example, the presenc~ of the Governor-in-chief in Bathurst in 
1881 provided them with the opportunity to resume the protectorate issue with 
1. c.O. 81/126, 1885, vol.). 2nd Nov., Benjamin Bah to C.A.Moloney, 
enclosed in despatch of 7ih Nov., Noloney to Sir P.A.Stanley. 
C.O. 87/126, 1885, vol.). 4th January, stanley to Rove. 
C.O. 87/126, 1885, vol.). 5th Dec., Moloney to Sir Samuel Rowe. 
officials at high level. Having led a welcoming deputation of prominent 
African citizens to Sir Samuel Rowe soon a.:t'ter his arrival in their midst, 
Richards followed this up b,y submitting a letter to the Governor which set out 
the Jarra problem and posed a solution for it. 
Liberated African interest in that state was almost purely economic; 
their opposition to Fodey Cabba intensified in proportion as that ruler 
appeared to destroy the prosperity that might otherwise have been expected b,y 
its inhabitants, and by those who were cultivators, or traders there like 
themselves. Indeed to them, Jarra was potentially productive, strategically 
situated at the crossroads to the interior, with "facUi ties of access to the 
upland countries be,yond, ••• an easy resort from various points to the interior, 
where natives reach the sea-border [the River bank] to settle and cultivate 
groundnuts, and enabled to return home within short periods without the risk 
and inconvenience of crossing and recrossing the River, and also with lesser 
risk of being plundered during their short journey from Jarra, which lasts 
t ,,1 only a day or yO •••• African entrepreneurs had the advantage of knowing 
the River states thoroughly, for even when prosperity enabled. some of them to 
direct their businesses from Bathurst, all of them had learnt the business 
the hard ~, as groundnut-bqyers for European merchants in those states. 
Their analyses of River situations at this crucial time, therefore, came to 
be regarded with some importance by Governors like Samuel Rowe. 
1. C.o. 87/130, 1887, vol.l. 1st June, J.D.Richards to Samuel Rowe. 
7 
1887 was in fact an auspicious moment to press for a use of force against 
Cabba in order to secure for Britain "the most peaceful of the l-1and.ingo states," 
as Richards put it in his letter, "while the event at Baddibu is still fresh."l 
It was, however, the diplomatic situation created in that region ~ the pursuit 
of Said Mattee by French torces down to the very banks at the Gambia which was 
to mark a turning-point in colonial policy in that colony; for the Colonial 
Office was quite likely to remain unmoved by letters and petitions emanating 
from African communities agitating for the declaration of a British protectorate. 
Under the disturbing circumstances of 1887, Mr. Heming was not slow to 
deduce the implications of French activities on the North Bank, being tully 
aware of the terms of the B~lS Agreement of two years betore with its 
emphasis on effective occupation as against il1-detined spheres of influence 
in the interior of Africa. "It the French are allowed to occup,y Baddibu," 
he warned Mr. Meade, "they will divert the trade ot the Gambia and ruin our 
Settlement. .And we may expect that they play the same game on the South ot 
the River and occupy Fogni. We ought to checkmate them at oncel" and he 
suggested that Governor Rove should be instructed ~ telegraph to proclaim a 
British protectorate over both banks ot the River tor one mile inland, as far 
up as MacCarthy Island, while the Foreign Office should at once make 
representation to the French Government. 2 
British officials on the spot vere even more disturbed ~ reports ot 
French encroachment in Baddibu. Indeed when Rove heard that the French flag 
1. c.o. 87/130, 1887, vol.1. 1st June, Richards to Rove. 
2. C.o; 87/130, 1887, Tol.1. 6th May, c.o. Minute, Hemming to Meade. 
had. been hoisted in Jirong (or Juronko), situated a short distance north ot 
the Ceded J.file, he telegraphed Ho'me for instructions to hoist the British flag 
I 
at all landing places willing to accept it, and to ask tor "the withdrawal ot 
the French flag from every p lace within gunshot ot highwater on the bank ot the 
River ••• pending negotiations."l Thus began a teverish scramble for territory 
between the French and the British in this part ot West Africa, with the French 
generally setting the pace, since the British were only prepared to hasten to 
annexation in order to obstruct French expansion. Indeed, in those areas 
where the French threat was minimal, the British Government pursued its old 
policy ot inactivity, tor protection involved expense. On the North Bank, 
tor example, immediate action was necessary to settle the boundary issue, it 
only to assert British rights over a waterw~ recognised b,y international 
treaties as British. 
Acting OD instructions trom Home, b,y which treaties were to be made with 
2 
riverain chiets and the British tlag hoisted at all landing places, Sir 
Samuel Rowe embarked on a systematic flag-boisting mission along the River, 
starting at Misera on the Atlantic Coast and regarded as the most northerly 
3 town in Barra kingdom. This move immediately raised the question ot the 
1. C.O. 87/130, 1887, vol.l. 24th ~, Rowe to Lord Knutstord. 
2. C.O. 87/130, 1887, vol.l. 14th April, letter and 15th July telegram, 
Knutstord to Rowe. 
3. C.O. 87/130, 1887, vol.l. 18th August, C.O. Ninutes, Hemming to lleade. 
3SS 
Anglo-French boundar.y, for occupation in this part had often been so haphazard, 
that it was tmcertain 'What the French in Senegal regarded as their southern 
boundary. 1 From Misera, Rowe had planned an expedition eastwards, but his 
course was deflected southwards by a. report that the French Army was on its 
way to Ca.pe Ba.ld on the coa.st of Foreign Combo. To forestall them, Rowe vas 
now instructed to make treaties with the chiefs of that district and with those 
of FOgni,2 particularly as there a.ppeared to be no sla.ver,y difficulties among 
the Joles, "and it would be a. profitable country to a.equire."3 The tho~ 
problem of protection for the Jolas against the ravages of Cabba. and Silla now 
had to be resolved. In September 1887, Governor Rowe signed treaties of 
friendship and commerce with fourteen chiefs of Pogni by 'Which they pr~mised 
never to cede any part of their territor,y to any other Power "or enter into 
any agreement, treaty or arrangement with any Foreign government except 
through, and with the consent of, the Government of Her l-fajesty the Queen of 
England. n4 Similar trea.ties were signed subsequently with the chiefs of 
Kiang and Jarra. 
While in his official capa.eity Rowe was prepared to interpret, as 
accurately as possible, the instructions he received from Home, he did not 
hesitate to make Colonial Office officials know his private opinion on a 
mere flag-hoisting and treaty-making policy. "Towards preventing the 
occupation of the River banks by the French," he wrote in a private letter to 
1. C.O. 81/130, 1887, vol.l. 28th July, R.L.A. to R.l-teade. 
2. Ibid., A.W.L.H. to R.Meade. 
3. C.O. 81/130, 1881, vol.1. 18th Auguat, A.W.L.H. to R.Meade. 
4. C.O. 81/131, 1881, vol.2, 15th Sept., Treaty between Governor Rowe & 
Chiefs of Pogni. 
Hemming, "I do not think they are worth the paper they are written on except 
they will in some way restrain the French from taking advantage of opportunities 
offered to them •••• ,,1 Though he did not mention the alternative of creating 
a British protectorate at an early date, he must have had this in mind. Prom 
a practical point of view alone, the prestige of the British flag could hardly 
be expected to last long "if the districts are pillaged and no punishment 
2 
meted out to the marauders." The colo~ itself being wholly dependent on 
produce cultivated in native states provided a reason for extending British 
influence over such states, if only to safeguard the revenue. 
If the Colonial Office could be moved to see the point of view of the 
Gambia Government, it could not authorise officials on the spot to take action 
against French encroachment once the British Government had decided to settle 
the question of its rights in the Gambia b.r international negotiation. While 
reports of French activity on the frontiers of the Gambia were circulating, 
Sir Samuel Rowe was instructed to suspend all operations for the time being. 
Little wonder that Heming was so critical ot the Bri tiah stand, and 
dissatisfied with the Foreign Office for "del~s and neglect" in matters 
relating to the colonies. "The results are fatal," he complained to l-Ieade, 
3 
"and this Office is the one that gets blamed." His conclusions on the Gambia 
situation were realistic, and to a great extent he supported Rove's opinion 
that Gambian chiefs could not be expected to prefer "sentimental alliances" 
1. C.O. 87/131, 1887, vo1.2. 22nd October, Rowe to Hemming. 
2. Ibid. 
3. c.O. 81/131, 1881, vol.2. 12th November, Hemming to Meade. 
with the British, trom which they got no advantage, to the active support and 
protection ot another power. Hemming went further and indicated the 
alternatives open to his Government: It was either to do the "honourable" thing 
and declare a British protectorate over the whole ot the states adjacent to the 
River; or, it could use the opportunity to resume talks with Prance about the 
cession ot the Gambia as time had shown that only "an impossible expenditure 
1 trom Imperial tunds" could save the coloqy trom dec~. A simpler solution 
was tor the Government to do nothing and allow the Gambia trade to die out 
altogether: 
Financial considerations were alw~s important to the Colonial Ottice, 
and though the revenue ot that coloqy had continued to improve during the 
'eighties, the Gambia was b.Y no means a prosperous co1oqy at this time. And 
senior otticials at the Colonial Ottice, such as Heade, were only interested 
to tollow a policy such as had been recommended b.Y Lord Kimberley when he was 
Secretar,y ot state tor the colonies "to take what we consider essential alone 
and leave the rest to other Powers it they choose to take it •••• "2 In this 
case, only the River itselt and the lands immediately adjacent to it would 
appear to have been ot interest to the British Government. Beyond this, there 
was something unscrupulous, it not sinister, in Hemming's suggestion that it 
would be ot advantage to Britain it she could "enlarge the Settlement as much aa 
possible betorehand - and 80 enhance its value tor purpose. ot exchange."' 
1. C.O. 87/131, 1887, vol.2. 18th November, Hemming to Meade. 
2. C.o. 87/114, 1888, vol.'. 29th December, R.Meade to Lord Knutstord. 
3. c.o. 87/1')4, 1888, vo1.3. 28th December, Hemming to Head •• 
General~, concern for the wellbeing of the riverain peoples was limited to 
their sufferings under the harsh rule of the Nuslims, and especially as victims 
1 
of slave-raiders like Fodey Billa and Fodey Cabba. Yet these so-called 
marauders had large numbers ot ardent supporters - men and women - in all 
parts of the River and in Bathurst itself, to whom they were more like 
liberators than marauders. If this were not so, it would be difficult to 
explain the influence and authority exercised by the two Podeys for halt a 
centur,y. European Powers in West Africa tended to overlook the ill-eonsequences 
of their own policies upon indigenous peoples, in particular, the partitioning 
ot territories and its consequent dislocation ot societies, which, like the 
policy of the Podeys, was largely guided by selt-interest. 
By an Agreement ot the 10th ot August 1889, the boundaries ot the Gambia 
"") 
were finally delimited, thus preparing the way for the creation ot a British 
--protectorate there. The treaty had been signed,in Paris by representatives 
ot Britain (E.H. Egerton and A.W.L. Hemming) and at France (A. Nisard and 
J. Bayol). 2 In November ot the same year, the treaty was ratified by the two 
Governments. The essence ot the agreement ~ that Anglo-French Boundar,y 
Commissioners were to be appointed at an early date to mark out the boundar,y 
line on the spot, starting tram Jinnack Creek on the North Bank and following 
1. C.O. 87/1)1, 1887, vol.2. 18th'NoT., Hemming to Meade. 
2. C.O. 87/136, 1889, Tol.2. Treaty Agreement ot 10th Aug. 1889. 
the River "at a distance of ten kilometres from [it]", as far east as 
Yarbutenda, nearly three hundred miles from the estuary. Similarly, on the 
South Bank, the line was to begin at the mouth of the San Pedro River on the 
Atlantic coast and likewise follov the Gambia, at a distance of ten kilometres, 
to Yarbutenda. l This done, the British representatives returned to London 
relieved that they had saved the great vate~ and its batiks for Britain. 
Unfortunately, with little consultation with local authorities in the Gambia 
beforehand, Egerton and Hemming vere not to know that a considerable depth of 
the river bank was covered with mangrove swamp and unfit for cultivation or 
habitation; that the ten kilometres boundar.y line vould cut across several 
villages, separating homes from farms, chiefs and alcaides from former subjects. 
Colonial Powers regarded the partitioning of colonies as a diplomatic affair 
to be concluded between metropolitan governments in Europe, in consequence of 
which the,y created more problems among indigenous peoples than they solved. 
Fode,y 5illa was the first native ruler to object to the presence of the 
commissioners in his territory, and chided the British representative, Captain 
Kenqy, for not being straightforward, "s~ smooth words and cutting his 
. t ,,2 country 1n wo •••• So disturbed was he that he actually forbade the 
Commissioners to continue marking out the boundary till he had seen the 
Governor. 3 It vas not irrelevant that he demanded to know how the boundary 
could have been fixed in London, how the Queen knew the extent of his country, 
1. c.o. 87/136, 1889, vol.2. Treaty Agreement ot loth August 1889. 
Secretariat Archives - Gambia, Confidential Despatch Book 1888-1890, 
Enclosure No.2, 15th Dec. 1890, Capt. Ke~ R.E. to Governor G.T.Carter. 
Ibid., Enclosure No.5, Aborigines No. 33, Fodey 5il1a at Brekama to 
G.T.Carter, received 19th Dec., 1890. 
and whether she would come to see the spot she had agreed to limit her 
protection to.1 Ke~ was not accustomed to such "disdainful hauteur" from 
3&0 
an African ruler, and recommended that a sufficient escort might be sent with 
the Commission to demand respect from the chief. Governor Carter, however, 
tactfully allayed some of Silla's fears by giving assurance that once the 
boundary was fixed, he would be sate from French interference in his territory. 2 
But within another three years, in 1894, Bri Ush troops routed Silla out of the 
terri tory that had been guaranteed to him, and French troops arrested him 
outside the border and deported him to st. Louis. 
Fodey Cabba was equally suspicious of European movements within his 
domain and refused the Commission admission into aqy part of it. 3 His 
concern, too, was with the possible partitioning of the lands under his 
control; 4 but the French were able to secure his submission. In a senae, 
Cabba was virtually a protege of the French, even carrying on an extensive 
correspondence with the French Commandant at Sejou in the Casamance. There 
were reports from traders in that area that Cabba and his warriors could get 
as ~ guns and ammunition from the French as they required.5 Cert~ he 
received gifts, as well as medicine for his sick herds of cattle, trom the 
CoumandantJ and in one letter, at least, the Conunandant wished him victory 
Confidential Despatch Book, 18th Dec., Ke~ to Carter. 
Confidential Despatch Book, ? Dec. 1890, Carter to Lord Knutstord. 
C.O. 87/139; 1891, vol.l. Telegram to Lord Knutstord. 
c.O. frl/139, 1891, vol.l. 29th March, Heming to Heade. 
Confidential Despatch Book 1888-1890, 1890-1895, 17th March 1892, 
Major George l-Jad.den, Officer Commanding the troops to Governor R.B. 
Llewelyn. 
over his enemies. l It was not unlikely that the French hoped Cabba would 
establish effective control over an extensive area, and thereafter sign 
treaties of peace and protection with them, in the same wa:y as they had 
secured l-Iusa Molloh' s friendship. 
In the transitional period between the signing of the 1889 Agreement and 
the creation of a protectorate in 1894, it was made ver,y clear to Governor 
Llewelyn in Bathurst that Jarra and Kiang had remained loyal to Fodey Cabba, 
notwithstanding Sir Samuel Rowe's flag-hoisting and treaty-making programme 
of 1887. Indeed, mediators like Benjamin Bah now disclosed that it was only 
through their perseverance that their people had surrendered territories to 
2 Samuel Rowe. Now, Cabba and his supporters determined to make a final 
effort against British influence in their midst, concentrated on British 
agents and spies in their towns as targets of oppreSsion. "Now I am so 
attacked on ever,y side," was Bah's desperate plea to the British Governor 
from his trading station in Sanding in east Pogni. 3 He had suttered robber,y 
of trade goods and personal etfects trom two ot Cabba's warriors from Datore) 
and when he complained to Cabba in J.ledina, he received the reply that he 
4 
could not interfere till he had seen the French. This was a reference to 
the agreement Cabba had entered into with the French b.Y which he was not to 
farade or molest British or French territor,y. 
1. 
It was a period' in the nineteenth centur,y wen the situation in the 
Confidential Despatch Book, Letters trom Commandant of Casamance to 
Cabba, translated by M.A..Savage, 6th January 1892, 11th January 1892. 
Confidential Despatch Book, 21st ~ 1892, Benjamin Bah to R.B.Llowe~. 
Ibid. 
Conf. desPe bk., 25th Pebruar,y 1892. Bah's account taken down by 
Llewelyn in ~thurst. 
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River states was made more difficult for urbanised African traders than before. 
And difficulties were to remain unsolved as long as such traders were attached 
to two independent authorities in the River - one to whom they paid custom 
for protection of trade and b,y whom they were constantly robbed in revenge for 
being subversive elements in the states, to the extent of serving British 
interests rather than their own; and the other to whom such traders were 
legally attached as British subjects. It was in attempting to fulfil these 
roles in the state of Jura that in 1892 Lydia Rose and Brimah Samuel, British 
African'tr'aders in Toniataba, got involved with Cabbats warriors. They had 
agreed to guide the troops ot the First West India Regiment to the stockade 
of Sulyman Suntu, Cabbats warrior chiet ot Toniataba; and had provided water 
and grass mats for the wounded soldiers atter the attack on the stoCkade, 
1 betore they made their own escape down River. But Samuel's"goods, cattle, 
eorn etc. to the value of £200.10.4." did not escape plunder from the 
MUslims; nor did those ot Lydia Rose to the same amount.2 Yet, neither 
the Government in Bathurst, nor Fodey Cabba in Medina, would compensate the 
traders who were caught in a complex River situation of European and MUslim 
intrigue. 
News of the plight of their traders soon reached the merchants of 
Bathurst. Henry Charles Goddard, the Mulatto son of William Goddard, and, 
agent for the Bathurst Trading Comp~, then the largest firm in the settlement, . 
took up the matter with Governor Llewelyn, reminding that the merchants had 
1. Cont. desp. bk., Fodey Cabba Papers, 17th ~fa.rch 1892, Hajor Hadden to 
R.B.Llewelyn. 
2. Cont. desp. bIt., 25th March 1892, Brimah Samuel to Llewelyn. 
put their traders "under the protection of the British Government." It had 
been the urgent representations of BritiSh merchants, and their threat to make 
1 
"heavy claims on the Government for loss of property," which had in fact 
resulted in the expedition against Toniataba. Punitive expeditions, however, 
proved equally disastrous to traders, for when the troops were commanded to 
burn down a rebel village, they tended to do the work thoroughly so that 
factories were at risk ot being destroyed too. 
)~rchants began to identit,y themselves much more with their traders, 
sending information to the Governor of their ex8C~ locations and the value 
of goods in their factories in the River whenever a punitive expedition was 
proposed. Henry Goddard went further; on one occasion he informed the 
Governor that he had sent his trader at Siecunda (a short distance from 
Toniataba which was to be destroyed) an ensign and a house flag - "a red flag 
with white letters B.T.C." - which he was advised to hoist over his store and 
groundnuts should he hear any firing in the neighbourhoOd.2 Governor Llewelyn 
was obliged to pass on these remarks to the Officer commanding the troops in 
the River. 3 Such problems made the government of the Gambia a tedious affair. 
Llewelyn had never had any doubt in his mind that the final solution to 
the growing complexities of the River lay in the creation ot a British 
protectorate. But his first objective was to destroy as m&qf ot the fortified 
1. cont. desp. bk., 
20th April 1892, 
cont. desp. bk., 
" 
If 
" 
18th &: 19th l-farch 1892, lI.e.Goddard to R.B.Llewelyn; 
James Topp, Hember ot LegislatiTe Council to Llewelyn. 
21st April 1892, Goddard to Llewelyn. 
26th April 1892, LJewelyn to Colonel Ellis. 
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Muslim towns - "pest holes" as he described them - as a preUminary to 
providing opportunities for "the civilization of the people and advancement 
at the countries."l Not that this was some new vision for the Gambia; it had 
been one of the reasons for the founding of the settlement in the early nine-
teenth century. Its significance lay in the fact that after eighty years of 
British administration in a small settlement like the Gambia, the tasks at the 
Colonial Power had not been fulfilled. Llewe~ was now determined to 
accelerate development, and he was fortunate to get the ~at~ of the 
Colonial Office. "I am quite prepared to go ahead here," he wrote in a 
private letter to Hemming in 1893, " ••• don't keep me here idle." He made it 
clear that he did not believe the British Government could pursue its 
traditional policy of remaining "quiet and stationary" any longer. Either 
the British Government was to advance with the French, or, it would be obliged 
2 to retire from the scene. Beyond holding general ideas about policy, 
Llewelyn was also a planner and a keen administrator. Within a few years of 
assuming the role of Governor, he had produced a detailed scheme tor the 
administration of a British protectorate that would be efficient, effective 
and inexpensive. 
The Protectorate Ordinance of 1894 provided for the division of the 
Gambia into districts to be administered b,y chiefs and alcaides appointed qy 
1. C.O. 81/141, 1892, vol.l. 2nd .~, Llewelyn to Lord Knutsford. 
2. C.O. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 12th April, Llewelyn to Hemming. 
the Governor in Bathurst, and. supervised by Travelling Colll1lissioners. The 
administrative, executive and magisterial powers of the Commissioners were 
outlined in the Ordinance. Native courts were to remain an integral part of 
the new system; and for the time being, domestic slavery was to remain 
untouched. The traditional, but unsatistactory institution ot native customs 
was to be reformed at last. 
The essence of the new machinery of Government was economy and. tmitormity 
without rigidity. It was the flexibility of the new system which was to make 
its fusion with traditional rule possible and acceptable to the indigenous 
peoples. Indeed, the comparative ease with which the Protectorate was 
established. was i tse1t indication of acquiescence on the part ot those who had. 
to live under it, as it was also evidence ot the durable toundations of law 
and order upon which societies in the River states had been built, and. which 
halt a ceiltury ot bitter wartare had not destroyed. Kings and chiefs had 
been deposed or killed, but for the most part, the aged ale aides and elder. 
of the villages had survived the revolution. The superstructure had 
collapsed under MUslim pressures, but the historic foundation ot traditional 
village rule by aleaides, a~s and headmen could not easily breakdown. 
This simplified the taSk of the Travelling Commissioners, and provided 
continuity between the old and the new -.y.tem of government. 
It was a bold policy that Governor Llewelyn embarked upon, even while 
Fodey 8illa and Fodey Cabba were in positions of authority trom which the,y 
could direct counter operations to the peaceful creation ot a protoctorate. 
Not that the protectorate ~ entirely Llewelyn's ideaJ hie contribution was 
to consolidate what Samuel Rowe, and George Carter his predecessor, had begun 
in the River states. There is little doubt, however, that, as the French 
Governor ot Senegal observed at the time, British pOlicy waa distinctly 
moditied under Llewelyn. His predecessors had assured native rulers that the 
delimitation ot the Anglo-French boundar,y would in no ~ intertere with their 
entire jurisdiction over their own states. l But because of continuous 
disturbances which almost became more fierce as ,the jihad. lost momentum and. 
direction Llewelyn's thoughts on a protectorate crystallised; and within a 
year of taking otfice he submitted a detailed scheme for the administration of 
the Gambia hinterland for the consideration ot the Colonial Office. 
Within the colony itself, the'Governor sought the advice ot his Councils, 
which now preferred to see the extension ot British jurisdiction to that ot 
Fodey Cabba. Local public opinion was also consulted while he was finding 
a solution to the Gambia dilemma. For that reason, B.C. Goddard, employer 
ot nearly six hundred traders in the River was on several occasions co-opted 
as ~raordinar,y Member to the Executive Council to give officials the benefit 
of his local experience.2 It was, for example, in the presence ot this 
Council that the first steps towards creating a protectorate were taken. 
The destruction ot Toniataba, Cabba' s headquarters in Jarra, was 
immediately folloved up b.r assembling all the chiefs and a~s ot Jarra and 
1. J.licrotilm trom Archives - Dakar, Senegal - A.O.P. Serie IF. Bobin 5, 
June 1893, H.Lamothe, Governor ot Senegal, to Capt. MOrin, French 
representative on Anglo-French Boundar,y Commission to locate Tillages 
on the North Bank. 
2. C.O. 81/141, 1892, Tol.l. 20th ~, Llewelyn to Lord Knutsford. 
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Kiang (districts over which Cabbats influence had extended) in Bathurst in 
1892. With no instructions from Home, nor aqy Ordinance as yet to implement, 
Llewelyn, however, saw this as a moment to exploit to the British advantage; 
and in the presence of the Executive Council he informed the chiets that all 
the land conquered from Cabba (who had retired to Medina after Toniataba) was 
1 
now Bri tish territory and would be governed as such. The detail of the 
proposed protectorate machinery was explained to them, after which they were 
made to show their support of the Governor' s policy by swearing on the Koran, 
and to sign an Agreement in which they pledged. themselves "to recognise the 
authority of the Governor of the Gambia, to whom alone we look for advice and 
t ' "2 protec 10n •••• The intention waa to undermine the authority of all former 
overlords and to exclude all foreign povers from those districts. For the 
first time, the chiefs were receiving their insignia of office from a European 
authority, an authority which now assumed the right to decide all claims to 
chieftainship. Thus Llewelyn immediately reinstated those chiefs who had. 
been deposed by Cabba, making head chiets of some who had put up the greatest 
:3 
resistance to him, like the chief of Soma. It was a practical solution 
perhaps to a-difficult situation which required immediate action for re-
establishing law and order; but Governor and Council underestimated the 
tenaci ty of the tribes. 
If the Governor's attitude towards the problems ot a British protecto~ate 
in the Gambia was sometimes incautious, it was to his credit that he made a 
1. c.O. 87/141, 1892, vol.l. 19th~, Llewelyn to Knutstord. 
2. Ibid., 17th May 1892, Agreement signed; interpreted. in Mandinka by I.H. 
Johnson and J.Elliot. 
3. C.O. 87/141, 1892, vol.l. 19th ~, Llewelyn to Knutstord. 
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determined effort to resolve the Gambia dileDlDa. Circumatances had shown that 
the answer lay not in subsidizing a number of semi-independent chiefs, nor in 
stationing troops in the River, but in controlling the ver,y governments ot 
those states. That was Llewelyn's mission. Indeed, his enterprising policy 
in the interior was a matter for frequent comment by French otficials at st. 
Louis and Nioro in the Senegal who saw it as aggrandisement, a determination 
to pursue British interests in the Gambia with less scruple and moderation 
than they were prepared to adopt in defending the interests of their countr,y.l 
In spite ot such criticisms, the French admired his s.ystem ot administration 
through Travelling Commissioners, by which British influence was to be 
constantly felt in the states by the presence of these agents in their midst. 
The first step "to advance British influence within the protectorate" 
itself came in January 1893 when Governor Llewelyn, accompanied by the newly 
appointed Commissioners and an escort ot policemen, made an arduous march 
through the main towns on the North Bank. as far up the River as Nianimaru in 
the vicinity of HacCartby Island. At each of the twelve principal towns 
visited, a Proclamation was read in English, Yolot and tlandinka. which stated 
that "the full sovereignty of [the territories] rests in Her Majesty Queen 
2 Victoria, Her Heirs and Successors tor eTer ••• " And the Proclamation va. 
then posted on the bantaba,3 followed by a gun salute, and the hoisting of the 
British flag. Alcaides who attended these ceremonies were given tlags for 
1. A.O.F. Serie IP, No. 879, 16th July 1893, H.Lamothe to the Secretar,y ot 
state in Paris. 
2. c.O. 87/143, 1893, vol.1. 23rd March, Llewelyn to the .~quess ot Ripon. 
3. bantaba: the largest tree in the centre ot a town under vhich all social 
gatherings were held. . 
their own smaller towns. This then was the legal machinery by which the 
North Bank too came under British control. 
It was in this area that the protectorate system W88 most completely 
established; for there being no head chiefs or kings in the region, the 
Governor simply substituted himself as their new king, "and they must obe,y his 
1 orders", he told them. This, he hoped, would not be difticult to obtain 
under a regime of newly nominated chiefs devoted to the British cause. For 
most of the former rulers had found themselves on the French side of the 
boundary, and the 1889 Paris Agreement and an assurance tram Governor Lamothe 
of Senegal in 1892 pro:vided that "the limits ot native jurisdiction should be 
in absolute agreement with the diplomatic trontier.,,2 
Not that this arrangement pleased the French or their prot6g6s who were 
now forbidden to demand customs trom the inhabitants on the British side ot 
the boundary, or indeed to exercise aqy jurisidction over them. The French 
had illegally extended their influence into the states ot Jokadu, Baddibu, 
Sanjal and Saloum atter the tlight ot Said l-fattee trom his kiD8dolD in 1887. 
There they appointed chiets under their protection to the chiefdoms vacated b,y 
Mattee t s supporters; and by native law and custom, these new rulers wera .. 
entitled to the customs ot the old. Issues in these border states were going 
to complicate the task ot the Anglo-French boundary cOmmissioners, and aftect 
relations between the French Governor in st. Louis and the Bri Ush Governor 
in Bathurst. 
1. C.O. 87/14), 1893, vol.I •. 23rd ~~ch, Llewe~ to Ripon. 
2. C.O. 81/143, 1893, vol.l. 8th April, Llewe~ to Ripon. 
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Meanwhile, Governor Llewelyn had informed all alcaides that they would 
now be regarded as Government officials, under the supervision ot the Governor 
and his deputy, the Travelling Commissioner. They would still be expected 
to maintain peace and order in the villages, as they had al~s done, but 
they would no longer receive customs directly from traders, as British traders 
would now p~ those customs to the administration in Bathurst in return for 
trade licenses, which would be submitted to the alcaldes by all who entered 
their towns for trade. Not only customs, but all substantial revenue hitherto 
collected by native authorities were suddenly to be handed over to the 
colonial Government, which was to decide what percentage wa.s to be handed back 
to the alcaldes. Ground rents on farms, for example, were to be fixed at an 
annual rate, and collected by the alcaldes, who were only to receive 50% of 
1 the total. Llewelyn'" aim was to prepare the people for the new regime by 
which power was to be distributed between native rulers and government Officials. I 
He had yet to draft the ordinances which would effect the new changes. 
In theor,y, the proposed changes in their towns did not at first seem 
radical to the native rulers of the North Bank, for the nev administration was 
not a picture they could not recognise or understand. Even the sudden 
appearance in their towns of temporar,y EUropean residents who were neither 
merchants nor soldiers did not disturb them unduly. Judging b,y the accounts 
of the Travelling Commissioners, it would seem that most villages extended 
warm hospitality to the Governor's deputy whom they felt honoured to 
accommodate. 2 This was partly because there was apparently nothing sinister 
1. 
2. 
c.o. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 23rd ~~ch, Llewelyn to Ripon. 
C.O. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 16th June, J.ll.Ozanne's Report on the North Dank 
to R.B.Llewelyn, enclosed in despatch to Ripon, 1st July 1893. 
about a whi tema.n who wandered from one village to another accompanied by a 
few sergeants and porters, attempting to settle disputes between the traders 
and the farmers, bringing news from the Governor in Bathurst, and collecting 
information for him. It was a ver,y different picture from the one across the 
border, where the Commandant ot Nioro travelled through his district accompanied 
by chiefs, cavalr,y and intantr,y who lived on the countr,y; and only those who 
had the chiefs' favour could approach him during his short stay in a village. 
The inhabitants of French villages therefore dreaded these otficial visits, 
being forbidden direct access to the Commandant by their own chiefs, and tended 
to look at French administration with tear, and at the British protectorate with 
1 longing. 
The Gambia protectorate, however, was only satistactory for the time 
being, while most River folk were war weary and desired peace to recuperate trom 
the ugly incidents ot half a centur,y ot violence. The alcaides, for example, 
were not in a position to know that protectorate administration was an 
insidious system which in the long run would only make nominal rule~s ot them, 
while greater control would pass to the Travelling COmmissioners. It would 
therefore be unfair to blame them for having accepted Llewelyn's far reaching 
terms (assuming they were correctly translated to them by the African 
interpreters) with so little criticism and resistance. But the future waa to 
prove tha.t apparent acquiescence in the Llewelyn plan was only a temporary 
victor,y for the Governor. 
1. A.O.F., Serie 1F, April 1896, Mons. Pargui, French representative on 1896 Anglo-French Boundar,y Commission, to the Governor-General at 
st. Louis. 
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It was the Secretar,y of state who first raised objection to the terms of 
the 1893 Proclamation, pointing out to Llewelyn that he had gone beyond 
instructions. By claiming full sovereignty over newly acquired 18lld.s for the 
British Crown, he had in effect made such districts "ipso facto British 
territor,y ••• subject to British law, and ••• the British Government ••• 
responsible for their protection and for the maintenance within them of peace 
and order •••• "1 Such responsibility was particularly unattractive to the 
Colonial Office because it raised the question of domestic slavery, for Which 
the only British solution was immediate abolition. Lord Knutitor4~'instructions 
of March 1892 had in fact merely envisaged a declaration of British protection 
over the people on the river banks whose alcaides were to be informed that 
"they are no longer to make any p~ents to chiefs outside the line •••• "2 
But Llewelyn knew that a proclamation that carried out these vague ideas would 
. be ineffectual , neither maintaining the status quo, nor replacing it by 
anything concrete.. He was not a man to pursue the policy of temporising till 
circumstances righted themselves, for there were obvious advantages to be 
gained by prompt action. Because of the confidence placed in his judgment 
by officials of the Colonial Office, Llewelyn was able ,to create the kind ot 
protectorate he believed suited the Gambia situation. 
1. C.o. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 3rd May, Ripon to Llewelyn. 
2. Ibid., quotation within despatch. 
0, 
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It would have been impracticable and imprudent to attempt to impose the 
new administration throughout the River states in 1894, the delimitation of 
the boundar,y alone was not completed till 1899. In the South Bank the 
Government ha.d. to move cautiously, being fully aware of the deep-rooted 
opposition in ma.qy districts there. This did not, however, mean that that 
region did not form part of the Protectorate programme, for like the North 
Bank, it had its own Travelling Conmissioner. But though the chiefs of 
Kiang and Jana had agreed to surrender the sovereignty of their states to the 
British Governor in 1892, some ot their most important towns remained loyal to 
Fodey Cabba, whose influence over his supporters in British territory was 
no less efficacious for being exercised from over the border. 
In another category tell the regions to the extreme east and west ot the 
newely created protectorate; these were Barra and Ferhdou, kingdoms ruled ~ 
traditional kings - Naranta Sonko and Hu.sa MaUoh, respectively. Llewelyn 
was wise to introduce a degree of diversity in his plan for native states, for, 
not only could traditional kings not be overlooked, but while no special funds 
for running protectorate administration existed, it was in the interests at 
the central Government to utilize, to its own purposes, those political 'j 
institutions which already existed in the states. For these reasons, Sanko 
was for the time being left in authority in Barra, though he had agreed to cede 
it to the British. No Travelling Commissioner traversed his lands, nor was 
he deprived of his ancient revenues. The only attempt made to bring Barra. 
into some conformity with the North and South Bank districts was to replace 
"maqy vexatious little taxes that have been imposed ~ the king on persons 
crossing from Baddibu to the Gambia" ~ an increase in the king's annual stipend 
from £83.6.8d. to£IIO during his lifetime. l 
Attitudes towards Nusa Hallah were less clearly defined, partly because 
Fe~ou was an unfamiliar state to British administrators, except perhaps to 
the Manager of J.facCarthy Island, and also because Holloh was still engaged in 
2 defending lands wrested b,y his father from Fodey Cabbals father. And French 
activity3 in a. kingdom which extended over both sides ot the boundary line 
restrained the British Governor from declaring a protectorate there. LlewelYn 
had to admit that he could not yet come to terms with the king "for, as a 
prot's6 of the French, he is watched and completely under the orders of the 
. . 4 
French offic!!B.~stationed at Amdallai where he resides." In any event, the 
boundary line across Fehlfdou was not marked out till 1899; and the country 
abounded in domestic slaves over whom ~~lloh would accept no compromise. But 
the king himself was not averse to reaching some agreement with the British 
in order to secure the eighty or more villages which he controlled in the 
Gambia.. In 1896, he wrote to Llewelyn a.sking him to "arrange with the French 
and let me know which of you I may choose. Now I am in a great fix," he If 
1. 
4. 
c.o. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 7th April, Llewelyn to Ripon. 
c.O. 87/141, 1892, vol.l. 16th March, Llewe~ to Knutsford re letter 
from Robert Syre~t, }fa.na.ger of !facCarthy Island. 
C.O. 87/141, 1892, vol.l. 16th March & 30th June, Llewelyn to Knutsford. 
c.O. 87/158, 1899, vol.I. 15th June, Llewelyn to Joseph Chamberlain. 
1 CQmplained, til cannot go anywhere." In a later letter, he reminded the 
Governor that his predecessor had assured him that the British did not intend 
to do anything except delimit the boundary, and. that the country would still 
be his. 2 
If the Governor was lUleasy about the slow extension of British influence 
in the upper River, Liberated Africans were thoroughly dissatisfied with the 
nature of the whole protectorate. They had long clamoured for an administrative 
machinery by which the native states would be brought more directly under the 
control of the Government in St. ~~'s. Their first criticism of the 
3 proposed protectorate arose over the Trade Ordinance of 1893 which aimed at 
terminating endless disputes over customs between traders and native rulers. 
1. C.o. 81/151, 1896, vo1.l. l-lusa Holloh to Llewelyn, translated by I.U. 
Johnson, 18th January 1896. 
2. C.O. 87/155, 1898, vol.l. c.o. Hinute, 9th July, R.L.I\. I. 
c.O. 81/141, 1892, vol.l. 20th }~, Llewelyn to Knutstord; 
c.O. 87/144, 1893, vo1.2. 25th October - An Ordinance to provide for the 
granting of aDIlual Trade Licences - passed by the Legislative COlUlcil, 
enclosed in despatch of 31st Oct. 1893. 
Instead of p~ing £6.2s. directly to the Chiet on arrival at his station, 
with the risk of further exactions once the trader commenced business, 
he was now to pq £10 p.a. for a factory Licence, £l.lOs. tor engaging 
in trade of whatever kind, and. 4/- tor dealing in earn, fish and. aalt. 
c.O. 87/141, 1892, vol.l. 2oth~, Llewelyn to Ripons 
Llewelyn at first proposed that about two-thirds of the Licence revenue 
should be returned to the native rulers. 
37(' 
It was not that the trade licences to be bought at the Treasurer's Office in 
Bathurst were prohibitive; it was the principle of this new torm of 
taxation to which they objected. Lleve~ hoped to make it less cost~ tor 
a trader to engage in trade in the River; and, by making the Treasurer's 
Otfice the receipt ot customs, he aimed at bringing the native authorities 
more directly under the control ot his Government, and to provide a balance 
ot revenue to cover the expenses at the Commissioners. "The principle seema 
good," was the comment of Bramston ot the Colonial Ottice, "but," he observed, 
"the Chiets would appear to be the losers •••• " For the salary now oftered 
them in lieu ot customs, though regular and easily attainable, was a tar 
smaller figure than they had tormerly received by direct control. 
Urbanised African traders in native states now looked to the new 
administration for some form ot compensation for hardships and losses suttered 
during the wars. With peace established, they assumed that tree trade would 
automatically follow in its wake, and all customs and exactions abolished. 
They had never had. much sympathy for the policies ot native rulers who appeared 
, 
to them as rapacious tyrants bent on exploiting traders vho entered their " 
territor,y. Nor had the civil war improved relations between them, even 
though such traders had played a significant role as intermediaries, and even 
as spies1 during the recent disturbances; and they were to make their own 
contribution to protectorate administration. 
Familiar with the political and. social patterns at the towns they had 
r( traded in for many generations, they became a "very usetul and obliging body" 
to Travelling Conunissioners who were unaccustomed to condi tiona in the Gambia J 
1. Secretariat Archives - Gambia, 8th January 1892, Report ot Mr. Shyngle to 
Llewelyn. 
and. were "the greatest help ••• in communicating with the Alcaides", 1 
particularly as they were in a position to give "a great deal of reliable 
information ••• on all subjects •••• "2 Their usefulness to the Government 
in the protectorate was unquestioned, but they objected to being rewarded b,y 
a discriminator,y tax like the Traders ldcence. To them the establiShment of 
a protectorate was the dawn of a new era when the natives of the River would 
benefit economically and socially from direct control from the Government in 
Bathurst. It therefore did not make sense that they should continue to bQy 
protection from chiefs and alcaides b,y indirect customs. That the Ordinance 
should have taken no account of the "scores of natives themselves who also 
engage in trade in their towns, and among them ver,y often kinsmen or agents 
of the chiefs or a.lcaides themselves," was their bitterest grievance. Such 
discrimination, they argued, would only encourage the people in the protectorate 
"to consider Bathurst traders as their bankers on whom they can draw at leisure." 
The responsibility for maintaining native rulers ought to devolve upon their 
3 
subjects, as a training in development and advancement. 
Their petition, however, did not bear fruit. B,y December 1893 the Act 
had been sanctioned, the Secretary of State pointing out to them that by 
Order in Council, the Legislative Council of the Gambia had obtained power to 
make laws tor the protectorate which would be binding on British subjects and 
1. c.o. 81/143, 1893, vol.l. 16th June, annual Report - J.H.Ozaene. 
2. C.O. 87/156, 1898, vol.2. 20th June, annual Report - Ozanne. 
3. C.O. 87/144, 1893, vol.2. 23rd October, ~Iemorial of Traders to Lord 
Ripon. 
the subjects of European powers and aqy natives who had accepted the Queen's 
. . di ti 1 Jur1S con. The protectorate states themselves, however, were "be,yond 
the powers of the Legislative Council of the Gambia", for which reason those 
clauses in the Ordinance which reterred to the punishment ot unjust alcaides 
in the courts of Bathurst required amendment. 2 The amended Ordinance came 
into operation in 1895, and almost immediately swelled the judicial business 
of the Travelling Commissioners in the River states. 
In the same year had appeared the Yard or Hut tax, by which flVery 
yardholder paid 1/- for every hut on his premises inhabited by a member ot 
his family, and 2/- tor every hut inhabited by a stranger. It was a tax 
which fell entirely upon the natives themselves, and did not in aqy w~ atfect 
urbanised traders in the River., With peace and growing prosperity the people 
were willing to pay the new tax imposed to swell the revenue, "appearing to 
recognise that in return for this taxation they can live peacably and cultivate 
their lands under British protection •••• "3 It was a tax collected during the 
I 
trade season, and would not seem to have been a burden; the Coamissioners 
reported that they had "never had to seize anything ••• and the collection has 
4 been done amongst themselves." This tax brought the protectorate a stage 
nearer to the colony, placing all inhabitants on an equal footing. For in 
Bathurst, a house tax of 4/- per annum was in existence, while in British Combo 
1. C.O. 87/144, 1893, vol~2. 4th Dec., Ripon to Llewelyn. 
C.o. 87/144, 1893, vol.2. 15th Sept., Ripon to Llewelyn. 
C.O. 87/156, 1898, Tol.2. 2nd July, Report by P.Wainwright, Commissioner 
of ~Cart~ Island District, to Llewelyn. 
C.O. 87/156, 1898, vol.2. 30th June, J.H.Ozanne to Llewelyn. 
8. land tax equivalent to the same amount had. been imposed for IIl8niY decades. 1 
The only exception was found. in the Ceded Mile and MacCarthy Island, into which 
districts the Yard Tax was introduced by an Ordinance of 1896.2 
With the new tax came the wider circulation ot cash in the River states 
and the beginning of a social and economic revolution there, accelerated in 
large measure by the co-operation ot French trading houses in the Gambia. 
If they had not been willing to open their factories in the River tor the supply 
ot cash, the tax could only have been collected in kind; for British merchants 
had. alw~s placed a restriction on the sending ot specie up the River in order 
3 tQ perpetuate the barter trade. They did not, however, approve of the 
important role ot the French houses in the new protectorate, and for that 
reason decided to remove the restriction on specie tor the time being. J.II. 
Ozanne, the Commissioner on the North Bank, described the situation as one 
which placed the Government "entirely in the hands ot the merchants".4 The 
merchants had not lost their influence in tiscal matters. While the" 
assisted the Government to implement its policy in the protectorate b,y cash 
circulation, they were also creating a degree ot economic independence among 
the peoples of the River, which was a significant aspect ot the developnent ot 
5 the protectorate. 
1. C.O. 87/152, 1896, vol.2. 7th November, Colonial Otfice Minute b,y tJewelyn. 
2. c.O. 87/152, 1896, vol.2. 5th Sept., Ordinance passed b,y Legislative 
Council. 
C.O. 81/151, vol.2. 1st July, Ozanne to .Acting Governor Brandtord 3. 1896, Griffith. 
4. Ibid. 
5. c.o. 87/156, 1898, vo1.2. 2nd July, C.P.Sitwell's annual ReportJ 
C.O. 87/159, 1899, vol.2. 30th June, J.H.Ozanne's annual Report. 
t, 
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Protectorate government was a compromise between Crown colo~ gavernment 
and traditional rule in }~dinka societies. As the Secretar,y of state 
emphasised in 1893, neither Governor nor Commissioners had aqy legal authority 
over native rulers themselves; but, with them, the Commissioners could hear 
cases of dispute between British subjects and British protected persons under 
native law. River society had become a more complex structure of graded legal 
relationships between persons owing allegiance to the British Crown, and 
subjects of native rulers who were now protected b,y the Crown. The 
Commissioners became the co-ordinating factor between one state and another, 
and between all the states and the central Government; but the stabilising 
influence in the River was found in the age old institution of alcaides and 
village elders. 
Ozanne's first annual report on the North Bank pointed to the simple 
dignity ot the tribes and to the efficient rule of alcaide-alm~-elders. 
ttl have never travelled 8.l\)'Where and seen so little fighting and wrangling," 
he wrote. "I have come aw~ from ~ District with a respect for these 
natives which I never could feel toward the negroes ot the Vest Indies 
amongst whom I have lived for years." His report continuedl- "llere the 
people manage their own affairs, live quietly and soberly together and keep 
their towns comparatively clean and healtqy ••• there [in Demerara] the people 
have sbovn themselves utterly incapable ot governing themselves ••• One cannot. 
deny the fa.ct that. the MahoDllledan out here shines by comparison vi th his 
1 
civilized brother in the West." 
1. C.O. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 16th June, annual Report - Ozanne. 
Indeed, so effective were existing native institutions in the River, that 
Governor Llewelyn had no difficulty in creating a village police out of the 
bodY of reliable messengers attached to the chiefs and alcaides. At a small 
monthly salar,y, he was able to get these 'badge messengers' to perform police 
duties economically and efficiently b,y virtue of knowing the countr,yside and 
1 the native languages. In short, the administration of the protectorate was 
made fairly simple for the Commissioners b,y the adaptability ot native 
institutions, and b,y Llewelyn's practical policy of constructing his new 
system upon indigenous patterns. 
Involvement in border disputes was a far less simple aspect of the 
Commissioners' work in the protectorate. In general, disputes arose from 
the suspiciOns entertained b,y British and French ofticials ot each other's 
activities on the frontier. Certain~ both sides were determined not to lose 
any village if energy and diplomacy could prevent it. The geographical 
advantages of the Gambia River, with its deep creeka and rivulets capable of 
carrying gun-boats and river craft of all description, vas an important factor 
in border disputes. The French grieved that their terrain around Nioro waa 
an extensive plateau of ferreous rock over which land travel by camel, mule 
or horse was almost impossible since the hooves ot these animals wore out vi th 
such rapidity. 2 It vas therefore of no interest to them, as Lt.-Colllll8Dder 
Morin emphasised in a report of 1895, to increase territor,y in this area; tor 
1. 
2. 
C.O. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 23rd .~ch, Llewelyn to Ripon, 
C.o. 87/151, 1896, vol.l. 7th April, Llewelyn to Chamberlain. 
A.O.F., Serie 1F, June 1893, MOrin's Report to the Governor ot Senegal; 
C.O. 87/156, 1898, vol.2. 30th June, annual Report - Ozanne. 
. .
the problems of an outlet for exports were insuperable. 1 
Inevitably, the produce from French territory followed southerly trade 
routes to trading depots situated on the creeks of the River Gambia. These 
were often little more than hamlets set up ~ traders and their clients during 
the annual Trade Season, which permitted easy access of goods to the main 
wate~. While they were envious of the facilities for transportation in the 
Gambia, French officials were unimpressed b,y its few villages producing just 
enough food for a meagre population, and quite incapable of supplying 
neighbours who might be attracted to move across the frontier and join them.2 
French interest in the creeks of the Gambia was disturbing to Llewelyn, 
who feared that French officials contrived to control as m&qT of the heads ot 
the creeks as they could "so as to tax and prohibit produce trom tinding its 
way to the River Gambia. "3 It was a view supported ~ l-fr. Antrobus ot the 
Colonial Otfice who believed it was a tallacy in British policy to have 
supposed when the 1889 treaty was signed "that if we had the River and a strip 
of land ten kilometres in width on either side, we should get all the trode 
of the surrounding countries."4 British advantages might even have been 
improved if their representatives in Paris had insisted on ten miles rather 
5 than ten kilometres as proposed b,y the French then. Nov, d.termined to 
1. A.O.F., S.rie 1F, 28th ~ 1895, Morin to the Secretar,y ot state in Pari •• 
2. A.O.F., Serie IF, June 1893, Morin's Report. 
C.O. 87/143, 1893, vol.1. 11th May, Llewelyn to RiponJ A.O.F., Serie IF, 
28th ~ 1893, Colonel Buderd, Commandant at Nioro, to Lamothe. 
C.O. 87/155, 1898, vol.l. 9th July, C.O. Nlnute b,y R.L.A. 
C.O. 87/158, 1899, vol.l. 15th June, Llewelyn to Chamberlain. 
divert trade from its natural outlet down the Gambia, the French wanted "the 
boundaries defined in order that they may do this more effectual~ •••• ,,1 
French officials on their part were fully aware, and complained constantly, 
of the British Governor's reluctance to speed up operations for the 
delimitation of the boundary, such delay being of advantage to his country.2 
Anglo-French relations were particular~ strained in an area between 
Niani and Upper Saloum, in which British flags had been planted before the 
delimitation ot the boundar,y, in spite of the tact that the chiefs of ~ of 
the towns in those areas were under French protection and direct~ controlled 
from the divisional headquarters at Nioro. A joint Commission of 1893 cited 
Panchang and Pate, two of the disputed towns, at 10.543 kilometres and 20 
kilometres, respectively, from the River, thereby justifying French fears of 
3 British encroachment in Niani. It did not improve Anglo-French relations that 
on arriving at Panchang to join the British representatives of the Commission, 
captain l-'[orin, the French representative, found that the village had been 
deserted by its inhabitants. Morin naturally suspected the British 
Commissioner of having circulated ill-reports about French administration 
4 
among the people of Pancha.ng; but Llewelyn thought the tault lay with the 
French themsel~es, "tor the people are so afraid ot (them] that they all wish 
me to say their towns are English. This is very galling to our neighbours •••• ~ 
1. C.O. 87/155, 1898, vol.l. 9th July, C.O. Minute b,y R.L.A. 
2. A.O.F., Serie 1F, 28th May 1895, l-Iorin's Report to the Political 
Minister in Paris. 
c.O. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 9th May, Lt.-CoDlIlander E.Lang (one of the 
British representatives on the Boundar,y COmmission) to Llewelyn. 
A.O.P., Serie IF, JWle 1893, Morin to Governor ot Senegal, H.Lamothe. 
C.O. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 12th April, private letter of Llewelyn to 
HeDJJdng. 
" 
There would seem to have been some truth in this statement tor the deserters 
of Panchang never returned once the town was given over to the French, 
preferring to migrate southwards to the wharf town of Nianibantang at the head 
of the Nianija creek. 
, ~gration into BritiSh territor,y was not only a feature of border 
disputes in the North Bank; in the South Bank the frontier was also an 
irritant. French officers in the Casamance complained that the BritiSh 
Commissioner enticed French subjects across the frontier; but Llewe~ was 
confident that the new immigrants into British territory were chiefly Fodey 
Cabba's runa~ slaves who were returning to their original homes in Fogni.l 
VollDltary emigration was, however, often confused with the distressing situation 
created by the artificiality of the boundary line itself, which might divide 
a farmer's village from his farm. Because of the depth of mangroves in 
some areas, towns were built inland and tarms were situated further in the 
interior. .A. boundary line measured by a surveyor's chain at a rigid distance 
of tan kilometres from the River took no account ot such niceties. In 
Llewelyn's words , "it is a 11 ttle puzzling for [the farmer] to tmderstond wb\Y 
the Whiteman should thus divide the countr,y.,,2 
The Governor of Senegal, however, saw the issue from the French view--
point, objecting to a border situation where farmers could emigrate to British 
territor,y aDa yet hope to cultivate, at their leisure, on French soil because 
1. C.o. 87/143, 1893, vol.1. 25th lmrch, Llewelyn to Ripon. 
2. C.O. 87/158, 1899, vol.l. 24th June, Fr1vate letter of Llev,~ to 
R.L.Antrobus. 
it vas fertile. Indeed, the most productive areas were supposed to be those 
along the frontier. A solution to the problem was-in fact suggested b,y the 
Commandant at Nioro-who thought a·policy of heavy taxation on strange farmers 
was preferable to a prohibition from entr,y into French terrltor,y.l It was 
obvious that the natives on the frontier were often the victims of AnglO-French 
diplomacy; their interests were not infrequently subordinated to the political 
and territorial aspirations of the two European Powers. The border problem 
was partly relieved by an Agreement of the deUm! tation ColllDlission of January 
1896 to erect boundar,y marks near frontier villages, and to advise the two 
Governments that no tax should be levied in disputed villages, while the 
illhabitants of such villages were to be given six months to decide whether 
the,y would move into British or French terrltor,y.2 
• The Travelling Commissioners felt that British rule-was fairly veIl 
accepted by indigenous peoples for its leniency, which contrasted with French 
rule. It would seem that chiefs -in French Niani, for instance, did not exactly 
enjoy their subordinate status as agents of the Commandant at Nioro. Taxation 
under French administration vas heavy {one franc per head in cash, and. one 
franc in kind, compared with one shilling per hut, and nam03 paid to chiefs, 
1. 
2. 
A.O.F., Serie IF., 28th ~~ 1893, Colonel Buderd to H.Lamothe. 
A.O.F., Serie lP, 6th January 1896, .Agreement signed. at Jambol b,y 
Boundary Comissioners Ozanne, Reeve, Farque, Robert. 
3. ~ = foodstuff - refers to produce given to chiefs b,y farmers after 
the harvest. 
. .
under British administration), and was efficiently collected b,y the chiefs, 
the taxes being divided equal~ between the French Government and themselves. 
Penalties for non-p~ent of tax were severe and rigidly enforced. l Indeed, 
one reason for migration into the Gambia before the Yard Tax Ordinance of 
1895 was because there was no taxation in the British Protectorate, outside the 
traditional customs paid in kind to the chiefs. 
There were other aspects of French protectorate administration which were 
no more attractive than taxation. Not only did the administration at Nioro 
depend entirely on its chiefs for the provision of free labour for all public 
works, but military service was compulsory for all able-bodied youngmen.in that 
protectorate. So much was military service resented b,y natives, that Tho 
Travelling Commissioners gave this as contributory reason for the mass exodus 
of French subjects across the frontier. 2 In MacCar~ Island District, Percy 
Wainwright, the Commissioner, estimated that fifteen new toWll8 had been built 
b,y immigrants trom French territory.3 The argument was that indirect rule 
in the British protectorate through chiefs and alcaldes had produced a kindly 
disposition towards British administrators. For under that pattern of 
government there was "not much cause for friction between them and the 
.. "4 C0mm1SS10ner •••• Events on the South Bank, however, were shortly to alter 
this optimism. 
1. c.O. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 16th June, annual Report - section on ~ative 
Rule under French protection" - J.H.Ozanne. 
c.o. 87/159, 1899, vol.2. 30th June, annual Report - Ozanne. 
C.O. 87/156, 1898, vol.2. 2nd July, annual Report - P.Wainvright. 
4. C.O. 87/156, 1898, vol.2. 30th June, annual Report, J.H.Ozonne. 
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For the moment, there was evidence of progress and stability in the 
British protectorate. In 1896, revenue collected in the protectorate amounted 
to £1,735.6.9d. while expenditure stood at £1,630. In 1897, the revenue had 
risen to £2,540.3.5d. and expenditure to £2,085~1 It was during this period 
ot growing prosperity that Governor Llewelyn called his first Chiefs' 
Conference in Bathurst with the object of malting a cohesive unit of the 
districts under the new protectorate administration. This kind of gathering 
was a nw experience ,for the chiets, and vas thoroughly exploited by Llewelyn 
.... 
to good effect. Government policy in the states under their control was 
elaborated upon at a general meeting of Chiefs, ~tembers ot the Executive and 
Legislative Councils held in Government Housel- Protectorate revenue and its 
purposes, fees and allowances for chiefs and alcaides, the policing of towns 
and villages, the planning of new towns and improved methods ot agriculture, 
were topics to which the Governor drew attention. 
His conment in a despatch to Chamberlain was, that the conferonce was 
2 
"considered to have been a great success." It was remarltable that within 
tour years ot summoning refractory chiets ot the South Bank to Bathurst, his 
administration of the protectorate should so tar have succeeded as to have 
made it possible to discuss developnent progranmes with them with the 
certainty of receiving support. Llewelyn had inaugurated a Conference that 
has been a teature of protectorate government to the present d~. Indeed, 
1. C.O. 81/155, 1898, vol.1. 2nd ~, Llewelyn to Chamberlain. 
2. C.O. 81/151, 1896, vol.1. 7th April, Llewelyn to Chamberlain. 
,. 
all seemed. very satisfactory in the protectorate when the Governor finally left 
the Gambia in 1899. He had laid a firm foundation of British rule from the 
mouth of the River to HacCartby Island, and had built up a growing revenue to 
provide for the services of the protectorate. 
Confidence in a stable and fairly prosperous protectorate was shattered 
when in June 1900, the people of Sankandi in Western Kiang murdered the 
Travelling Commissioner, C.P. Sitwell, together with his assistant, l~. Silva, 
Sergeant Cox and an escort ot six policemen (all of them Africans of Bathurst). 
It was a dispute over some rice fields between the people of Sanltandi and their 
neighbours in the town of Jattaba which had exploded a sf tuation already highly 
charged. 1 This was evidence that Llewe~ had been a little too self-confident 
about the success of his plan in the River states, when it was known that Podey 
Cabba, though an old man of nearly seventy years, had not lost his influence 
over the districts of Kiang and Jarra. Sitwell, too, had underestimated the 
tenacity of the M.lslims of that region, partly because he had toured the South 
Bank for six years, and had apparently gained the confidence of ~ of its 
iDhabitants, some of the chiefs like Mansa Koto of Jattaba showing deep loyalty 
2 
to the British. 
, 
1. C.o. 87/160, 1900, vol.l. 25th June, Brandford Griffith to Chamberlain. 
2. C.O. 87/160, 1900, Tol.l. 25th June, Griffith to Chamberlain. .' 
But as early as 1893 opposition to the proposed protectorate had been 
openly demonstrated by some of the towns. In that year, the head a1caide of 
Buraing in East Jarra had issued orders that "if the Government enforces the 
License, Farm Rent and Slave Laws, they are to join Fodey Cabba." On first 
arriving in his district, Sitwell had found the rulers there determined to 
continue to collect the traditional revenues as had been the custom. 1 
Domestic slaver,y had been a recognised institution of their society for 
centuries, and they were not prepared to abide by the Ordinance of 1898, 
which instructed all masters to register their slaves with the Commissioner, 
allowed slaves to purchase their freedom, and freed all newly imported slaves, 
2 
as veIl as those whose masters had died. Thus Abolition was intended to be 
gra:CLual, but in the eyes of malcontents the Ordinance was radical. Beyond 
this, a new Protectorate Ordinance of 1898 had increased the powers of the 
Commissioners, and those of the Supreme Court in Bathurst over Native Courts.3 
Gradually, authority was passing out of the handa of the traditional rulers to 
the central Government and its agents in the River. The people knew this and 
resented it; and it was only "through fear [that] they profess friendship to 
t ,,4 the Governmen •••• 
fear and resentment; 
But no effective administration could be built upon 
and it was inevitable that the revolt against the 
administration would come. 
1. c.o. 87/143, 1893, vol.l. 16th June, annual Report, C.F.Sitwell. 
c.O. 87/159, 1899, vol.2. loth Sept., C.F.Sltwell to the Colonial atfice _ 
on the application of the Ordinance on slavery. 
0.0. 87/155, 1898, vol.l. 4th February, Llewelyn to Chamberlain. 
C.O. 87/14), 1893, vol.l. 16th June, annual Report - C.F.Sitwell. 
. .
The Sankand! incident had repercussions throughout the protectorate; 
even in the most peaceful areas in the North Bank the spirit of revolt was 
kindled, and MUslim clerics tried to assume the power they had enjoyed under 
Maba and his successors. OZaDne described the situation in these wordsa-
"The Cormnissioner may travel safely through the country, as long as he does 
nothing, but in certain parts it is not safe to hold Native Courts and make 
arrests. ,,1 Sitwell and his escort had been shot becau.se they had entered a 
native town and attempted to arrest its chief and certain rebels b,y force. 
The perpetrators of the murders had then fled across the frontier and joined 
Pode,y Cabba, while the whole River awaited British reprisals. 2 
The town of Sankandi was promptly destroyed, but, beyond that, nothing 
could be done without troops or gun boats. And it took the British 
Government a year to plan and execute the destruction of Podey Cabba, who was 
supposed to have been the instigator of the rebels of Sankandi. lfeanwhile, 
the Acting Governor admitted that it was a "very slender hold that we have 
over the people of the protectorate." ) 
The death of Podey Cabba in March 1901 was the end of an epoch; effective 
British control could now be established over both banks of the River, and 
over l-fusa Nolloh' s state. Halloh had agreed to bring Pehrdou into the 
protectorate s,ystem in return for an annual salar,y of £500.4 Thus the 
1. C.O. 87/161, 1900, vol.2. 28th Dec., Ozanne to Griffith. 
2. C.O. 87/160, 1900, vol.l. 25th June, H.M.B.Griffith to Chamberlain. 
). C.O. 87/160, 1900, vol.l. 28th June, Griffith to Chamberlain. 
4. C.O. 87/16), 1901, vol.2. 7th June, Sir George Denton to Chamberlain. 
" 
! 
entire area which fell to Britain by the Paris Agreement of 1889, had now 
come under British administration. Governor Llewelyn had attempted to 
establish peaceful government in the River during his years in the GambiaJ 
and had earned the admiration ot the French tor his introduction ot Travelling 
Commissioners into the protectorate system. But there was no good reason why 
Nuslim chiefs and supporters, who had fought for halt a century to concentrate 
power in their own hands, should in the end have acquiesced under European 
domination. Perhaps Llewelyn had been too hasty in declaring a protectorate 
over the South Bank, and less inclined to negotiate with the'rebels' of that 
region tlian wi th ~fusa Holloh. Nevertheless, it was a tribute to his 
achievements in the River that Governor George Denton, his successor, was able 
to continue to promote the weltare of the people ot the Gambia, with their 
cooperation. 
. .
,. 
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
It will be the purpose of this chapter to outline the stage of 
development reached by those communities in the colo~ area which had been 
under direct British control since 1816, and to consider to what extent they 
had fulfilled some of their own ,aspirations. By the 'eighties, Bathurst, the 
capital of the Gambia, contained maqy of the institutions of a British colo~ 
on the West Coast of Africa - a Governor with an Executive Council, and a 
~ .semi-representativi' Legislative Council, a fair~ well-organised Civil 
Service, a commercial centre with harbour facilities, churches and schools. 
And its six thousand inhabitants lived in 110 stone houses, 137 wooden houses, 
1 
and about 1400 wattle huts. The census of 1901 was to show an increase in 
population of nearly 3000, with an expanding African and European population, 
and a decreasing }mlatto community. A reduction of wattle huts and an increase 
in stone houses, and particularly in wooden houses indicated some improvement 
in economic circumstances among the inhabitants of the town. Within this 
society of less' than ten thousand, however, nearly one thousand vere entered 
2 
as unemployed Qy the Census enumerators of 1901. 
In eighty-five years of British rule, the Governor's role as ultimate 
authority in a British colo~ had not undergone significant changes, but 
1. c.o. 81/141, 1892, vol.l. 13th April, R.B.Llewelyn to Lord Knutsford. 
2. C.O. 87/163, 1901, vo1.2. 18th June, S.J.Forster, Jnr., to the Governor. 
bnn 
Government policy had often .. modified by articulate public opinion. 
Sometimes opinion had only represented the interests of a particular 
community or commercial group, but it could never be ignored on that score 
alone. While controlling the reins of government, colonial Governors had 
grown accustomed to receiving advice from official bodies like the legislature 
or Sanitary Boards, as from particularistic organisations lilte the Gambia Native 
Association. Over many decades, out of the interdependence of communities 
which composed the town of Bathurst, a society had emerged with recognizable 
goals for its citizens, a society within which the dominant group established 
its claims to leadership. In the early decades of the settlement, this 
dominant role was played by a small and dynamic bo~ of British merchants in 
the social and economic field, the Governor or Administrator with, or without, 
a nucleus of officials, being responsible for interpreting Colonial polic,y as 
despatched to him. 
B,y the 'eighties and 'nineties, the Liberated African-Creolel community 
had effectively shaken the foundations of the EUropean mercantile power without, 
however, displacing it; and, by dint of hard work and. personal sacrifico, hod 
improved their state of economic dependence and infiltrated social areas 
hitherto the precincts of Europeans. As importers of kola nuts and British 
manufactures, and as exporters of groundnuts, they began to compete with the 
private British merchant$,whose d~s were numbered, and their position further 
1. Creole - used in the West African sense to mean the descendants of 
Settlers and Liberated Africans. Cf. Arthur Porter, "Creoledom", 
(O.U.P., 1963) p.51. 
threatened by the appearance of companies and combines in the limited Gambia 
market. It was very largely through the opportunities offered in the 
transitional stage from private business to large commercial firms that 
African entrepreneurs availed themselves of property in what was the EUropean 
and commercial centre. Profits accumulated from the kola trade enabled the 
Richards family, for example, to purchase a building in Wellington street, 
which they named "Kola buildings If , while J.D. Richards was planning to erect 
a magnificent edifice in Albion Place with stone from the Canar,y Islands. 
Fo11~wing the same pattern, other entrepreneurs - S.J. Forster, H.R. Carrol, 
Jones Brothers, J.E. l>fahoney, invested hard won profits in SUbstantial houses 
in Wellington street, Russell Square and Buckle Street. The circumstances 
of trade of the late nineteenth cent~, had enabled these families to move 
up the social scale (formerly reserved for EUropeans and ~Mlattoes) from 
t b .. 1 relatively modes eg1nn1ngs. Their ancestors had formed the class of 
artisans and sma.ll traders in Bathurst or Freetown in the mid-nineteenth 
century. 
With economic and social prestige had come political recognition; and in 
1883 J.D. Richards had been nominated the first African representative to the 
Legislative Council. The Governor-in-Chief had recomnended the need for a 
representative from "a numerous class of small traders, natives of the Gambia 
or of Sierra Leone, whose views and interests appear to conflict with those of 
1. Information was collected from the late :Hr. Cecil Richards, from lIr. 
Henry Jones, Hr. Henry Carrol a.nd Sir John Nahoney about the businessos 
of their fathers. 
1 the European merchants." And Gouldsbury, the Administrator, nominated 
Richards Ita respectable trader and shopkeeper", 2 because he was articulate 
in defending the interests of his class, and would be a useful check on the 
mercantile oligarchy. His role as a member of the Legislative Council was a 
significant stage in the political awareness and development of his community. 
Indeed, so articulate was he in the Council Chamber and outside it, that G.T. 
Carter, when acting Administrator in 1887 recommended the termination of his 
commission for being an obstructionist to Government policy. But in press 
and b.Y letter, Richards continued to press forward the views of the so-called 
radic'al element. 
The African community had not, however, lost representation in Council 
with the removal of Richards, for, in 1886, S.J. Forster had been recommended 
for nomination as "very intelligent and thoroughly conversant with native 
affairs ••• (and] already a J.P ••••• ,,3 With this new member also sat J.R. 
}~ell, Queen's Advocate and later Chief }fugistrate, as ex-officio member. 
In the Councils (for he was also a member of the Executive Council), he 
fulfilled the role of an official, albeit with an African bias; but he found 
outlet for his personal opinions on issues of the day - the Negro Question, 
which occupied the minds of many of his contemporaries like Blyden, tho role 
. 't' 4-of Europeans in West Africa - in Ius own wrl lDgS. He appears to have held 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
c.o. 87/119, 1882, vol.2. 27th Nov., A.E.Ilavelock to Secretar,y of state. 
C.o. 87/119, 1882, vol.2. 21st Nov., Gouldsbury to Havelock. 
c.o. 87/126, 1886 vol.2. 5th August, I.J.S.~ to Edward stnnhope. 
J.R.Naxwell, "Advantages and Disadvantages ot European intercourse with 
the West Coast of Africa", (London, 1881); also liThe Negro Question", 
(London, 1892). 
-
himself aloof from society in order to safeguard his honour, for as a. Judge 
in an African settlement where one of the leading members of the 'Bar was his 
own brother-in-law, he was determined not to be involved in cliques that might 
influence his judgment. l The unfortunate result was that in the social 
field, at least, he was a loss to his own community. 
As a result of petitions for greater representation in the legislature, 
Governor Llewelyn instituted a system of indirect election in 1895, where~ 
a confidential circular was issued to all jurors, magistrates, and professional 
gentlemen in the colony in order that they should nominate three candidates 
for appointment as unofficial members of Council. But so determined was the 
Government to exclude radical elements from the legislature, that even though 
Richards gained 49 votes against 34 votes given to S.J. Forster, he was 
deliberately passed over, and Forster retained his seat. ).gain in 1900, he 
ga.ined one vote more than Forster, but acting Governor Griffith could not 
recommend his nomination because he was "undoubtedly faddy and. would be 
inclined to oppose all me~ures b,y the Government ••• [and] would only prove a 
stumbling block in the way of the Council •••• " Richards was further described 
as representing the Sierra Leone comcuni ty in Bathurst, while Forster WIl.S 
regarded as representing the Gambians, who had much confidence in him, as had 
the Europeans too. "He cannot be regarded as an active member ot Council," 
continued Griffith, "but I can safely say that he is a much more usetul member 
than Hr. Richards would be ,,2 .... 
1. c.o. 87/131, 1887 vol.2. 11th August, Petition of J.D.Richards & others for the continuance of ~faxwell in the Gambia Service. 
c.o. 87/161, 1900 vol.l. 6th Dec., H.H.B.Grittith to Chamberlain. 
A situation had risen then in the colo~ where the interests of 
Liberated Africans of Bathurst were being distinguished from those of Sierra 
Leone immigrants. The fact that all senior and middle grades in the Civil 
Service open to Africans continued to be filled b,y Sierra Leone natives did 
not please the Gambians, and created tensions in the society, which obstructed 
African development. 
Nevertheless, in the field of local government, Richards attempted to 
introduce the elective principle, and to secure funds which would be 
controlled by the Board of Health of which he was a member. It was as late 
as 1887 that the first Public Health Ordinance was passed for the colony and 
a Board of ten men appointed as a. "result of the efforts of some of the 
intelligent native population of this colony for the establishment of a. Town 
01 ttl COunC1 •••• But after a. brief existence, the Ordinance seemed to have 
remained a dead letter, partly because members would not a.ttend moetinas 
beca.use they were too busy with trade," or else someone refuses to serve 
because he is not on friendly terms with some other nominated member •••• " 
This waS Llewelyn's view; and he suspected Richards of being ambitious to be 
2 
chairman of the Board. Certainly there were grievances against the 
constitution of a Board that had no authority to act by its own resolutions, 
to hire a building for storing its property, or even to employ labourers for 
cleaning the town, without the Governor's sanction.) But Llewelyn was not 
1. C.o. 87/141, 1892 vol.l. 17th J.iarch, Petition of Richards, FAlmund. Thomas, 
P.G. nJie and others to R.B.L1ewelyn. 
C.O. 87/141, 1892 vo1.1. 13th April, R.B.Llewelyn to I~utsford. 
C.O. 87/141, 1892, vol.l. 17th ~mrch, Petition 
prepared, either to introduce elections into local government, or to increase 
the Board's control over the expenditure of funds provided from rates, a 
privilege that would have provided valuable training for Africans. 
Unfortunately, "the state of education here is not sufficiently advanced for 
aqy sort of representative Government, and the various nationalities ••• would 
render such a step most impol! tic •••• ,,1 This was the Governor's decision. 
The appalling state of education was in the final analysis the problem 
of the colony area. It was no unfamiliar problem, but over the decades no 
solution had been found, and far from improving, the Wesleyan schools, which 
were the oldest in the settlement, .had deteriorated. This meant .that tho 
efforts of isolated characters like Richards, with their demands for more 
effective participation in the Government, were botmd. to fail while the masses 
in their midst were poor and ignorant. Economic well-being and enlightenment 
were limited to a very small percentage of the population; for much depended 
on the energy put into scaling the barriers from small trader to entrepreneur, 
or .from refugee to trader. The unhealt~ credit system of the groundnut trade 
had. destroyed many a small trader, so that by the 'eighties and 'nineties, 
they had either been reduced to abject poverty, by debts, or confined in go.ol 
for the same reason. It was therefore the Sierraleone trader, who, arriving 
in the colony with a little capital and industrious womenfolk, was able to 
1. C.o. 87/140, 1891, vol.2. Llewelyn to Secretary of state. 
-
survive the vicissitudes of the Gambia trade ot the late nineteenth cent~. 
For that reason, the colony was not re~ for the first Education 
Ordinance of 1882, by which Government grants to the schools were to be 
determined b.Y school attendance and attainment. Far from stimulating progress, 
and producing the required results, the schools in the first few years after 
the Ordinance came into effect earned very little financial aid through pupils, 
who could not reach the required standard, and. who had always been most irregular 
at school. Apart trom the Roman Catholic schools, which soon began to score 
points b.Y their concentration on industrial training for girls - needlework, 
cookery, laundr.y - the annual education reports from 188) to 1901 presented a 
most depressing picture. The Inspectors of Schools - African and. EUropean _ 
deplored an "abnormally low standard" of education. 
W.C. Cates, a native of Sierra Leone who was appointed as Inspector in 
188), suggested three main reasoJUI for tho "lethargic state of Education in the 
settlement •••• " The main ca~e he ascribed to the absence of trained 
teachers of the right kind; with the pathetically low suary scale, youngman 
were not attracted to the profession, preferring to seek emplo~nont in 
Government or mercantile houses. Cates also tound public opinion genorally 
apathetic about education, except as an economic proposition that might get 
the child a job upon leaving school. For that reason, not only wore children 
kept away trom school in the Trade Season when they accompanied their paronts 
to trading stations in the River, but many children were r~ovod from school 
altogether as soon as they could earn a living. Yot a third reason, was "that 
the major portion of the population are either l~ommedans or Heathens who 
do not care to send their children to Christian schools."l 
This last reason was what Wesleyan Hissionaries constantly held to in 
justification of their own failures. In 1881 the Rev. Robert Dixon wrotea 
"Hohammedanism being such a proponderating element in the population in these 
parts, makes this a specially difficult field to work and accounts for the 
Mission not having made more progress, tho' so long established. ,,2 But Islam 
apart, the content of education in the schools was evidently ot a poor quality. 
It was of one of Dixon's infants schools that the Inspector for 1884 reported 
that instruction was limited to "a. loose indolent teaching of the Wesleyan 
Conference Catechism which the children repeat qy rote with a few sacred hymns 
etc." The report continueda- "Lessons on common things it taught at all are 
evidently not taught to much advantase.,,:3 
This was the tragedy, not that Hwslims and other communities yoro not yet 
ready for secular education of a western kind, but that those who were attending 
school, were receiving such poor education, added to which schooling was 
practically limited to six months ot the year, as to be of vor,y littlo benotit 
either to the pupils themselves or to the society in Vbich they lived. One 
Inspector ruthlessly remarked that taking the entire popUlation of Bathurst 
"at the lowest ~eckoning, there is less than 1 in 400 educated, o.nd. thero aro 
4 
scarcely 50 who can even boast of a. sound elomento.r,r education. tI And this was 
1. C.O. 87/122, 1884, vol.l. 24th Dec. 1883, Education Report ~ W.C.Cates 
to the Govern~r. 
2. liethodist l-1issionary L1bra.r,y, Gambia Correspondonco, 1881, tho Rov. Robort 
Dixon to the Rev. Kilner. 
3. C.O. 87/122, 1884, vol.l. 24th Dec., 1883 Report, W.C.Catos to tho Govornor. 
4. Ibid. 
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in 1884: 
The Government had to tclte partial responsibility for this state of 
affairs, for it was very soon obvious that an Education Ordinance and the 
provision of an Inspector for three to four weeks of every year were not likely 
by themselves to produce results. Education required to be less haphazardly 
organized and more generously supported from public funds. The steady growth 
of schools and qualified teachers in Sierra Leone had been the result of 
fostering care by missions, government and the people themselves. In the 
Gambia, while the greater proportion of persons in tho coloQY area was 
composed of aliens and other displaced persons, there was all the more reason 
for a paternalistic attitude towards educational needs. For equipped with 
little more than their labour to sell, such persons were preoccupied with 
rehabilitation and economic pressures and not with educationa.1 programmes. 
And while the masses were not yet re~ to respond it was not possible to 
impose education upon their children in the w~ the Government planned to do it. 
Indeed, the Roman Catholics pointed to the magnitude of the problem 
connected with the education of alien children apprenticed to Guardians in 
Bathurst:- "In a. community such as ours, where so many different tribes and 
tongues go to make up the population ••• rewards to educational effort as 
measured by results must necessarily be a very unfair and indeed ••• a 
mischievous system •••• that the Serer, the Jolof, the Jo1ah and the l-iandingo, 
who never speak a word of English in their homes should be put in competition 
with the English speaking child [the Liberated African - Creole] •••• seems 
quite inexplicable. ,,1 Another grievance of the Roman Catholic church was 
that the Education Ordinance had involved them in heavy expenditure with its 
stipulation that English was to be the medium of instruction. This had 
necessitated a change in their co~~ity of Nuns, and the provision of five 
,+oz. 
new Sisters from Dri tain lito teach English instead of French and Jolof", all 
at the expense of the mission. 2 While the missionar,y bodies themselves were 
so dissatisfied with the terms and working of the Ordinance, so long was 
development in the educational field hindered. 
Though there was no lack of ideas for tackling the problems of education, 
it seemed impossible to provide funds for experiment, and to secure agreement 
-for such experiment from the communities in ~thurst. There were those who 
wanted a Government Hodel School after the Sierra Leone pattern, which would 
serve the needs of Huslim and Pagan children as no mission school could; 3 
others there wer~ (among them R.B.}~ke, Inspector of schools) who proposed the 
founding of a boarding school in NacCart~ island, "into which promising youths 
may be drafted from the out stations, similar to the process adopted by the 
Basel Hission on the Gold Coast." But the adoption of such a scheme, he 
warned, "would require a serious ••• organization. ,,4 
1. C.O. 87/133, 1888 vo1.2. 23rd June, J.F.Gleeson to the Governor. 
2. c.o. 87/133, 1888 vol.2. 23rd June, Gleeson to Governor. 
3. c.o. 87/125, 1885 vol.2. 7th August, Gambia Native Association to 
Administrator. 
4. C.O. 87/158, 1899 vol.l. 11th July, R.B.~~ke to Governor; c.o. 87/152, 
1896 vol.2. 26th June, C.F.Sitvell to Governor:- Recommended the establish-
ment of an institution in the Protectorate modelled on the Scotch 
Industrial ~1ission in Uganda. 
--
-
In fairness to the Government, it must be stated that successive 
Governors showed genuine interest in providing special schools for ~fuslim 
children, and had. the }fuslim community in Bathurst responded to these 
overtures, progress would certainly have been made in that direction. In 
1890, Carter reported that he had. held several interviews with the leaders of 
the :t-tuslim commmti ty about the education of their children, but internal 
divisions among them prevented them from working together even for a common 
object like education. l The following year, Llewelyn got no satisfaction 
from his September meeting with the principal Nuslims of British Combo on 
the same subject; indeed "they were still considering what I told them in 
Hay and begged for more time •••• It But the Governor concluded that they hnd. 
in fact made up their minds against his proposals for education.2 Nor did 
Llewelyn find better response in Bathurst where the HusUm community was most 
reluctant to submit any scheme for the consideration of Government with a view 
to receiving financial support from it. In self defence, the Almall\Y and his 
followers submitted that they owned no buildings that might be convertod for 
school purposes, nor was the lo:luslim community sufficiently well-to-do to 
contribute towards a school for their children.) When Governor Denton 
arrived in the colony in 1901 from Lagos, one of his first concerns was 
educa.tion; and he was able to reach an agreement with the .AlmM\Y whereby his 
1. C.O. 87/137, 1890, vol.l. ··lst J.fa.rch, G.T.Carter to Secretary of Sta.te. 
2. C.O. 87/140, 1891, vol.2. )rd Sept. R.B.Llewelyn to Secretnr,y of Sta.ie. 
3. C.O. 87/141, 1892, vol.l. 18th June, Llewelyn to Secretar,y of State. 
people would provide a school building with equipcent, while the Government 
1 
would pay the teachers. In 1903, the first Hohammedan school in the Gambia 
was opened with 126 pupils. 
Educa.tion in a wider and less forma.! sense had been the concern of the 
sprinkling of educated Africans in the colony. They had. reached a stage of 
development where they demanded a superior education for their own children 
than that available in the Gambia. The result was a. continuous outflow ot 
potential from the secondary school population of Ba.thurst, which inevitably 
sttmted the growth of the Wesleyan Boys' High School founded in 1879 to meet 
their needs. until the Second World War, it was the accepted pattern of 
education for children of Sierra Leone descent, and from middle class families 
of the Gambia, to complete their formal education in one ot the secondar,y 
schools in Freetown. A few, like the Rev. George Nicol - Colonial Cha.plDin -
who had benefitted from institutions of higher education in England, sent tlloir 
children there, at great financial cost. Not only was this for the prostige 
value attached to an English education, but they believed that in tha.t diroction 
lay their hopes "for the progress of abstract civilization in West Africa., ,,2 
and the spe~ emancipation of its colonies. 
1. C.O. 87/163, 1901 vol.2. 15th }~, George Denton to the Bathurst Board 
of Filucation. 
2. l1a.xwell, "The Advantages and Disadvantages of European Intercourse". 
, 
i 
Within the west African situation, they sought through the Press, through 
public lectures, indeed, through the church, to educate public opinion in 
urban areas. Certainly, this role was true of Nicol who was a promoter of 
the Bathurst Observer, the first local newspaper founded in 188) with the 
Vest Indian barrister, Chase Walcott, as proprietor and Eaitor. Its purpose 
was stated clearly in its own columns:- "1'0 create a love of reading generally 
in the community and to assist in its social, moral and intellectua.l advancement 
is the raison dtetre of this paper •••• Our Settlement is the oldest on the 
coast. The time has come, we believe, to give utterance of its own life and 
aspirations and to assert its claim to a distinctive individuality."l Short-
lived though it was, the paper was a most effective platform for commercial 
and economic debates in the 'eighties; and it certain~ got support from a 
cross-section of the mercantile community, even if the wider public romnined 
indifferent. 
Nicol was convinced that this indicated the need for a Reading Room and 
Lending Library, and appealed for popular support, while he promised to provide 
books and periodicals from his friends in England. In his view, such on 
educative organ was "absolutely necessary ••• in the present state of our 
political and social progress.,,2 For the same reason, he undertoolt to 
organize a series of popular lectures on scientific and general subjects, 
ranging from astronomy and agriculture, to the Importance of Sanitation, nnd 
1. Bathurst Observer, 27th January 1885. 
2. Bathurst Observer, 29th April 1884. 
----. 
Readings from English authors "to help natives with articulation of English 
1 
words." But attendance at the first two meetings was so disappointina as to 
provoke an article in the Observer entitled tiThe Native Youths of Bathurst". 
The writer was concerned that such neglect of opportunities offered for 
educational development indicated a lack of ambition to emula.te grea.t lfest 
Africans as Crowther, Blyden, Samuel Lewis, "who stand out as sMning examples 
of what Africans can become •••• ,,2 In their own way, and on their own 
initiative, Nicol and his friends attempted to raise the cultural and 
intellectual level of their community, but their plans were premature, and so 
they failed. 
This nucleus neither carried public opinion with it nor secured officia.1 
support for its programmes for cultural development. Indeed, Carter despised 
Nicol for attempting to educate his children in England. on e. salary of £450 
per annum, which caused him serious financial embarrassment. .And the 
Administrator's recommendation for his retirement in 1886 was firmly supported 
by the Bishop of Sierra Leone, who described him as a "man, full of good 
intentions, but terribly, terribly wealt and very vain.,,3 However una.pprocia.-
tive of eighteen years' service in the Gambia. this was, Nicol had mndo his ovn 
unique contribution to the building of the Anglican church and school in 
Bathurst, and, beyond this, he had attempted to educate public opinion on 
major issues of his d~. He could not do more. 
1. 
2. 
Bathurst Observer, 17th February 1885. 
Bathurst Observer, 10th Narch 1885. 
C.O. 87/129, 1886 vol.3. 18th Dec., Bishop of Sierra. Loone to John 
Bramston of Colonial Office. 
It has been the intention of this Chapter to focus on the Liberated 
African - Creole community in the colony, notwithstand.ing its numerical 
insignificance, because wi thin this community in the Gambia, as in Sierra 
Leone, were to be fotmd the leaders who were to change the political face of 
British West .A:frica. By the end of the ninetoenth century, the Hulatto 
cornr.nmity had dwindled to 116, according to the census of 1901. This decline 
in numbers was partly because European merchants and officials had almost 
abandoned the practice of living with or marrying local women, and J.hlattoes 
at the peripher,y of their own community had become absorbed in the more 
dominant communities of the society. With economic success and Westorn 
education, a Nulatto merchant like H.C. Goddard soon merged in with the 
European commtmi ty, eventually retiring to England where he settled with on 
English wife in Brighton. Similarly, lulattoes at the bottom of the economic 
and social scale were as easily absorbed into the Goree-Wolot community. 
Generally speaking, only a handful of this social group engaged in business 
as entrepreneurs at the end of the century, for the gradual withdrawal of 
patronage b.Y the white community brought with it economic decline and loss 
of social status. 
As the foregoing indicates, significant changes were tnking plnee in 
attitudes towards literate Africans, which inevitably a.ftected community 
relationships in the Settlement. Among other factors, tho emergence of a 
Liberated African - Creole nucleus of business and professional men, sonior 
.~ ..... _-
civil servants and churchmen, the displo.cement of the private British merchant 
by trading companies, and, by far the most important, the fundamental change 
that had taken place in British colonial policy since Partition, produced 
tensions between Europeans and Africans. Two incidents in the 'eightios 
illustrate this change in attitudes - that J.R. ~~ell, Who was doing private 
practice in the Gold Coast in 1883, should have been offered the post of 
Queen's Advocate in the Gambia, when an Englishman had applied for it, on the 
principle that "when there is a really good native available ••• he should, if 
1 possible, be employed." In contrast to this view, stands the Bishop of 
Sierra Leone's judgment on the retirement of the Rev. George Nicol, Colonial 
Chaplain of Bathurst, and the Rev. Thomas ~1a.xwel1, Colonial Chaplain of Cnpe 
Coast:- "I am of opinion that ••• £250 at the most is all you need PS3" n 
native Chaplain at Bathurst and Gold Coast ••• it would be ••• far better if 
Europeans filled these posts alwavrs, at ~ rate so long as you have European 
officials 
Between 1816 and 1901, articulate public opinion had not alwnys supported 
Government policy, but an element of trust and confidence in the goodwill ot 
the British Government was contained in most petitions. Once race rolntions 
vere seriously disturbed in the Gambia Settlement, as elsewhere on the Wost 
Coast of Africa, public opinion was to be organized as a weapon ogainst 
Government. 
1. C.O. 87/120, 1883 vol.l. Jrd }lay, C.O. Hinute, B.L.A.. to Heade. 
2. c.o. 81/129, 1886 vo1.3. Bishop ot Sierra Leone to J.Bramston. 
-
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, 45-1935. 
~'O 
I.PRIMARY SOURCES: Unpublished. 
i.COLONIAL OFFICE SERIES: in the PUBLIC RECORD OFFICEf London. 
C.0.267/29 to C.0.267/83 J Documents for Sierra Leone, Senegal & Goree, 
and the Gambia, between 1809 and 1827. 
, 
c.0.261/93, The Rowan Commission of Enquiry into the west African 
Settlements. 
C.0.267/173,The Kadden COMMISSION, 1841. 
C.0.261/286,The Ord Commission, 1865. 
After 1821, the Gambia documents are kept separately in the series 
C.0.81/ 
C.0.81/1 to C.0.87/163, inclusive, are the volumes on which this 
investigation is based. (1828-1901). 
C.0.90/ series: Blue Book of Statistics (Population figures, Civil 
Establishments, Lists of Government Officers, Imports & Exports eto). 
C.0.90/24, C.0.90/44, C.0.90/64 are the volumes studied. 
C.0.15891: Kemorandum of Association of the RIVER GAMBIA TRADING CO,LTD 
Registered and Incorporated, 17th Sept. 1881. 
The C.0.267/ series on Senegal and Goree form a useful and 
necessary background study for the history of the Gambia in the 
nineteenth century. The volumes provide equally valuable material 
for the early years of the settlement on st Karl's Island. 
The C.0.87/ documents are invaluable for any comprehensive or 
detailed study of the colony, and this thesis 1s largell the result 
of mthorough investigation into this source. For apart trom ample ) 
material providing a cross-section of official opinion, there 1s a 
wealth of unofficial material contained within official despatches -
petitions and private letters from representative groups in the Gambi~ 
as well as from mercantile and philanthropic bodies in England, with 
interests in that Colony. 
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PRIMARY SOURCES, Unpublished. 
ii. Archives of the Gavernment of the Gambial 
There is no organised archives department in the Gambia, and the 
research student is obliged to rummage for material in a basement store-
room, officially kcalled the Secretariat Archives. Hours or days of 
disoomfort might be rewarded by the sudden disoovery of an interesting 
file; for the documents are unbound, anduncatalogued. This makes it 
very difficult to fecord the material collected from this source in 
any kind of sequence. I have therefore used the title - Secretariat 
Archives - to distinguish them from other documents referred to in the 
text. 
~While very little is now available of early nineteenth century 
records ( most of them having been disposed of as litter), there is 
a substantial amount of late nineteeDth,.e •• ~.y and early twentieth, 
century material. 
Some of the more relevaDt historical doouments of the period 
(among them Governors' despatches, letters in arabic and in translation 
from Fodey Cabbals supporters, registers of apprentices, the official 
diary of the Manager of British Combo, covering a number of years,) 
are preserved in Government House, and in the Eands Office. 
I. PRIMARY SOURCESs Unpublished. 
iii. Archives of the Government of Senegals in Dakar. 
This is an important collection of documents)in the care of an 
archivist, tor it contains material on Anglo-French relations in 
Senegal and the Gambia in the nineteenth century, with detailed 
documentation of the latter part of the period. Two spools of 
microfilm in the series IF were provided for my use, one of which 
I have studied. 
This French source has been particularly valuable as a counter-
poise to the British material, thereby showing Anglo-French boundary 
disputes in clearer perspective. Further, observations on economic 
and Bocial problems of frontier tribes, consequent upon the delimitation 
of the boundary, are penetrating. And comparisons drawn between 
French and British administration in the protectorates of the ~ •. - • 
~ , . 
respective territories are not only interesting, but are of some 
significance. 
iv. Archives of the Wesleyan Missionary Society. in library of 
METHODIST MISSIONARY SOCIETY, London. 
This is not a fruitful source for the work of early Wesleyan 
missionaries in the Gambia, material being almost limited to condensed 
annual reports. A selected number ot these, for the years between 
1878 and 1902, was studied. But documents relating to the question 
of 'Cession' were not consulted since they had already been used by 
J.D.Hargreave8 for his study on the Gambia. 
iv. Archives of the Wesleyan Missionary Society. in Bathurst,Gambia. 
. ; This co11eotion was found to be the more valuable and interest-
ing of the two. Documents are preserved in the Methodist Mission 
House; and are clearly classified. Among those I studied were the 
following. 
District Meeting Books for st Mary's,and MacCarthy Island, 
1841-1904. 
Wesleyan Registers of Baptism"Marriages, Deaths, 1831-1899. 
Circuit Books, 1835-1858. (These contained the Accounts of the 
Mission). 
The Registers were useful for providing a realistic picture ot 
evangelisation in the early years of the settlement; while the 
Circuit Books indicated the efonomic status of the congregations. 
The most valuable source,however, was the District Meeting Book 
(the 'Meeting' was an embryonic 'Synod') with its fairly detailed 
minutes on the yearly review of the Mission's work. Beyond this, 
it indicated attitudes of the missionaries towards their African 
assistants, and growing tensions within the ohuroh in the period. 
With these documents were considered the published works of 
early missionaries, in particular, Fox-If! Brief History," Moister-
"Missionary labours," and Morgan- "Reminiscenoes." 
There were no records available in the Anglican ohurch, except 
for Registers of Births, Marriages and Deaths for the late nineteentb 
centu%7. 
I.PRIMARY SOURCES: Unpublished. 
v. Newspapers: The British Museum Newspaper Library, Colindale. 
The African Times (London), volumes from 1860- 1901 consulted. 
Until the death of the Editor, Fitzgerald, in 1884, particular 
emphasis was given to the affairs of the Gambia in this paper. 
The Bathurst Observer and West Africa Gazette (Bathurst). 
The paper was short-lived - 1883-1888. All the volumes studied. 
Available in the Royal Commonwealth Society Library. 
These newspapers are complementary to the official documents 
in the C.O.series, together they were an effective organ for articulate 
opinion in the Gambia. 
The Liverpool Mercury. 
Issues ~ of the paper in the 'seventies contained numerous letters 
from persons living in the 6ambia on the unsatisfactory state of 
affairs in the colony. But only cuttings enclosed in official documents 
were studied. 
vi. Archives of the United Africa Company. in U.A.C.HouBe,Blackfriarsc I 
Volumes relevant to the history of the GAmbia, and consulted by mel 
The Letter Book of Lloyd's Agent in the Gambia, 1853-1896. 
Only a selection of these letters is available. 
Lloyd's Vessels to and from the Gambia. 
Miscellaneous Papers 1863 -1893 - a selection available. 
These documents throw light on commercial transactions in the G mbia, 
A. 
especially as conducted by Lloyd's Agents - William Goddard, H.C.Godda~ 
The latter was also Manager of the __ River Gambia Trading Company. 
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PRIMARY SOURCES: Published and Unpublish~d. 
vil. General. 
For the study of traditional societies in the River Gtmbia, 
the accounts of contemporaries - traders, scientific explorers, 
casual travellers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have 
been drawn upon. Francis Moore's Journal, for example, is valuable 
because he writes as a trader among traders, albeit African traders, 
so that the result is an informative account of the society in which 
~t'a 
he lived in the River. Less useful~the superficial, and sometimes 
exaggerated, reports of European travellers of the nineteenth century. 
With discfimination, it is possible to reconstruct a realistic picture 
of Bathurst and the riverain states, from these sources, in a way *ne 
~&ft could not from official documents. 
ORAL MATERIAL: 
While there are no private papers preserved in family cupboards 
l 
as in Nigeria, there is a nucleus of Gambian merchants,whose bUBlneB.~ 
collapsed in the slump of the 'twenties, and who can still give useful 
information on commercial activity in the colony at the turn of the 
century •. Among them, Mr Henry Jones was the most instructive. 
II. SECONDARY SOURCES, Cited. 
The paucity of material in this class indicates forcibly the 
small extent to which the Gambia has concerned historians. The 
following works cited in the text were found helpful towards an 
understanding of some of the problems of the colony in our period. 
DIICE,IC.O. , "Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885." 
(O.U .P., 1956). 
FITZGERALD, C.W." "Gambia and its proposed Cession to France." 
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GRAY ,J .M., "The History of the Gambia." (Cambridge University Press 
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Bulletin of Religion,vol 4, no 1, 1962. 
The Sierra Leone 
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